

**13 1685**







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THE  
HISTORY  
OF THE  
PELOPONNESIAN WAR,  
TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK OF  
THUCYDIDES.

TO WHICH ARE ANNEXED  
THREE PRELIMINARY DISCOURSES.

- I. On the Life of Thucydides.
- II. On his Qualifications as an Historian.
- III. A Survey of the History.

BY WILLIAM SMITH, A.M.

RECTOR OF THE PARISH OF THE HOLY TRINITY IN CHESTER,  
AND CHAPLAIN TO THE RT. HON. THE EARL OF DERBY.

A NEW EDITION.  
VOLUME THE SECOND.

L O N D O N :

Printed for T. EVANS, near York Buildings, Strand.

MDCCCLXXXI.





# PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

## B O O K V.

Y E A R X.†

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**I**N the following summer, the truce, made for a year, expired, of course, at the time of the Pythian Games. And, during this relaxation from war, the Athenians caused the Delians to evacuate the isle of Delos; imagining that, upon the taint of some crimes long since committed, they were not sufficiently pure to perform due service to the God, and that *this* yet was wanting to render that work of purgation complete, in which, as I have already related, they thought themselves justified in demolishing the sepulchres of the dead. The Delians settled again, so fast as they could remove themselves thither, at Atramyttium, bestowed upon them for this purpose by Pharnaces.

Cleon,\* having obtained the commission from the Athenians, went by sea into the Thracian dominions, so  
VOL. II. B soon

† Before Christ 422.

\* Cleon is now grown perfectly convinced that he is a very hero, and hath prevailed upon a majority of the people of Athens to be of the same mind, since, seriously and deliberately, they intrust him with a most important and delicate commission. He now imagines he can carry all before him, and pluck all the laurels of Brasidas from the head of that accomplished Spartan, even without having Demosthenes for his second. We may guess to what an height of insolence he was now grown from  
the

soon as the suspension of arms expired, having under his command twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three hundred horsemen, and larger numbers of their allied forces. His whole armament consisted of thirty sail. Touching first at Scione, yet blocked up, he drew from thence the heavy-armed, stationed there as guards; and, standing away, entered the haven of the Colophonians, lying at no great distance from Torone. Being here informed, by the deserters, that Brasidas was not in Torone, nor the inhabitants able to make head against him, he marched his forces by land towards that city, and sent ten of his ships about, to stand into the harbour. His first approach was to the new rampart, which Brasidas had thrown up quite round the city, in order to inclose the suburbs within its cincture, and thus, by the demolition of the old wall, had rendered it one intire city. When the Athenians came to the assault, Pasiteli-

the *Knights of Aristophanes*. And, to set it in the most ludicrous view, the poet opens his play with Nicias and Demosthenes, whom he paints in a very injurious manner; and, no doubt, it must have been very grating to them, to see themselves represented in so low buffoonery upon the stage at Athens. "Demosthenes begins with a shower of curses on that execrable Paphlagonian, Cleon; Nicias seconds him; and, then, both of them howl together in a most lamentable duetto. They next lay their heads together about some means of redress. Demosthenes proposeth getting out of their master Cleon's reach. *Let us go then*, says Nicias. *Ay; let us go*, cries Demosthenes. *Say more*, says Nicias, *let us go over to the enemy*. *Ay, over to the enemy*, adds the other. *But first*, says Nicias, *let us go and prostrate ourselves before the images of the Gods*. *What images?* says Demosthenes; *dost thou think then there are any Gods?* *I do*. *Upon what grounds?* *Because I am undeservedly the object of their hatred*.—Such are the daring misrepresentations Aristophanes makes of characters that by no means deserved it! Demosthenes afterwards describes the arrogance of Cleon thus; *He hath one foot fixed in Pylus, and the other in the assembly of the people*. *When he moves, he struts and stretches at such a rate, that his bum is in Thrace, his hands in Ætolia, and his attention amongst the tribes at home*.—Nicias then proposeth poisoning themselves by drinking bull's blood, like Themistocles;—*Or rather*, says Demosthenes, *a dose of good wine*. This is agreed upon, in order to cheer up their spirits, and enable them to confront Cleon, and play off against him the seller of black-puddings. Nicias accordingly goes and steals the wine.—Yet, in spite of the most outrageous ridicule, and the opposition of all wise and honest men at Athens, we see Cleon now at the head of an army, to stop the rapid conquests of Brasidas.

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das, the Lacedæmonian, (who was commandant,) and the garrison under his command, exerted themselves in its defence. But, when they could no longer maintain it, and at the same time the ships, sent round on purpose, had entered the harbour, Pasitelandas, fearing lest the ships might take the town now left defenceless, and, when the rampart was carried by the enemy, he himself might be intercepted, abandons it immediately, and retired with all speed into the town: But the Athenians were already disembarked and masters of the place. The land-force also broke in instantly at his heels, by rushing along through the aperture in the old wall; and some, as well Peloponnesians as Toronæans, they slew in the moment of irruption. Some also they took alive, amongst whom was Pasitelandas, the commandant. Brasidas was indeed coming up to its relief, but, receiving intelligence on his march that it was taken, he retired; since he was \*forty stadia off, too great a distance to prevent the enemy.

But Cleon and the Athenians now erected two trophies; one upon the harbour, the other at the rampart. They farther doomed to slavery the wives and children of the Toronæans. The male-inhabitants, together with the Peloponnesians and every Chalcidæan that was found amongst them, amounting in all to seven hundred, they sent away captives to Athens. The Peloponnesians indeed were afterwards released, by virtue of the subsequent treaty; the rest were fetched away by the Olynthians, who made exchanges for them, body for body.

About the same time, the Bœotians, by treachery, got possession of Panæstum, a fort upon the frontier, belonging to the Athenians.

As for Cleon, having established a garrison at Torone, he departed thence, and sailed round Athos, as bound against Amphipolis.

But two vessels about this time, bound for Italy and Sicily, sailed out of the harbour of Athens, having on-

\* About 4 miles.



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board Phæax, the son of Erasistratus, with whom two other persons were joined in commission, to execute an embassy there. For the Leontines, after the departure of the Athenians from Sicily, in consequence of the joint-accommodation, had inrolled many strangers as denizens of their city, and the *populace* had a plan in agitation for a distribution of the lands. The *noble*, alarmed at this, gain the concurrence of the Syracusans and eject the *commons*. They were dispersed, and wandered up and down as so many vagabonds; whilst the *noble*, striking up an agreement with the Syracusans, abandoned and left in desolation their own city, settling at Syracuse as free citizens of that place. And yet, soon after, some of this number, dissatisfied even here, forsook Syracuse again, and seized upon Phocææ, a quarter of the old city of the Leontines, and upon Bricinnæ, which is a fortress in the Leontine. Hither the greater part of the ejected *commons* resorted to them; and, adhering firmly together, from these strong holds they annoyed the country by their hostilities.

When the Athenians had intelligence of this, they send out Phæax, to persuade, by all proper methods, their old allies in that country, and to gain, if possible, the concurrence of the other Sicilians, to take up arms, for the preservation of the people of Leontium, against the incroaching power of the Syracusans. Phæax, upon his arrival, recommendeth the scheme successfully to the Camarinéans and Agrigentines. But his negotiations meeting with some obstacles at Gela, he desisted from addressing himself to the rest, since he was assured he could not possibly succeed. Retiring therefore through the district of the Siculi to Catane, and calling on his road at Bricinnæ, and having encouraged the malcontents there to persevere, he departed. Not but that, in this Sicilian voyage, both passing and repassing, and also upon the coast of Italy, he had urged to several cities "how expedient for them was the Athenian friendship."

He

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He met also in his course with those Locrians, who were going to another settlement, after expulsion from Messene. • They had been driven to this necessity by seditious factions at Messene, one of which had invited them thither since the joint-accommodation among the Sicilians; and now they were forced to shift again, though Messene had for a time been entirely in their power. Phæax therefore, meeting with these in their removal, gave them no annoyance; for the Locrians had been at a conference with him, to concert the measures of an agreement with the Athenians. These, however, were the only party of all the confederates, who, when the Sicilians had amicably ended their disputes, refused to treat with the Athenians, and were brought to such submission since merely by a war, in which they were embroiled against the Itonians and Meléans, who bordered upon them, and were colonies of their own. And, some time after this, Phæax truly returned to Athens.

But Cleon, who from Torone was gone about by sea against Amphipolis, marching away from Eïon, maketh an assault upon Stagirus, a colony of Andrians, but without success; yet Galeplus, a colony of the Thasians, he taketh by storm. He sent farther embassadors to Perdiccas, to summon his attendance in the expedition, according to the tenor of the new alliance. He sent others into Thrace to Polles, king of the Odomantians, that he would hire as large a body of Thracians as could be got, and bring them up under his own orders. And, during this interval, he himself lay quiet at Eïon.

But Brasidas, informed of these proceedings, placed himself in an opposite post at Cerdilium. This place belongeth to the Argilians, and is seated on an eminence on the other side of the river, and at no great distance from Amphipolis. From hence he had a perfect view of all Cleon's motions; so that now it was impossible for the latter to make any approach with his army, from thence to Amphipolis, without being discovered. Brasidas, however, suspected that Cleon would approach,

and, from a contempt of his opponents, would certainly advance thither, without waiting for reinforcements.

He had, at the same time provided himself with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and had assembled all the Edonian targeteers and horsemen. Of the Myrcinians and Chalcidéans he had a thousand targeteers, besides those in Amphipolis. But his whole force of heavy-armed of all sorts amounted to about two thousand; and he had three hundred Grecian horsemen. With a detachment, consisting of fifteen hundred of these, Brasidas had posted himself at Cerdylum; the rest were left in Amphipolis, under the orders of Clearidas.

Cleon remained without stirring for the present, but was soon forced to such a step as Brasidas expected. The soldiers were chagrined at their inactivity, and were disparaging his conduct by invidious parallels, "against how much skill and courage, with how much unskilfulness and cowardice, he was matched;" and that, "with the highest regret they had attended him from Athens on this expedition." Sensible of their discontent, and unwilling to disgust them more, by too long a continuance in the same post, he drew them up and led them on. He acted now, upon the vain conceit with which his success at Pylus had puffed him up, as a man of great importance. It could not enter his heart, that the enemy would presume to march out against and offer him battle. He gave out, that "he was only advancing in order to view the place; he waited indeed the arrival of additional forces, not as if they were needful to his security, should the enemy attack him, but to enable him completely to invest the city, and to take it by storm." Being advanced, he posted his troops upon a strong eminence before Amphipolis, and went in person to view the marshes of the Strymon, and the situation of the city on the side of Thrace, *how* it really was. He judged he could retreat at pleasure, without a battle. Not so much as one person appeared upon

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upon the works, or issued out at the gates; for they were all shut fast. He now concluded himself guilty of a mistake, in coming so near the place without the machines, "as the town must infallibly have been taken, & because abandoned."

Brasidas, however, had no sooner perceived that the Athenians were in motion, than, descending from Cerdylum, he marcheth into Amphipolis. He there warned all manner of sally and all shew of opposition against the Athenians. He was afraid of trusting too much to his own forces, as he judged them inferior to the enemy, not truly in numbers, for so far they were nearly balanced, but in real worth: for the Athenian force, appointed for this service, was composed of the very flower of Athens, and the choicest troops of the Lemnians and Imbrians. For this reason, he prepared to assail them with art; because, in case he gave the enemy a view of his numbers, and of the sorry manner in which they were armed, he judged he should be less likely to gain a victory, than by concealing them till the moment of action, and avoiding that contempt which their real state would have inspired. Picking out, therefore, a party of one hundred and fifty heavy-armed for himself, and appointing Clearidas to command the rest, he designed to fall suddenly upon the Athenians in their retreat; concluding, he should never again find them in this forlorn manner, when the reinforcements they expected were come up. Calling, therefore, all his soldiers around him, as he was desirous of animating them, and letting them into his scheme, he harangued them thus:

"YE men of Peloponnesus, let it suffice that I briefly put you in mind, that we are natives of that country which hath ever by valour preserved itself free, and that *you* of the Doric are now going to attack your opponents of the Ionic descent, whom you are inured to defeat. My words are chiefly designed to

“ inform you in what manner I have planned the method  
“ of attack, lest hazarding the event with so small a party,  
“ ty, and not with our intire force, may seem unequal  
“ to the work, and may too much dispirit you. The  
“ enemy, I conjecture, from an utter contempt of us,  
“ and a strong presumption that we durst not come out  
“ into the field against them, have shewn themselves  
“ before this city; and this very moment, disorderly  
“ scattered as they are to view the situation, they haughtily  
“ despise us. The leader, therefore, who hath the  
“ most acuteness in detecting such blunders in a foe,  
“ and then seizeth the proper moment to fall upon  
“ them, as best enabled by his own strength; not so  
“ much in the open and regular manner of a methodical  
“ fight, as with a surprise, most advantageous in the  
“ present juncture; — such a leader may, for the most  
“ part, be assured of success. Such stealths as these  
“ draw after them the highest glory: By these, the  
“ man, who over-reacheth his enemy the most, performeth  
“ the most substantial service for his friends.  
“ Whilst, therefore, haughtily presuming on their own  
“ worth, they remain thus disordered, and, by what  
“ appeareth to me, are bent more on drawing off than  
“ remaining here, — during this their intermission of  
“ purpose, and before their resolutions can be regularly  
“ adjusted, I myself, at the head of my chosen party,  
“ will be amongst them, if possible, and will rush  
“ with vigour into the center of their army. And then,  
“ Clearchidas, when once you perceive that I am engaged,  
“ and, as in probability it must be, have thrown them  
“ into disorder; then, at the head of yours, accompanied  
“ by the Amphipolitans and the rest of the confederates,  
“ throw open the gates on a sudden for your sally,  
“ and advance with your utmost speed to the charge.  
“ And thus, it may confidently be hoped, the enemy  
“ must be thrown into the utmost consternation; because  
“ a second body, thus running to the charge, is more  
“ terrible to the foes than the present which is  
“ already

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“ already engaged.—And shew yourself now, Clearidas, that gallant man, which in honour, as a Spartan, you ought to be.

“ You in general, ye confederates, I exhort to follow with manly resolution, and to remember that good soldiers are bound, in duty, to be full of spirit, to be sensible of shame, and to obey commanders; that, this very day, if you behave with valour, you are henceforth free, and will gain the honourable title of *Lacedæmonian allies*; otherwise, must continue to be the slaves of the Athenians; where the best that can befall you, if neither sold for slaves nor put to death as rebels, will be a heavier yoke of tyranny than you ever yet have felt, whilst the liberty of the rest of Greece must by you for ever be obstructed. But so dastardly behaviour I conjure you to scorn, as you know for what valuable prizes you are to enter the lists. I myself shall convince you, that I am not more ready to put others in mind of their duty, than personally to discharge my own through the whole scene of action.”

Brasidas, having ended his harangue, prepared to sally out himself, and placed the main body under the orders of Clearidas, at the gates which are called the Thracian, to be ready to rush out at the appointed time.

To Cleon now,—for Brasidas had been plainly seen coming down from Cerdylum; and, as the prospect of the city lay open to those without, had been seen also when sacrificing before the temple of Minerva and forming the proper dispositions:—To Cleon, I say, who was now in a remote quarter to view the posts, advice is brought, that “ the whole force of the enemy was visibly drawn up within the city, and that, under the gates, many feet of horses and men might be discerned, as ready for a sally.” Upon hearing this, he went to the place, and was convinced by his own sight. He determined, however, not to hazard a battle before his

his succours were arrived; and though he knew his motions could not be concealed, he went off, and ordered the signal to be given for a retreat; commanding farther that the *left* wing should file off first, which indeed was the only method of drawing off securely to Eïon. Put as they seemed to him to be long about it, he wheeled off himself at the head of the *right*; and thus, exposing his men to the missive weapons of the enemy, was drawing off his army.

At this instant Brasidas, perceiving it was time to attack, since the army of the Athenians was already in motion, says to those about him, and to all that were near, — “These gentlemen wait not for us; that plainly  
 “appeareth by the shaking of their spears and heads;  
 “for those who make such motions are not used to stay  
 “for the enemy’s approach. But let somebody throw me  
 “open the appointed gates, and let us boldly and with all  
 “speed sally out against them.” In effect, Brasidas, issuing at the gates of the intrenchment, and the first of what was then the *long-wall*, advanced with all speed directly along the road, where now standeth the trophy, to be seen by those who pass along by the strongest part of the town, and, falling upon the Athenians, dismayed not only at their own irregular situation, but also terrified at his bold attack in the very center of their army, he putteth them to the rout. And now Clearidas, sallying out according to order at the Thracian gates, was advancing to second him. The consequence was, that, by such an unexpected and sudden assault on both sides, the Athenians were thrown into the highest confusion. Their left wing, which inclined the most towards Eïon, as having filed-off first, was instantly broken, and fled. These were no sooner dispersed in flight, than Brasidas, advancing to the attack of the right, is wounded:—He dropped;—but the Athenians are not sensible of it. Those who were near him took him up, and carried him off. This accident, however, enabled the right wing of the Athenians to maintain their ground the longer;  
 though

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though Cleon, who from the first had never intended to stand an engagement, flies instantly away; and, being intercepted by a Myrcinian targeteer, is slain. But his heavy-armed, embodying together and gaining an eminence, repulsed Clearidas, who twice or thrice attacked them, and maintained their ground till the Myrcinian and Chalcidic cavalry and the targeteers, surrounding and pouring in their darts upon them, compelled them to fly. Thus the whole Athenian army was distressed in a laborious flight: They ran different ways amongst the mountains; numbers had been destroyed in the charge, others by the Chalcidic horse and targeteers; but the remainder escaped in safety to Eïon.

Those who took up Brasidas, when he dropped in the action, and bore him off, carried him into the city yet alive. His senses remained till he heard his party were victorious, and soon after that he expired.\*

The rest of the army with Clearidas, being come back from the pursuit, rifled the dead and erected a trophy.

This done, all the confederates assisted under arms at the funeral of Brasidas, whom they interred at the public expence within the city, near the place where the *forum* now standeth. And afterwards the Amphipolitans, having inclosed his monument, performed sacrifice to him as a hero. They also enacted solemn games in his honour and annual sacrifices. Nay, they ascribed their colony to him as founder, after demolishing the edifices of Agnon, and defacing every memorial which might continue the memory of his foundation. They acted thus, partly out of real gratitude to Brasidas, whom they regarded as their deliverer, and partly at this juncture

\* The first embassy, which came from the Grecians in Thrace to Sparta, after the death of Brasidas, made a visit to his mother Argileonis. The first question she asked them was, *Did my son die bravely?* And when the ambassadors expatiated largely in his praise, and said, at last, *There was not such another Spartan left alive,* — *You mistake, gentlemen,* said the mother, *my son was a good man; but there are many braver men than he in Sparta.* Plutarch's Laconic Apophthegms.



to shew their high respect for the Lacedæmonian alliance, as they stood in great dread of the Athenians. For, considering their hostile embroilments with the Athenians, they thought it neither for their interest nor satisfaction to continue the honours of Agnon.

To the Athenians they also delivered the bodies of their dead. The number of them, on the Athenian side, amounted to six hundred, whereas the enemy lost but seven men. This was owing to the nature of the fight, which had not been carried on in a regular manner, but was rather a slaughter, in consequence of a surprise and sudden consternation. After the reception of their dead, the Athenians sailed away for Athens; but those under the orders of Clearchus applied themselves to re-settle and secure Amphipolis.

About the same time, in the close of this summer, Ramphias, and Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, Lacedæmonians, were conducting up, for the Theban service, a reinforcement consisting of nine hundred heavy-armed. Being arrived at Heraclea, in Trachis, they regulated there such things as seemed to require an amendment; and, during the season they halted here, the battle of Amphipolis was fought, and the summer ended.

But, early as possible in the succeeding winter, the reinforcement under Ramphias proceeded on their route as far as Pierium of Thessaly. But, the Thessalians opposing their farther passage, and Brasidas being now dead, to whom they were conducting this supply, they returned home. They imagined that their aid was no longer wanting, as the Athenians, in consequence of their overthrow, had quitted that country; and themselves had not sufficient ability to carry the plans into execution which Brasidas had been meditating. But the principal motive of their return was their own consciousness, at setting out, that the Lacedæmonians were more inclined to peace.

It

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It so fell out indeed, immediately after the battle of Amphipolis and the return of Ramphias from Theffaly, that neither of the parties meddled any longer with the operations of war, but were more inclined to a peace. The motives on the Athenian side were these;—They had received a terrible blow at Delium, and a second lately at Amphipolis: Hence they no longer entertained that assured confidence of their own strength, which had formerly occasioned them to reject all accommodations, ~~as~~ they imagined, in their then career of success, they should soon give law to their enemies. Now also they were under apprehensions of their dependents, lest, buoyed up by the late misfortunes of Athens, they might the sooner be induced to revolt. And they heartily repented now, that they had neglected the fine opportunity, which their success at Pylus gave them, of bringing the dispute to a happy determination.

~~On the~~ other hand, the Lacedæmonians acted on these motives:—They found themselves strangely mistaken in the events of war. At its commencement, they imagined, that, in the space of a few years, they should intirely have demolished the power of the Athenians, by laying their territory waste; but they had suffered a terrible calamity in the affair of Sphacteria, such as never before had been the lot of Sparta. Devastations now were extended over all their country, from Pylus and Cythera. Their Helots had also in numbers deserted to the foe; and they lived in constant expectation that those, who yet persevered in their allegiance, gained by the solicitations of those who were fled, might, in the present low ebb of Sparta, attempt to subvert their constitution, as had formerly been the case. It happened farther, that the thirty years truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring; and the Argives were unwilling to renew it, unless the Cynuria was previously restored. They judged it therefore a plain impossibility, to make head, at the same time, against both Argives and Athenians. They had also a  
suspicion

suspicion that some cities of Peloponnesus would revolt from them to the Argives, which proved afterwards true.

Both parties, then, being respectively influenced by such considerations, an accommodation was judged to be expedient. The anxiety of the Lacedæmonians about it was not the least, as they were eagerly bent on recovering their prisoners that had been taken at Sphacteria; for they were all citizens of Sparta, of the first rank, and allied to the most honourable families. They had begun to solicit their liberty so soon as ever they were taken; but the Athenians, flushed with conquest, at that time disdained to treat. Yet, after the blow received at Delium, the Lacedæmonians, knowing then they were become more tractable, laid hold of the favourable juncture, and obtained a cessation of arms for a year, in which space they were, by article, to hold mutual conferences, in order to settle an accommodation for a longer time. And since the Athenians had now again more lately been totally defeated at Amphipolis, and as well Cleon as Brasidas was dead, both of whom had most strenuously opposed an accommodation; the latter, because he was successful and reaped glories in war; the former, because, in a season of tranquillity, his villanies must needs be detected, and his bold calumniations lose all credit; the persons, who at present were chief in the management of either state, were more strongly disposed than ever to adjust disputes. These were, Pleistionax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, and Nicias, the son of Niceratus, by far the most successful general of that age. Nicias desired it, as hitherto he had never been defeated, and was bent on securing his own prosperity on a lasting foundation, on obtaining a relaxation of toils for himself, and of their present burdens for his fellow-citizens, and on leaving his name illustrious to posterity, as one who had never involved his country in calamity. These views, he judged, could only be accomplished by vacuity from danger, by  
exposing;

exposing himself, as little as possible, to the uncertainties of fortune; and vacuity from danger was compatible solely with peace. Pleistionax had been calumniated by his enemies on the account of his restoration; and they invidiously suggested to his prejudice, upon every loss whatever which the Lacedæmonians sustained, that such was the consequence of transgressing the laws in the repeal of his banishment. For they laid to his charge, that, in concert with his brother Aristocles, he had suborned the priests of Delphi to give one general answer to all the deputations sent by the Lacedæmonians to consult the oracle, that "they should bring back the seed of the demi-god son of Jove from a foreign land into their own country; if not, they should plough with a silver plough-share;" and thus, at length, so seduced the Lacedæmonians in the favour of an exile, residing at Lycæum, upon account of his precipitate retreat out of Attica, & though purchased by bribes from the enemy, and from a dread of his countrymen dwelling in a house, one half of which was part of the temple of Jupiter, that, nineteen years after, they conducted him home with the same solemn processions and sacrifices as those, who were the original founders of Lacedæmon, had appointed for the inauguration of their kings. Repining, therefore, at these calumniations, and judging that, as peace giveth no room for miscarriage, and that, farther, if the Lacedæmonians could recover the prisoners, his enemies would be debarred of a handle for detraction; whereas, whilst the chances of war subsist, the persons at the helm of government must be liable to reproaches for every disaster; he was earnestly desirous to bring about an accommodation.

This winter, therefore, they proceeded to a conference; and, at the approach of spring, great preparations were openly in hand on the Lacedæmonian side, and a scheme for fortifying in Attica was circulated through all the *States*, in order to render the Athenians more compliant. Many meetings were held, and many demands,

demands, with large justifications, were urged on both sides, till, at length, it was agreed, that “ a peace should be concluded, each party restoring what they had conquered in the war, but Nisæa to remain in the hands of the Athenians.” Platæa was re-demanded by the latter, but the Thebans urged that it had not fallen into their hands by force or by treachery, but they possessed it in pursuance of a free and voluntary surrender. And, upon the same plea, the Athenians kept Nisæa.

Things being so far adjusted, the Lacedæmonians called together their confederates; and all their voices, excepting those of the Bœotians, and Corinthians, and Eléans; and Megaréans, who were not at all satisfied with these proceedings, concurring for a peace, they ratify the accommodation, and solemnly pledged the observance of it to the Athenians, who, in exchange, swore the same to the Lacedæmonians, in effect as followeth: —

“ THE Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and their allies, have made peace on these terms, and every *State* hath sworn to their observance.

“ In regard to the common temples:—Permission is granted, to all who desire it, to sacrifice, to visit, to consult the oracles, to send public deputations, in the prescribed forms of every people, both by land and sea, without any molestation.

“ That the sacred soil and the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and Delphi itself, be ruled after its own model, be taxed at its own discretion, and be administered by its own magistrates, whose determinations to be final both in regard to life and property, according to the primitive laws of the place.

“ That this peace continue for the space of fifty years, between the Athenians and the confederates of the Athenians, on the one side, and the Lacedæmonians and the confederates of the Lacedæmonians,

“ on

“ on the other, without fraud and without molestation,  
“ both at land and sea.

“ Be it farther unlawful for either party to take up  
“ arms to the detriment of the other,——neither the  
“ Lacedæmonians and their allies against the Athenians  
“ and their allies,——nor the Athenians and their al-  
“ lies against the Lacedæmonians and their allies, —  
“ without any fraud or evasion whatsoever. And, if any  
“ difference intervene between the contracting parties,  
“ let it be adjusted according to equity and upon oath,  
“ in such manner as they shall agree.

“ Agreed, farther,—That the Lacedæmonians and  
“ allies deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians.

“ That, whatever cities the Lacedæmonians deliver  
“ up to the Athenians, leave be given to the inhabi-  
“ tants to remove, at their own discretion, with all  
“ their effects.

“ ~~That~~ the cities, which pay the assessments rated by  
“ Aristides, enjoy all their rights and privileges what-  
“ ever.

“ And,—be it unlawful for the Athenians and their  
“ allies to take up arms, to the annoyance of those ci-  
“ ties which pay that assessment, from the time that this  
“ treaty be in force. Those cities are, Argilus, Stagi-  
“ rus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus:—  
“ These cities to observe a strict neutrality, forming no  
“ engagements with either Lacedæmonians or Atheni-  
“ ans.—Provided, that, if the Athenians can by fair  
“ means prevail upon these cities, it be lawful for the  
“ Athenians to admit them confederates at their own  
“ free choice.

“ That the Mecybernéans, and Sanéans, and Singé-  
“ ans, shall inhabit their own cities in the same man-  
“ ner as the Olynthians and Acanthians.

“ Agreed, farther,—That the Lacedæmonians and  
“ allies restore Panactum to the Athenians.

“ That the Athenians restore to the Lacedæmonians  
 “ \*Coryphasium, and Cythera, and Methone, and  
 “ Pteleum, and Atalanta, and all the Lacedæmonians,  
 “ now prisoners of the state at Athens, or public pri-  
 “ soners, in any quarter soever within the dominions of  
 “ Athens; and to give leave of departure to all the  
 “ Peloponnesians blocked up in Scione, and to all the  
 “ confederates of the Peloponnesians whatever in Sci-  
 “ one, and to all persons whatever whom Brasidas pla-  
 “ ced there.—— This article also to extend to any con-  
 “ federates of the Lacedæmonians, now public priso-  
 “ ners at Athens, or public prisoners in any other quar-  
 “ ter of the Athenian dominions.

“ That, in return, the Lacedæmonians and allies  
 “ release all the prisoners, both Athenians and confede-  
 “ rates, which are now in their hands.

“ That, in regard to the Scionéans, Toronéans, and  
 “ Sermyliaus, and any other city belonging, of right,  
 “ to the Athenians, the Athenians to proceed with the  
 “ cities specified, and all the others, at their own dis-  
 “ cretion.

“ That the Athenians shall swear observance to the  
 “ Lacedæmonians and their allies, separately, according  
 “ to their cities. Let both sides swear, in the most so-  
 “ lemn manner, according to the forms of each separate  
 “ State; and the oath to be conceived in these words;  
 “ —— *I abide by my compacts and the present articles, ho-*  
 “ *nestly, and without equivocation.*—— Be an oath taken,  
 “ to the Athenians, by the Lacedæmonians and allies,  
 “ to the same purport.

“ Be this oath renewed annually by the contracting  
 “ parties.

“ Be pillars erected at Olympias, at Pythus, at the  
 “ Isthmus, and at Athens in the citadel, and at Lace-  
 “ dæmon in the Amycléum, with this treaty inscribed  
 “ upon them.

\* This includes the fort of Pylus, seated on the cape of Coryphasium.

“ If

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“ If any point be in any manner or degree for the  
“ present, through forgetfulness on either side, omit-  
“ ted; or, if any thing, upon a serious consultation  
“ holden, be judged more proper; the Lacedæmonians  
“ and Athenians are impowered, with all due regard  
“ to their oaths, to make additions and alterations, at  
“ their joint discretion.

“ Pleistolas, presiding in the college of Ephori, put-  
“ teth this treaty in force at Sparta, on the twenty-  
“ seventh day of the month Artemisius: At Athens,  
“ Alcæus, the Archon, on the twenty-fifth day of the  
“ month Elaphebolion.

“ Those who took the oath and sacrificed were,

“ On the Lacedæ- } Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis,  
“ monian side, — } Metagenes, Acanthus, Daïthus,  
Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeux-  
idas, Anthippus, Telles, Alci-  
nidas, Empedias, Menas, Lam-  
philus.

“ On the Athenian,—Lampo, Isthmionicus, Nicias,  
Laches, Euthydemus, Procles,  
Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus,  
Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristo-  
cætes, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leo,  
Lamachus, Demosthenes.”

This treaty was perfected upon the close of the winter, in the first commencement of the spring, immediately after the Bacchanalian festivals at Athens. Ten complete years, and some few days over, were elapsed, since the first irruption into Attica, and an open commencement of the war. And let him, that would be assured of the truth, compute only by the seasons of the year, and not by those who, in the contending *States*, were either Archons, or, by the offices they bore, had events distinguished by an enumeration of their names. For it



cannot be exactly known in what determinate part, whether in the beginning or middle, or any other portion, of a magistracy, any important event occurred. But, if the computation proceed by summers and winters, which method I have observed, such an inquirer will find, that these two halves being equivalent to a whole year, ten complete summers, and the same number of winters, elapsed in the course of this first part of the war.

The Lacedæmonians, for to them it fell by lot to make the first restitutions, released immediately what prisoners they had in their hands; and, having dispatched Ischagoras, and Menas, and Philocharidas, in the quality of their ambassadors to the cities of Thrace, ordered Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and all the confederates there to submit to the terms of the treaty, according to the stipulation given for them. But this they positively refused, as they judged the treaty prejudicial. Clearidas also, to ingratiate himself with the Chalcideans, would not deliver up Amphipolis, alledging, that, without their concurrence, he could not possibly do it. He himself returned in person soon after with the ambassadors, in order to make his defence at Lacedæmon, should Ischagoras accuse him there of disobeying orders. His view was, farther, to try if the accommodation could by any means be evaded. But, when he found it fast confirmed, he posted back with all speed to his government, having express orders from the Lacedæmonians to deliver up Amphipolis; or, if that was beyond his power, to cause all the Peloponnesians within that garrison instantly to evacuate the place.

The confederates happened, at this juncture, to be at Lacedæmon, where such of them, as had hitherto refused to accept the treaty, were ordered by the Lacedæmonians to accede to it. But this they positively refused, alledging the same reason as before; and plainly affirming, that “they would not come in, till better terms than the present were obtained for them.”

Their

Their remonstrances had no effect upon the Lacedæmonians, who sent them away without redress, and struck up forthwith an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Athenians. They had reason to conclude that "the Argives would come to no agreement with them," since they had lately declared a negative to their ambassadors, Ampelidas and Lichas; "and yet these Argives," they judged, "could be no dreadful foe without the Athenians; and that the rest of Peloponnesus would not now presume to interfere, who, without this method of prevention, would certainly have gone over to the Athenians." An Athenian embassy, therefore, being at this crisis resident amongst them, a conference was holden, and the terms completely adjusted. The ratification was made by solemn oath, and the articles of this alliance, offensive and defensive, were these:

"THE Lacedæmonians enter into this alliance for the term of fifty years.—Provided that,

"If any enemy enter the territories of the Lacedæmonians, and commit any manner of hostilities to their prejudice, the Athenians march forthwith to their succour, with all the possible means of redress, and with their whole united force.


"And, in case such invaders shall have withdrawn themselves, that the *State* under which they acted be declared an enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, both which are to join in acting offensively against that *State*, nor to lay down their arms without the mutual consent of both the contracting *States*.

"These terms to be observed with honour, with alacrity, and without any fraud whatever.

"Provided, farther,—That, if any enemy enter the territories of the Athenians, and commit hostilities to the prejudice of the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians march forthwith to their succour, with all

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" the



“ the possible means of redress, and with their whole united force.

“ And, in case such invaders shall have withdrawn themselves, that the *State* under which they acted be declared an enemy both to Lacedæmonians and Athenians, both which are to join in acting offensively against that *State*, nor to lay down their arms without the mutual consent of both the contracting *States*.

“ These terms also to be observed with honour, with alacrity, and without any fraud whatever.

“ Provided, farther,—That, if there happen any insurrection among the Helots, the Athenians march to the succour of the Lacedæmonians with their whole strength, to the full extent of their power.

“ The same persons, on both sides, shall swear to the observance of these articles, who swore to the former treaty.

“ The oaths to be annually renewed; for which purpose, the Lacedæmonians shall give their attendance at Athens, at the Bacchanalian festival; and the Athenians theirs at Lacedæmon, at the Hyacinthian.

“ Both parties to erect their pillar; one at Lacedæmon, near Apollo's, in the Amyclæum; the other at Athens, near Minerva's, in the citadel.


“ And, in case the Lacedæmonians and Athenians think proper to make any additions or alterations in the terms of this alliance, the same lawfully to be done by both, at their joint discretion.

“ The oath of observance was sworn,

“ On the Lacedæ- } \* Pleistionax, \* Agis, Pleistolas,  
monian side, by } Damagetus, Chionis, Metage-  
nes, Acanthus, Daïthus, Icha-  
goras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas,  
Anthippus, Alcınadas, Tellis,  
Empedias, Menas, Laphilus.

\* The kings sign this alliance, but did not sign the former treaty.

“ On



“ On the Athenian } Lampo, Isthmionicus, Laches,  
 side, by } Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles,  
 Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus,  
 Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates,  
 Iolcius, Timocrates, Leo, Lamachus, Demosthenes.”

This alliance was concluded in a very little time after the treaty of peace; and the Athenians now released to the Lacedæmonians their *Spartans*, who were made prisoners at Sphacteria. The summer also of the eleventh year was now begun; and so far the transactions of these first ten years of this war, closely carried on, have been regularly compiled.

## Y E A R XI.†

AFTER the treaty of peace and the alliance, offensive and defensive, between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians; both which were concluded after the ten years war, at the time when Pleistolas presided in the college of *Ephori* at Sparta, and Alcæus was *Archon* at Athens; the peace became in force amongst the acceding parties. But the Corinthians and some of the Peloponnesian *States* were endeavouring the overthrow of all these proceedings: And immediately there arose another great combustion, amongst the confederates, against Lacedæmon. More than this, as time advanced, the Lacedæmonians became suspected by the Athenians, as they shewed no great punctuality in executing the conditions of the peace. For the space of six years and ten months, they refrained indeed from entering one another's territory in a hostile manner; but, during such a correspondence which abounded in suspicions, they were, in all other respects, active in a reciprocal annoy-

† Before Christ 427.

ance. And at length, necessitated to dissolve the treaty concluded at the ten years period, they engaged afresh in open war.

The same THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, hath also compiled an account of these latter transactions in a regular series, according to the summers and winters, down to that period of time when the Lacedæmonians and their allies put an end to the empire of Athens, and became masters of the *long-walls* and the Piræus. The whole continuance of the war to this period was twenty-seven years. And, if any man be inclined to think that this intervening accommodation should not be reckoned as war, he will find no arguments to support his opinion: For, let him only survey the transactions as they are distinctly related, and he will find it an absurdity to pronounce *that* an interval of peace, in which neither all the restitutions were made, nor the benefits obtained, which the mutual stipulations required. And, setting these considerations aside, in the Mantinæan and Epidauric and other wars, transgressions were committed on both sides. The confederates also of Thrace continued still to be as great enemies as ever. And the Bœotians never agreed to more than a bare cessation of arms, renewable every tenth day.

Including, therefore, the first war, which lasted ten years, and that suspicious interval which ensued, and ended at last in a second open rupture, the whole continuance, if computed by summers and winters, will turn out, upon enquiry, to have been so many years, and some few additional days. And such as laid stress upon the predictions of oracles can assent only to this computation as genuine. For my own part, I perfectly well remember that, not only at the commencement, but even during the whole course, of the war, many such predictions were given out, that “it must needs “continue three times nine years.” I also lived through its whole extent, in the very flower of my understanding and strength, and with a close application of my thoughts,

thoughts, to gain an exact insight into all its occurrences. It was farther my lot to suffer a twenty years exile from my country, after my employment in the business of Amphipolis, and to be present at the transactions of both parties, and not the least at those of the Peloponnesians, in consequence of my banishment; by which means I had leisure to gather more ample informations about them. I shall relate therefore the quarrel and breach of the treaty, subsequent to the first ten years, and the incidents of the war which afterwards ensued.

UPON the conclusion of the treaty of peace for fifty years and the subsequent alliance, the embassies from the different ~~parts~~ of Peloponnesus, who had been summoned thither to give their concurrence, withdrew from Lacedæmon. The rest of them indeed went directly home; but the Corinthians, stopping in their return at Argos, began first, at a conference with some of the magistracy there, to insinuate, “ that, since the  
 “ Lacedæmonians, not in order to serve but to enslave  
 “ Peloponnesus, had entered into a treaty and an alliance, offensive and defensive, with their once most  
 “ inveterate foes, the Athenians, it highly behoved the  
 “ Argives now to watch over the preservation of Peloponnesus, and to form a public resolution,—That  
 “ any Grecian *State*, which is free and uncontrolled,  
 “ which enjoyeth and supporteth an equal share of  
 “ rights and privileges, might enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Argives, for the guard  
 “ of their mutual properties against their common foes:  
 “ — This to be communicated only to the *few* who were  
 “ absolute masters of the decisions of each *State*, and every where to shun all conference with the bulk of  
 “ the *people*, lest the scheme might be detected, in case  
 “ the *multitude* should refuse their concurrence.” They assured them, that the majority of the *States* were so exasperated against the Lacedæmonians, that they would  
 infallibly

infallibly come in. And, after suggesting such a course, the Corinthians also returned home.

The persons at Argos, who had listened to these insinuations, reported the scheme, in the next place, to the whole magistracy and people of Argos. The Argives resolved *accordingly*, and elected a committee of twelve, with whom such Grecians, as desired it, might agree upon an alliance, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians excepted; Neither of these *States* were permitted to treat with the Argives, without the public consent of the whole *people*.

The Argives were the more readily persuaded to such a measure, as they plainly saw a war was unavoidable between themselves and the Lacedæmonians; for the truce between them was on the point of expiring. They were also animated by the hope of gaining into their hands the sovereignty of Peloponnesus. For, at this juncture of time, Lacedæmon lay under the greatest discredit, and was fallen into utter contempt upon account of their late disasters; whereas the Argives were in the high vigour of their strength in all respects, as they had never interfered in the Attic war; and, having observed an exact neutrality with both, had been thriving in peace and plenty. The Argives, therefore, in this manner invited those Grecians who were willing to enter into their alliance.

The Mantinéans and allies were the first who, out of a dread of the Lacedæmonians, accepted the proposal. For these Mantinéans, in the heat of the war against the Athenians, had seized and appropriated to themselves a certain district of Arcadia subject to Lacedæmon, and now concluded that the Lacedæmonians would never leave them in the quiet possession of it, when they were at liberty to act for its recovery. This readily induced them to have recourse to the league of Argos, regarded by them as a powerful *State*, which had ever been at variance with Lacedæmon, and, like their own, was democratical.

No

No sooner had the Mantinéans revolted, than the rest of Peloponnesus began to mutter that "they ought also " to take the same step," imagining that revolt to have been founded upon some stronger reasons than yet appeared; exasperated also against the Lacedæmonians for sundry reasons, and, above all, for this article in the peace with Athens,—that, "in case the two *States* of " Lacedæmon and Athens think proper to make any " additions or alterations, the same to be lawful." For this was the clause which gave the greatest alarm to Peloponnesus, and inspired a jealousy that the Lacedæmonians might strike up a bargain with the Athenians to enslave the other *States*; since, in justice, no alteration ought to be made without the concurrence of the whole confederacy. ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~therefore~~, therefore, at these proceedings, many of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~city~~ <sup>city</sup> made instant application to the Argives, exerting their several endeavours to obtain their alliance.

But the Lacedæmonians, perceiving what a combustion was arisen in Peloponnesus, principally owing to the insinuations of the Corinthians, who were also going to enter into this league with Argos, they dispatch ambassadors to Corinth from a desire to prevent what might ensue. Here they represented to them, — "how criminal their conduct had been, in having thus " originally fomented the present tumult; and that, "in case they abandoned the Lacedæmonians and went " over to the Argive league," they assured them, that, "by such a step, they must break the most sacred " oaths; injustice they had already committed in refusing to accede to the Athenian peace, since, pursuant " to old stipulations between them, *whatever a majority of the confederates resolved was to be binding " on all, unless some god or hero enjoined a dissent.*" But the Corinthians, in the presence of all those of the confederacy who had not accepted the peace, and whose attendance they had previously invited, replied to the Lacedæmonians without entering into a particular detail of the injuries they had done them, in not covenanting  
with



with the Athenians for the restitution of Solium, or Anactorium, or any other point in which they thought themselves aggrieved; but speciously pretending, that “they could never abandon their allies in Thrace, whom by solemn oaths they were bound to support; oaths which they had severally sworn when they first revolted in concert with the Potidæans, and had on other occasions since renewed:” arguing from hence, that “they could not have violated the common oath of the confederates in refusing their accession to the Athenian peace, since, as they had sworn upon the faith of the gods to the former, they could not betray them without the guilt of perjury. The stipulation, indeed, ran thus: *unless some god or hero enjoined a dissent*: — their present ~~disorder~~ *disorder* therefore appeared to them to be a divine injunction.” So far they argued from their former oaths; and, in regard to the alliance offensive and defensive with Argos, — “they would hold consultations with their friends, and take such steps as were expedient and just.” And with this answer the Lacedæmonian ambassadors departed home. An Argive embassy happened also at the same time to be at Corinth, who pressed the Corinthians to enter into their league without any farther hesitation. They desired them to attend, at the next public meeting they held, for a final answer.

There arrived soon after an embassy from the Eléans, who made, in the first place, an alliance offensive and defensive with the Corinthians; and then, from Corinth repairing to Argos, became allies of the Argives, according to the scheme pre-established for this purpose; for a misunderstanding had arisen between them and the Lacedæmonians about Lepreum. In a former war of the Lepreatæ against a province of Arcadia, the Eléans had been prevailed upon to join the Lepreatæ for a moiety of the land that should be conquered; and, at the conclusion of the war, the Eléans left all the land in the management of the Lepreatæ, subject to the annual tribute

bute of a \*talent to Olympian Jove. This was regularly paid till the Athenian war; but, that war being then made a præence of its discontinuance, the Eléans would have exacted it by force. The others had recourse to the Lacedæmonians. The dispute was referred to the Lacedæmonian arbitration; but the Eléans, taking up a suspicion that they should not have justice, would not abide the reference, but began to ravage the territory of the Lapreatæ. The Lacedæmonians, notwithstanding this, proceeded to a sentence:—that “the Lepreatæ were masters of their own conduct, and that the “Eléans were guilty of injustice;” and, as the latter would not abide by their arbitration, they threw a garrison of heavy-armed into Lepréum; but the Eléans, regarding this step as the reception of a city by the Lacedæmonians which had revolted from them, and alledging the treaty in which it was stipulated, — that, “of “whatever places the parties were possessed upon the “commencement of the Attic war, the same they “should continue to hold at its expiration,” as if they had met with injustice, they revolt to the Argives; and the Eléans entered into that league offensive and defensive as hath been already related.

The Corinthians soon followed their example, and, with the Calcidæans, also of Thrace, became the allies of Argos. But the Bœotians and Megaréans, though they had threatened the same thing, thought proper to drop it. They had been ill used by the Lacedæmonians, but judged however that the democracy of the Argives would be less compatible with their interests, whose form of government was oligarchical, than the polity of the Lacedæmonians.

About the same time of this summer, the Athenians, becoming masters of the Scionéans after a long blockade, put all who were able to bear arms to the sword, and made their wives and children slaves, and gave the land to be cultivated by the Platæans.

\* 193l, 15s. sterling.

They



They also again brought back the Delians to Delos, induced to it by the many defeats they had suffered in battle, and the express oracle of the god at Delphi.

The Phocians also and Locrians began about this time to make war upon one another.

And now the Corinthians and Argives, united in league, go together to Tegea, to persuade its revolt from the Lacedæmonians. They saw it was a large district; and, in case they compassed its accession, they imagined the whole of Peloponnesus would be at their beck. But, when the Tegeatæ declared, that "they would in no shape oppose the Lacedæmonians," the Corinthians, who till now had acted with great alacrity, slackened in their zeal for contention, and began to fear that no more of the *States would come in*. They proceeded, however, to the Bœotians, and solicited them "to accede to the league between themselves and Argives, and to co-operate with them for the common welfare."—And, as there were truces for ten days between the Athenians and Bœotians, which were agreed upon soon after the peace for fifty years was made, the Corinthians now pressed the Bœotians "to accompany them to Athens, and solicit for truces of the same nature for them; but, in case the Athenians refused to grant them, to renounce the suspension of arms, and for the future never to treat without their concurrence." The Bœotians, thus solicited by the Corinthians, desired a longer time to consider about their accession to the Argive league. To Athens, indeed, they bore them company, but could not obtain the ten-days truces: For the Athenians answered, — "The Corinthians have a peace already, if they are confederates of the Lacedæmonians." And, upon the whole, the Bœotians absolutely refused to renounce their own truces, though the Corinthians insisted upon it, and urged, with some warm expostulations, that it had been so covenanted between them. So there was only a mere cessation of arms between the Corinthians,

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rinthians and Athenians, without any solemn ratification.

This same summer, the Lacedæmonians took the field with their whole united force, under the command of Pleistionax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, and marched to the Parrhasians of Arcadia. These were subject to the Mantinéans, and, in consequence of a sedition, had invited this expedition. But it was also designed, if possible, to demolish the fortrefs of Cypsela, which the Mantinéans had erected; and, as it was situated in Parrhasia, towards the Skiritis of Laconia, had placed a garrison in it. The Lacedæmonians, therefore, ravaged the territory of the Parrhasians. But the Mantinéans, leaving their own city to the guard of the Argives, marched themselves to the support of their dependents. But, finding it impossible to preserve the fortrefs of Cypsela and the cities of the Parrhasians, they retired. The Lacedæmonians also, when they had set the Parrhasians at liberty, and demolished the fortrefs, withdrew their forces.

The same summer also, upon the return from Thrace of those soldiers who had served under Brasidas, and who came home after the peace under the conduct of Clearidas, the Lacedæmonians decreed “ those Helots, “ who had served under Brasidas, to be free, and to “ have permission to reside wherever they pleased.” And, no long time after, they placed them, together with such persons as were newly enfranchised, at Lepréum: It is situated between Laconia and Eléa; and they were now at variance with the Eléans. As for those *Spartans* who had been made prisoners in Sphacteria, and had delivered up their arms, conceiving some fears about them, lest, should they lay their late disgrace too much to heart, as they were persons of the greatest rank, they might introduce some innovations in the *State*, they declared them *infamous*, even though some of the number were, at this time, possessed of posts in the government. But this *infamy* extended no farther than to disqualify them

them from offices, and from buying and selling. Yet, in a short time afterwards, they were again restored to their full privileges.

The same summer also the Dictidæans took Thyssus, a town seated upon the Athos, and confederate with the Athenians.

Through the whole course of the summer, the communication was open between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. Not but that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians began to be jealous of one another immediately after the peace, as the reciprocal restitution of places was not punctually performed. For, though it had fallen to the Lacedæmonians lot to begin these restitutions, yet they had not restored Amphipolis and other cities. They had compelled neither their confederates in Thrace, nor the Bœotians, nor the Corinthians, to accept the peace, always pretending, that, "should they refuse it, they were ready to join with the Athenians in their compulsion;" nay, they limited to them a time, though not by a regular written notice, "within which, such as did not accede were declared enemies to both." The Athenians, therefore, seeing none of these points were put in actual execution, became jealous of the Lacedæmonians, as men who acted insincerely in every step; inso-much, that, when Pylus was re-demanded, they refused its restitution, and heartily repented that they had released the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. They also kept possession of other places, and intended to do so, till the other side had performed their engagements. But the Lacedæmonians alledged "they had done every thing in their power; that, for instance, they had released such Athenians as were prisoners amongst them, had recalled their soldiers from Thrace, and, wherever they were masters of the execution, had performed it. As to Amphipolis," they said, "they were not so far masters of it as to make an actual surrender. They had omitted no endeavours to bring the Bœotians and Corinthians to a compliance, to re-

cove

“ cover the disposal of Panactum, and to obtain the  
 “ dismissal of those Athenians who were prisoners of  
 “ war in Bœotia. Pylus however,” they insisted,  
 “ should be immediately restored to them; at least that  
 “ the Messenians and Helots should be withdrawn, as  
 “ their people had been from Thrace; and then the  
 “ Athenians, if they pleased, might continue to garri-  
 “ son that fortress themselves.” Many meetings were  
 held, and much argumentation passed between them  
 this summer; and, at last, they prevailed upon the A-  
 thenians to withdraw from Pylus the Messenians and o-  
 thers, as well Helots as all deserters whatever out of La-  
 conia. These they transplanted to Crania of Cephalle-  
 ne. This summer, therefore, was a season of inaction,  
 and the intercourse was open between them.

~~and~~ In the ensuing winter, — for other Ephori were in of-  
 fice, as the authority of those, under whom the peace  
 was made, was now expired, and some who were averse  
 to the peace had succeeded, — embassies, attending from the  
 whole confederacy, the Athenians, and Bœotians, and  
 Corinthians, also being present, and, after much reci-  
 procal altercation, coming to no regular agreement, the  
 rest of them separated to their own homes without ef-  
 fect. But Cleobulus and Xenares, those two of the  
*Ephori* who were most inclined to dissolve the peace, de-  
 tained the Bœotians and Corinthians for a private con-  
 ference. In this they exhorted them “ to act unani-  
 “ mously in promotion of their scheme; in pursuance of  
 “ which the Bœotians should first make themselves a  
 “ party in the Argive league, and then employ their  
 “ good offices to form an alliance between the Argives  
 “ and Lacedæmonians: For, by these methods, the  
 “ Bœotians could least of all be necessitated to take  
 “ part in the Attic peace; as the Lacedæmonians  
 “ would prefer the renewal of friendship and alliance  
 “ with the Argives to the enmity of the Athenians and  
 “ the dissolution of the peace; since, to their certain  
 “ knowledge, the Lacedæmonians had ever been desi-

“ rous to have the friendship of Argos, consistently  
 “ with their honour; knowing it would facilitate the  
 “ success of their war without Peloponnesus.” — They  
 also requested the Bœotians “ to deliver up Panactum to  
 “ the Lacedæmonians, that, exchanging it if possible  
 “ for Pylus, they might get clear of the main obstacle  
 “ to a fresh rupture with the Athenians.”

The Bœotians and Corinthians, instructed by Xenares and Cleobulus, and the party in their interest at Lacedæmon, departed, *both*, to report this scheme to their principals. But two persons, of the greatest authority in the *State* of Argos, were attending upon the road for their return. They met, and conferred with them  
 “ about the means of gaining the concurrence of the  
 “ Bœotians in this league, upon the same footing with  
 “ the Corinthians, and Eléans, and Mantinéans. For  
 “ they were confident, were this point once completed,  
 “ they might easily become the arbiters of war or peace,  
 “ either in relation to the Lacedæmonians, (if they so  
 “ determined, and would act together with firm unanimity,) or to any other *State* whatever.”

The Bœotian ambassadors were highly delighted with this discourse. The solicitations of these Argives happened to coincide with the instructions recommended to them by their friends at Lacedæmon. And the Argives, finding them satisfied with their motion, assured them they would send ambassadors to the Bœotians, and so they parted.

But the Bœotians, at their return, reported to the *Rulers* of Bœotia the proposals from Lacedæmon, and those from the Argives upon the road. The Bœotian-rulers were delighted, and grew now more zealous than ever; because, on both sides, from their Lacedæmonian friends and also from the Argives, the solicitations were concurrent. And, very soon after, the Argive ambassadors arrived to forward the dispatch of the treaty. The Bœotian-rulers, however, at present, gave only a verbal approbation of the scheme, and then dismissed

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missed them, promising to send an embassy of their own to Argos, to perfect the alliance.

But, in the mean time, it was judged to be previously expedient, that the Bœotian-rulers, and the Corinthians, and the Megaréans, and the embassadors from the allies of Thrace, should mutually interchange their oaths, "to act in support of one another, if, upon any occasion, such support might be requisite, and to enter neither into war nor peace without joint-consent;" and then the Bœotians and Megaréans (for these acted in union) to form a league with the Argives. But, before such exchange of oaths, the Bœotian-rulers communicated the whole of the plan to the four Bœotian councils, in whom the sovereignty is lodged; recommending it, as worthy their confirmation, that "whatsoever cities were willing might mutually interchange such oaths for their reciprocal advantage." Yet the Bœotians who composed the councils refused a confirmation; apprehensive it might tend to embroil them with the Lacedæmonians, should they pledge such an oath to the Corinthians, who were now abandoning the Lacedæmonian interest: For the rulers had not made them privy to the scheme from Lacedæmon, how "Xenares and Cleobulus, of the college of *Ephori*, and their friends, advise them, to enter first into league with the Argives and Corinthians, and then to extend it to the Lacedæmonians." They had presumed that the supreme council, though they secreted these lights, would not resolve against a plan which *themselves* had pre-digested and recommended to them. But now, as this affair took so wrong a turn, the Corinthians and embassadors from Thrace went home without effect; and the Bœotian-rulers, who had all along intended, in case their scheme had passed, to perfect an alliance with the Argives, made no farther report to the councils in relation to the Argives, sent no embassy to Argos in consequence of their promise, but suffered the



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whole plan to sink away in careless and dilatory unconcern.

In this same winter, the Olynthians, after a sudden assault, took Mecyberne, which was garrisoned by Athenians.

After the former proceedings,—for conferences were still continued between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians about those places they held from one another, — the Lacedæmonians, conceiving some hope that, if the Athenians could recover Panactum from the Bœotians, they also might regain Pylus, addressed themselves in solemn embassy to the Bœotians, and importuned them to deliver up Panactum and the Athenian prisoners, that they in return might get Pylus from *them*. But the Bœotians persisted in a refusal, unless they would make a separate alliance with them, as they had done with the Athenians. Upon this the Lacedæmonians, though convinced that such a step would be injustice to the Athenians,—since it had been stipulated that, “without joint consent, they should neither make peace nor war,” — yet, bent on the recovery of Panactum, that they might exchange it for Pylus, the party at the same time amongst them, who were meditating a fresh rupture, inclining to the Bœotian interest, made the requisite alliance in the very close of this winter on the approach of spring. The consequence was, that Panactum was immediately levelled with the ground; and the eleventh year of the war was brought to a conclusion.

## Y E A R XII. †

E A R L Y in the spring of that summer which was now approaching, the Argives, — when the expected embassy from Bœotia was ~~not~~ arrived in pursuance of promise, when they found that Panactum was demolished, and a separate alliance struck up between the Bœotians and Lacedæmonians, — began to fear they

† Before Christ 420.

should

should be totally abandoned, and that their whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedæmonians. They concluded that, through the prevalence of the Lacedæmonian arguments, the Bœotians had been persuaded to level Panactum and accede to the treaty made with Athens, and that the Athenians were privy to all these steps; and so, of consequence, they themselves were now utterly excluded from an alliance with the Athenians, and their former hopes entirely blasted, that, in case disputes should arise, and their treaty with the Lacedæmonians not be renewed, they might, at worst, depend on gaining the Athenian alliance. The Argives, therefore, amidst these perplexities, and the dread of being attacked at once by the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ, by the Bœotians and Athenians, as they had formerly refused an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians, and had grasped in thought at the sovereignty of Peloponnesus;—the Argives, I say, had no longer one moment to lose, but dispatched instantly Eutrophus and Æson, whom they judged to be persons most agreeable there, in embassy to Lacedæmon. They now judged it their interest to procure the best peace which the present posture of affairs would allow from the Lacedæmonians, and then quietly to attend the event of things. In this view, the ambassadors on their arrival had a conference with the Lacedæmonians about the terms of a peace; and at first the Argives insisted, that “to some State or private person should be referred, for equitable arbitration, the controversy betwixt them about the district of Cynuria;” concerning which, as it is frontier to both, they are eternally at variance; in this district stand the cities of Thyrea and Anthena, and the possession of it is in the hands of the Lacedæmonians. But, at length, when the Lacedæmonians would not suffer any mention to be made of this, declaring only, that, “were they willing to renew the former truce, they should find them complying,” the Argive ambassadors, however, prevailed upon the

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Lacedæmonians to agree to these proposals ; that, “ for  
 “ the present, a peace should be concluded for the term  
 “ of fifty years ; provided, notwithstanding, that liber-  
 “ ty remain to either party to send a challenge, when  
 “ neither was embarrassed by plague or war, and the  
 “ right of this district be then decided by arms between  
 “ Lacedæmon and Argos, as had formerly been done \*  
 “ when the victory was equally claimed on both sides ;  
 “ and that, in this case, it be not lawful to carry the  
 “ pursuit beyond the boundaries of either Argos or La-  
 “ cedæmon.” These proposals, it is true, appeared at  
 first to the Lacedæmonians to be foolish ; but, at  
 length, as their necessary interest made them vastly desi-  
 rous of the Argive friendship, they complied with the  
 demand, and the terms agreed on were digested into  
 writing. But the Lacedæmonians, before they put the  
 last hand to the treaty, insisted on their previous return  
 to Argos, and reporting it to the *people* ; and, in case  
 the ratification was given, to repair again to Lacedæ-  
 mon, at the Hyacinthian festival, and swear obser-  
 vance, And upon this they returned to Argos.

\* Herodotus relates this remarkable piece of history in *Clio*. “ They had a con-  
 “ ference, (says he,) and came to an agreement, that three hundred men on each  
 “ side should decide the point by combat, and the land contested should remain the  
 “ property of the victors ; that both armies in the mean time should retire within  
 “ their respective dominions, nor be present at the combat, lest, by being spectators  
 “ of it, either of them, seeing their countrymen defeated, might run to their assist-  
 “ ance. When articles were settled both armies drew off ; those selected on each  
 “ side for the combat staid behind and engaged. They fought it out with equal reso-  
 “ lution and fortune : Of six hundred men only three were left alive ; two of them  
 “ Argives, Alcino and Chromius ; and one Lacedæmonian, Othryades : These  
 “ were all the survivors when night came on. The Argives, as victors, ran in  
 “ haste to Argos ; but Othryades, for the Lacedæmonians, having stripped the dead  
 “ bodies of the Argives, and carried off their arms to the place where his own side  
 “ had encamped, continued upon the field of battle. Next morning both parties  
 “ came to learn the event ; and then, truly, each party also claimed the victory ;  
 “ one averring, that a majority survived on their side ; the other maintaining, that  
 “ even those had fled, whilst their own combatant had kept his ground and spoiled  
 “ the dead. In short, from wrangling they came again to blows and a general engage-  
 “ ment ; in which, after great slaughter on both sides, the Lacedæmonians obtained  
 “ the victory.”

Whilst

Whilst the Argives were employed in this negotiation, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Andromenes, and Phædimus, and Antimenidas, who were commissioned to receive Panactum and the prisoners of war from the Bœotians, and deliver them over into the hands of the Athenians, found, upon their arrival, that Panactum was already demolished by the Bœotians, upon pretext that, "in former times, upon occasion of some dispute about it, an oath had been taken, by the Athenians and Bœotians, that neither should inhabit that place, excluding the other, but should jointly possess it;" but what Athenian prisoners of war were in the hands of the Bœotians were delivered up to Andromenes and his colleagues, who carried and released them to the Athenians. They also reported the demolition of Panactum, declaring this to be equivalent to a restitution, as no enemy to Athens could occupy that post for the future.

These words were no sooner heard than the Athenians conceived the deepest resentments. They thought themselves injured by the Lacedæmonians, not only in the demolition of Panactum, which ought to have been restored standing, but also in the separate alliance made lately with the Bœotians, of which they now had notice, in open contradiction to their own declaration, "of joining them to compel by force such as would not accede to the treaty." They reflected also upon other points in which the engagements of the treaty had been in no wise fulfilled, and concluded themselves overreached. For these reasons, they gave a rough answer to the ambassadors, and an instant dismissal.

Upon so much umbrage taken by the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians, such persons at Athens, as were willing to dissolve the peace, set themselves instantly at work to accomplish their views. Others were labouring the same point, but none more than Alcibiades,

des, the son of Clinias ; \* a person, in respect of age, even then but a youth ; at least he would have passed for such in the other *States*, though, for the dignity of his birth, he was much honoured and carested. It seemed to him the most expedient step to form a good understanding with the Argives. Not but that his opposition to other measures was the result of his ambition and a study of contention, because the Lacedæmonians had employed their interest in Nicias and Laches to perfect the treaty, slighting his assistance upon account of his youth, nor paying him the deference he expected from the ancient hospitality between that *State* and the family from which he was descended. This, indeed, his grandfather had renounced ; but he himself, in the view of renewing it, had shewn extraordinary civilities to the *Spartans* who were made prisoners at Sphact. ~~etc.~~ ~~Thinking~~ himself, therefore, in all respects slighted, at this crisis he began openly to oppose them : He affirmed, that “ the Lacedæmonians were a people who could not be “ trusted ; that they had treacherously entered into the

\* Alcibiades is here beginning his political intrigues, to open the field for his own soaring and enterprising genius to dilate itself more at large. Pericles was his near relation and guardian ; Socrates was his friend and guide so long as virtue was his care. Warmer passions soon gained the ascendant over him ; and he plunged into all the busy scenes of life, with that intense application and flexible address, to all persons and all occasions, which surprised the world ; “ more changeable than a camelion, “ (as Plutarch expresseth it,) fixed that creature cannot put on a fair or white appearance ” His character is thus drawn in miniature by the neat and masterly pen of Cornelius Nepos : “ Nature (says he) seems to have exerted her utmost power “ in Alcibiades. It is agreed, by all writers who have made him the subject of their “ pens, that a more extraordinary man never lived, either for virtues or vices. Born “ in a most noble republic, of a most honourable family, by far the handsomest person “ of his age, fit for every thing, and full of address ; he was a commander that “ made the greatest figure both by land and sea ; an orator whom none could surpass ; nay, his manner and matter, when he spoke, were quite irresistible. Exactly as occasions required, he was laborious, persevering, indefatigable, generous ; splendid in all his outward appearance, and at his table ; full of affability, “ profuse of civility, and of the utmost dexterity in adapting himself to the exigencies “ of time ; and yet, in the seasons of relaxation, and when business no longer required him to keep his faculties on the stretch, he was luxurious, dissolute, lewd, and “ intemperate. The whole world was astonished that so vast an unlikeness, and so “ different a nature, should be united in the same person.”

“ peace

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“ peace in order to divert the Argives from their alliance, that again they might attack the Athenians when left alone.” Nay farther; upon the first dissatisfaction between them, he secretly dispatcheth his emissaries to Argos, exhorting them, “ at his invitation, to come to Athens, in company with the Mantinéans and Eléans, and solicit an alliance, since opportunity favoured, and his whole interest should be exerted in their support.”

The Argives, having heard these suggestions, and being now convinced that the Bœotian separate alliance had been made without the privity of the Athenians, who, on the contrary, were highly discontented at the Lacedæmonian proceedings, took no farther notice of their embassy at Lacedæmon, though sent expressly ~~there to ingratiate~~ an accommodation, but recalled all their attention from thence to the Athenians. They reflected, that Athens, a *State* which from long antiquity had been their friend, which was governed by a *democracy* in the same manner as their own, and which was possessed of a great power at sea, could most effectually support them in case a war should break out against them. In short, they lost no time in dispatching their ambassadors to the Athenians to propose an alliance, who were accompanied by embassies from the Eléans and Mantinéans.

A Lacedæmonian embassy also arrived in great haste, composed of Philocharidas, and Leon, and Endius, persons who were judged most acceptable at Athens. They were afraid lest the Athenians, in the heat of their resentments, should clap up an alliance with the Argives. They sent also by them a demand of the restitution of Pylus in lieu of Panactum, and excuses for the separate alliance they had made with the Bœotians, “ which had been concluded without any design of prejudicing the Athenians.” Upon these points they spoke

spoke before the senate,\* notifying at the same time that “they were come with full power to put an end to all “disputes;” by which they gave some alarm to Alcibiades, lest, should they make the same declaration before the assembly of the *people*, it might have an influ-

\* The Lacedæmonian embassy have, on this occasion, their first audience from the senate. The business of this history hath been hitherto transacted in the *assembly of the people*: For, as the generals of the *State* were the chief ministers in time of war, and had a power of convening the people at their own discretion, all points that required a speedy determination were brought before the people in the first instance; and the influence of the senate, which operated on *ordinary* occasions, was checked and suspended in time of war, which starts many *extraordinary* occasions, or left it in the will of the generals of the *State* to call and treat as *extraordinary* whatever they pleased. By these means the people had ingrossed the power, the balance which Solon designed always to preserve was in a great measure lost, and the *aristocratical* influence was quite suspended.

As, therefore, the *popular assembly* had its *note* at first setting on the form and constitution of the *senate* now requires an explanation. — At that time it consisted of five hundred persons, and for that reason is often stiled the council of *five hundred*, and sometimes, by Thucydides, the council of the *bean*, from the manner of their election. Every year, on an appointed day, each tribe returned the names of their members who were qualified and stood candidates for this honour. The names were engraved on pieces of brass, and cast into a vessel; the same number of beans were cast into another vessel, fifty of which were white and the rest black. They then proceeded to draw out a name and a bean, and the persons to whom the white beans were drawn became the senators of the year. Each senator had a drachma, that is, seven pence three farthings, a day for his salary.

In the next place, the names of the tribes were thrown into a vessel, and into another nine black beans and one white one; the tribe, to whose name the white bean was drawn, took the first course of *presidency* for a tenth part of the year, and the order of the succeeding courses was determined in the same manner by the bean. How the fifty in course were again subdivided into *tens*, and from these *tens* a chairman chosen for a day, hath been already explained, in the *note* on the popular assembly, Book I.

The senate sat every day in the *prytaneum*, or *state-house*, where the *presidents* had also their diet. They were the grand council of state, took into consideration all the affairs of the commonwealth, debated, and voted by beans; and whatever determinations were thus made in the senate were afterwards carried down to the *assembly of the people*, to be ratified and passed into laws. By Solon's original constitution, nothing was to be proposed to the people before it had been canvassed and approved in the senate: But this seems to have been eluded by the generals of the state, who had all the military business in their department, and a power to convene the people at their pleasure, and lay matters before them in the first instance. To restore the *aristocratical* power, and reduce that of the *people*, occasioned an usurpation and sad confusion in Athens, as will be seen in the eighth book of this history.

ence upon the *multitude*, and an alliance with the Argives might prove abortive.

But Alcibiades now contriveth to baffle them by art. He prevaileth upon the Lacedæmonians, by solemnly pledging his faith to them, that, "in case they would disown, before the *people*, the full powers with which they were invested, he would engage for the restitution of Pylus; for he himself would then persuade the Athenians to it with as much zeal as he now dissuaded, and would get all other points adjusted to their satisfaction." His view in acting thus was to detach them from Nicias, and to gain an opportunity of inveighing against them, in the assembly of the *people*, as men who had nothing sincere in their intentions, and whose professions were dissonant with themselves; and ~~for a~~ alliance with the Argives, and Eléans, and Mantinéans. And this artifice in the sequel took effect: For, when they were admitted to an audience before the *people*, and replied to the demand, when put, contrary to what they had said in the senate, that "they had no such powers," the Athenians in an instant lost all patience. And now, Alcibiades roaring out aloud against the Lacedæmonians with much more vehemence than he had ever done before, they listened greedily to all he said, and were ready instantly to call in the Argives and their companions, and to make them confederates. But, the shock of an earthquake being felt before any thing could be formally concluded, the assembly was adjourned.

At the next day's assembly, Nicias, — though the Lacedæmonians had been thus overreached, and he himself ensared by their public acknowledgement that they had no full powers, — spoke, however, on the Lacedæmonian side, insisting "on the necessity of maintaining a good correspondence with them, and deferring all agreement with the Argives, till they could send to the Lacedæmonians, and be distinctly informed of their final resolutions." — "It maketh, said he,  
" for





diately conceived the warmest indignation : And, looking upon themselves as highly abused, Alcibiades introducing the Argives and their associates, who were still at Athens, they entered into treaty and an alliance offensive and defensive with them, as followeth :

“ THE Athenians, and Argives, and Eléans, and  
 “ Mantinéans, for themselves and their respective de-  
 “ pendants on all sides, have made a peace, to conti-  
 “ nue for the term of a hundred years, without fraud  
 “ and without violence, both at land and at sea.


“ Be it unlawful to take up offensive arms, ——— ei-  
 “ ther by the Argives, and Eléans, and Mantinéans,  
 “ or their dependents, against the Athenians and  
 “ dependents of the Athenians, ——— or by  
 “ ~~the Athenians~~ and their dependents, against the  
 “ Argives, and Eléans, and Mantinéans, and their de-  
 “ pendants, without any artifice or evasion whatsoever.  
 “ On these conditions the Athenians, and Argives,  
 “ and Eléans, and Mantinéans, to be confederates for  
 “ one hundred years.

“ Provided that, in case an enemy invade the terri-  
 “ tory of the Athenians, the Argives, and Eléans, and  
 “ Mantinéans, march to the succour of the Athenians,  
 “ in strict conformity to a summons received from A-  
 “ thens, in the most vigorous manner they may be a-  
 “ ble, to the fulness of their abilities.

“ But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again with-  
 “ drawn, the *State* under which they acted to be decla-  
 “ red an enemy to the Argives, and Mantinéans, and  
 “ Eléans, and Athenians ; and to be pursued with the  
 “ offensive arms of all those confederate *States*.

“ And farther, that it be not lawful for any of the  
 “ contracting *States* to lay down their arms against that  
 “ *State*, which hath so offended, without the consent  
 “ of all the rest.

“ The Athenians also to march to the succour of Ar-  
 “ gos, and Mantinea, and Elis, in case an enemy in-  
 “ vade



“ vade the territory of the Eléans, or that of the Mantinéans, or that of the Argives, in strict conformity to  
 “ a summons received from any of those *States*, in the  
 “ most vigorous manner they may be able, to the fullness of their abilities.

“ But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again withdrawn, the *State* under which they acted to be declared an enemy to the Athenians, and Argives, and Mantinéans, and Eléans, and to be pursued with the  
 “ offensive arms of all these confederate *States*.

“ And farther, that it be not lawful to lay down their arms against the *State* which hath so offended; without the joint consent of all these contracting  
 “ *States*.

“ That no armed force be admitted to pass in order for war through any of their respective ~~dominions~~ <sup>regions</sup> or those of their respective dependents, nor along their sea, unless such a passage be granted unanimously by all the contracting parties, by the Athenians, and Argives, and Mantinéans, and Eléans.

“ Agreed farther, that, when the auxiliaries attend, the *State* which summoned them supply them with thirty days provision so soon as they shall have entered the territory of the *State* which summoned their attendance, and the same at their departure.

“ And, if there be occasion for the attendance of such an auxiliary force for a larger space, that the *State* which sent for it maintain that force, by paying to every soldier, heavy-armed and light-armed, and every archer, three *oboli* of Ægina † a day, and a *drachma* of Ægina to every horseman.

“ But the *State* which sent for auxiliaries to have the supreme command, so long as the war continueth within its district.

† The value of three oboli of Ægina is about six-pence, and the drachma of Ægina nearly one shilling, *English*: For, according to Dr. Arbuthnot, the talent of Ægina consisted of a hundred Attic *minæ*, and therefore was larger than the Attic talent in the proportion of one hundred to sixty.

“ If,

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“ If, farther, it be agreed by the contracting *States*  
“ to act offensively with their united forces, the com-  
“ mand then to be equally divided among all the  
“ *States*.

“ That the Athenians swear to observe these arti-  
“ cles in their own names and those of their depend-  
“ ents; but the Argives, and Mantinéans, and Eléans,  
“ and the dependents of these, are to swear separately,  
“ each *State* for itself.

“ Each party to take the oath in the most solemn fa-  
“ shion of their own country, in the most sacred man-  
“ ner, with the choicest victims. The terms of the  
“ oath to be thus conceived :—*I will stand by the alli-*  
“ *ance, according to covenant, justly, honestly, and sin-*  
“ *cerely; and I will not transgress its obligation by any*  
“ ~~fraud or evasion~~ *whatsoever.*

“ To be sworn:—

“ At Athens, by the senate and the city-magistrates:  
“ The Presidents in course to administer the oath.

“ At Argos, by the senate, and the eighty, and the  
“ Artynæ: The eighty to administer the oath.

“ At Mantinea, by the Demiurgi, and the senate,  
“ and the other magistrates: The Theori and Pole-  
“ marches to administer the oath.

“ At Elis, by the Demiurgi, and the officers of state,  
“ and the six hundred: The Demiurgi and the keepers  
“ of the sacred records to administer the oath.

“ These oaths to be renewed. — For which purpose,  
“ the Athenians to repair to Elis, and to Mantinea, and  
“ to Argos, thirty days before the Olympic games.  
“ But the Argives, and Eléans, and Mantinéans, are  
“ to repair to Athens, ten days before the great Pana-  
“ thenæa.

“ The articles relating to this peace, and these oaths,  
“ and this alliance, to be inscribed on a column of  
“ stone,

“ By the Athenians, in the citadel:

“ By

“ By the Argives, in the forum, in the temple of Apollo:

“ By the Mantinéans, in the temple of Jupiter, in the forum: And

“ All jointly to erect, by way of memorial, a brazen pillar at Olympia, at the Olympics now approaching.

“ If it be judged expedient, by any of the contracting *States*, to make any additions to these articles already agreed, whatever, in pursuance of this, be deemed proper, by the joint determination of all parties, the same to be valid.”

A peace and alliance, offensive and defensive, was in this manner concluded: And those subsisting between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians were not, ~~upon this~~ <sup>on this</sup> account, renounced by either side.

The Corinthians, however, who were confederates of the Argives, refused to accede; but, what is more, they had never sworn to the alliance, made previous to this, between the Eléans, and Argives, and Mantinéans,—“ to have the same foes and the same friends.” They pretended that the defensive league, already made, was quite sufficient,—“ to succour one another, but “ not to concur in an offensive war.” In this manner the Corinthians were drawing off from the league, and again warped in their inclinations towards the Lacedæmonians.

The Olympics were solemnized this summer, in which Androlihenes, the Arcadian, was for the first time victor in the *pancrace*, and the Lacedæmonians were excluded the temple by the Eléans, so that they could neither sacrifice nor enter the lists. They had not discharged the fine set upon them by the Eléans, by virtue of the Olympic laws, who had charged them with a conveyance of arms into the fort of Phyrcon, and with throwing some of their heavy-armed into Lepréum, during the Olympic cessation. The fine imposed was  
two

two thousand \**minæ*, at the rate of two *minæ* for every heavy-armed soldier, agreeably to the letter of the law.

The Lacedæmonians, upon this, dispatched an embassy, to remonstrate against the injustice of the sentence; that "the cessation had not been notified at Lacedæmon when they threw in their heavy-armed."

The Eléans replied, that "the cessation was already in force: For they proclaim it first amongst themselves; and so, whilst they were quiet, and expected no such usage, they had been wronged by a surprise."

The Lacedæmonians retorted, that, "if so, it was needless for them to proceed to a publication of it in Lacedæmon, if the Eléans had already judged themselves wronged. But the fact was far different in the light they saw it, and trespass had not been committed in ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> whatever."

But the Eléans adhered to their first charge, that "they could not be persuaded the Lacedæmonians had not wronged them; yet, in case they were willing to surrender Lepréum to them, they are ready to remit their share of the fine, and to pay for them that part of it which was due to the god."

But, when this would not content, it was urged again by the Eléans, that, "if they were unwilling to part with it, they should by no means surrender Lepréum; but then, as they were desirous to have the use of the temple, they must go up to the altar of Olympian Jupiter, and swear, in the presence of the Grecians, that they would hereafter pay the fine."—But, as they also refused to comply with this, the Lacedæmonians were excluded the temple, the sacrifice, and the games, and performed their own sacrifices at home. Yet the rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreatæ, were admitted to assist at the solemnity.

The Eléans however, apprehensive they would sacrifice by force, set a guard of their armed youths around the temple. These were reinforced by the Argives and

\* 2000 *minæ* = 64581. 6s. 8d. sterling.

Mantinéans, a thousand of each, and a party of Athenian horse who were at Argos in readiness to attend the festival. But a great consternation had seized the whole assembly of united Greece, lest the Lacedæmonians should return with an armed force; more especially, when Lichas, the son of Archefilaus, a Lacedæmonian, was scourged in the course by the under-officers, because, when his chariot had gained the prize, and the chariot of the Boeotian *State* was proclaimed victor, pursuant to the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians from the race, he stepped into the midst of the assembly, and crowned the charioteer, desirous to make it known that the chariot belonged to him. Upon this, the whole assembly was more than ever alarmed, and it was fully expected that some strange event would follow: The Lacedæmonians, however, ~~made no battle~~; and the festival passed regularly through its train.

After the Olympics, the Argives and their confederates repaired to Corinth, in order to solicit the concurrence of that *State*. A Lacedæmonian embassy happened also to be there. Many conferences were held, and nothing finally determined; but, upon feeling the shock of an earthquake, they parted each to their respective cities. And here the summer ended.

In the ensuing winter, a battle was fought, by the Heracleots of Trachis, against the Ænians, and Dolopians, and Meliensians, and some of the Thessalians. For the bordering nations were enemies to the city of Heraclea, as this latter place had been fortified for their more especial annoyance. From its foundation they had ever opposed it, preventing its growth to the utmost of their power; and at this time they defeated the Heracleots in a battle, in which Xenares, the son of Cnidis, the Lacedæmonian commandant, was slain; a number also of the Heracleots perished. And thus the winter ended: and the twelfth year of the war came also to an end.

YEAF

## Y E A R XIII. ‡

THE succeeding summer was no sooner begun, than the Bœotians, viewing the low estate to which it had been reduced by the late battle, took into their own hands the city of Heraclea, and discharged Hegesippidas, the Lacedæmonian commandant, as guilty of mal-administration. They took this city into their own hands, from the apprehension that, during the embroilments of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, the Athenians might seize it. The Lacedæmonians, however, were chagrined at this step of the Bœotians.

The same summer also, Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, being general of the Athenians, with the concurrence of the Argives and their allies, entered Peloponnesus with a small party of heavy-armed Athenians and archers, and enlarged his forces upon his route by the aids of the confederates in those quarters; where he not only made such a disposition of affairs as might best answer the views of the alliance, but also, traversing Peloponnesus with his force, he both persuaded the Patreans to continue their works quite down to the sea and intended also to execute a plan of his own for erecting a fort upon the Rhium of Achaia. † But the Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and all such as were alarmed at the annoyance this fort might give them, rushed out to prevent him, and obliged him to desist.

The same summer a war broke out between the Epidaurians and the Argives. The pretext was grounded on a victim due from the Epidaurians to the Pythian Apollo, as an acknowledgement for their pastures; for

‡ Before Christ 419.

† This was a grand project indeed! It aimed at no less than the total ruin of Corinth, and putting an end to all the navigation of that trading and opulent city through the bay of Crissa. The Athenians were already intire masters of the sea on the other side of the isthmus.



the Argives were now the chief managers of the temple. But, this pretended grievance set apart, it had been judged expedient, by Alcibiades and the Argives, to get possession, if possible, of Epidaurus, in order to prevent molestation on the side of Corinth, and to render the passage of Athenian succours more expeditious from Ægina than by fetching a compass about Scyllæum. The Argives, therefore, were intent on their preparations, as resolved to take the field and act against Epidaurus, in order to exact the victim by force of arms.

But, about the same time, the Lacedæmonians also marched out, with their whole force, as far as to Leuctra, upon their own frontier, towards Lycæum, under the command of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. Not a man was privy to the design. ~~For~~ Thus taking the field, not even the *States* from which the quotas were furnished out. But, when the victims they sacrificed for a successful campaign proved inauspicious, they again marched home, and circulated fresh orders to their confederates to be ready to take the field again after the next month, which was the month Carneius,† the grand festival of the Dorians. But, when they were thus withdrawn, the Argives, taking the field on the twenty-seventh day of the month preceding Carneius, and though celebrating their own festival that very day, continued all this intermediate time to make incursions and ravages upon Epidauria. The Epidaurians sent about to solicit the succours of their allies; some of whom excused themselves as bound to observe the approaching festivals, though others advanced as

† This festival was observed by most cities in Greece; but with the greatest pomp and solemnity at Sparta, where it began the thirteenth of the month Carneius, according to the Lacedæmonian stile, and lasted nine days. A camp was formed for its celebration, in which they continued during the whole solemnity, and observed strict military discipline. By these means, as we find a little lower, the Argives, in this instance no slaves to superstition, attended to the festival and warfare at the same time, and annoyed the Epidaurians, whilst religious awe restrained the friends of the latter from acting in their defence. See *Potter's Archaeologia*, vol. i. p. 4c8.

far as the frontiers of Epidauria, and then refused to act. And, during the space of time that the Argives were in Epidauria, embassies from the several *States* held a congress at Mantinéa, at the request of the Athenians; and, proceeding to a conference, Ephamidas, the Corinthian, remonstrated, that “their words  
 “were by no means consistent with their actions; for,  
 “whilst they were here sitting together upon the terms  
 “of peace, the Epidaurians and allies and the Argives  
 “were opposing one another in arms: That, consequently, the first thing to be done was to send deputations on both sides to disband those armies, and  
 “then orderly to proceed to treat of peace.” Yielding, therefore, to the justice of such a remonstrance, they fetched the Argives out of Epidauria; and, returning to the congress, they were not able even then to agree together: Upon which the Argives once more entered Epidauria, and resumed the ravage.

The Lacedæmonians now had taken the field, and were advanced to Caryæ; but, as now again the victims sacrificed portended no success to a campaign, they once more withdrew.

The Argives also, after ruining about a third of the territory of Epidauria, were returned home. In this incursion they were assisted by one thousand heavy-armed Athenians, with Alcibiades at their head; who, having heard that the Lacedæmonians had now left the field, as their service was now no longer needful, marched away. And in this manner the summer passed.

In the beginning of the next winter, the Lacedæmonians, unknown to the Athenians, threw a body of men to the number of three hundred, with Agesippidas as commandant, into Epidaurus by sea. Upon this, the Argives repaired instantly to Athens, with remonstrances, that, “though it was explicitly mentioned in the  
 “treaty that no enemy should be suffered to pass  
 “through their respective dominions, yet they had  
 “permitted the Lacedæmonians to make this passage

“ by sea without molestation. † Unless, therefore, they would replace the Messenians and Helots in Pylus, to annoy the Lacedæmonians, they should deem themselves aggrieved.” Upon this, the Athenians, at the instigation of Alcibiades, underwrote this charge upon the Laconic column, that “ the Lacedæmonians were guilty of perjury ;” and removed the Helots from Crania into Pylus, to resume their depredations, but refrained from any other act of hostility.

In the course of this winter, though the Argives and Epidaurians were at war, yet no regular battle was fought between them. The hostilities consisted of ambuscades and skirmishes, in which, according to the chance of action, some persons perished on both sides.

But in the close of winter, when the spring was now approaching, the Argives, provided with ladders for scale, came under Epidaurus, hoping to take it by surprise, as insufficiently manned by reason of the war ; but, failing of success, they soon withdrew. And then the winter ended, and with it ended also the thirteenth year of the war.

#### Y E A R XIV. ‡

ABOUT the middle of the ensuing summer, when their confederates, the Epidaurians, were sadly distressed, when some of the Peloponnesians had already revolted, and others shewed plainly a spirit of discontent, the Lacedæmonians were clearly convinced that, unless expeditiously prevented, the mischief would spread abroad. Upon this they took the field against Argos with their whole force, both themselves and their Helots ; and Agis, the son of Archidamas, king of the Lacedæmonians, commanded in chief. They were atten-

† The Argives, in this remonstrance, acknowledge the dominion of the sea, even on the coast of Peloponnesus, to belong to Athens.

‡ Before Christ 413.

ded in the field by the Tegeatæ, and all the other Arcadians whatever confederated with the Lacedæmonians. But the allies of the other parts of Peloponnesus, and those without the isthmus, were assembled at Phlius; — the Bœotians, consisting of five thousand heavy-armed, and the same number of light-armed; five hundred horsemen, each attended by a soldier on foot: — the Corinthians of two thousand heavy-armed; — the other confederates with their several quotas; — but the Phliasians with the whole of their force, because the army was assembled in their district.

The Argives, who had some time before intelligence of the Lacedæmonian preparations, and that *since* they were filing towards Phlius in order to join the forces assembled there, now took the field themselves. They were joined by a succour of the Mantinæans, strengthened by the addition of their dependents, and three thousand heavy-armed Eléans. Upon their march, they fell in with the Lacedæmonians at Methydrium of Arcadia. Each party posts itself upon a rising ground. The Argives got every thing in readiness to attack the Lacedæmonians whilst yet they were alone; but Agis, dislodging by night and stealing a march, completed his junction with the body of confederates at Phlius. When this was perceived by the Argives, they drew off early the next dawn, first of all to Argos, and then to the pass on the route of Nemæa, by which they expected the Lacedæmonians, with their confederates, would fall into their country. Yet Agis took not that route which they expected; but, having communicated his design to the Lacedæmonians, and Arcadians, and Epidaurians, he took a different route, though much less practicable, and descended into the plains of Argos. The Corinthians, and Pellênians, and Phliasians, followed by another more direct route; and orders had been given to the Bœotians, and Megaræans, and Sicyonians, to take the route which leadeth to Nemæa, on which the Argives were posted, that, in case the Ar-

56 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. B.V,  
gives should march into the plain to make head against  
the Lacedæmonians, the last with their cavalry might  
press upon their rear.

After these dispositions, and such a descent into the plain, Agis ravaged Saminthus and other places; upon intelligence of which, the Argives, so soon as it was day, dislodged from Nemea to stop the depredations, and on their march met with the body of Phliasians and Corinthians; and, encountering, slew some few of the Phliasians, whilst not a much greater number of their own men were destroyed by the Corinthians. The Bœotians also, and Megaréans, and Sicyonians, took the route of Nemea conformably to orders, and found the Argives already dislodged; but the latter, upon entering the plain, and a view of the ravage made upon their lands, drew up in order of battle. The Lacedæmonians stood regularly drawn up on the other side. And now the Argives were shut up in the middle of their enemies: For, on the side of the plain, the Lacedæmonians, and those in their body, intercepted their return to the city; on the high ground above them were the Corinthians, and Phliasians, and Pellenians; on the other part, towards Nemea, were the Bœotians, and Sicyonians, and Megaréans. Cavalry they had none: For the Athenians were the only part of their confederacy who were not yet come up.

The bulk, indeed, of the Argives and confederates apprehended not the danger, which at present environed them, to be so great; but rather concluded they might engage with advantage, and that they had caught the Lacedæmonians fast within their territory, and near to Argos itself. Two Argives, however,—Thratylus, one of the five in command, and Alciphron, the public host of the Lacedæmonians,—the very instant the armies were moving to the charge, had addressed themselves to Agis, and proposed expedients to prevent a battle; giving their word, that “the Argives  
“ were ready to do and to submit to justice, upon a  
“ fair

“ fair and equitable arbitration, in case the Lacedæmonians had any charge against them ; and for the future would live at peace, if a present accommodation could be effected.”

In this manner these Argives presumed to talk, merely of themselves, and without the public authority. Agis also, by his own private determination, accepted the proposals; and, without reporting them to the council of war, without canvassing things maturely himself, or at least communicating only with one person of the number which had authority in the army, grants them a four months truce, “ in which space they were to make good what engagements they had now made;” and then instantly drew off the army, without imparting the reasons of his conduct to the other confederates. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, and confederates, followed when he led them off, because their laws exacted such obedience; yet, amongst themselves, were lavish of their censure against Agis, that, when so fine an opportunity of engaging was in their power, when their enemies were hemmed in on all sides, both by their horse and their foot, they were drawn off, without performing any thing worthy of such mighty preparations; for, to this very day, a finer army of Grecians had never appeared in the field. A most gallant figure in truth it made, whilst they were all together at Nemea. The Lacedæmonians were there to be seen with the whole collected force of their *State*, accompanied by the Arcadians, and Bœotians, and Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and Pellenians, and Phliansians, and Megaréans. The troops which composed their several quotas were all picked men, and were judged a match in the field of battle, not only for the whole Argive alliance, but the addition of double strength. This great army, however, laying all the time most heavy imputations on the conduct of Agis, drew off, and were disbanded to their several habitations.

On

On the other part also, the Argives were still much more exasperated against those, who had made this suspension without public authority. They imagined the Lacedæmonians had escaped them, when they had the finest opportunity of striking a blow, inasmuch as the contest must have been decided under the very walls of Argos, and in company with a numerous and gallant alliance. And hence, upon their return, at the Charadrum, the place where the crimes committed in an expedition are adjudged, before they enter the city, they were beginning to stone Thrasyllus, who, flying to an altar, escapeth with life: His effects, however, they confiscated to public use.

But, after this, came up the Athenian succour, consisting of a thousand heavy-armed and three hundred horsemen, commanded by Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives, who, after all, were afraid to break the agreement with the Lacedæmonians, ordered them "to be gone forthwith;" and, though they requested a conference, refused to introduce them into the assembly of the people, till the Mantinéans and Eléans, who were not yet departed, by great importunity obtained a compliance. Here the \*Athenians, in the presence of Alcibiades their ambassador, assembled with the Argives and their allies, averred, that "the suspension was not valid, since agreed to without the consent of the body of the confederates; now, therefore, as themselves were come up opportunely to their assistance, they were obliged in honour to prosecute the war." The confederates allowed the force of this argument; and the whole alliance, except the Argives, marched instantly away against Orchomenus, of Arcadia. But even the Argives, though they stayed behind at first, were persuaded by such reasoning, and soon after went also to take part in the expedition. Thus united, they sat down before and besieged Orchomenus. They made several assaults upon it, desirous for other reasons to get

\* Laches and Nicostratus.

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it into their hands, but more particularly because the hostages from Arcadia were lodged in that city by the Lacedæmonians.

The Orchomenians, terrified at the weakness of their walls and the multitude of their besiegers, and lest, as no relief appeared, they should soon be exhausted, thought proper to capitulate on these conditions; — “to be received into the confederacy, — to give hostages of their own body, — and to deliver up to the Mantinéans those whom the Lacedæmonians had lodged with them.”

Having thus got possession of Orchomenus, the confederates, in the next place, held a consultation, “against what other city, in their plan of conquest, they should next proceed.” The Eléans exhorted them to march against Lepréum, but the Mantinéans against Tegea; and the Argives and Athenians adhered to the Mantinéans. The Eléans, upon this, were offended that they had not voted for the siege of Lepréum, and separated to their own home. But the rest of the confederates set about preparations at Mantinée, as fully bent on the siege of Tegea; and even some of the citizens of Tegea were exerting their efforts within that city to betray it to them.

But the Lacedæmonians, after they were withdrawn from Argos, in pursuance of the suspension of arms for four months, laid heavy charges upon Agis, for not conquering Argos at so fair an opportunity, fairer than ever they had reason to expect, — “since so numerous and so gallant a body of confederates could never again, without greater difficulty, be assembled together.” And, when afterwards the news arrived that Orchomenus was taken, their indignation became more violent than ever. In such a ferment, they instantly resolved, though not consistently with the calm Lacedæmonian temper, that “his house must needs be demolished, and a fine of \* one hundred thousand drach-

\* 3229l. 3s. 4d. sterling.

“mas





“mas be imposed upon Agis.” He earnestly pleaded against the execution of the sentence, that, “in another expedition, he would purge the charge by some notable service to the *State*; if not, they might then proceed to punish him at pleasure.” Upon this, they suspended the fine and demolition, but passed a law upon the present occasion, such as never before had been made amongst them; for they elected a committee of ten *Spartans* to attend him as a council, without whose concurrence he was not permitted to lead out their army into the field.

In the mean time, a message is brought them from their friends at Tegea, that, “unless they come thither with the utmost expedition, Tegea will revolt from them to the Argives and their confederates, and is only not revolted already.”

To prevent this, the whole Lacedæmonian strength, both of citizens and Helots, is levied with more sharpness than had ever been known before; and, taking the field, they marched to Orestæum, of Menalia. An order was sent beforehand to their Arcadian allies, to assemble and follow them directly towards Tegea.

But, when the whole Lacedæmonian strength was thus marched to Orestæum, the sixth part of the number, consisting of the more aged and younger classes, was from thence again dismissed to Sparta, to take upon them the guard of that place, whilst the rest of their military force marcheth to Tegea; and, not long after, their Arcadian confederates join them.

They sent also to Corinth, to the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, a summons of speedy aid into the Mantinéan. But, for some of these, the summons was too short; and, for the rest, it was by no means an easy task to take the field in separate bodies, and waiting for their mutual junction, to force their passage through an enemy's country; for such lay between to obstruct their advance: However, they were earnestly bent to attempt it. The Lacedæmonians, in the mean time, enlarged  
with

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with such Arcadian parties as were already come up, marched on and broke into the Mantinéan; and, having formed their camp near the temple of Hercules, they ravaged the country.

The Argives and their allies, when their enemy was thus in sight, having posted themselves on a spot of ground by nature strong and difficult of approach, drew up in order, as ready to engage. The Lacedæmonians also immediately advanced towards them, and even approached so near as within the cast of a stone or a dart. But one of the old experienced *Spartans*, perceiving that they were to attack so difficult a post, roared out aloud to Agis,\* that "he was going to repair one evil by another;" as if, by his present ill-judged eagerness, he was bent on making reparation for his censured retreat from Argos. Upon this, either struck with such an exclamation, or whether upon a sudden his own thoughts suggested to him a different conduct, he drew off his army again, with all possible expedition, before the battle could be joined. And, wheeling from thence into the Tegeatis, he turned a stream of water into the Mantinéan, about which, as apt to do great damage to the lands on which side soever it flowed, the Mantinéans and Tegeatæ are eternally at blows. It was his scheme to draw down the Argives and their allies from their strong post, on the eminence, in order to prevent the turning of this stream, so soon as they knew it was in agitation, and thus to gain an opportunity of fighting in the plain. In pursuance of this, he halted the whole day upon the stream, and accomplished its diversion. But the Argives and their allies, surprised at this sudden and precipitate retreat, had been, at first, unable to conjecture what it meant. At length, when the enemy was totally

\* Plutarch says it was an apophthegm of this Agis, that Lacedæmonians never ask concerning their enemies, "How many are they?" but "Where are they?" And that, when he was hindered from fighting at Mantinéa, he said, "They, who would rule over many, must fight against many:" And, being asked what was the number of the Lacedæmonians, he replied, "Enough to beat cowards."

withdrawn,

withdrawn, and quite out of their view, after lying inactively in their posts, and no orders received for a pursuit, they began a second time to lay heavy imputations on their own commanders;—that, “on the former occasion, the Lacedæmonians, when fairly caught near Argos, had been suffered to escape; that now again, though they were openly flying, not a soul must pursue them, but, through shameful indolence, their enemies are preserved, and themselves are treacherously betrayed.” The commanders, upon the first noise of these clamours, were highly chagrined, but afterwards they marched them down from the eminence, and, advancing into the plain, encamped them there, as determined to fight the enemy. The day following, the Argives and allies were drawn up to be in readiness for action, should the enemy appear. And the Lacedæmonians, marching away from the stream, to re-occupy their former camp near the temple of Hercules, on a sudden perceived that the whole body of their foes were ready drawn up in order of battle, and had quitted their strong post on the eminence.

At this crisis, the Lacedæmonians were struck with a greater astonishment than the memory of man could parallel. For now, in an interval of time exceeding short, they were bound to get every thing in readiness for fight: Yet, such was their diligence, that in an instant they were formed into a beautiful array, Agis, their king, issuing all the necessary orders, according to law; for, when a king leadeth their armies, all orders are given by him: He himself declareth what he willeth to be done to the \**general-officers*; they carry his orders to the † *colonels*; these to the ‡ *captains*; who afterwards forward them to the § *subalterns*; by whom they are communicated to all the private men under their re-

\* Polemarchæ.

† Lochages.

‡ Pentecontarchs.

§ Enomataarchæ.

spective commands. The orders, when any such are requisite, are in this method dispersed and circulated with the greatest expedition: For, in the Lacedæmonian armies, almost the whole soldiery, few only excepted, have a command assigned in regular subordination; and the care of executing orders is incumbent upon numbers.

In their present array, the left wing consisted of the Skiritæ, who, of all the Lacedæmonians, ever claim this post as their peculiar right; next them were posted the Brasiliæan soldiers who had served in Thrace, accompanied by those who had lately been honoured with the freedom of Sparta; then, along the line, were regularly posted all the troops which were composed of pure Lacedæmonians; next to them stood the Heræans of Arcadia, and beyond them the Mænalians. In the right wing were the Tegeatæ, but in the utmost extent of it some few Lacedæmonians. Their cavalry was equally posted on both the wings: And in this form was the Lacedæmonian disposition made.

On the side of the enemy, the Mantinéans had the right wing, because the business fell upon their ground; next to them were the allies from Arcadia; then a picked body of Argives, to the number of a thousand, who long had been exercised in the study of arms at the public school at Argos; and next to them stood the rest of the Argive forces: These were followed by their own confederates, the Cleonéans and Orneatæ. The Athenians were ranged in the outermost body, and composed the left wing, supported by their own cavalry. Such was the order and disposition on both sides.

The army of the Lacedæmonians had the appearance of superior numbers: But exactly to write the number, either of the several bodies on each side, or of their whole force, I own myself unable. The amount of the Lacedæmonians was not known, because of the profound secrecy observed in their polity; and the amount of their enemies, because of the ostentation ordinary to mankind  
in

in magnifying their own strength, hath been still disbelieved. However, from the following computation, an inquirer may discover the number of the Lacedæmonians, who on this occasion were drawn up in the field.

Besides the Skiritæ, who were in number six hundred, seven *battalions* were in this engagement. Now in every *battalion* there were four *companies*; and, in every *company*, four *platoons*; in the first rank of every *platoon* were four fighting soldiers. In regard to depth they were not equally formed, as every *colonel* determined the depth at his own private discretion; but generally they were drawn up eight deep. The front-line of their whole force, excepting the Skiritæ, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men.†

When both sides were ready, the small respite before the engagement was employed by the several commanders in animating the soldiers under their respective orders.

To the Mantinéans it was urged, — That “the points, for which they were going to fight, were their country and their future fate, either rule or slavery; that of rule, whose sweets they had known, they might not be divested, and that they might never feel again what slavery is.”

To the Argives, — It was “for their ancient sovereignty, and the equal share of dignity they had once enjoyed in Peloponnesus, now timely to prevent an eternal submission to such losses, and earn revenge

† The Lacedæmonian *mora*, or brigade, consisted of four *lochi*, or battalions, = 2048 men: For a *lochos*, or battalion, consisted of four *pentecostes*, or companies, = 512 men; a *pentecosty*, or company, of four *enomatiæ*, or platoons, = 128 men; and each *enomatia*, or platoon, consisted of 32. This is the account of Thucydides, who computes the platoon by 4 in front and 8 in depth. The platoon consisted therefore of 32; which,  $\times$  by 4, = 128, the number of a company; which, also  $\times$  by 4, = 512, the number of a battalion. The number of battalions was seven, which shews the number of Lacedæmonians to have been 3584; and then, with the addition of 600 Skiritæ, who were posted on the left, to have amounted, in the whole, to 4184 men. Or again, the whole front line, = 448,  $\times$  8, the number in depth, is equal to 3584, + 600 Skiritæ, = 4184.

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“ for the many injuries a neighbouring *State*, unrelenting in its enmity, had done them.”

But, to the Athenians, — That, in honour, they were obliged to signalize their valour in a conspicuous manner, in the company of numerous and gallant allies: That, should they gain a victory over the Lacedæmonians on Peloponnesian ground, their own empire would be established and enlarged, and no enemy would ever again presume to invade their territories.”

And in this manner were the Argives and their confederates animated to the fight.

But the Lacedæmonians were encouraging one another, and, during martial strains enjoined by their discipline, like men of bravery as they were, each animated his neighbour with the recital of the gallant acts they had performed together. They were persons, who knew that a long experience in the toils of war conduceth more to preservation, than a short verbal harangue, how finely soever delivered.

And now the armies were mutually approaching: The Argives and their allies advanced in a brisk and angry manner; but the Lacedæmonians moved slowly forwards to the sound of many flutes, the music which their laws ordain; not from any religious motive, but for advancing with equal steps, keeping time with the notes, to prevent all disorders in the ranks; accidents very frequent in large armies whilst drawing to an encounter.\*

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But,

\* Milton hath made use of this Lacedæmonian march to adorn and raise his own noble poetry. It was full and strong in his imagination, when he wrote the following lines. *Paradise lost*, book 1.

— Anon they move

In perfect phalanx, to the Dorian mood  
Of flutes and soft recorders; such as rais'd  
To height of noblest temper heroes old,

Arming

But, during the approach, Agis, the king, bethought himself of making a new disposition.—It is the constant case with all armies, that, upon the right, their wings, whilst they approach one another, extend themselves too far, so that constantly, on both sides, the left wing is overreached and flanked by the enemy's right. This proceedeth from the dread every soldier lieth under of being exposed on his unarmed side, which maketh him eager to get it covered by the shield of the next person on his right, and positive that a firm closing together, in this manner, will render them impenetrable to the shock of the enemy. This turn of the body is first begun by the right-hand man of the whole front, and is the result of his constant care to shift his defenceless side from the aim of the foe; and the dread of being in the same manner exposed obligeth all the rest to follow his motion. And thus, in the present approach, the Mantinéans in their wing had far overreached the Skiritæ; but the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ had done so, more in regard to the Athenians, in proportion as they exceeded them in numbers. — Agis, therefore, fearing lest the left wing of the Lacedæmonians might be quite surrounded, and judging that the Mantinéans quite too

Arming to battle; and, instead of rage,  
 Deliberate valour breath'd, firm, and unmov'd  
 With dread of death to flight or foul retreat:  
 Nor wanting pow'r to mitigate and swage,  
 With solemn touches, troubled thoughts, and chase  
 Anguish, and doubt, and fear, and sorrow, and pain,  
 From mortal or immortal minds. Thus they,  
 Breathing united force, with fixed thought,  
 Mov'd on in silence to soft pipes, that charm'd  
 Their painful steps o'er the burnt soil: And now,  
 Advanc'd in view, they stand, a horrid front  
 Of dreadful length and dazzling arms, in guise  
 Of warriors old with order'd spear and shield,  
 Awaiting what command their mighty chief  
 Had to impote. He through the armed files  
 Darts his experienc'd eye; and soon, travell'd  
 The whole battalion, views their order due,

far

far overreached them, sent orders to the Skiritæ and Brasidéans to wheel away from the spot where they were first posted, and fill up the extremity of the line, so as to render it equal to the Mantinéans; and, to supply the void thus made, he ordered, from the right wing, two *battalions*, commanded by *general-officers*, Hipponoidas and Aristocles, to repair thither, and, falling in, to close up the ranks; judging, that their own right would still be more than sufficient to execute their parts, and the wing opposed to the Mantinéans might, by this disposition, be properly strengthened. But, as he issued these orders in the very onset and close of battle, it happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas absolutely refused to change their post (though for such disobedience, as apparently the result of cowardice, they were afterwards banished from Sparta); and, before the new disposition could be completed, the enemy had begun to charge. Upon the refusal of these two battalions to change their post, Agis countermanded those marching to strengthen the Skiritæ to their former places, who now were unable to fall into the ranks, or close together with those whom they had quitted: But, on this occasion, more remarkably than ever, the Lacedæmonians, though in all respects outdone in the military art, gave signal proofs of their superiority in true manly valour.

For, to come to particulars, when once they were at blows with the enemy, the right wing of the Mantinéans routs their Skiritæ and Brasidéans. Then the same Mantinéans, supported by their confederates and the thousand picked Argives, falling in at the void in the Lacedæmonian line, which was not yet filled up, did great execution upon them; for, taking them in flank, they intirely broke them, drove them for shelter among their carriages, and made a slaughter of the old men who were appointed for their guard. And in this quarter the Lacedæmonians were clearly vanquished.

But in the other quarters, and especially in the center, where Agis, the king, was posted, and round him



the horse-guards, stiled *The three hundred*, falling upon those troops which were composed of the elder Argives, and them which are called the *Pentelochi*, and upon the Clonéans, and Orneatæ, and those Athenians who ranked along with them, they broke them in an instant, so that many of them durst not stand to exchange a blow, but, so soon as they felt the Lacedæmonian shock, turned about at once, and others were trampled under foot in the great hurry they were in to secure their escape.

But, when the main body of the Argives and their allies was in this quarter routed, their foot, on both the flanks, were instantly discomfited. Now, also, the right of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ, by the advantage of superior numbers, had overreached and encompassed the Athenians. These now, on all hands, were beset with danger; in this quarter they were surrounded by their enemies, in another they were already vanquished; and they must have suffered the most of any part of the army, had it not been for the excellent support their own cavalry gave them. It happened also that Agis, when he perceived that the Mantinéans and the thousand Argives had got the better on the left, commanded the whole army to wheel off to the support of the vanquished. And, whilst this was executing, the Athenians laid hold of the interval, which this motion of the enemy, and their drawing off from around them, occasioned, to secure their own escape without any opposition, accompanied by the Argives, who were also vanquished with them.

But the Mantinéans, and those who fought in company with them, and the picked band of Argives, were now no longer intent on pressing upon their adversaries; but, perceiving their own side to be completely vanquished, and the Lacedæmonians approaching to their attack, they turned about and fled. Yet numbers of them perished, and those chiefly Mantinéans; for the  
greatest

greatest part of the picked band of Argives completed their escape.

The flight however was not precipitate, nor the distance to a place of safety great. For the Lacedæmonians, till the enemy fled, maintain their combats with long and steady toil; but, after a rout, pursue them neither long nor far.

And thus, or very nearly thus, was the procedure of the whole battle, the greatest that for many ages had been fought amongst Grecians, and where the competition lay between most renowned and flourishing *States*. The Lacedæmonians, amassing together the arms of their enemies who had been slain, immediately erected a trophy, and rifled the bodies of the dead. They also took up their own *dead*, and carried them to Tegea, where they received the rights of sepulture; and also delivered, upon truce, the slain of their enemy. There fell, of the Argives, and Orneatæ, and Cleonæans, seven hundred; and two hundred of the Mantinéans; two hundred also of the Athenians, including the Æginetæ and their several commanders.\* On the Lacedæmonian side,—as the confederates were never hard pressed, what loss they suffered is scarcely deserving of notice; and the exact number of their own dead it is difficult to discover, but it was reported to have been about three hundred.

When a battle was certainly to be fought, Pleistionax, the other king, marched out to their support, with the whole body of citizens, both old men and youths. But, when he was advanced as far as Tegea, he received the news of a victory, and returned to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians also sent messengers to countermand their allies from Corinth, and from without the isthmus. And, being themselves returned to Sparta, after giving dismissal to their allies, as the Carneian solemnities were at hand, they celebrate the festival. The imputation also of cowardice, at that time laid to their charge by the rest of Greece, because of their misfortune at

Sphacteria, and some other instances of impolitic and dilatory conduct, by this one action they completely purged away. Now it was determined that their depression had been merely the result of fortune, but that in inward bravery they were still themselves.

The day before this battle was fought, it happened that the Epidaurians, with the whole of their strength, had made an incursion into Argia, as left defenceless, and had done great execution on the guards, left behind at the general march of the Argives.

Three thousand heavy-armed Eléans, as auxiliaries to the Mantinéans, came up after the battle; as did also a thousand Athenians to join the former body; upon which the whole alliance marched immediately against Epidaurus, whilst the Lacedæmonians were solemnizing the Carneian festival. After an equal distribution of the work, they began to raise a circumvallation around that city. The rest, indeed, soon desisted; but the Athenians, conformably to their orders, completed theirs round the eminence on which stood the temple of Juno. To guard this work, the whole alliance left behind a sufficient number draughted from their several bodies, and then departed to their respective homes. And the summer was now at an end.

In the first commencement of the succeeding winter, and after the celebration of the Carneian festival, the Lacedæmonians immediately took the field; and, advancing as far as Tegsa, sent from thence to Argos proposals for an accommodation. There was already in that city a party in their intelligence, who were also bent on overturning the popular government at Argos; and, since the event of the late fatal battle, they were enabled to use more cogent arguments to persuade the *many* into the accommodation. Their scheme was, first to enter into truce with the Lacedæmonians, as preparatory to an alliance offensive and defensive, which was next in agitation; and, this point carried, then immediately to execute their plot against the *people*.

Lichas,

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Lichas, son of Arcefilaus, the public host of the Argives, accordingly arriveth at Argos, charged to make two demands in the name of the Lacedæmonians : The one, “ whether war be still their option ? ” the other, “ how ? if their choice be peace.” Upon this a strong debate arose, for Alcibiades was present. But the party, who acted in the Lacedæmonian interest, prevailed with the Argives to accept their proposals of an accommodation ; which were as followeth :

“ T H U S resolved, by the Lacedæmonian council,  
“ to compound with the Argives. —

“ These to restore their children to the Orchomenians, and their men to the Mænalians ; to restore  
“ also to the Lacedæmonians their citizens now detained at Mantinea ; to evacuate Epidaurus and demolish their works.

“ And the Athenians, if they will not quit Epidaurus, to be declared enemies to the Argives and to the  
“ Lacedæmonians, and to the confederates of the Lacedæmonians and to the confederates of the Argives.

“ And, if the Lacedæmonians have in their power  
“ any young men, to release them to all the *States*.

“ In relation to the god, \* we consent that an oath  
“ be administered to the Epidaurians, and we grant  
“ the form to be prescribed by the Argives.

“ The *States* of Peloponnesus, both small and great,  
“ to be, none excepted, free, according to their own  
“ primitive constitutions.

“ And, if any *State* without Peloponnesus shall enter  
“ offensively into the lands of Peloponnesus, succours to be united, in pursuance of a general consult  
“ of Peloponnesians about the determinate and most  
“ expedient methods.

“ All confederates of the Lacedæmonians whatever,  
“ without Peloponnesus, shall enjoy the same privileges

\* The *Pythian* Apollo. This article seems designed to adjust the quarrel about the victim, related in the transactions of the last year.

“ as those of the Lacedæmonians and those of the Argives enjoy, each remaining in free possession of their territories.

“ These articles to be communicated to the confederates, and ratification to be made, if they approve.  
 “ If different methods seem adviseable to the confederates, all parties to desist and return directly home.”

These proposals, by way of preliminary, the Argives accepted; and the army of the Lacedæmonians was drawn off from Tegea to their own home. And afterwards, in the course of mutual negotiation, the same party at Argos prevailed upon their countrymen to renounce their alliance with the Mantinéans and Eléans, and even with the Athenians, and to strike up a peace, and an alliance offensive and defensive, with the Lacedæmonians. The tenor of it was this :

“ RESOLVED thus, by the Lacedæmonians and the Argives, on a peace, and an alliance offensive and defensive, for the term of fifty years.

“ They shall do justice to each other reciprocally, with impartiality and equity, according to their several forms of law.

“ The other *States* in Peloponnesus, comprehended in this peace and alliance, shall continue in the enjoyment of their own laws, their own independence, holding the same territories, doing justice with impartiality and with equity, according to their several forms of law.

“ All confederates of the Lacedæmonians whatever, without Peloponnesus, shall enjoy the same privileges with the Lacedæmonians themselves; and the Argive confederates shall enjoy the same with the Argives themselves; each holding their respective territories.

“ If a joint-expedition be at any time requisite, a consultation to be held, by the Lacedæmonians and  
 “ the

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“ the Argives, about the determinate and most expedient methods of issuing orders to the rest of the alliance: ”

“ But, if any controversy arise between the *States*, either those within or those without Peloponnesus, either concerning their boundaries or any other point, it shall be determined by judges.

“ And, if any confederate *State* have a dispute with another *State*, they shall go, with a reference, to that *State* which to the contending *States* shall be thought most impartial. Private persons, however, to be judged by the laws of that *State* to which they are subject.”

This peace, and such an alliance, was now perfected; and the reciprocal damages of war and all other offences were now buried in oblivion. And, having already settled all points to general satisfaction, they concurred in a suffrage, “ to receive no herald nor embassy from the Athenians, till they were withdrawn out of Peloponnesus, and had given up their fortifications at Epidaurus; ” and farther, “ for the future to make neither peace nor war but with joint concurrence.” Their attention was also extended to objects more remote; and in conjunction they dispatched ambassadors to the cities in Thrace and to Perdiccas, and seduced Perdiccas to swear adherence to their league: Not that he instantly declared his revolt from the Athenians, but he was bent on accomplishing it ever since he saw the Argives had done it; for he was originally descended from Argos. They renewed also their ancient oaths to the Chalcidæans, and strengthened them by the addition of new.

The Argives also dispatched an embassy to the Athenians, requiring them to quit the works they had raised at Epidaurus. The latter, sensible that their soldiers there were but a handful of men, when compared with those who were associated with them in that service, sent Demosthenes

mosthenes to draw them off. He, upon his arrival, pretending to solemnise some martial game without the fortress, when the rest of the garrison was gone out to the spectacle, barred fast the gates. And afterwards, the Athenians, having renewed the peace with them, surrendered the fortifications they had raised into the hands of the Epidaurians.

When the Argives had in this manner gone off from the alliance, the Mantinéans also, who at first stood out, finding at length that without the Argives they could do nothing of themselves, thought proper to accommodate their disputes with the Lacedæmonians, and resigned their command over the cities of Arcadia. The Lacedæmonians also and Argives, to the number of a thousand each, marched in company to Sicyon; where, principally by the presence of the Lacedæmonians, the government was shifted into the hands of a smaller number. And, after transacting such points in concert, they soon procured the demolition of the popular government at Argos; and an oligarchy, suited to the Lacedæmonian model, was erected in its stead.

As the winter was now in its close, these transactions ran out nearly into the spring; and the fourteenth year of the war expired.

## Y E A R XV. †

IN the following summer, the Dictidéans of Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidéans; and the Lacedæmonians resettled the state of Achaia, which for a time had been under a management not agreeable to them.

The *people* of Argos also, combining gradually together and resuming their spirits, made an assault upon the *few*. They waited for a favourable opportunity, till the festival of the *naked games* was celebrating at La-

† Before Christ 417.

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cedæmon. A battle was fought within the precincts of Argos, in which the *people* was the victor: Some of their opponents they slew, and others they doomed to perpetual exile. The Lacedæmonians, when their adherents implored their succour, were too dilatory in moving; but at last they adjourned the games, and marched away to their support; and hearing, when they were come to Tegea, that "the *few* were vanquished," they determined to proceed no farther, maugre all the intreaties of the new exiles; but, retreating forthwith to Sparta, they resumed the celebration of the games. Yet, being afterwards attended by deputations from those in Argos, as well as by such as had been lately banished, in the presence of the whole confederacy, after many arguments had been urged on both sides, they came to a resolution, that "the Argives in the city were guilty of injustice;" and a decree was passed, that "they should march against Argos." But, after all, their proceedings were dilatory and remiss.

In the mean time, the *people* of Argos, dreading the Lacedæmonian strength, and re-addressing themselves again to Athens for a renewal of alliance, and proceeding to execute a plan which they thought the strongest expedient of preservation, built long walls quite down to the sea, that, in case they should be blocked up by land, all proper supplies might be thrown into the city by sea, through the good offices of the Athenians. To this scheme of new fortifications some cities also of Peloponnesus were privy underhand. The whole body of the Argives without distinction, the citizens, their wives, and their servants, forwarded the work; and from Athens they were supplied with carpenters and masons. And here the summer ended.

Winter now succeeding, the Lacedæmonians, when advertised of these new fortifications, marched their forces against Argos, their own, and all those of their allies, excepting the Corinthian. Some new projects in their favour were now also in agitation within Argos itself.



self. The whole army was commanded by Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. The new turns they expected for their service took not effect within the city; but they made themselves masters of the new-erected walls, and levelled them with the ground. They also took Hysia, a town in Argia; and, having put all the freemen found within that place to the sword, they drew off, and dispersed to their several cities.

After this, the Argives marched their force into Phliasia; and, after ravaging that district, because the exiles from Argos had met with a reception there, they again retired: For many of those exiles had taken up their residence at Phlius.

In the same winter, the Athenians, exasperated against Perdiccas, prevented all manner of importations into Macedonia. They charged him “with taking part in  
“the late treaty, confirmed by the sanction of oaths,  
“between the Argives and Lacedæmonians; that, farther, when they had made great preparations against  
“the Chalcidæans of Thrace and Amphipolis, and Nicias, the son of Niceratus, was appointed to command  
“in that service, he had violated his obligations to act  
“in concert, and *that* expedition came to nothing purely through his secession: He was therefore an enemy  
“to Athens.”

The winter expired in this manner; and with it the fifteenth year of the war came also to an end.

## Y E A R XVI.†

WHEN summer came on, Alcibiades, with twenty sail, arrived at Argos, where he seized three hundred of the citizens, whose fidelity to the Athenians, and adherence to the Lacedæmonian interest, was still suspected; and these the Athenians secured in the neighbouring lands, which were subject to their dominion.

† Before Christ 416.

### B. V. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 79

The Athenians also undertook the reduction of Melos with a naval force, consisting of thirty sail of Athenians, six of Chians, and two of Lesbians; on-board of which were transported twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three hundred archers, and twenty who drew the bow on horseback. The number also of their dependents, from the continent and islands, which attended, was about fifteen hundred heavy-armed. The Melians\* are a colony of the Lacedæmonians, and had therefore refused to receive law from the Athenians in the same manner as the inhabitants of the other islands received it. At first, however, they observed a strict neutrality; but, in process of time, when the Athenians, by ravaging their country, would have obliged them to act offensively, they openly took part in the war against them.

With a force so strong as hath been described, Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, the son of Ti-

\* The original of this colony is curious, according to the account given of it by Plutarch.—“ When the Tyrrhenes were masters of Lemnos and Imbrus, and made a practice of ravishing the wives of the Athenians at Brauron, a mixed breed was the consequence; whom, as half-barbarians, the Athenians drove out of the isles. Thus exiled, they repaired to Tænarus, and were useful to the Spartans in their war against the Helots. They were afterwards rewarded for their good services with the freedom of Sparta and liberty of intermarriage. Yet, not being allowed the honour of serving the offices of the state, or a seat in the council, they became afterwards suspected, as caballing together for bad designs, and projecting to overthrow the constitution: The Lacedæmonians therefore apprehended them all; and, throwing them into prison, kept them confined under a strong guard, till they could find out clear and incontestable evidence against them. The wives of the prisoners came in a body to the prison, and, after much prayer and intreaty, were at length admitted by the guard to the sight and discourse of their husbands. When once they had gained access, they ordered them immediately to strip, and change clothes with them; to leave them their own, and, dressed in those of their wives, to make their escape directly in that disguise. It was done; the women staid behind, determined to endure whatever might be the consequence; and the guards, deceived by appearances, let out the husbands instead of the wives. They marched off and seized Taygeta; then seduced the Helots to revolt, and promised to support them; which struck a great terror amongst the Spartans. They sent to treat with them, and made up the matter on these conditions: That they should have their wives restored safe to them; should be furnished with money and vessels for removal; and, when settled in another country, should be reckoned a colony and kinsmen of the Lacedæmonians. — A body of them settled some time after in the isle of Melos.” *Of the virtues of women.*

Simachus,

himachus, landed and encamped upon the island. Yet, before they proceeded to hostilities, they sent a deputation from the army to demand a conference; whom the Melians refused to introduce into the assembly of the people, but, in the presence only of the magistrates and the *few*, commanded them to deliver their instructions. Upon this the Athenian deputation expressed themselves as followeth :

“ SINCE to the people in full assembly we are precluded from speaking, lest the *many*, — hearing their true interest declared at once by us in a continued discourse, and proved by arguments fitted to persuade and too strong to be refuted, — might be wrought into our views, for such, we are sensible, is the plain construction of this our guarded audience by the *few* : To you also, who now sit here, we recommend a method of making that point yet more secure, — that, to the reasons we offer, you reserve not your objections for one formal deliberate reply, but, in case we offer any seeming incongruity, you immediately interrupt us, and discuss the point. And tell us, first, whether or not this proposal be agreeable.”

The Melians, who composed the synod, answered thus :

“ THE candour of such leisurely debate, for mutual information, is not to be disapproved : And yet there seemeth to be great inconsistency between such candour and those warlike preparations, with which you no longer intend hereafter, but in present act have already beset us. For we perceive, that hither you are come to be authoritative judges of your own plea : and that the decision must needs prove fatal to us : Since if, superior in debate, we for that reason refuse submission, our portion must be war ; and, if we al-

“ lov

“ low your plea, from that moment we become your  
“ slaves.”

ATHENIANS.

“ T O what purpose *this*? If here you are met to-  
“ gether to retail your suspicions of future events, or to  
“ talk of any thing but the proper means of extricating  
“ and preserving your *State* from the present and mani-  
“ fest dangers which environ it, we had better be si-  
“ lent :— But, if the latter be your purpose, let us come  
“ to the point.”

MELIANS.

“ T H E R E is reason for it, and there ought to be  
“ forgiveness, when men, so situated as we are, are li-  
“ able to much distraction both in speech and thought.  
“ The point for which we are assembled is, it is true,  
“ no less than our future preservation : If, therefore,  
“ it must be so, let the conference proceed in the me-  
“ thod you require.”

ATHENIANS.

“ A S, therefore, it is not our purpose to amuse you  
“ with pompous details, — how, after completely van-  
“ quishing the Mede, we had a right to assume the so-  
“ vereignty, or how, provoked by the wrongs received  
“ from you, we come hither to earn redress, — we shall  
“ wave all parade of words that have no tendency to-  
“ wards conviction : And, in return, insist from you,  
“ that you reject all hopes of persuading us by frivo-  
“ lous remonstrances, — that, as a colony of the Lace-  
“ dæmonians, you were incapacitated from accompa-  
“ nying our arms, or that wrongs in any shape you  
“ have never done us. — But, these things apart, let us  
“ lay all stress on such points as may really on both  
“ sides

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“ sides be judged persuasive : Since of this you are as  
 “ strongly convinced as we ourselves are sensible of it,—  
 “ that, in all human competitions, equal wants alone pro-  
 “ duce equitable determination; and, in what terms so-  
 “ ever the powerful injoin obedience, to those the weak  
 “ are obliged to submit.”

MELIANS.

“ IF this be so, we boldly aver,—for, as you have  
 “ discarded justice from the question, and substi-  
 “ tuted interest in its place, we must follow the  
 “ precedent, ——— that you also it concerneth, we  
 “ should not be deprived of the common privilege  
 “ of men; but that to human creatures, ever liable to  
 “ so dangerous a loss, the pleas of reason and equity,  
 “ even though urged beyond their exact limitations,  
 “ should be indulged and allowed their weight. And  
 “ more to you than to others is this proper to be sug-  
 “ gested, lest, after satiating revenge in all its fury,  
 “ should you ever be overthrown, you may teach your  
 “ enemies how you ought to be treated.”

ATHENIANS.

“ T H A T affecteth us not : For, though to our  
 “ share an overthrow of empire fall, the event would  
 “ render us neither abject nor desponding; because  
 “ men, inured to enlarged command, as the Lacedæ-  
 “ monians for instance, are never terrible to the van-  
 “ quished. But our contest, at present, is not against  
 “ the Lacedæmonians. *That* revenge alone is terrible,  
 “ when subjects tumultuously rebel, and gain the ascen-  
 “ dant over such as were once their masters: And truly,  
 “ to avert such dangerous extremities, be the care en-  
 “ trusted to us. But, on the present occasion, that we  
 “ are here for the enlargement of our own power, and  
 “ that what we have to urge concerneth the preserva-  
 “ tion of the *State* of Melos,——these are the points we  
 “ are

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" are to establish. We are desirous to have our power  
" extended over you without obstruction; and your  
" preservation to be amply secured for the common be-  
" nefit of us both."

MELIANS.

" AND how can it turn out as beneficial for us to be-  
" come your slaves as it will for you to be our mas-  
" ters?"

ATHENIANS.

" PLAINLY thus: — Because, instead of suffering  
" the extremities of conquest, you may merely become  
" our subjects; and we, by exempting you from a  
" total destruction, shall gain your service."

MELIANS.

" BUT will not these terms content you: — That we  
" be permitted to persevere in quiet; to be friends to  
" you, instead of enemies; but, in regard to war, to  
" be strictly neutral?"

ATHENIANS.

" NO: For all your enmity cannot hurt us so much  
" as the acceptance of such friendship from you. The  
" latter, to those over whom we rule, would suggest in-  
" timations of our weakness: Your enmity is a proof  
" of our power."

MELIANS.

" ARE your subjects then such sorry judges of e-  
" quity and right, as to place upon the same level those,  
Vol. II. G " who

“ who are under no manner of tie, and who were never  
 “ indebted for their settlement to you, and those, who,  
 “ revolting from you, have been again reduced?”

## ATHENIANS.

“ WHY should they not? They know such a sense  
 “ of things may be well grounded in regard to both;  
 “ inasmuch as those, who are exempted from our yoke,  
 “ owe such exemption to their own superior strength,  
 “ and, if we attack them not, it is the pure result of  
 “ fear. And hence, the reduction of you, besides in-  
 “ larging our empire, will invest it with more ample se-  
 “ curity; especially, when seated on an island, you are  
 “ bound to submit to the masters of the sea, and to re-  
 “ main henceforth too weak for resistance, unless you  
 “ are victorious at the present crisis.”

## MELIANS.

“ DO you then conclude that what we have proposed  
 “ is incompatible with your own security? — For since,  
 “ excluding us from the plea of justice, you endeavour  
 “ merely to persuade us into subserviency to your inter-  
 “ est, we also are again necessitated to insist once more  
 “ on the *profitable* to ourselves, and, by shewing that  
 “ with our welfare your own also coincideth, endea-  
 “ vour to prevail. — What think you of all *those* States  
 “ which now stand neutral in your disputes? How will  
 “ you avoid their implacable hatred, when, terrified at  
 “ such your usage of us, they must live in constant expec-  
 “ tation of your hostilities? And whither can such con-  
 “ duct tend, but to enlarge the number of your decla-  
 “ red enemies, and to constrain others, who never de-  
 “ signed to be your foes, to take up arms against you,  
 “ though to their own regret?”

ATHENIANS,

## ATHENIANS.

“ THAT never can be : Since from *States* seated on  
 “ the continent we have nothing to apprehend ; they  
 “ are under no immediate necessity of guarding their li-  
 “ berty against attacks from us. Those alone we dread  
 “ who are seated in islands ; and who, like you, refuse  
 “ our government ; or who, having felt the pains  
 “ of subjection, are irritated against us. Such are most  
 “ likely to have recourse to violent measures, and to  
 “ plunge themselves and us into imminent dangers.”

## MELIANS.

“ IF this be so ;—and if you, ye Athenians, can rea-  
 “ dily embark into so many perils to prevent the disso-  
 “ lution of your own empire ; if *States*, by you infla-  
 “ ved, can do as much to throw off your yoke ; —  
 “ must it not be wretchedly base and cowardly in us,  
 “ who yet are free, to leave any method, even to the  
 “ last extremity, untried, of averting slavery ?”

## ATHENIANS.

“ I F you judge of things as wise men ought, we  
 “ answer——*Not*. For the point, in which you are at  
 “ present concerned, is not a trial of valour upon equal  
 “ terms, in order to escape the reproach of cowardice ;  
 “ but your deliberations proceed at present about the  
 “ means of self-preservation, that you may not be obli-  
 “ ged to encounter those who must by far overpower  
 “ you.”

## MELIANS.

“ B U T we, on the contrary, know, that the enter-  
 “ prizes of war have sometimes very different events



“ to those which superiority of numbers gave reason to  
 “ expect ; and, in regard to ourselves, that, if we yield  
 “ at once, eternal despair must be our fate; but, by  
 “ acting resolutely in our own defence, we may yet en-  
 “ tertain a hope of success.”

## ATHENIANS.

“ HOPE in this manner is ever applied to be the fo-  
 “ lace of danger. And truly, in situations which can  
 “ afford to be disappointed, though ever prejudicial,  
 “ it is not always fatal. But such, as idly lavish their  
 “ last resource, their very *all*, upon hope, (for it is  
 “ prodigal by nature,) are only by their own ruin con-  
 “ vinced of its delusion ; nay, when its delusion is thus  
 “ by sad experience discovered, and men should guard  
 “ themselves against it, it will not yet let go its hold in  
 “ the human heart. Choose not, therefore, so fatal a  
 “ resource for yourselves in your present destitute situa-  
 “ tion, hanging as you are on the very brink of ruin.  
 “ Let not your conduct resemble the foolish behaviour  
 “ of the mob of mankind ; who, though by human  
 “ means their safety might be earned, yet, when cala-  
 “ mity hath chaled away all visible hopes of redress,  
 “ betake themselves to others of a darker cast, to divi-  
 “ nations and to oracles, and all such vain expedients  
 “ as hope suggesteth, to draw them to their destruc-  
 “ tion.”

## MELIANS.

“ DIFFICULT indeed, as we apprehend, and you  
 “ well know, the contest must prove to us against your  
 “ strength and fortune, matched as we are so unequally  
 “ together. Yet the confidence still supporteth us,  
 “ that in fortune, since of divine disposal, we shall not  
 “ be inferior, as with innocence on our side we stand a-  
 “ gainst injustice ; that, farther, our deficiencies in  
 “ strength

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“ strength will be amplified by the addition of Lacedæmonian aid; since it is incumbent upon them to support us, if from no other motive, yet from the ties of blood and a sense of honour. And thus it is not intirely without good grounds that we can form the resolution to withstand your efforts.”

ATHENIANS.

“ N O R have we any reason to apprehend, on our own account, that the divine benevolence will not equally exert itself for us; because neither our opinions nor our acts are worse than those of the rest of mankind, either in regard to the worship of the gods or an acknowledgement of their providence. For of the divine nature we think like the rest of the world; and of men, that beyond a scruple they are impelled, by the necessary bent of their nature, to seize dominion wherever they have power. As for ourselves, we were not the authors of this constitution, nor were we the first who digested it into practice. We found it already in force; we have accordingly applied it, and shall leave it behind us for the practice of every future age; conscious that you yourselves, and every other *State*, invested with equal power, would make the same exertion of it. And truly, so far as relateth to the gods, we have no more reason to distrust their protection than our neighbours. But your sentiments of the Lacedæmonians are such, that you are confident of support from them because it will be base in them to refuse it. Here we bless your simplicity, but envy not your folly. The Lacedæmonians, we allow, amongst one another, and in paying all due regard to the laws of their country, give ample proofs of honour and virtue: But their behaviour towards the rest of mankind, though it would open a large field of censure were it to be minutely examined, yet at present shall be shewn by one concise declaration,

“ tion, — that, according to the best lights we have  
 “ been able to collect, they repute as honourable the  
 “ things which please them, and as just — the things  
 “ which promote their interest. Such maxims are not  
 • “ in the least conducive to your preservation : It is all  
 “ chimera.”

MELIANS.

“ NO. We ground our hopes of relief from them  
 “ upon their own clear conviction of what their interest  
 “ injoineth them. This never can suffer them to enter-  
 “ tain a thought of abandoning the Melians, who are  
 “ a colony of their own ; of being faithless to the *States*  
 “ of Greece, who wish them well ; or of promoting the  
 “ schemes of the common foe.”

ATHENIANS.

“ O F consequence you imagine, — that their interest  
 “ is connected with your security ; that the duties of jus-  
 “ tice should in honour be observed, though attended  
 “ with dangers. But these are maxims which the La-  
 “ cedæmonians, least of all men, have resolution enough  
 “ to observe in fact.”

MELIANS.

“ WE have the strongest grounds to imagine, that  
 “ in our defence they will hazard any dangers, from a  
 “ sense that their own preservation dependeth more on  
 “ us than any other people, as we are finely situated for  
 “ doing them service in Peloponnesus, and in affection  
 “ are more faithfully attached to them through the  
 “ bands of consanguinity.”

ATHENIANS.

ATHENIANS.

“ BUT the certainty of obtaining succour in the intervals of need seemeth not to depend so much on the merit of those who implore it, as on the consciousness of superior strength in those who are implored to give it: A maxim, this, to which no *State* adheres so strictly as the Lacedæmonian. Hence, ever through a diffidence of their own domestic force, they never dare even to invade their neighbours without the concurrence of numerous allies. There cannot, therefore, be the least room to expect, that they will transport an aid into an island whilst we are masters of the sea.”

MELIANS.

“ NOT perhaps of their own forces ; but they have confederates enow to employ in this service. The sea of Crete is wide and spacious; a passage through it even the lords of the sea will find it more difficult to obstruct than those who are intent on stealing it to effect with safety. Or, grant they miscarry in the attempt, at worst they can make a diversion upon your territory, or against the remainder of your dependents who escaped the efforts of Brasidas. And then your attention and your arms must be drawn from a quarter where you have no right to fix them, for the necessary defence of your own home and your own appendage.”

ATHENIANS.

“ THOUGH such turns may intervene, your own experience should teach you to distrust them: For you are not, cannot, be ignorant, that the Athenians never yet would condescend to raise a siege through  
G 4
“ hostile

“ hostile dread. But we cannot avoid observing, that,  
“ in the whole course of this debate, though de-  
“ clared by you to be held as the means of your prefer-  
“ vation, you have not so much as started one single  
“ point upon which wise men can presume to fasten the  
“ least confidence of redress. Your firmest security is  
“ placed in the faint hope of some distant contingen-  
“ cies; but your present strength is merely trifling a-  
“ gainst the extensive scope of your antagonists. Nay,  
“ victims you must fall to your own absurd presumptions,  
“ unless, when we are once withdrawn to give you time  
“ to consult, you determine to try some other expe-  
“ dient. You will then no longer be controuled by  
“ that sense of shame, which, when dishonour glareth  
“ before and danger presseth on, precipitateth men in-  
“ to ruin. For though they see, with their eyes quite  
“ open, into what an abyss they are going to plunge,  
“ yet, to avoid the imputation of what the world sti-  
“ leth dishonour, — so prevalent is the force of one be-  
“ witching sound! — though vanquished by it, they  
“ scorn to yield to reason, wilfully embarrassing them-  
“ selves with incurable calamities, and contracting a  
“ more shameful weight of dishonour, through their  
“ own mad obstinacy, than fortune could award them.  
“ Such consequences you are now concerned by mature  
“ deliberations to avoid. You are next to reflect, that  
“ no shame can attend your plying under the force of a  
“ most formidable *State*; a *State*, which designeth to  
“ make the moderate demands alone, — that you would  
“ accept her alliance, and securely enjoy your territory  
“ upon the condition only to pay her tribute; and,  
“ when war or safety are left to your own option, that  
“ you would not peevishly prefer the worst. For those  
“ are the men, to maintain themselves in credit and  
“ prosperity, who never suffer their equals to insult  
“ them, who pay proper regard to their superiors, and  
“ towards their inferiors behave with moderation.  
“ Reflect on these points whilst we withdraw; and re-  
“ member,

“ member, again and again, that your country now  
 “ calleth for all your prudence, since, by the single de-  
 “ liberation of this single day, as either it taketh a prof-  
 “ perous or sinister turn, her fate will be determi-  
 “ ned.”

Here the Athenians withdrew from the conference ;  
 and the Melians, after being some time alone, and re-  
 solving finally to reject what they had already refused,  
 gave in their answer thus :

“ WE continue, Athenians, in the very same senti-  
 “ ments we have already declared. We shall not in  
 “ an instant of time abandon that liberty, which, in the  
 “ free possession of our own *State*, we have enjoyed for  
 “ the space of seven hundred years ; which still we shall  
 “ spare no endeavours to preserve, intrusting it to that  
 “ fortune which, by divine permission, hath hitherto  
 “ preserved it, and to that redress we expect from hu-  
 “ man aid and the Lacedæmonians. But thus much  
 “ again we offer:—To be friends to you, enemies to  
 “ neither, on condition you quit our lands, after an  
 “ accommodation ratified between us to our reciprocal  
 “ satisfaction.”

The Melians in this manner delivered their final an-  
 swer. But the Athenians, the very moment they quit-  
 ted the place of conference, uttered themselves thus :

“ YOU, Melians, alone, of all mankind, are the  
 “ persons, so far as we can judge, who regard future  
 “ contingencies as an over-balance for instant dangers,  
 “ and, through mad presumption, value things yet in-  
 “ visible as really actual. But, the greater your depen-  
 “ dence, the more rash your confidence, upon Lacedæ-  
 “ monians, upon fortune, and upon hope, the more  
 “ abundantly fatal your delusions will prove.”

And,



And, this said, the Athenian deputation returned to their camp.

But the Athenian commanders, upon this refusal of submission from the Melians, applied themselves instantly to the acts of war; and, dividing the work in shares to the several parties in their army, completely shut up the Melians in a line of circumvallation. And, when this was perfected, and a sufficient number, both of the Athenians and their dependents, were appointed to stay behind and continue the blockade both by land and sea, they departed with the bulk of their forces. Those farther, who were left for this service, staid behind and continued the blockade.

About the same time, the Argives, making an irruption into Phliasia, and caught in an ambuscade, laid for them by the Phliasians and their own exiles, were slaughtered to the number of eighty.

The Athenians, by their excursions from Pylus, committed many depredations on the Lacedæmonians. But these had not influence enough upon the Lacedæmonians to cause a renunciation of the peace, or a renewal of the war. They only proclaimed, that "their people had free leave to make reprisals on the Athenians."

The Corinthians also had a war with the Athenians, on account of some private differences between them; but the rest of Peloponnesus interfered not in the quarrel.

The Melians, farther, assaulting it by night, carried that part of the Athenian circumvallation which lay close to their market. They slew the guards who were posted there; and, having gained a conveyance into the town for provisions, and all necessary stores they could procure by money, they afterwards withdrew, and discontinued all efforts of resistance: But the Athenians took  
care

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care for the future to place a stronger guard upon their works. And here the summer ended.

In the winter which followed, the Lacedæmonians drew out their forces in order to begin an expedition into Argia; but, when the victims, offered on the frontiers, boded no success to the expedition, they again withdrew. Yet the Argives, as such an invasion had been intended against them, suspected it was owing to the intrigues of a faction within their city; some of whom they immediately secured, but the rest escaped by flight.

About the same time also, the Melians carried another part of the Athenian circumvallation, as the party by which it was guarded was not numerous. But, upon such disturbances, a strong reinforcement was sent from Athens, under the command of Philocrates, the son of Demeas. The Melians were now closely invested on all sides; and, some schemes to betray the town being in agitation amongst them, they thought proper to make a voluntary surrender. This they did "at the discretion of the Athenians;" who put to death all they found within the place able to bear arms, and made the women and children slaves. The town they afterwards re-peopled by sending thither a colony of five hundred.

**T H E**



T H E  
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

B O O K VI.

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**I**N the same winter, the Athenians came to a resolution, to make a second expedition against Sicily, with a larger force than had been sent thither heretofore, under Laches and Eurymedon, and to attempt its total reduction. The bulk of the people was, in truth, ignorant of the largeness of the island, and of the multitude of the Grecians and Barbarians by whom it was inhabited; ignorant, farther, that they were going to embark in a war, not much less considerable than the Peloponnesian.

The compass of Sicily is little under eight days sail for a trading vessel; and, though it be so large, it is severed from the main-land, so as not to be part of the continent, by a gut, in breadth but \*twenty stadia. The manner in which it was inhabited in the earliest ages was *this*; and the several nations which possessed it *these*.

The Cyclops and Lestrigons are said to be the most ancient inhabitants of some part of this country; but, from what stock they were derived, or from whence they came hither, or what is become of them since, I have nothing to relate. Poetical amusements must here

\* About 2 miles.

suffice,

suffice, or such information as every man picks up for his own use.

The Sicanians appear to be the first people who, next to those, inhabited this country; though, according to their own accounts, they are prior; because they claim to themselves the original tenure: But, according to the truest discoveries, they are found to have been Iberians, who were compelled to remove from the banks of the Sicanus, in Iberia, by the Libyans. And from them, at that time, this island received the name of Sicania, having before been called Trinacria. They continue, to this day, to inhabit the western parts of Sicily.

After the taking of Troy, some of the Trojans, who had escaped the Achæans, arrive in their vessels upon the Sicilian shore, and, forming a settlement adjacent to the Sicanians, they all took jointly the name of Elymi; and their cities were Eryx and Egesta. They were also increased by the accession of some Phocians from Troy, who, having first been driven to Libya by a storm, passed over afterwards from thence into Sicily.

The Siculi passed over first into Sicily from Italy, for there they originally dwelled. They fled before the Opici; and, as the story is told, not without probability, having observed how the current set within the strait and seized a favourable gale, they crossed over upon rafts, and perhaps by some other methods. There are, even to this very day, a people in Italy called Siculi; and that region, in a similar manner, obtained its name of Italy from a certain Arcadian king, who bore the name of Italus. These, crossing into Sicily with formidable numbers, and vanquishing the Sicanians in battle, drove them into the southern and western parts, caused the name of the island to be changed from Sicania to Sicily, settled themselves in, and kept possession of, the richest tracts in the country, since their passage hither was near three hundred years earlier than the landing of any Grecians in Sicily. Nay, they continue,

to this very day, in possession of the midland and northerly parts of the island.

The Phœnicians also had settlements quite round the coast of Sicily. They secured the capes on the sea and the small circumjacent isles, for the sake of trafficking with the Sicilians. But, when the Grecians, in considerable numbers, began to cross over and fix their residence here, the Phœnicians abandoned their other settlements, and, uniting together, seated themselves at Motya, and Sokoeis, and Panormus, near to the Elymi; secure of their own continuance in these quarters from their friendship with the Elymi, and because, from this part of Sicily, the passage to Carthage is exceeding short. — So many were the barbarians seated in Sicily; and such the order of their settlements.

The first Grecians who came hither were the Chalcidæans of Eubœa. Thucles led the colony, which settled at Naxos, and erected the altar of Apollo the *Guide*, which is still to be seen without the city; and on which the *deputations*, sent from hence to the oracles, offer sacrifice before they begin their voyage.

In the year following, Archias, a Corinthian, of the race of Hercules, founded Syracuse, having previously expelled the Sicilians out of that island on which the *inner-city* is seated, though now no longer washed round about by the sea. And, in process of time, the *upper-city* also, being taken in by a wall, became exceeding populous.

In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, Thucles and his Chalcidæans sallied forth out of Naxos; and having, by force of arms, drove away the Sicilians, they build Leontium, and afterwards Catana. But the Catanæans themselves declared Evarchus their founder.

About the same point of time, Lamis also, leading a colony from Megara, arrived in Sicily, and planted them on a spot called Trotilus, upon the river Pantacias. But, removing afterwards from thence to Leontium, he associated himself a short time with the Catanæans for the protection

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protection of his party; yet, being ejected by them, and then having founded Thapsus, he dies. His followers, upon this, removed from Thapsus; and, Myblon, a Sicilian king, betraying another place into their hands, and becoming himself their conductor, they settled those Megaréans who are called Hyblæan; and, after a continued possession of two hundred forty-five years, they were expelled out of their city and territory by Gelon, tyrant of the Syracusans. Yet, before this ejection, about a hundred years after their settlement there, they had sent out Pammilus, and built the city of Selinus. Pammilus had come thither more lately from Megara, their mother-city, and assisted them in making this new settlement at Selinus.

Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus from Crete, each leading a separate colony, founded Gela in conjunction, in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The name of this new city was taken from the river Gela: Yet the spot where the city now stands, and which was first walled round, is called Lindii. But their polity was framed upon the Doric model.

In the hundred and eighth year, as near as possible, after this last settlement, the Geloans built Acragas, giving the city its name from the river Acragas. They declared Aristonous and Pythilus to be its founders, and gave it the civil institutions of Gela.

Zanclé was originally founded by a band of pirates, who arrived there from Cymé, a Chalcidic city in Opicia; though afterwards a numerous reinforcement, from Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa, joined them, and possessed that district in community. The founders were Perieres and Cratæmenes; one of them from Cymé, the other from Chalcis. But the name of Zanclé was first of all given it by the Sicilians, because in shape it bears resemblance to a scythe, and the Sicilians call a scythe *zanc'um*. But, in process of time, these people were driven from thence by the Samians and other Ionians, who, flying from the Medes, had landed in Sicily.

ly. And, after a short interval, Anaxilas, tyrant of the Rhegians, ejected the Samians, repopled the city with a number of mixed inhabitants, and changed its name to Messene, in honour of the country from whence he was originally descended. Himera also was founded from Zancle by Euclides, and Simus, and Sacon. Into this colony came also a very numerous body of Chalcidæans. Some exiles farther from Syracuse, who had been worsted in a sedition, and were distinguished by the title of Miletidæ, took up their residence amongst them. Hence their dialect became a mixture of the Chalcidic and the Doric; but the Chalcidic model obtained in their civil institutions.

Acraë and Casmenæ were founded by the Syracusans; Acraë seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenæ near twenty after Acraë. Camarina also was first founded by the Syracusans, very nearly one hundred thirty-five years after the building of Syracuse: Its founders were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Camarinæans being afterwards driven out by the arms of the Syracusans, because of a revolt, in process of time, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, received the lands of the Camarinæans as a ransom for some Syracusan prisoners of war, and taking upon himself to be their founder, replanted Camarina. Yet once more again it was demolished by Gelon; and replanted a third time by the same Gelon. So many nations of Greeks and Barbarians inhabited Sicily.

An island so large and so populous the Athenians were passionately bent on invading. Their truest and final view was to compass its total reduction; but the pretext, alledged for a colour, was their readiness to succour such as by blood were related, or by prior alliances had been attached to them. An Egestæan embassy, now residing at Athens, laboured the point with all possible industry, and with extraordinary earnestness pressed them to engage in it. For the Egestæans, who bordered upon the Selinuntians, had been embroiled in a  
war

war with the latter, about some connubial points, and a certain tract of land to which both laid claim. The Selinuntians, farther, assisted by their Syracusan allies, pressed hard upon them both by land and sea. And hence, the Egestéans were now suggesting at Athens, that “ they ought not to forget their alliance with the  
 “ Leontines, made by Laches in the former war ;” requesting farther, that a naval force might be sent thither for their succour. To this purpose many other arguments were alledged by them, but the principal was this: “ If the Syracusans, who have overthrown the Leon-  
 “ tines, be left in the unmolested enjoyment of their  
 “ conquest, and proceed still farther to destroy the re-  
 “ maining parties of that alliance, they will get into  
 “ their hands the whole power of Sicily. Such an e-  
 “ vent would be attended with the utmost danger ; left  
 “ in consequence of it, as they were Doric by descent,  
 “ they might think themselves bound by the ties  
 “ of blood to assist with a powerful armament their kin-  
 “ dred Dorians, and, in quality of colonies, might suc-  
 “ cour those Peloponnesians by whom they were origi-  
 “ nally planted, and thus form a combination to de-  
 “ molish the Athenian empire. In policy, therefore,  
 “ the Athenians were obliged to support the allies who  
 “ yet remained, in order to make head against the Sy-  
 “ racusans ; and this the more readily, as they them-  
 “ selves would undertake to furnish them with sums  
 “ of money equal to the exigencies of the war.” With  
 such discourse the Athenians were frequently entertained  
 in their popular assemblies, as the Egestean embassa-  
 dors, still urging their point, had gained many advo-  
 cates to second their arguments. And at length it was  
 decreed, that “ ambassadors should be previously dis-  
 “ patched to Egesta to inspect the state of their wealth,  
 “ whether they had such sums as they talked of in the  
 “ public treasury and the temples ; and also to draw  
 “ up a report of the present posture of their war against  
 Vol. II. H “ the

“ the Selinuntians.” And, in pursuance of this, the ambassadors from the Athenians were sent to Sicily.

The Lacedæmonians, in the same winter, joined by their allies, those of Corinth excepted, and marching into Argia, ravaged a small part of that territory, and carried off the corn, having brought carriages for that purpose. They also removed the Argive exiles to Ornea, and left them a small detachment from their main army for the security of their persons. A temporary truce being also made, during which the Orneatæ and Argives were to abstain from all hostilities against one another, they drew off the army to their respective homes.

However, not long after this, the Athenians arrived with thirty sail of ships and six hundred heavy-armed. The Argives, in conjunction with the Athenians, took the field with all their strength, and besieged those in Ornea for the space of a day. But, as at night the besiegers removed to a distance in order for repose, those of Ornea made their escape. On the day following, the Argives, when sensible of their escape, levelled Ornea with the ground, and then withdrew. And afterwards the Athenians re-embarked for Athens.

The Athenians also threw in by sea a party of horsemen into Methone, a frontier-town on Macedonia. With these, consisting of their own citizens and such Macedonians as had refuged among them, they harraided the country belonging to Perdiccas. But the Lacedæmonians sent a summons of aid for Perdiccas to the Chalcidæans of Thrace, who kept terms with the Athenians by truces renewed every tenth day : These however refused to march. Thus ended the winter, and with it the sixteenth year of the war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history.

· YEAF

## . Y E A R XVII.†

IN the succeeding summer, very early in the spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, accompanied by the Egestæans. They brought sixty talents of uncoined silver, being a month's pay for sixty sail of ships, the equipment of which for succour they were instructed to solicit from the Athenians. Upon this, an assembly of the people was called, and the reports of the Egistæan and their own ambassadors were received, consisting of many points, specious indeed, but false in fact; and, so far as related to their treasure, that "sums ample enough are already repositied in their temples and their public treasury." In consequence of this, a decree was made, that "a fleet of sixty ships should sail for Sicily; the commanders, Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and \* Lamachus, the son of Xenophanes, to be invested with full powers to act at their own discretion. The

† Before Christ 415.

\* Lamachus, the third in this commission, seems to have been picked out for the command for the peculiar constitution of his own character, which was a proper mean between the cautious and plegmatic disposition of Nicias and the fiery impetuous ardour of Alcibiades. He was now, according to Plutarch, a brave old experienced officer. In his youth he had been remarkable for heat and fire; a length of service and years had mellowed him into the right temper, to do his duty at once, and then gallantly to carry the point into execution. But then, he wanted the means of properly supporting the authority and dignity of his post. He was now ranked with two of the most wealthy and noble Athenians; whereas his own condition was low; nay, he was (according to Plutarch) so exceedingly poor, that, before he went to any foreign command, he was used to petition the *State* for a little money to furnish him out, and even to buy him some shoes. Mr. Wallis, in his notes on *Thucydides*, refers us for his character to a comedy of Aristophanes (*The Acharnians*); that is, to enquire after the character of a plain blunt officer from a professed droll, or to seek truth from him who ridiculed all mankind. Aristophanes hath represented Lamachus as a vain glorious roasting bully, a mere throb of arms, a creature of verbal pomp and parade; contrary to all the truth of history. Writers, who live by turning great and good men into ridicule, should never be reckoned good evidence as to the truth and reality of characters, when history assists.



“ whole armament to act as an aid to the Egistæans against the Selinuntians ; to replace also the Leontines in their former habitations, if the state of the war gave them leisure to execute that service ; and to manage all other points in Sicily as they should judge most beneficial for the Athenian interest.”

But, the fifth day after this, another assembly of the people was held upon the *ways* and *means* to expedite the equipment of the fleet, and by proper decrees to supply the commanders with what might be requisite to accelerate their departure. Nicias, who against his will had been named for a commander, was persuaded that the public determinations were rash and premature, since, on short examination, and motives merely specious, they were bent on the total reduction of Sicily,—an arduous undertaking ! Now therefore he stood up ; and, having a mind to stop proceedings, he advised the Athenians as follows :

“ I A M aware that the present assembly is held to concert the means of expediting our preparations, and to get all in readiness for the expedition to Sicily. But, in my sentiments, we ought once more to resume the consideration of the previous point, “ Whether upon the whole it be adviseable to equip out such a fleet ;” and not, by rash and premature resolves on points of such vast importance, through too easy compliance with foreign solicitations, to embroil ourselves in an unnecessary war. For my own part, truly, I am invested with honour by the present measures, and no man upon earth is so little anxious about his own personal safety. But at the same time I pronounce that person to be a valuable member of the public, who makes use of all his prudence to preserve his own life and property : For such an one, purely for his own private benefit, must be desirous that the public welfare flourish and abound. But, however, neither in the preceding assemblies could  
“ the

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“ the preeminence of honour awarded to me bias me to  
“ speak in contradiction to my judgement ; nor shall it  
“ bias me at present ; but what I think tends most to  
“ the public good, that only shall I utter.

“ I am also sensible, that what I can urge may have  
“ but little influence on Athenian tempers, when I at-  
“ tempt persuading you to secure what you already  
“ possess, and not to hazard the present for things invi-  
“ sible and future ; but that your eagerness is quite un-  
“ seasonable ; and that the ends, which you too fan-  
“ guinely propose, are not easy to be accomplished ; —  
“ these things I shall clearly demonstrate.

“ To this purpose I aver, that, if the intended expe-  
“ dition proceeds, you are going to leave many ene-  
“ mies behind you here, and to take the most certain  
“ method of fetching hither more numerous opponents.  
“ You imagine, perhaps, that the late peace will be  
“ firmly and constantly observed ; though it is merely a  
“ nominal peace, and that only so long as you remain  
“ inactive. Nay, such it hath been made by the con-  
“ duct of some even of our own community. And,  
“ should any considerable force of ours have the  
“ unhappiness to sink under hostile efforts, our old  
“ enemies will be suddenly upon us ; since merely by  
“ calamities they were reduced to an accommodation,  
“ and, in a manner more disgraceful to themselves than  
“ to us, were necessitated to treat. In the next place,  
“ we have found, that in the treaty itself many arti-  
“ cles are still controverted. There are, farther, di-  
“ vers *States*, and those by no means the weakest,  
“ who have not accepted the accommodation ; but, on  
“ the contrary, are still in arms against us ; whilst o-  
“ thers are inhibited merely by ten-day truces, and that  
“ only because the Lacedæmonian measures are hither-  
“ to pacific. But suddenly perhaps, when once they  
“ find our strength divided, the very measure into  
“ which we are now precipitating ourselves, they may  
“ fall upon us in a general combination, augmented by

“ the strength of Sicily, whose accession to their for-  
 “ mer confederacy they would have been glad to pur-  
 “ chase at any price. On these possibilities we are  
 “ bound sedately to reflect, that we may not plunge a  
 “ *State*, so highly exalted, into superfluous dangers, nor  
 “ fondly covet to wrest their empire from the hands  
 “ of others before we have adequately insured our  
 “ own: Since the Chalcidéans of Thrace, though so  
 “ many years are now elapsed since they first revolted,  
 “ are not yet reduced; and some other *States* on the  
 “ continent render us only a precarious obedience.

“ Yet—“ to the Egestéans, our old allies, who are  
 “ injuriously oppressed, we are bound in honour to send  
 “ a most speedy succour.”——And, in the mean time,  
 “ we continue to defer avenging ourselves upon those,  
 “ whose revolt from us is of long standing now, and  
 “ whose injustice we are still obliged to suffer. Though  
 “ the latter, could we once bring them back to their  
 “ duty, we might easily controul for the future: But  
 “ the former, should we ever become their masters, re-  
 “ mote and numerous as they are, we should not with-  
 “ out difficulty be able to awe. It must be madness,  
 “ therefore, to invade that people, whom, though con-  
 “ quered, you can never retain in their obedience;  
 “ and who, in case the attempt against them miscarry,  
 “ will for the future be much more disaffected towards  
 “ you than they were before that attempt was made.

“ But it is farther my real opinion, that the Sicilians,  
 “ as their affairs are now circumstantiated, would be-  
 “ come less formidable to us, if once reduced to the  
 “ Syracusan yoke;—and yet on this remote contingen-  
 “ cy the Egestéans have chiefly insisted, in order to a-  
 “ larm us. Perhaps *now* it may come to pass, that its  
 “ single *States* may combine against us to gratify the  
 “ Lacedæmonians: But, in the other case, it is quite  
 “ improbable that an united empire would hazard its  
 “ own welfare to demolish another. For if, acting  
 “ from a political precaution, they may side with the  
 “ Peloponnesians

“ Peloponnesians to overturn our empire, those very  
 “ Peloponnesians may probably, from the same princi-  
 “ ple, concur with us to demolish the Sicilian. As  
 “ for us, the Grecians there may have reason to dread  
 “ us most if we go not at all amongst them; and,  
 “ what is next to that, if we only give them a sight  
 “ of our power for a short time, and then withdraw.  
 “ But if, acting offensively, we incur miscarriage, they  
 “ will instantly despise us, and join our neighbouring  
 “ foes to annoy us here. For things that are placed  
 “ most remotely from us, as likewise those which yield  
 “ no opportunity of adjusting our opinion of them by  
 “ experience, such, it is universally known, are most  
 “ apt to excite admiration. Reflect, ye citizens of A-  
 “ thens, that your present elevation of spirits is owing  
 “ to your success against the Lacedæmonians and allies.  
 “ You crouched for fear under their first attacks; till,  
 “ having gained the superiority over them, to their utter  
 “ disappointment, you instantly despised them. And  
 “ now, nothing less than Sicily can content you. We  
 “ by no means ought to be too much buoyed up by the  
 “ disasters of our foes, but only to be so far confident as  
 “ we are able to awe their intriguing tempers. We ought  
 “ to ascribe no other view to the Lacedæmonians, than  
 “ a vigilant care to seize the first opportunity of wiping  
 “ off their disgrace by giving us a blow, and thus réco-  
 “ vering their former reputation; and that they are  
 “ most earnest on accomplishing this, since, from time  
 “ immemorial, the glory of military valour hath been  
 “ their warmest, most prevailing, passion. Our welfare  
 “ therefore, if we knew in what our welfare consists,  
 “ by no means summons us to enter the lists in be-  
 “ half of the Egestæans of Sicily, who to us are mere  
 “ barbarians; but to exert our utmost vigilance to  
 “ guard our own constitution from oligarchical in-  
 “ croachments.

“ My duty obligeth me also to remind you, that we  
 “ have had but a short respite to breathe from the ha-

“ voc made amongst us by pestilence and war, and  
 “ to repair the prodigious waste of our fortunes and  
 “ our lives. These, according to all the rules of equi-  
 “ ty, should be reserved for our own domestic exigen-  
 “ cies, and not be lavished away on a set of fugitives,  
 “ who implore our protection, and are bound in inte-  
 “ rest to tell specious falsehoods; though, whilst plun-  
 “ ging their neighbours into hazards, they have no-  
 “ thing but words to contribute; and, should we re-  
 “ dress them, know not how to be grateful; but, in  
 “ case we miscarry in the attempt, must involve their  
 “ friends in their own destruction.

“ If there be, farther, a *person*, who, elevated with  
 “ his own designation to the command, incites you  
 “ earnestly to sail; heedful of nothing but his own pri-  
 “ vate views, nor qualified by his years for so important  
 “ a trust; if his passion be merely to excite admiration  
 “ for his fine breed of horses, or, by the gains of his  
 “ commission, to repair the havoc of his fortune caused  
 “ by prodigality; I conjure you to afford no such per-  
 “ son an opportunity to make a splendid figure at the  
 “ expence of your country: But rest convinced, that  
 “ men of such a turn will be corrupt in public office,  
 “ as they are bad œconomists in private life; that the  
 “ enterprize in hand is a very arduous trust, far be-  
 “ yond such measures or such exploits as a stripling can  
 “ devise or execute.

“ I own myself intimidated by that crowd of youths  
 “ who sit by this *person* and abet his schemes. I am  
 “ hence obliged to implore the men of years and expe-  
 “ rience, who happen to sit near them, by no means to  
 “ dread that appearance of pusillanimity, which, in  
 “ case this decree of war be revoked, might be objec-  
 “ ted to them; by no means to indulge the same raw  
 “ passions by which boys are actuated, so as to dote  
 “ upon remote contingencies. You, gentlemen, by  
 “ experience are convinced, that success exceedingly  
 “ seldom results from hot and sanguine presumption,  
 “ but

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“ but most frequently from calm and prudent deliberation. In behalf, therefore, of your country, which is now on the brink of more critical dangers than ever it was known before, hold up your hands in opposition, and support what I am going to move; namely,—That “ the Sicilians, confining themselves within their present limits, which we do not pretend to abridge, with free navigation along the coast of the Ionian gulf, and transacting their own affairs at large through the whole extent of the Sicilian seas, be at liberty to take care of their own concerns without any molestation :”—And, in particular, to return the Egestæans the following answer :—— “ Since, without the privity of the Athenians, they have already involved themselves in a war against the Selnuntians, let them also, without the concurrence of the Athenians, bring it to a conclusion : That, moreover, we shall form no alliance for the future, as hath formerly been the case, with men whose indirect behaviour we must be forced to abet, though, when we stand in need of reciprocal assistance from them, we shall get none at all.”

“ And you, sir, who at present preside in this assembly, if you are conscious that it is your duty to superintend the public welfare, if you are desirous to behave like a worthy patriot, put the question, and call upon the Athenians once more to give their votes. And, in case you are afraid to act contrary to order, in proposing what is counter to a former decree ; reflect that, when so great a crowd of witnesses are at hand to justify the step, you only act the part of a physician to your country, which hath swallowed down pernicious counsels ; and that he best dischargeth the duty of first magistrate, who will render to his country all the service he is able ; at least, with his eyes open, will never suffer it to be hurt.”

In

In this manner Nicias delivered his sentiments. But the far greater part of the Athenians who were present declared for the expedition, and against the repeal of what had been already decreed. Some however there were, who made a fruitless opposition.

The person who shewed most ardour, and pressed them most earnestly to proceed, was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias; partly from a resolution to oppose Nicias, with whom, in other political points, he generally clashed, and because he had calumniously glanced at him in his speech; but, principally, because he was ambitious of being at the head of this expedition. He presumed, that not Sicily only, but Carthage also, might be reduced by himself; and, when he should be the author of so great a success, that he must needs abound in wealth and glory. His credit was great, at present, amongst the citizens; but the warmth of his passions threw him into larger expences than his fortune could support, being sumptuous in every article of life, and especially in horses. And it was chiefly by him that the final overthrow of Athens was at length occasioned. For the bulk of the city, alarmed at the great irregularity of his private life, the excessive luxury of his dress and diet, as also at that greatness of spirit which he shewed in every single branch of his conduct, turned out enemies to him as a man who affected the tyranny. And though, when in public commands, he conducted the war with the utmost bravery, yet, at home, each single citizen was chagrined at his manners, and displaced him to make room for others, which soon drew after it the subversion of the *State*. Upon this occasion, therefore, Alcibiades stood up, and advised the Athenians as follows :

“ YES; to me, ye citizens of Athens, in preference  
 “ to others, this command is due;—for with this I  
 “ must needs begin, since on this point Nicias hath at-  
 “ tacked

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“tacked me;—and I also judge myself deserving of the  
“trust. In regard to those things which have caused  
“me to be so loudly censured; those very things give  
“splendor to my ancestors and to myself, and are of  
“public emolument also to my country. The great  
“magnificence I displayed at the Olympic solemnities  
“hath raised in the Grecians an idea of Athens far be-  
“yond its actual strength; though, previous to this,  
“they entertained the hope of being able totally to war  
“her down, For I am the man who brought seven  
“chariots thither, more than any private person ever  
“furnished out before; who carried off the first, and  
“the second, and the fourth, prize; and, in all other  
“respects, supported my quality as a victor. Such  
“things, it must be owned, are declared to be honour  
“by the laws of Greece; and, whenever atchieved,  
“they leave a high opinion of power behind them.  
“The splendid figure I have made at home, whether  
“in exhibiting entertainments for the public, or any o-  
“ther method of munificence, may naturally excite the  
“envy of Athenians, but are to strangers instances of  
“our grandeur. And that man’s extravagant spirit is  
“not useless to the public, who, at his own private  
“expence, does service not merely to himself, but to  
“a whole community. Nor can it imply injustice, for  
“a person, whose sentiments are generous and exalted,  
“to soar above the ordinary level; since, should he af-  
“terwards be reduced to a state of depression, no man  
“is to share in his reverse of fortune. As therefore in  
“calamity we are not to expect even civil salutations,  
“let others in the mean time submit, as in justice they  
“ought, to that assuming behaviour which prosperity  
“inspireth; or, at least, let equality of demeanor be  
“first shewn by him who demands it as a debt from an-  
“other. I am indeed aware, that persons of such un-  
“common elevation, and all in general, who, in some  
“splendid qualities, outshine the crowd, must, so long  
“as they live, be the objects of spleen, chiefly to those  
“who



" who claim equality with them; and, in the next  
 " place, to those amongst whom they are conversant:  
 " And yet, to succeeding generations, they leave an  
 " ambition of claiming affinity to them, though quite  
 " groundless and chimerical; and to their country,  
 " whatever it be, the haughty boast, that they were  
 " not aliens, were not offenders, but citizens of its own  
 " growth, and patriots of true renown and worth. Of  
 " such reversionary honours I own myself ambitious;  
 " and, in order to succeed in the pursuit, have ever  
 " rendered my name illustrious in private life; and, as  
 " to my public behaviour, reflect, Athenians, whether  
 " I am inferior to any person whatever, in performing  
 " good services to my country. For I am the person,  
 " who, without throwing you into hazard or expence,  
 " have brought the strongest powers of Peloponnesus  
 " to act in your concurrence; who reduced the Lace-  
 " dæmonians to stake their *all* upon the fortune of one  
 " day at Mantinéa. It is true, they came off victori-  
 " ous from the contest; but have not even yet so far  
 " resumed their spirits as to dare to act offensively.

" Such are the exploits which my greener years, nay  
 " even that unnatural giddiness imputed to me hath at-  
 " chieved; which, by insinuating language, hath made  
 " the Peloponnesian strength to ply before it, and, gi-  
 " ving energy to my frantic humour, hath now persua-  
 " ded the world that it is no longer to be dreaded.  
 " Whilst, therefore, I flourish in this manner, whilst  
 " Nicias yet continues to be esteemed *fortunate*,  
 " lay hold of that service we are each of us able to per-  
 " form; and by no means repeal the decree of our ex-  
 " pedition to Sicily, as if intended against a people we  
 " are not able to encounter.

" For in Sicily the cities swarm with crowds of pro-  
 " miscuous disunited inhabitants, inhabitants for ever  
 " used to sudden revolutions and to perpetual fluctua-  
 " tions. And hence, not one of those crowds is equip-  
 " ped with such arms as are requisite to defend a native  
 " soil,

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“ foil, or to secure even personal safety; nor is the re-  
“ gion supplied with the needful stores of resistance.  
“ It is the habit of each, either to execute his purpose  
“ by artful language, or to wrest it from the public by  
“ sedition. These are all his resources; and, if they  
“ fail, at the worst, he barely shifts his habitation. It  
“ is therefore improbable that a rabble, so jumbled to-  
“ gether, will ever be unanimously guided by one con-  
“ certed plan, or combine together for its just execu-  
“ tion. Each moment they will be veering about to  
“ such expedients as happen most to soothe their ca-  
“ price; and the more, upon account of these seditions,  
“ in which, we are informed, they are already em-  
“ broiled.

“ Their number of heavy-armed, it must also be ob-  
“ served, is not so large as the pompous accounts of  
“ fame have made it; nor does the sum total of the  
“ Grecians amongst them turn out so considerable as each  
“ city hath computed for her own. But Greece, in  
“ this manner ever addicted most terribly to belie her  
“ own numbers, hath been found, in the present war,  
“ scarce able to provide herself with arms.

“ Such, according to the best informations I have  
“ been able to collect, is the present condition of af-  
“ fairs in Sicily. Nay, there are means within our  
“ reach still more to facilitate its reduction. For we  
“ shall obtain the concurrence of many barbarians feat-  
“ ed there, who, from inveteracy against the Syracu-  
“ sans, will join us to attack them. Neither can any  
“ obstacles accrue from the situation of our affairs near-  
“ er home, if you only view it in the just and proper  
“ light.

“ The bravery of our fathers, though opposed by the  
“ very same enemies, who at present, it is urged,  
“ should we sail for Sicily, must be left behind us,  
“ though opposed by all the power of the Medæ, erected  
“ this our empire, by the sole resource of their superi-  
“ ority in naval power. The Peloponnesians, farther,  
“ have

“ have never had less hopes of being a match for us than  
 “ at this very juncture, even though their strength be in  
 “ all its maturity of vigour. It is true, they have it  
 “ ever in their option to make inroads into our domini-  
 “ ons, even though we waive this expedition; but, at  
 “ sea, they never can be able to hurt us: The fleet we  
 “ shall leave behind will be amply sufficient to make  
 “ head against them.

“ By what plausible arguments, therefore, can we ex-  
 “ cuse our behaviour, should we now pusillanimously  
 “ desist? what evasion can we find to deny our confede-  
 “ rates the succour they demanded? We are bound in  
 “ honour, by the oaths we have sworn, to undertake  
 “ their redress. Unavailing is the pretext, that they  
 “ have never done such good offices for us. Our alli-  
 “ ance with them was not made on the condition of their  
 “ failing hither to bring us succour, but of giving such  
 “ full employ to our enemies there, as might effectua-  
 “ ally deter them from coming hither. The ready  
 “ road to empire, as not Athenians only, but every  
 “ people who have risen to a summit of power, by ex-  
 “ perience know, is ever to succour those who implore  
 “ our protection, whether they be Greeks or barba-  
 “ rians. For, had it been the constant method to che-  
 “ rish indolent inactive measures, or minutely to liti-  
 “ gate who in justice ought to be protected, the en-  
 “ largement of our empire had been but trifling, or ra-  
 “ ther we had been liable to the loss of our original  
 “ portion. For a *State* invested with superior power  
 “ is not only openly opposed in the field, but recourse  
 “ is had to every precaution to prevent their appear-  
 “ ance in it. Neither is it in our power to prescribe ex-  
 “ act or arbitrary limitations to our own empire; but  
 “ we are by necessity compelled to cabal against some,  
 “ and with a high hand to keep others in subjection;  
 “ because, should we relax our command over others,  
 “ we endanger our own authority, and those we will  
 “ not awe may become our masters. Nor, farther,  
 “ ought

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“ ought peace to be so much the object of regard to  
“ you as it is to other people, unless you new-model  
“ your government, and render it conformable to that  
“ of your neighbours.

“ Weigh therefore these arguments; and be convin-  
“ ced, that *thus* only our interest is capable of any con-  
“ siderable advancement,—if we proceed against Sicily,  
“ and execute the expedition in order to deject the  
“ haughty Peloponnesian spirit, by so plain an instance  
“ how much we despise them, how little fond we are at  
“ present of this inactive interval, and how eager to  
“ begin again with a Sicilian voyage. And, by acting  
“ thus, there is probability on our side, that, in case  
“ we subdue the people there, we may gain the sove-  
“ reignty over all Greece; or, at worst, we shall de-  
“ press the Syracusan power: The latter point alone  
“ will be an important service to ourselves and our al-  
“ lies. But, in case any measure of success attends us,  
“ our ships will enable us to secure our acquisitions, or  
“ at worst our departure: For, though the whole body  
“ of the Sicilians combine together against us, we shall  
“ be absolute masters of our own retreat.

“ Let not therefore the words of Nicias, calculated  
“ merely for the service of sloth, and to raise dissensions  
“ between the young and the old, disconcert your plan.  
“ But let the usual decorum take place, observant  
“ of which our forefathers, at whose consultations both  
“ the seniors and the youths assisted, exalted this *State*  
“ to its present height; and do you now, adhering to  
“ the established practice, endeavour its farther exalta-  
“ tion. Remember also, that youth and age, if debar-  
“ red one another’s reciprocal assistance, lose all their  
“ influence and weight; that, on the other hand, from  
“ the wildness of youth, and the moderation of the  
“ middle-aged, and the consummate prudence of the  
“ old, when tempered harmoniously together, the most  
“ perfect strength must infallibly result; that a *State*,  
“ which supinely gives way to sloth, like other things  
“ for

“ for want of exercise, must infallibly droop and pine  
 “ away, and the whole of her skill grow old and obso-  
 “ lete ; but, when inured to uninterrupted conflict, it  
 “ is continually improving by practice, and will gain a  
 “ perfect habit of surmounting every obstacle ; not by  
 “ a parade of words, but by active perseverance.

“ Upon the whole I am firmly convinced, that a  
 “ *State*, which hath been accustomed to full employ,  
 “ must soon droop into destruction if it resigns itself to  
 “ sloth ; and that such persons take the best method  
 “ of infallibly securing their welfare, who adhere most  
 “ steadily to their present customs and laws, though  
 “ possibly better might be substituted in their stead.”

In this manner Alcibiades spoke. And the Athenians, moved by his arguments,—— which were also seconded by the intreaties of the Egestean and Leontine exiles, who, standing forth in the assembly, implored their protection, and, reminding them of their oaths, adjured them to redress their wrongs, — declared for the expedition with a warmer zeal than at any time before. Nicias was convinced by this, that whatever dissuasion he could alledge would be quite incapable to change their resolves. Yet as possibly, by a minute detail of the immense preparations he was going to demand, he might cause them at once to change their sentiments, he stood up again, and re-addressed them as follows :

“ I PERCEIVE, Athenians, that your resolutions  
 “ are fixed on this expedition beyond the power of dis-  
 “ suasion ; and——may its event be such as your wishes  
 “ portend ! But I shall once more beg leave to com-  
 “ municate to you my own sense of the affair.

“ According to the best informations I have been a-  
 “ ble to procure, we are now going to invade a num-  
 “ ber of powerful cities, cities independent of one an-  
 “ other, nor standing in need of public revolutions,  
 “ which people who cringe under the yoke of slavery  
 “ might

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“ might readily embrace, in order to render their condition more supportable. Nor is it, farther, to be  
“ presumed, that they will readily exchange their own  
“ liberty for subjection to us, as they are numerous, at  
“ least for one island, and many of them inhabited by  
“ Grecians. For, without reckoning Naxos and Catana, which I hope, upon account of their affinity to  
“ the Leontines, will side with us, there are no less than  
“ seven provided in all respects with as good martial habiliments and stores as our own armies; and more  
“ particularly those against which we chiefly bend our  
“ course, Selinus and Syracuse. These cities abound with  
“ soldiers heavy-armed, with archers, and with darters.  
“ They have a great number of triremes, and plenty  
“ of hands to man them. They possess a large quantity of wealth, not only in private purses, but in their  
“ public treasuries. So rich are even the Selinuntians.  
“ And to the Syracusans, farther, a tribute is paid by  
“ several barbarians. But the points, in which they  
“ most of all excel us, are, that numerous cavalry  
“ of which they are possessed, and corn of their own  
“ growth sufficient to answer all demands without foreign importations. An armament, therefore, simply naval, will by no means be sufficient to cope with  
“ such a strength. A large land force must accompany the naval, if we are desirous of performing such  
“ achievements as may be worthy the greatness of our  
“ power, and would not be debarred an opportunity  
“ of acting by their numerous cavalry. And this will  
“ be more needful, should the cities, alarmed at  
“ our approach, combine together against us, and no  
“ other friends but the Egesteans join us, or supply us  
“ with a body of cavalry sufficient to countenance our  
“ landing. It would be a terrible disgrace, should we  
“ be compelled by force to give over our design, or to  
“ send for a larger supply, as if our councils at first setting-out were rash and ill-concerted. We must steer  
“ at once against them with preparations in all respects  
“ well-

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“ well-proportioned to the design, since we know that we  
 “ are bound to a land far remote from our own, and  
 “ are under many disadvantages to grapple with our  
 “ foes. It will not be now your employment to march  
 “ to the relief of your dependents seated near to A-  
 “ thens against a hostile invasion, where all the needful  
 “ supplies would be brought to your camp out of the  
 “ territories of friends; but you are to roam to a dis-  
 “ tant climate, where you cannot call one inch of ground  
 “ your own, and from whence, in the four winter months,  
 “ you will scarcely be able to send a messenger to A-  
 “ thens.

“ In my opinion, therefore, it is incumbent upon us  
 “ to carry thither large parties of heavy-armed, to be  
 “ raised out of our own citizens, our allies, and our  
 “ dependents, and an additional strength of Pelopon-  
 “ nesians, if we are able to procure it by persuasion or  
 “ by pay. Our archers and slingers must be also nu-  
 “ merous, that we may be able to make good our de-  
 “ scent in spite of the Sicilian horse. We must also be  
 “ attended by supernumerary vessels, that we may be  
 “ enabled with greater ease to fetch in necessaries for  
 “ our army. We must also carry with us from A-  
 “ thens, in our tenders, a great quantity of corn, such  
 “ as wheat and barley, parched; with bakers, some  
 “ of whom, for certain wages, must be obliged to  
 “ grind, that, if our armament lie any where weather-  
 “ bound, we may not stand in need of the necessaries  
 “ of life: For, so numerous as we must be, it will not  
 “ be possible for every city to receive us. All other  
 “ provisions must be laid in by ourselves to the utmost  
 “ of our power, and we must trust for nothing to the  
 “ care of others.

“ But what concerns us most is, to carry from hence  
 “ a fund of money as ample as we can raise. As for  
 “ that, which the Egestæans pretend is already laid up  
 “ for our use, conclude it to be so only so far as words  
 “ are current. For, unless we set out from Athens,

“ no

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“ not barely provided as well as those we are to encounter, — but, equality in strength for battle alone excepted, in all other respects far surpassing them in every needful appointment, — we shall hardly be able to reduce who are to be reduced, or even to protect who are to be protected. We should regard ourselves in the character of people who are going to seek a new settlement among aliens and enemies; and, as such, are necessitated to render themselves victors of the spot the very day they land; or to rest assured, if they then miscarry, that the whole of that region will be in arms against them. Of this I own myself afraid; against this I am convinced that by repeated consultations we ought timely to provide; and, after all, must trust still farther to the goodness of our fortune, hazardous, as we are but men. Yet hence, I should be glad to set out in this enterprize with as little occasion as possible to rely on uncertain fortune, and to be amply provided with every expedient for a successful expedition: For these, to my apprehension, are the readiest means to secure the public welfare, and the safety of us who are destined for the voyage. But, if any man thinks my reasons chimerical, I am ready to resign my command to his superior abilities.”

In this manner Nicias delivered himself, with a view, visible, to discourage the Athenians from proceeding, first a demand of articles requisite to the design; next, that, in case he must be obliged to undertake service, he might set out with such ample expedients of security.

Yet all this bulky and embarrassing demand of appointments could not raise in the Athenians the least aversion to the expedition, but rather fastened their eagerness upon it more intently than ever; and Nicias prevailed on that side of the question where he hoped to have been defeated. It was now universally agreed, that



that his advice was just and proper ; and, if obeyed, the expedition must be attended with all imaginable security. All ranks of men were now equally seized with a fondness for the voyage : For, such as were advanced in years were confident that a career of success must attend the enterprize, and that so formidable an armament could not possibly miscarry ; the younger sort were animated with the desire of seeing so remote a clime, and gratifying at large the curiosity of their tempers, assured that safety would attend their course ; the bulk of the populace and the soldiery in general were pleased with their present assignment of pay, and the hope of enlarging dominion, which would afford them perpetual employ and subsistence. The passions of the generality were for these causes so vehemently elated with the project, that such as could by no means approve were afraid to oppose it by a vote, lest they might be censured as men who malevolently opposed the public glory. And by this all opposition was effectually quashed.

At length, a certain Athenian, standing forth from amongst the crowd, and calling aloud upon Nicias, told him, — “ He must no longer cast about for evasions, nor meditate delays ; but declare expressly, now, in the presence of them all, the particulars of the preparations which the Athenians should vote him.”

Nicias, though sorry at his heart, was obliged to reply, — That, “ in order to be exact, he ought to consult more leisurely with his colleagues. But, so far as he could judge in this sudden manner, they ought to set out with a fleet consisting of at least one hundred triremes ; that the Athenians themselves ought to furnish as many transports for heavy-armed soldiers as was possible, and to send for an additional number from their dependents ; that the number of heavy-armed, both of Athenians and dependents, should at least be five thousand, and, if possible, more ; that to these the rest of their preparations should be proportioned, such as archers to be levied at home.

“ an

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“ and procured also from Crete, not forgetting slingers;  
 “ and, in fine, that whatever should be judged in any  
 “ degree expedient should be provided in good time,  
 “ and carried along with them in the fleet.”

This the Athenians had no sooner heard, than they instantly voted, — “ That the generals were invested  
 “ with absolute authority, to determine the numbers  
 “ of the expedition, and the whole procedure of the  
 “ voyage, at their own discretion, as might best pro-  
 “ mote the public welfare.”

In pursuance of this, the preparations were immediately in hand. Summonses for the quotas adjusted were sent to their dependents, and the levies at home went briskly forwards. Athens was now finely recovered from the pestilence and a long-continued destructive war; both in a multitude of young men now arrived at the vigour of their age, and an increase of the public revenues by favour of the peace. By this means all the needful supplies were more easily provided; and thus were the Athenians busied for the present in fitting out their armament.

But, at this very juncture, almost all the statues of Mercury, wherever found within the precincts of Athens, and according to the established custom they were very numerous, both in the porches of private houses and the public temples, † \* \* \* \* had their faces disfigured in the space of one night. The authors

this outrage were not known; but large rewards were offered by the *State* in order to discover them, and was also passed, that, “if any person knew of the

† I have omitted two words in the original, because I cannot translate them with any precision or clearness. They are ἡ τετραγώνος ἐργασία, *opus quadratum*, says one Latin translator; *opus ex lapide quadrato*, says another. Mr. Hobbes hath it, *Mercuries of square stone*: How such a description can be applicable to a statue will be hard to conceive. Whether they allude to the inclosure in which the statues were erected, or to the form of the pedestals, or whether a Mercury was carved on any or all the sides of a square stone, I am not able to decide. The *Mercuries* were very numerous; and many of them, it is certain, were strange, uncouth, and very bungling performances.

“ commission of any other impiety of the same nature,  
 “ he should boldly inform the public of it, whether he  
 “ were a citizen, or a foreigner, or a slave.”

This accident in truth made a deep impression on their minds. For it was construed as a bad omen in regard to the expedition in hand, and as an evidence of some terrible combination to introduce innovations and an overthrow of the *democracy*.

An information was at length given in by some sojourners and their footmen, relating indeed not at all to the *Mercuries*, but to the defacements of other images committed formerly by some young men in a frolicsome and drunken mood; and how, farther, “ they had celebrated \* *the Mysteries* in private houses by way of “ mockery;” and amongst others they also accused Alcibiades. The party most inveterate against him caught readily at this charge. As he was the main obstacle to the advancement of their own popularity and credit, they concluded, that, in case they could rid themselves of him, they might at once become leaders of the *State*. Hence they aggravated the charge, and bellowed aloud, that “ those myttic frolics, and the defacements of “ the *Mercuries*, struck at the very foundations of the “ democracy; and, that none of these outrageous acts “ had been committed without his participation.” They alledged, as a circumstance that corroborated the charge, the whole tenor of his behaviour, flagrantly licentious, and quite inconsistent with a democratical constitution.

Alcibiades endeavoured forthwith to clear himself the best he could from all appearances of guilt, and declared himself ready, before he entered upon the voyage, to submit to a trial, (for the armament was now almost completed,) and, if proved to be guilty, to suffer the pe-

\* The sacred *Mysteries* celebrated by the Athenians at Eleusis. *Plutarch* relates, that the informers were brought in by one Androcles, a demagogue, a virulent foe of Alcibiades. They deposed, that one Theodorus acted the part of the *Crier*, Polytion of the *Torch-bearer*, Alcibiades that of the *Hierophant*, and many of his intimates assisted and were initiated in solemn and formal mockery.

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nalties of law; and only, if acquitted, to take upon him the command. He conjured them, farther, “to receive no  
“calumnious accusations against him in his absence;  
“but if he was really guilty to put him instantly to  
“death; — that, in common prudence it could not  
“be justified, to intrust a person, so heavily charged,  
“with the command of so large an armament, before  
“his innocence had been regularly explored.”

But his enemies — apprehensive that, in case he was brought to an immediate trial, he would be supported by all the favour of the soldiery; and, that the people, whose idol he was, might possibly relent, because in compliment to him the Argives and some of the Mantinéans accompanied the expedition, — opposed and put off the prosecution. They put the management of this point into the hands of a set of orators, who urged that “for  
“the present he might proceed in his voyage, that the  
“expedition ought not to be deferred on his account,  
“and upon his return a day should be assigned for his  
“trial.” Their design was to gather more heavy matter against him, which in his absence could be more easily effected, and then to recal him and force him to his trial. In short it was resolved that “Alcibiades  
“should go the voyage.”

Things being thus determined, and the year now advanced to the middle of summer, the fleet set sail for Sicily. Orders had been issued before for the bulk of the confederates, and victualling-ships, and small and all the tenders in general, to repair to and  
ble together at Corcyra; that, from thence, in a body, they might cross the Ionian to the cape of Japygia. But such as were subjects of Athens, and such of the confederates as were then in the city, marching down to the Piræus on the appointed day by morning’s dawn, went on-board the ships in order to weigh and be gone. They were conducted thither by a great crowd, it may be said by the whole crowd of Athens, both citizens and strangers. The former attended, to perform the

parting decorums where their several attachments claimed it; some to their friends, some to their relations, some to their own sons. The whole company moved along with a medley of hope and lamentation; with hope, that success would attend their course; with lamentation, lest they might never meet again. The sad recollection occurred—to how great a distance from their native soil they were going to be sent! And now that the hour of departure was come, and when this moment they were going to be dismissed into scenes of danger, the impressions of terror were felt with much keener sense than when the expedition was only decreed. However, at the sight of their present strength, of the numerous expedients of a prosperous enterprise which their eyes beheld, their spirits were again elated.

As for the strangers and bulk of the crowd, they attended merely for the pleasure of gazing at the means intended to accomplish a great and stupendous design. For never did any one *State* of Greece, before this time, equip by its own strength such a powerful armament. It was the finest and most glorious fleet, that to this day the world had seen. It is true, in number of ships and heavy-armed on-board, *that* which sailed against Epidaurus under command of Pericles, and *that* also against Potidæa under Agamemnon, where by no means inferior. For those carried four thousand heavy-armed soldiers, all native Athenians, with three hundred horsemen: The number of their triremes was a hundred; fifty more were furnished by the Lesbians and Chians, besides a large number of confederates who attended those expeditions. But then they were fitted for a voyage in comparison trifling, and in a slight and penurious manner.

On the contrary, the present equipment was calculated for a length of time, and completely fitted out for both services, as occasion might demand, either of the sea or of the land. The shipping, at the great expence of the captains of the several triremes and of the *State*, was quite elaborate. The pay assigned by the public to every

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every mariner was a \* drachma a day. The number of new ships for the battle and chace was sixty; that of transports for the heavy-armed, forty. The several captains of the triremes were very choice in making up their crews, and gave to such of the mariners as rowed on the uppermost bench, and to the sailors, a gratuity out of their own pockets over and above the public pay. They had farther adorned their vessels with images and all kind of sumptuous decorations. It was the high ambition of every single captain, to have his own ship excel all the rest of the fleet in splendor and in swiftness.

The land-force was distinguished by the choiceness of their levies and their arms; and all the individuals vied with one another in the goodness of their accoutrements and equipage whatsoever. It happened also on the same account that a warm contention was kindled amongst them, under what officers they should be ranged; and opportunity afforded, to the rest of Greece, to construe the whole into a mere ostentation of their power and opulence rather than an effective equipment against a foe. For, were a computation to be formed, both of the public disbursements of the *State* on this occasion, and the private expences of the whole soldiery; — of the *State*, what prodigious sums they had already advanced, and what additional sums the generals were to carry along with them; — of the soldiery, what each had expended on his own equipage, every captain on the decoration of his vessel, and to how much greater charges he will liable; — without taking into the account the

of necessaries which, over and above the public allowance, each private person was obliged to lay in for so long a voyage, or the goods which a soldier or trader might take with him on-board for the sake of traffic; — the amount of talents now carried out of Athens would turn out exceeding large.

Nor was it merely for the strangeness of the enterprize or the splendor of its shew, that the armament was noised

\* 7d.  $\frac{1}{4}$

abroad,



abroad, but also for the numerous force with which it was provided to attack the foe; for the remoteness of the voyage, great as ever they had undertaken from their native clime, and that prodigious expectation which was raised of the event; in order to which the *State* had now exerted itself quite beyond its strength.

When the whole force was got on-board the fleet, when the stowage of all necessary stores and all baggage whatever was completely adjusted, silence then was proclaimed by sound of trumpet: But the solemn prayers for a successful expedition were not offered from every vessel apart, but in behalf of all united, by the voice of a herald. The goblets mingled with wine ran the circle of the whole armament, and every crew as well as the commanders poured out the libations, and drank *success and happiness* out of gold and silver cups. The whole crowd that stood upon the beach, both of citizens and such strangers as were there and wished them prosperity, joined with them in the public prayer. And now, the *pean* being sung and the *libation* finished, they put out to sea. \* After moving off at first in a line a-head,

\* Many incidents are related by *Plutarch*, in the life of *Nicias*, in regard to the denunciations of the priests against this expedition, the coining and wresting of oracles both for and against it, and omens which portended nothing but misfortune. Mere human foresight, and a consciousness, that the means were not equal to the end proposed, gave the wisest and steadiest part of the Athenian community a sad apprehension of the event. Socrates constantly declared against it; and assured his friends, it would draw after it the destruction of the *State*: This his pre-sentiment soon became the public talk. Meton, the *Astronomer*, who was named to a post of high rank in the expedition, feigned himself mad and set his house on fire. Others deny the circumstance of his counterfeiting madness; and say, he set his house on fire by night, and appeared next morning on the forum in an abject manner, and begged of his fellow-citizens, in order to comfort him under so great a misfortune, to excuse his son, who was to have commanded a trireme, from going the voyage. An incident, farther, at the very time of the departure of the grand fleet, gave many persons vast concern. The women were then celebrating the rites of *Adonis*, in which many representations of deaths and funerals were exhibited all over Athens; and the women, according to custom, were making heavy moan and lamentation. This struck sad forebodings into people, who laid stress on such incidents, that this expensive and mighty

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a-head, each vessel made afterwards the best of her way to Ægina. And this armament made all possible haste to reach Corcyra, where the force of their allies by which they were to be joined was already assembled.

Though the intelligence of such an intended invasion had been brought to Syracuse from several quarters, yet for a long course of time they would yield no credit to its truth. Nay more, when an assembly was convened, such speeches as follow were made by different persons; some believing the accounts received in relation to this armament of the Athenians; others pronouncing them absolutely false. On this occasion Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, standing forth in the assembly, and as one convinced in his own mind that all such accounts were true, addressed and advised his countrymen thus:

“ I T will probably be my own fate, as it hath been  
 “ the fate of others, to be disbelieved, when I speak of  
 “ this intended invasion as a matter of truth and cer-  
 “ tainty. And I also know, by experience, that both  
 “ those who vent and those who retail such accounts of  
 “ things as seem incredible are so far from effectually  
 “ persuading, that they generally incur the imputation  
 “ of madness. Yet no such apprehensions shall intimi-  
 “ date or strike me dumb, when such a weight of dan-  
 “ ger hovers over my country; when in my own heart  
 “ I am convinced, that I am more clearly enlightened  
 “ on the point than any other person whatever.

“ For I assert *that* to be a matter of the highest cer-  
 “ tainty, which you hear only with a fit of stupid  
 “ pride, that the Athenians have already set sail  
 “ against us with a numerous force both for the service  
 “ of the sea and the land. The pretext alledged by  
 “ them is, execution of treaties with the Egestæans, and  
 “ the restoration of the Leontines; but the true motive  
 “ is their ambition to enslave Sicily, and above all this

mighty armament, though now so vigorous and magnificent, would soon moulder into ruin,

OUR



“ our own Syracuse, which, if once reduced, they are  
 “ well assured that nothing will be able afterwards to  
 “ give a check to their arms. Taking it therefore for  
 “ granted that they will be immediately upon us, delibe-  
 “ rate in what manner you may make the most gallant  
 “ defence in the present posture of your strength; care-  
 “ ful that through contempt you be not taken unprovi-  
 “ ded, nor through incredulity abandon the means of  
 “ preservation. Nor, farther, let those, who are con-  
 “ vinced of their immediate appearance, be terrified at  
 “ the boldness or strength of their undertaking. For  
 “ they will not be able to hurt us more than we shall  
 “ be enabled to retaliate upon them. Nor are they  
 “ more beyond our reach, because they invade us with  
 “ so vast an armament; since this, in regard to the  
 “ other Sicilians, will plead more abundantly in our  
 “ cause; for, terrified at the foe, they will be disposed  
 “ with higher warmth of friendship to co-operate with  
 “ us. And if thus, in the train of affairs, we are either  
 “ enabled to defeat their arms, or merely to force their  
 “ return, their schemes unexecuted and their ambition  
 “ disappointed, (for I am not in the least afraid that  
 “ their sanguine expectations can be glutted with suc-  
 “ cess,) such events would reflect the highest glory upon  
 “ you, and complete<sup>d</sup> what I firmly hope.

“ It is a truth evinced by facts, that few considerable  
 “ armaments of either Grecians or Barbarians, which  
 “ have been sent out on remote expeditions, have re-  
 “ turned successful. Nor, farther, are our present in-  
 “ vaders more numerous than the Syracusans them-  
 “ selves or their friends of the neighbouring *States*, whose  
 “ strength mere hostile dread will cement and bind fast  
 “ together. It therefore, though merely for want of need-  
 “ ful supplies, they incur miscarriages on a foreign shore;  
 “ if they prove unsuccessful, though chiefly through  
 “ their own misconduct; the whole honour must how-  
 “ ever rest with us, as if we had ruined their projects  
 “ by art and management. Even these very Athenians  
 were

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“ were indebted to a parallel coincidence of events  
“ for the vast enlargement of their strength and empire,  
“ when ~~the~~ *Mede*, who gave out that he aimed the blow  
“ at *Athens*, was, contrary to all human expectation,  
“ disconcerted by a series of errors that were purely his  
“ own. And some such fortunate coincidence, in our  
“ own behalf, we have at present all imaginable rea-  
“ son to expect.

“ Let us therefore with active resolution put our do-  
“ mestic affairs into a posture of defence, and dispatch  
“ our ambassadors to the *Siculi*, to keep firm in our  
“ friendship such as are already our friends, and to  
“ endeavour to procure the friendship and concurrence  
“ of the rest. Nay, let our embassies regularly com-  
“ plete the whole circuit of *Sicily*, where they may re-  
“ present the common danger which equally threatens  
“ them all. Let them, farther, cross over to *Italy* to  
“ procure for us their defensive alliance, or at least to  
“ negotiate a denial of reception to the *Athenians*. I  
“ also judge it adviseable to send to *Carthage*: For even  
“ the *Carthaginians* are not exempted from the present  
“ dangers, but have been ever under apprehensions of  
“ receiving from them a visit at *Carthage*. It may  
“ perhaps effectually occur to their thoughts, that,  
“ should they now abandon us, the storm must soon  
“ extend itself to them; by which they may be deter-  
“ mined either secretly or openly, by some expedient  
“ or other, to vindicate our cause. And, were their  
“ nation equal to their power, no people on the  
“ globe could so easily redress us. For they are pos-  
“ sessed of an immensity of wealth, which gives an easy  
“ and prompt completion to the schemes of war and to  
“ every human enterprize. Let us send, farther, to *La-*  
“ *cedæmon* and *Corinth*, requesting the dispatch of  
“ immediate succours hither, and the renewal of the war  
“ against the *Athenians*.

“ There is one point more, which in my opinion is  
“ more critical and important than all the rest: and  
“ which,

“ which, though perhaps, inured as you are to domestic  
 “ indolence, it may not gain your ready approbation,  
 “ I shall however boldly recommend. Would all of  
 “ us in general who are inhabitants of Sicily, or at least  
 “ would only we Syracusans, with what other people  
 “ we can get to assist us, put out instantly to sea with  
 “ all the ships we have in readiness, and victualled  
 “ but for the space of two months; — would we then  
 “ give these Athenians the meeting either at Tarentum  
 “ or cape Japygia, and there convince them, that, be-  
 “ fore they enter the lists of war for the conquest of  
 “ Sicily, they must fight for their passage across the  
 “ Ionian; — we should then strike them with the utmost  
 “ terror, and infinitely perplex them with the thought  
 “ ‘ that from a friendly port we shall sail forth to guard  
 “ our out-works, (for Tarentum will readily receive us,)  
 “ whilst they have a long tract of sea to pass with all  
 “ their cumbersome train, and must find it hard,  
 “ through so long a voyage, to be always steering in  
 “ the regular order.’ As their course must thus be slow,  
 “ and must advance only in exact conformity to orders,  
 “ we shall have a thousand opportunities to attack them.  
 “ If again they clear their ships for action, and in a  
 “ body bear down expeditiously upon us, they must  
 “ ply hard at their oars; and, when spent with their  
 “ toil, we can fall upon them. Or, in case that may  
 “ not be judged advisable, we have it always in our  
 “ power to retire into the harbour of Tarentum. And  
 “ thus the Athenians, if, in constant expectation of be-  
 “ ing fought with at sea they must make their passage  
 “ with a small portion only of their stores, will be re-  
 “ duced to great distress on coasts, which will afford  
 “ them no supply. Should they choose to continue in  
 “ their station, they must infallibly be blocked up in it.  
 “ Should they venture a passage, they must unavoidably  
 “ leave their tenders and storeships behind; and, as  
 “ they have no assurance of a hearty reception from the  
 “ cities on the coasts, must be terribly dismayed.

“ It

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“ It is my firm opinion, that, amidst that great perplexity of thought which must result from these obstructions, they will never presume to sail from Corcyra; or, at least, whilst they are agitating the forms of procedure and sending out spy-boats to discover our numbers and position, the season of the year must be protracted to winter; or, utterly dispirited at so unexpected a resistance, they will give up the voyage. This I more readily expect, as I am informed that their most experienced commander hath been forced into office against his inclination, and would gladly lay hold of the pretext to desist, if such a show of resistance could be made by us as would preserve his honour from suspicion. And I am perfectly convinced that rumour will increase and aggravate our strength. Now the sentiments of mankind are constantly adjusted by rumours: Parity of danger is supposed, when an enemy declares he is ready to begin the attack; and such an enemy is always more dreaded than he, who betrays an intention merely to defend himself against an enemy’s assaults. Such excess of fear must now fall to the lot of the Athenians. They are invading us, with the fond presumption that we shall not fight. They think they have grounds for such a presumptich, because we have not concurred with the Lacedæmonians in their demolition. But when, to their bitter disappointment, they find we have the courage to act offensively, the suddenness of our efforts will terrify them more than all the reality of our expected strength could have done.

Determine therefore to execute with bold and ready resolution the plan I have proposed; or, if this must not prevail, with the utmost expedition to get all things at home in readiness for war. And let each Syracusan be firmly convinced, that contempt of an enemy ought never to be shewn but in the heat of action; that the conduct of those men must tend most highly to the public preservation, who, alarmed by

“ by a decent fear, judge it needful to prepare with all  
 “ caution and alacrity, as if the danger was instant at  
 “ our doors. But these our enemies are ~~not~~ actually  
 “ coming; they are already (I know it well) upon the  
 “ voyage; they are this moment only not in sight.”

In this manner Hermocrates spoke his sentiments. But the popular assembly of the Syracusans was embroiled with much variance and contention. One party cried out, that “ it was all a joke, the Athenians durst not  
 “ think of invading them.” Another, “ Hermocrates  
 “ had truth and reason on his side.” A third, “ let them  
 “ come, what damage can they do us which we are  
 “ not able heartily to repay them ? ” Others betrayed an open contempt at the whole account, and laughed at it as downright ridiculous. The party was but small which gave credit to Hermocrates and trembled for the future. At length, Athenagoras stood up, who, being the first magistrate of the people, and whose credit at this time was highest with them, delivered himself as followeth :

“ T H E man, who wishes the Athenians may not  
 “ be so mad as to come hither and run themselves head-  
 “ long into our subjection, is either a coward or a trai-  
 “ tor to his country. \But for those, who vent such  
 “ news and endeavour to frighten you by the terrible  
 “ recital, at their audaciousness, truly, I am not in the  
 “ least surpris’d ; but I am greatly so at their folly, if  
 “ they imagine their views can escape detection ! Poor  
 “ abject souls, quite dispirited within through their  
 “ own pusillanimity, are glad to spread consternation  
 “ throughout a whole community ; that, under the  
 “ general panic, their own may lie veiled and undistin-  
 “ guished. And such is the effect, which the present  
 “ informations may be ready to produce ; not from any  
 “ grounds of truth and certainty, but the fictions and  
 “ falsehoods of an iniquitous cabal, who are ever dab-  
 “ bling in the practices of faction.

. “ But

“ But you, Syracufans, I exhort, to apply your good  
 “ fense on this occafion, and fearch after probability ;  
 “ not by confidering fuch accounts as thefe men have  
 “ pompoufly detailed, but fuch enterprifes as a wife and  
 “ abundantly-enlightened people (for fuch I efteem the  
 “ Athenians) are likely to undertake. For, what pro-  
 “ bability is there, that, leaving the Peloponnefians on  
 “ their backs, when the war at home is not yet brought  
 “ to any fettled conclufion, they would wilfully embark  
 “ into another of no lefs importance? For my part,  
 “ I am perfuaded they reft well contented, that, fo  
 “ many and fo powerful *States* as we Sicilians are, we  
 “ have not yet thought proper to invade them.

“ But, allowing thefe informations true, and that  
 “ they are actually coming, — I am firmly perfua-  
 “ ded, that Sicily is better able than Poloponnesus to  
 “ war them down, by how much in all refpects it is  
 “ better furnifhed with every refource of war; and  
 “ that this our Syracufe alone is far fuperior in ftrength  
 “ to that, nay double that armament, which by report  
 “ now threatens its invafion. For I know, affuredly,  
 “ that no horfe can follow in their train; that, farther,  
 “ none can be procured for them in this country, if we  
 “ abate an inconfiderable party which the Egeftéans  
 “ may furnifh. And I know, that a body of heavy-  
 “ armed, equal in number to our own, can never be  
 “ transported by them acrofs fuch a length of fea.

“ The enterprize is bold indeed, to attempt fo long a  
 “ journey with only light and nimble fhips, and to  
 “ carry thofe military ftores, the roll of which muft  
 “ be exceffively large, in order to attack fo great a city.  
 “ Shall I therefore be terrified at vain reports? I, who  
 “ am firmly perfuaded, that, if the Athenians were  
 “ poffeffed of a city on our coafts as confiderable in all  
 “ refpects as Syracufe itfelf, and fould dare to pro-  
 “ voke us; if mafters of the neighbouring territory,  
 “ they fould from thence make war upon us; — even  
 “ with fuch advantages they would with difficulty efcape

“ a total destruction. And what therefore, in all human  
 “ probability, must be their fate, when all Sicily to a  
 “ man will be combined to oppose them? For now  
 “ their war must issue from a camp on the beach of the  
 “ sea, of which their ships must form the ramparts.  
 “ They will not be able to make long excursions from  
 “ their tents and magazines of needful stores, as our  
 “ cavalry will bridle and controul them. But, in short,  
 “ it is my firm opinion that they never will be able to  
 “ accomplish a descent, so far am I convinced that our  
 “ force is in all respects superior.

“ I am well persuaded, that all those obstacles, which  
 “ I have hitherto recited, their own wise reflexions  
 “ have suggested to the remembrance of the Athenians,  
 “ and deterred them from hazarding their own ruin;  
 “ and that our own malcontents amuse us with ficti-  
 “ tious accounts of things, that neither have nor can  
 “ have existence. This is by no means the first occasi-  
 “ on, on which I have been able to detect their  
 “ schemes. I am no stranger to their constant attempts  
 “ of fomenting faction, ever intent as they are, by  
 “ forgeries like these, or more malicious than these, or  
 “ even by the open efforts of sedition, to strike a panic  
 “ amongst the Syracusan *people*, and to seize the helm  
 “ of your government. And I have reason to apprehend,  
 “ that, amongst the many projects they attempt, some  
 “ one at length may be fatally successful. But this  
 “ must be charged to our own pusillanimity, who ex-  
 “ ert no precautions to avert impending miseries, nor  
 “ bravely oppose the storm, though we perceive it to be  
 “ gathering around us. And from hence it unavoida-  
 “ bly results, that our *State* is seldom blessed with a  
 “ season of tranquillity, but feels the bitter lot of sedi-  
 “ tion or sedition, of more numerous struggles against fac-  
 “ tions within than public hostilities without; nay, some-  
 “ times tyranny and despotic rule have been our portion.  
 “ To guard the present times from such disastrous  
 “ contingencies shall be my constant endeavour; and,

“ 11

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“ if favoured with your concurrence, my care shall be  
 “ successful. To this end I must prevail upon you,  
 “ who are the *many*, to co-operate with me, whilst I  
 “ inflict, upon these artificers of faction, the punishment  
 “ they deserve, not barely for overt commissions, (for  
 “ in these they are not easily caught,) but for all the  
 “ treacherous plots which, how desirous soever, they  
 “ are not able to execute. For we ought not only to  
 “ award our vengeance on the open outrages of an ene-  
 “ my, but to disarm his malice by wise precaution;  
 “ because the man, who will not thus in time disarm  
 “ it, will feel its blow before he is aware.

“ On the *few* I have also to bestow, partly some re-  
 “ proofs, partly some cautions, and partly some in-  
 “ structions. For chiefly by these methods I judge it  
 “ feasible to deter them from their factious designs.  
 “ Let me therefore request from you, ye youths of  
 “ Syracuse, the solution of a point which hath frequent-  
 “ ly occurred to my own imagination. — What is it  
 “ you would have? — An immediate possession of the  
 “ government of your country? — Why, the very  
 “ laws of that country declare you incapable of it.  
 “ And these very laws were intended, rather to exclude  
 “ you, so long as you are unequal, than to give you a  
 “ disgraceful rejection when you shall be equal, to the  
 “ trust. But, farther, — Are you not piqued in heart  
 “ at being placed upon the same rank and level with  
 “ the bulk of your fellow-citizens? And where would  
 “ be the justice in awarding distinctions of honour and  
 “ trust to those, who are in no respect differenced from  
 “ others? It may perhaps be urged, that a *democracy*  
 “ is repugnant to the dictates both of wisdom and  
 “ justice; that the most opulent members of a *State*  
 “ are intitled to its highest honours, are best able to  
 “ superintend the public welfare. But to this I reply,  
 “ that, in the first place, by the word *people* is signified  
 “ a whole community, including its every individual;



“ but an *oligarchy* means only a party ; in the next place,  
 “ that men of opulence are the most suitable guardians  
 “ of the public treasure ; that men of understanding  
 “ and experience are best qualified to advise ; but the  
 “ *many*, after hearing, are the best judges of measures.  
 “ And thus, by a *democracy*, equality of right and of  
 “ privilege is most fairly preserved, as well as the  
 “ separate members as to the whole community. An  
 “ *oligarchy* indeed bestows an ample portion of dangers  
 “ on the *many*, but in beneficial points it not only as-  
 “ sumes the larger share to itself, but by an unboun-  
 “ ded rapacity monopoliseth the public harvest. These  
 “ are the ends, which the men of power and the raw  
 “ unexperienced youths amongst you ambitiously pur-  
 “ sue ; ends, incompatible with the welfare of a great  
 “ and flourishing *State*. The accomplishment of these,  
 “ I say, you have this very moment in agitation ; though  
 “ the world cannot furnish such a set of fools, if you  
 “ perceive not the pernicious tendency of your schemes.  
 “ Nor can any set of Grecians, within my knowledge,  
 “ equal either your brutality or your villany, if with  
 “ open eyes you dare proceed. Lay hold then at once  
 “ of sound information, or repent if already informed,  
 “ and unite in the infallible advancement of the general  
 “ welfare of the whole community. And let the men  
 “ of probity amongst you rest perfectly satisfied, that  
 “ thus they shall obtain a proper share, nay more than  
 “ a share, in those emoluments, which will equally re-  
 “ dound to all their country. But, in case you give  
 “ into different schemes, the hazard is great ; the whole  
 “ of your plan will be baffled and confounded.

“ Trouble us therefore no farther with your infor-  
 “ mations, as we are privy to and shall certainly discon-  
 “ cert the views of their authors. For the Syracusan  
 “ *State*, even though the Athenians actually invade us,  
 “ will repel their efforts with a magnanimity worthy of  
 “ herself : And we have already a set of brave com-  
 “ manders, who will effectually manage the point.

“ But,

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“ But, if not one tittle of these intended invasions be true,  
“ which is my firm opinion, the *State* will not be struck  
“ into a panic by your rumours, will never place the  
“ command of her forces in your hands, so as to rivet  
“ a voluntary servitude upon herself. She, on the con-  
“ trary, will exert her own vigilance and discretion; she  
“ will interpret the rumours you have spread as so many  
“ acts against her welfare, and will not give up her  
“ liberty to accounts expressly forged to terrify the ear;  
“ but, aware in time, by no means to intrust herself into  
“ your management, will leave no possible method of  
“ defence untried.”

Thus spoke Athenagoras. But here one of the generals rising up prevented any other person from continuing the debate, and put an end to the present heats by delivering himself thus:

“ I T is contrary to all decorum, both for those who  
“ speak to pour forth calumniation against one another,  
“ or for those who hear to receive them with attention.  
“ At present, we are rather concerned to yield regard  
“ to the informations which are brought us, that every  
“ individual and this community may be timely prepa-  
“ red to repel the invaders. And, if this should prove  
“ at last to be mere superfluity of care, yet what harm  
“ can possibly accrue from such an equipment of the  
“ *State* with horses, and arms, and such other habili-  
“ ments as are the glory of war? We ourselves shall  
“ take all proper care of the provisions of war and the  
“ levy of soldiers; and at the same time shall circulate  
“ our messengers to the cities around us, and to watch  
“ the appearance of the foe; and shall expedite every  
“ point judged needful in the present emergence. Some  
“ care of these points hath already been taken, and,  
“ what more we shall perceive to be expedient, we shall  
“ on the proper occasions communicate to you.”

When the general had expressed himself thus, the Syracusans broke up the assembly and departed.

The Athenians, with the reinforcements of their allies, were by this time all arrived at Corcyra. And the first thing done by the commanders was, to take a review of the whole equipment, and to settle the order in which they were to anchor and form their naval station. They also divided it into three squadrons, and cast lots for the command of each; to the end that, in the course of the voyage, they might be well supplied with water, and harbours, and the proper necessaries, wherever they might chance to put in; that, in other respects, a better discipline might be kept up, and the men be more inured to a ready obedience, as being under the inspection of an able commander in each several division. These points being settled, they dispatched three vessels to Italy and Sicily, to pick up informations, what cities on those coasts would give them a reception. And their orders were, to come back in time and meet them upon the voyage, that they might be advertised into what ports they might safely enter.

These previous points being adjusted, the Athenians, with an equipment already swelled to so great a bulk, weighing anchor from Corcyra, stood across for Sicily. The total of their triremes was a hundred and thirty-four, to which were added two Rhodian vessels of fifty oars. One hundred of these were Athenian, and, of this number, sixty were tight ships fit for service; the rest were transports for the soldiery. The remainder of the fleet consisted of Chians and the other allies. The total of the heavy-armed on-board was five thousand one hundred men. Of these, fifteen hundred were citizens of Athens inrolled; seven hundred were Athenians of the lowest class, (called *Thetes*,) who served by way of marines. The rest of the force consisted of the quotas of their alliance; some, of their own dependents; five hundred belonged to the Argives; the number of Mantinéans and mercenaries was two hundred and fifty; the archers in the whole amounted to four hundred and eighty;

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eighty; and, of these, eighty were Cretans. There were seven hundred Rhodian slingers, and a hundred and twenty light-armed Megaræan exiles. And one horse-transport attended, which carried thirty horsemen.

So great an equipment sailed out at first to begin the war. And, in the train of this equipment, went thirty store-ships laden with corn, and carrying on-board the bakers, and masons, and carpenters, and all things requisite in the works of fortification; and also a hundred sail of small vessels, which necessity demanded to attend the ships that carried the stores. A large number also of small craft and trading vessels sailed voluntarily in company with the fleet, for the sake of traffic. All which now, in one collected body, stood away from Corcyra across the Ionian gulf.

The whole armament being got over to cape Japygia, or to Tarentum, as they severally could make the passage, sailed along the coast of Italy, — where not one city would receive them, would grant them a market, or suffer them to land, barely permitting them to anchor and to water, — though at Tarentum and Locri even that was denied them, — till they arrived at Rhegium, a promontory of Italy. At Rhegium the whole fleet was now assembled; and without the city (for an admission into it was refused them) they formed an incampment within the verge of Diana's temple, where also they were accommodated by the Rhegians with a market.

Here, having drawn their vessels on-shore, they lay some time for refreshment; and had a conference with the Rhegians, in which they pressed them, as they were of Chalcidic descent, to succour the Leontines who were also Chalcidéans. Their answer was, that “they should side with neither party, but, whatever measures were judged expedient by the other Italians, they should conform to those.” The Athenians counsels were now solely bent on the affairs of Sicily, in what manner they might most successfully make their approaches. They also waited for the return of the three vessels from

Egesta, which had previously been dispatched thither, longing earnestly for a report about the state of their treasure, whether it was really such as their envoys at Athens had represented.

To the Syracusans, in the mean time, undoubted advice is brought from several quarters, and by their own spies, that "the fleet of the enemy lies at Rhegium." The truth of this being uncontested, they prepared for their defence with the utmost attention, and were no longer duped by incredulity. They also sent about to the Siculi; to some places, their agents, who were to keep a watchful eye upon their conduct; and, to others, ambassadors. And into those towns upon the coast, which were exposed to a descent, they threw a garrison. In Syracuse, they examined if the city was provided with the proper means of a defence, by a careful inspection of the arms and the horses; and all other points were properly adjusted, as against a war coming swiftly upon them, and only not already present.

The three vessels, detached beforehand to Egesta, rejoin the Athenians, yet lying at Rhegium, with a report that "the great sums which had been promised them were quite annihilated, since they saw only \* thirty talents in specie." Upon this the commanders were instantly seized with a dejection of spirit, because their first hope was thus terribly blasted; and the Rhegians had refused to concur with their attempts, upon whom they had made their first essay of persuasion, and with whom they had the greatest probability of success, as they were by blood allied to the Leontines, and had ever shewn themselves well-disposed to the Athenian State. The Egestean affair had indeed taken no other turn than what Nicias fully expected, but the other two commanders were quite amazed and confounded at it.

The trick, made use of by the Egesteans, at the time that the first embassy went thither from Athens to take a survey of their treasures, was this: — Having conducted

\* 5812*l.* 10*s.* Sterling.

them into the temple of Venus at Eryx, they shewed them the offerings repositied there, the cups, the flagons, and the censers, and the other furniture of the temple, in quantity by no means small. These, being all of silver, presented to the eye a vast show of wealth, far beyond their intrinsic value. Having also made entertainments in private houses, for those who came in the vessels of the embassy, they amassed together all the gold and silver cups of Egesta; they borrowed others from the adjacent cities, as well Phœnician as Grecian; they carried their guests about from one house of feasting to another; and each exhibited them as his own property. Thus, all of them displaying generally the same vessels, and great abundance appearing at every place, the Athenians who made the voyage were prodigiously surprised at the splendid shows. Hence it was that, on their return to Athens, they enlarged, with a kind of emulation which should magnify it most, on the imminency of wealth they had seen at Egesta. In this manner, being deceived themselves, they obtruded the same fallacy upon others; but now, when the true account was spread amongst them, that “there was no such wealth at Egesta,” they were much censured and reproached by the soldiers.

The generals, however, held a consultation about the methods of proceeding. And here it was the opinion of Nicias; “That with their whole armament they should stand immediately against Selinus, the reduction of which was the principal motive of the expedition; and, in case the Egestéans would furnish the whole armament with the proper supplies of money, their councils then might be regulated accordingly: But, otherwise, they should insist on their maintaining the sixty sail of ships, which had been sent expressly at their own request; then, abiding by them, they should reconcile their differences with the Selinuntians, either by force of arms or negotiation: They afterwards might visit other cities, and display  
“ before

“ before them the mighty power of the Athenian *State*;  
 “ and, having given such conspicuous proofs of their  
 “ alacrity to support their friends and allies, might re-  
 “ turn to Athens; provided, that no sudden and unex-  
 “ pected turn of affairs might give them opportunity  
 “ to do service to the Leontines, or bring over some  
 “ other cities to their interest; ever intent not to bring  
 “ their own *State* into danger by a needless profusion of  
 “ blood and treasure.”

Alcibiades declared, “ That it could never be justi-  
 “ fied, if, after putting to sea with so great an armament,  
 “ they should return with disgrace, and no effectual  
 “ service done to their country; that, on the contrary,  
 “ they ought, by heralds dispatched expressly, to notify  
 “ their arrival in these parts to all the cities except  
 “ Selinus and Syracuse; that, farther, they should try  
 “ what could be done with the Siculi, in order to per-  
 “ suade some of them to revolt from the Syracusans,  
 “ and to strike up treaties of alliance and friendship  
 “ with others, that so they might provide a resource  
 “ of provisions and reinforcements; that, the first trial  
 “ of this kind should be made upon the Messenians,  
 “ (who lay in the finest situation for favouring their  
 “ passage and descent into Sicily,) which must open to  
 “ them the most convenient harbour and station for their  
 “ armament: Thus, gaining the concurrence of the  
 “ cities, and certain from whom they might depend  
 “ upon assistance, the way would then be open for them  
 “ to make attempts upon Syracuse and Selinus, in case  
 “ the former refused to make up the quarrel with the  
 “ Egestæans, and the latter to suffer the replantation of  
 “ the Leontines.”

The opinion of Lamachus was diametrically opposite,  
 since he advised it “ to be the most judicious measure  
 “ to stand at once against Syracuse, and to try their  
 “ fortune before that city with the utmost expedition,  
 “ whilst they were yet not competently provided for resis-  
 “ tance and their consternation was still in its height:  
 “ Because

“ Because every hostile force is always most terrible on  
 “ its first approach; and, in case it protract the time of  
 “ encountering the eyes of its foes, they must recover  
 “ their courage through familiarity with danger, and  
 “ then the sight of an enemy is more apt to inspire  
 “ contempt: — But, should they assault them on a sud-  
 “ den whilst yet their approach is with terror expected,  
 “ the victory must infallibly be their own: — In this  
 “ case, all things would co-operate with them to terrify  
 “ the foe; such as, the sight of their numbers, which  
 “ now only could appear in their greatest enlargement,  
 “ the forebodings of their hearts what miseries were like  
 “ to ensue; and, above all, the instant necessity they  
 “ must lie under of hazarding a battle: That, moreover,  
 “ it was likely, that numbers of the enemy might be  
 “ surprised yet roaming abroad in the adjacent country,  
 “ as still they were incredulous of the approach of the  
 “ Athenians: Or, even though the Syracusans were safely  
 “ retired with all their effects into the city, the army  
 “ must needs become masters of prodigious wealth, if  
 “ they should besiege the city and awe all around it:  
 “ That, by taking this step, the other Sicilians would be  
 “ more discouraged from succouring the Syracusans,  
 “ and more easily inclined to concur with the Athenians,  
 “ and all shifts and delays to keep clear of the contest,  
 “ till one side was manifestly superior, would be pre-  
 “ cluded.” He added farther, that “ they should take  
 “ care to possess themselves of Megara, which was now  
 “ deserted and not far from Syracuse either by sea or  
 “ land, as it would afford a fine station for their ships  
 “ to lie in, would shelter them upon a retreat, and give  
 “ expedition to their approaches.”

But, though Lamachus delivered his sentiments thus, he  
 soon gave up his own opinion and went over to that of  
 Alcibiades. And, in pursuance of this, Alcibiades with  
 his own single ship passed over to Messene; and, having  
 gained a conference with the Messenians about an alliance  
 offensive and defensive, when no arguments he brought  
 could



could persuade, when on the contrary they returned this answer, that "into their city they would not receive them, though they were ready to accommodate them with a market without the walls," he repassed to Rhegium. And immediately the generals, having manned out sixty ships with the choicest hands of the whole fleet and taken in a requisite stock of subsistence, steered away for Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament at Rhegium under the care of one of those in the commission.

After a reception granted them into their city by the Naxians, they stood away from thence to Catana. And, when the Catanéans refused to receive them, (for in that city was a party strongly attached to the Syracusans,) they put into the river Terias. After a night's continuance there, the next day they sailed for Syracuse; keeping the rest of the fleet ready ranged in a line of battle a-head. But they had detached ten beforehand, who were ordered to enter the great harbour of Syracuse, and to examine what naval force lay there ready launched for service, and to proclaim from their decks as they passed along the shore — That, "the Athenians are come into those parts to replace the Leontines in their own territory, as they were bound in point both of alliance and consanguinity; that whatever Leontines therefore were now residing at Syracuse should without fear come over to the Athenians, as friends and benefactors."

When the proclamation had been made, and they had taken a view of the city and its harbours, and of the adjacent ground, what spots were most convenient for a descent and the commencement of the war, they sailed back again to Catana. A council of war had been held in that city, and the Catanéans were come to a resolution, "not to receive the armament;" but, however, they granted an audience to the generals. At which, whilst Alcibiades harangued, and the inhabitants of Catana were all in the public assembly, the Athenian soldiers,

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soldiers, without giving any alarm, pulled down a little gate of a very sorry structure, and then, entering the city, walked up and down in the market. But, such of the Catanéans as were of the Syracusan party no sooner found that the army was got in, than, struck into a sudden consternation, they stole presently out of the ~~city~~ city. The number of these was but trifling. The rest of the inhabitants decreed an alliance with the Athenians, and encouraged them to fetch over the remainder of their armament from Rhegium.

This point being carried, the Athenians, having passed to Rhegium, were soon with the whole of their fleet under sail for Catana, and, on their arrival there, they formed a proper station for their ships and men.

But now intelligence was brought them from Camarina that "if they would come to countenance them, that city would declare on their side;" and that "the Syracusans are busy in manning their fleet." With the whole armament therefore they steered along the coast, touching first at Syracuse. And, when they found that no fleet was there in readiness to put to sea, they stood off again for Camarina; and there, approaching the shore, they notified their arrival by the voice of a herald. Admittance was however refused them, the Camarinéans alledging that "they were bound by solemn oaths to receive only one single ship of the Athenians, unless of their own accord they should require a larger number." Thus disappointed they put out again to sea; and, having made a descent on some part of the Syracusan territory, they picked up a booty, till the Syracusan cavalry making head against them and cutting off some of their light-armed who were straggled to a distance, they re-embarked, and went again to Catana.

On their return thither they find the *Salaminian* arrived from Athens to fetch back Alcibiades, by public order of the *State*, to take his trial for the crimes charged against him by his country, and also some  
others

others of the soldiery who attended him in the expedition, against whom informations had been given that they were guilty of impiety in the affair of the *Mysteries*, and against some of them in that of the *Mercuries*. For, the Athenians, after the departure of the fleet, continued to make as strict an inquisition as ever into the crimes committed in regard to the *Mysteries*, and also in regard to the *Mercuries*. What sort of persons the informers were was no part of their concern, but, in the height of jealousy, giving credit indiscriminately to all, through too great a deference to men of profligate and abandoned lives, they apprehended and threw into prison the most worthy citizens of Athens; esteeming it more prudent by pains and tortures to detect the fact, than that a person of irreproachable character, when once accused through the villany of an informer, should escape without the question. For, the people, having learned by tradition how grievous the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons became at last; and, what is more, that it was not overthrown by themselves and Harmodius, but by the industry of the Lacedæmonians; lived in a constant dread of such another usurpation, and beheld all these incidents now with most suspicious eyes. But, in fact, the bold attempt of Harmodius and Aristogiton, took its rise merely from a competition in love. The particulars of which I shall here unfold more largely, to convince the world, that no other people, no not even the Athenians themselves, have any certain account, either relating to their own tyrants or the transactions of that period.

The truth is, that Pisistratus dying possessed of the tyranny in a good old age, not Hipparchus (as is generally thought) but Hippias, the eldest of his sons, was his successor in power. Harmodius being at this time in the flower of his youth and beauty, Aristogiton a citizen of Athens, nay a citizen of the middle rank, doated upon and had him in his possession. But, some attempts having been made upon Harmodius, by Hipparchus

Hipparchus the son of Pisistratus, he rejected his solicitations, and discovers the whole affair to Aristogiton. The latter received the account with all that anguish which a warm affection feels; and, alarmed at the great power of Hipparchus, lest by force he might seize the youth, he instantly forms a project, a project as ~~notable~~ as his rank in life would permit, to demolish the tyranny. And, in the mean time, Hipparchus, who, after making a second attempt upon Harmodius, was equally unsuccessful in his suit, could not prevail upon himself to make use of force; but, however, determined, upon some remote occasion which might cover his real design from detection, and was actually studying an opportunity, to dishonour the youth. — For, the power he had was never exerted in such a manner as to draw upon him the popular hatred, and his deportment was neither invidious nor distasteful. Nay, for the most part, this set of tyrants were exact observers of the rules of virtue and discretion. They exacted from the Athenians only a *twentieth* of their revenue; they beautified and adorned the city; took upon themselves the whole conduct of the wars; and presided over the religious sacrifices. In other respects, the *State* was governed by the laws already established, except that they always exerted their influence to place their own creatures in the first offices of the government. Several of their own family enjoyed the annual office of *Archon* at Athens; and, amongst others, Pisistratus, the son of Hippias the tyrant, who bore the same name with his grandfather, and, in his *archonship*, dedicated the altar of the twelve Gods in the public forum, and that of Apollo in the temple of the *Pythian*. The people of Athens, having since made additions to it in order to enlarge the altar in the forum, by that means effaced the inscription: But that in *the Pythian* is yet legible, though the letters are wearing out apace, and runs thus:

Pisistratus

Pisistratus from Hippias born  
 Of Pythian Phœbus, radiant God of day,  
 Chose thus the temple to adorn,  
 And thus record his own superior sway.

But, farther, that Hippias succeeded in the government as the eldest son, I myself can positively aver; as I know it to be so, and have examined all the accounts of tradition with much greater accuracy than others. But any one may be convinced of the fact by what I am going to subjoin.—Now, we have abundant light to prove, that he was the only one of the legitimate brothers who had any sons. So much the altar attests, and the column erected for a perpetual brand of the injustice of the tyrants in the citadel of Athens. In the latter, the inscription makes no mention of any son, of either Thessalus or Hipparchus; but nameth five sons of Hippias, who were brought him by Myrrhine, the daughter of Callias, the son of Hyperochidas. It is certainly most probable that the eldest son was married first; nay he is named the first after his father on the upper part of the column. And there were good reasons for this preference; because his seniority gave him this rank; and because he succeeded to the tyranny. Nor can it in any light seem probable to me, that Hippias, on a sudden and with ease, could have seized the tyranny, had Hipparchus died when invested with it, and he had only one day's time to effect his own establishment. The reverse is the truth; that, having for a length of time been familiarized to the expectation, having rendered himself awful to the citizens, and being supported by vigilant and trusty guards, he received and enjoyed his power with abundant security. He never had cause, as a younger brother must have had, to work his way through perplexities and dangers, as in that case he could not by practice have been made an adept in the affair of government. But it was accidental, and owing intirely to subsequent misfortunes, that  
 Hipparchus

Hipparchus got the title, and passed in the opinion of succeeding ages for one of the tyrants.

On Harmodius therefore, who was deaf to his solicitations, he executed his resentment in the manner predetermined. For, a summons having been delivered to a sister of his, a young virgin, to attend and carry the basket in some public procession, they afterwards rejected her; alledging, she never had nor could have been summoned, because she was unworthy of the honour. This affront highly provoked Harmodius; but Aristogiton, out of zeal for him, was far more exasperated at it. The points needful to their intended revenge were concerted with the party who concurred in the design. But they waited for the great Panathenæa to strike the blow; on which festival alone, without incurring suspicion, such of the citizens as assisted in the procession might be armed and gathered together in numbers. It was settled, that they themselves should begin; and then, the body of their accomplices were to undertake their protection against the guards of the tyrant's family.

The persons made privy to this design were but few, from a view to a more secure execution of it. For they presumed that even such as were not in the secret, when the attempt was once in whatever manner begun, finding themselves armed, would seize the opportunity, and readily concur to assert their own freedom. When therefore the festival was come, Hippias, repairing without the walls to the place called Ceramicus, and there attended by his guards, was prescribing and adjusting the order of the procession. Harmodius and Aristogiton, each armed with a dagger, advanced to execute their parts. But, when they saw one of their accomplices in familiar conversation with Hippias, (for Hippias was affable and courteous to all men,) they were struck with fear; they imagined the whole of their plot had been betrayed, and that already they were only not apprehended. Now therefore, by a sudden turn of resolution, they determined, if possible, to snatch a

timely revenge upon him, by whom they were aggrieved, and on whose account they had embarked into so dangerous an affair. In this hurry of thought they rushed back into the city, and met with Hipparchus at the place called Leocorium; where, without any regard to their own safety, they made an instant assault upon him. And thus, in all the fury of passion, one actuated by jealousy, and the other by resentment, they wounded and they kill him. As the people immediately ran together, Aristogiton by favour of the concourse escapes for the present, but, being afterwards seized, was unmercifully treated: But Harmodius is instantly slain on the spot.

The news of this assassination being carried to Hippias at the Ceramicus, he moved off immediately; not to the scene of action, but towards the armed accomplices in the procession, before they could be informed of the fact, as they were stationed at a distance. He artfully suppressed on his countenance all sense of the calamity; and, pointing to a certain spot, commanded them aloud to throw down their arms and file off thither. This command they obeyed, expecting he had something to communicate to them. But Hippias, addressing himself to his guards, orders them to take away *those* arms. He then picked out man by man, from amongst them, such as he designed to put to the question, and all upon whom a dagger was found: For, by ancient custom, they were to make the procession with a spear and a shield.

In this manner truly, from the anguish \*of irritated love, this conspiracy took its rise, and this desperate attempt

\* And yet so violently were tyrants detested at Athens, that the memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton was ever after honoured there, as martyrs for liberty and first authors of the ruin of tyrants. Their praises were publicly sung at the great *Panathenæa*. No slave was ever called by their names. Praxiteles was employed to cast their statues, which were afterwards set up in the forum: Xerxes indeed carried them away into Persia, but Alexander afterwards sent them back to Athens.

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
attempt was executed by Harmodius and Aristogiton, from the impulse of a sudden consternation. But, after this, the tyranny became more grievous upon the Athenians. Hippias, who was now more than ever alarmed, put many of the citizens to death; and cast his thoughts about towards foreign powers, to secure himself an asylum abroad in case of a total reverse at home. To Æantidas therefore, the son of Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampfacus, — to a *Lampsacene* though he himself was an *Athenian*, — he married his daughter Archedice, knowing that family to have a powerful interest with king Darius. And the monument of that lady is now at Lampfacus, and hath this inscription:

From Hippias sprung, with regal pow'r array'd,  
Within this earth Archedice is lay'd;  
By father, husband, brothers, sons, ally'd  
To haughty thrones, yet never stain'd with pride.

For the space of three years after this, Hippias continued in possession of the tyranny at Athens; but, being deposed in the fourth by the Lacedæmonians, and the exiled Alcæonidæ, he retired by agreement to Sigæum; from thence, to Æantidas at Lampfacus; and, from thence, to king Darius: and, with a command under him, he marched twenty years after to Marathon; and, though much advanced in years, served in that war with the Medes.

The People of Athens, reflecting on these past transactions, and recollecting all the dismal narratives about them which tradition had handed down, treated with great severity, and deep suspicions, all such as were informed against, in relation to the *mysteries*: and they construed the whole procedure as the dawning of a plot to

*Plutarch* hath preserved a smart reply of Antipho the orator, who will appear in this history, to the elder Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse. The latter had put the question, which was the finest kind of brass? "That," replied Antipho, of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made."





erect an oligarchical and tyrannic power. And, as their passions were inflamed by such apprehensions, many worthy and valuable citizens were already thrown into prison. Nay, it seemed as if their inquiry was to have no end, since from day to day their indignation gave into more increasing severity, and numbers were constantly arrested. Here, one of those \* who had been imprisoned on suspicion (and a suspicion too of being most deeply concerned in the crime) is persuaded, by one of his fellow-prisoners, to turn an evidence, no matter whether of truth or falsehood. Many conjectures have passed on both sides; but no one, neither at that time nor since, hath been able to discover the men who were really concerned in the affair. The argument which prevailed upon this person was, “the necessity for his taking such a step, even though he had no hand in the commission, since by this he would infallibly procure his own safety, and deliver the city from its present confusions. For he must be much more secure of saving his life by such voluntary confession on a promise of indemnity, than he could possibly be should he persist in an avowal of his innocence, and be brought to a trial.” In short, this man became an evidence, both against himself and against others, in the affair of the *Mercuries*.

Great was the joy of the Athenian people at this (as it was thought) undoubted discovery. And, as they had been highly chagrined before at their inability to detect the criminals, who had so outrageously insulted the *multitude*, they immediately discharged this informer, and all other prisoners, whom he did not name as accomplices. Upon such as he expressly named the judicial trials were held. Some of them they put to death, as many

\* This person, according to *Plutarch* in *Alcibiades*, was Andocides the orator, a man always reckoned of the *oligarchical* faction. And one Timæus, his intimate friend, who was a man of small consideration at Athens but remarkable for a penetrating and enterprising genius, was the person who persuaded him to turn informer.

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many as were prevented by timely arrests from flying from justice; but they pronounced the sentence of death against the fugitives, and set a price on their heads. Yet all this while it was by no means clear, that those who suffered were not unjustly condemned. Thus much however is certain, that by such proceedings the public tranquillity was restored.

In regard to Alcibiades; the Athenians were highly incensed against him, since the party, which were his enemies, and had made their attacks upon him before his departure, continued still to inflame them. And now, as they presumed the truth had been detected in relation to the *Mercuries*, it appeared to them, beyond a scruple, that he must also have been guilty of the crimes charged against him about the *mysteries*, upon the same ground of a secret combination against the *democracy*.

At this critical period of time, when the public confusion was in all its height, it farther happened, that a Lacedæmonian army, though by no means large, advanced as far as to the Isthmus, to execute some scheme along with the Bœotians. This was interpreted to the prejudice of Alcibiades, as if they had now taken the field at his instigation, and not on any account of obliging the Bœotians; and that, “had they not happily apprehended in time such as had been informed against, Athens had now been infallibly betrayed.” Nay, for the space of a night, they kept guard under arms, within the city, in the temple of Theseus.

About the same time, also, the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were suspected of a design to assault the *people*. And those hostages of the Argives, who were kept in custody among the islands, the Athenians on this occasion delivered up to the *people* of Argos, to be put to death on these suspicions.

Thus reasons flowed in from every quarter for suspecting Alcibiades. Desirous therefore to bring him to a trial and to execution, they accordingly dispatched the

*Salaminian* to Sicily, to order him and such others as they had informations against to repair to Athens. But it had been given them in charge to notify to him, that "he should follow them home in order to make his defence," and by no means to put him under arrest. This management was owing to a desire of preventing all stir in the army or in the enemy; and, not least of all, to their willingness that the Mantinéans and Argives should continue in the service, whose attendance in the expedition they wholly ascribed to the interest Alcibiades had with them.

In pursuance of this, Alcibiades on-board his own ship, and accompanied by all those who were involved in the same accusation, sailed away from Sicily with the *Salaminian* for Athens. And, when they were got to the height of Thuria, they no longer followed; but quitting their ship were no longer to be seen. Censured as they were, they durst not in fact undergo a trial. The crew of the *Salaminian* exerted themselves immediately in the search after Alcibiades and his companions: But, when they found the search was ineffectual, they gave it up, and steered away for Athens. And Alcibiades, now become a fugitive, passed over in a vessel soon after from Thuria \* to Peloponnesus. But the Athenians, upon his thus abandoning his defence, pronounced the sentence of death against him and his associates.

After these transactions, the Athenian generals who remained in Sicily, having divided their whole armament into two squadrons and taken the command of each by lot, set sail with all their united force for Selinus and Egesta. They were desirous to know, whether the Egesteans would pay down the money: to discover also the

\* Somebody at Thuria, who knew Alcibiades, asked him, why he would not stand a trial, and trust his country? "In other points I would; but, when my life is concerned, I could not trust my own mother, lest she should make a mistake, and put in a black bean instead of a white one." And, when he was afterwards told, that his countrymen had passed the sentence of death against him, he briskly replied—"But I'll make them know that I am alive." *Plutarch in Alcibiades.*

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the present posture of the Selinuntians; and to learn the state of their quarrels with the Egestéans. In their course, keeping on the left that part of Sicily which lies on the Tyrrhene gulf, they arrived at Himera, which is the only Grecian city in this part of Sicily; and, when denied reception here, they resumed their course. Touching afterwards at Hyccara, a Sicanian fortress but an annoyance to the Egestéans, they surprise it; for it was situated close upon the sea; and having doomed the inhabitants to be slaves, they delivered the place into the hands of the Egestéans, whose cavalry was now attending on the Athenian motions. The land-forces marched away from hence through the territories of the Siculi, till they had again reached Catana; but the vessels, on-board of which were the slaves, came back along the coasts.

Nicias had proceeded from Hyccara directly to Egesta, where, after transacting other points and receiving thirty \* talents, he rejoined the grand armament at Catana. And here they set up the slaves to sale †, and raised by the money paid for them ‡ one hundred and twenty talents.

They also sailed about to their Sicilian allies, summoning them to send in their reinforcements. With a division also of their force they appeared before Hybla, a hostile city in the district of Gela, but were not able to take it. And here the summer ended.

Winter now succeeding, the Athenians began immediately to get all things in readinels for an attempt upon Syracuse. The Syracusans were equally intent on making an attack upon *them*. For, since the Atheni-

\* 5812*l.* 10*s.* *Sterling.*

† Among the rest, Nicias sold at this sale *Lais* the famous courtesan, at this time a very young girl, whom her purchasers carried to Corinth, where she set up and drove a prodigious trade indeed. *Plutarch* in *Nicias*.

‡ 2325*ol.* *Sterling.*

ans had not thought proper, during their first panic and consternation, to fall instantly upon them, such a protraction re-inspired them day after day with new reviving courage: Since, farther, by cruizing on the other side of Sicily, they seemed to affect a remoteness from them; and, though shewing themselves before Hybla, and attempting the place, they had not been able to carry it, the Syraculans began now to treat them with an open contempt. They even insisted, as might be expected from a populace who are high in spirits, "that their generals should lead out towards Catana, since the enemy durst not venture to march against them." The Syracusan horsemen also, sent daily out to observe their motions, rode boldly up to the camp of the Athenians, insulting them in other respects but especially with this sneering demand, "Whether they were not rather come to gain a settlement for themselves on a foreign shore than to replace the Leontines in their old possessions?"

The Athenian generals, informed of these bravadoes, were desirous to seduce the whole strength of Syracuse to as great a distance as possible from that city, that they might snatch an opportunity of transporting thither their own forces by favour of the night, and seize a proper spot whereon to fix their incampment, without any obstruction from the enemy. They were well convinced, that their point could not be so easily accomplished, should they endeavour to force a descent in the face of the enemy, or by a land-march should give them an early notice of their design. For, in such cases, their own light-armed, and that cumbersome train which must attend, as they had no horse to cover their motions, must suffer greatly from the numerous cavalry of the Syraculans: But, by the other scheme, they might pre-occupy a spot of ground, where the cavalry could not give them any considerable annoyance. Nay, what is more, the Syracusan exiles, who followed their camp,

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camp, had informed them of a piece of ground, convenient for their purpose, near Olympiæum.

In order therefore to accomplish the point, the generals have recourse to the following artifice. — They dispatch an emissary, of whose fidelity they were well assured, and who might also pass with the generals of Syracuse as well affected to their cause. The person employed was a Catanéan. He told them “ he was  
“ sent by their friends in Catana,” with whose names they were acquainted and knew well to be of that number in Catana, which persisted in steadfast attachment to them: He said farther, that, “ the Athenians reposed  
“ themselves by night within the city at a distance  
“ from their arms; and that in case they (the Syracusans) on a day prefixed, would with all the forces  
“ of their city appear by early dawn before the Athenian camp, the Catanéans would shut up those within the city and set fire to their shipping, by which  
“ means they might force the intrenchments and render themselves masters of the camp; that, farther, the  
“ party of Catanéans, that would co-operate with them  
“ in this scheme, was very large, and already prepared  
“ to execute these points he was now sent to propose.”

The Syraculan generals, whose ardour other contingencies had already inflamed, and who had formed a resolution, even previous to such encouragement, to march their forces towards Catana, without the least reserve gave implicit credit to this emissary; and, having instantly pitched upon a day for execution, dismissed him. They also (for by this time the Selinuntian and some other auxiliaries had joined them) issued out their orders for the whole military strength of Syracuse to march out on the day appointed. No sooner therefore were all the needful preparations adjusted, and the time at hand at which they were to make their appearance, than — on the march for Catana, they halted one night upon the banks of the Symæthus, in the Leontine district. But the Athenians, when assured they

they had thus taken the field, decamping instantly with the whole of their force, and with all the Siciliæ and other auxiliaries who had joined them, and embarking themselves on-board their ships and transports, steered away by night for Syracuse. And, early the next dawn, they landed on the intended spot near Olympiæum, intent on forming and securing their incampment. The cavalry of the Syracusans, in the mean time, came up first to Catana; and discovering, that the whole Athenian army had put to sea by night, they return with this intelligence to their foot. Upon this, the whole army, soon wheeling about, returned with all speed to the defence of Syracuse.

In the mean time, the Athenians, as the enemy had a long way to march, formed an incampment on an advantageous spot without the least obstruction. On it, they were possessed of the advantage of fighting only at their own discretion, and the Syracusan horse could give them the least annoyance, either during or before an engagement. On one side, they were flanked by walls, and houses, and trees, and a marsh; and on the other by precipices. They also felled some trees that grew near; and, carrying them down to the shore, they piled them into a barricade for the defence of their ships, and to cover them on the side of Dascon. They also expeditiously threw up a rampart, on the part which seemed most accessible to the enemy, of stones picked out for the purpose, and timber, and broke down the bridge of the Anapus.

Thus busied as they were on fortifying their camp, not so much as one person ventured out of the city to obstruct their proceedings. The first, who appeared to make any resistance, were the Syracusan cavalry; and, when once they had shewn themselves, the whole body of their infantry was soon in fight. They advanced first of all quite up to the Athenian works; but, when they perceived that they would not fall out to fight them,

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them, they again retreated: And, having crossed the road to Helorum, reposed themselves for the night.

The succeeding day, the Athenians and allies prepared for engagement, and their order of battle was formed, as follows: — The Argives and Mantinéans had the right, the Athenians the center, and the rest of the line was formed by the other confederates. One half of the whole force, which was ranged in the first line, was drawn up by eight in depth. The other half, being posted near the tents, formed a hallow square, in which the men were also drawn up by eight. The latter were ordered, if any part of the line gave way, to keep a good look-out and advance to their support. And within this hallow square they posted all the train who attended the service of the army.

But the Syracusans drew up their heavy-armed, which body consisted of the whole military strength of Syracuse and all the confederates who had joined them, in files consisting of sixteen. Those, who had joined with auxiliary quotas, were chiefly the Selinuntians; and next, the horse of the Geloans, amounting in the whole to about two hundred: The horse also of the Camari-néans, about twenty in number, and about fifty archers. But their horsemen they posted to the right, being not fewer in number than twelve hundred; and, next to them, the darters.

The Athenians being now intent on advancing to the charge, Nicias, addressing himself in regular order to the troops of the several *States*, animated them to the fight by the following harangue, repeated in turn to the whole army.

“ WHAT need, my fellow-soldiers, of a long exhortation, since we are here, determined, and resolute for action? For this our present arrangement seems to me a stronger confirmation of your courage, than any words could be, how eloquently soever delivered, if we were inferior in strength. But when,  
“ Argives,



“ Argives, and Mantinéans, and Athenians, and the  
 “ flower of the isles, we are here assembled together;—  
 “ how is it possible, when such brave and numerous  
 “ allies are to fight in company, that we should not  
 “ entertain a steadfast, nay the warmest, hope, that the  
 “ victory will be our own? Nay more, as we have to  
 “ do with a promiscuous crowd, the mob of a city,  
 “ not selected for service, as we have had the honour  
 “ to be; and who, it must be added, are but Sicilians;  
 “ who, though affecting to despise us, will never sus-  
 “ tain our charge, because their skill is far beneath their  
 “ courage.

“ Let every soldier farther recal to his remembrance,  
 “ that he is now at a vast distance from his native soil,  
 “ and near no friendly land but what you shall render  
 “ such by the efforts of your valour. Such things I  
 “ am bound to suggest to your remembrance, the re-  
 “ verse, I am well convinced, of what our enemies utter  
 “ for their mutual encouragement. They undoubtedly  
 “ are roaring aloud — It is for your country you are  
 “ now to fight. But I tell *you*, that from your coun-  
 “ try you are now remote; and, as such, must either  
 “ conquer, or not without difficulty ever see it again,  
 “ since the numerous cavalry of the enemy will press  
 “ hard upon our retreat. Call therefore to mind your  
 “ own dignity and worth; advance with alacrity to  
 “ assault your foes; convinced, that your present ne-  
 “ cessities and wants are far more terrible than the  
 “ enemy you are to engage.”

When Nicias had finished this exhortation, he led on  
 his army towards the encounter. But the Syracusans  
 were not yet prepared, as by no means expecting to be  
 charged so soon; and some of the soldiers, as the city  
 lay so near, were straggled thither. These however  
 came running with all eagerness and speed to gain their  
 posts; too late upon the whole; but, as each of them  
 met with any number intent on action, he ranged  
 himself

himself in their company. The Syracusans, to do them justice, were not deficient in alacrity or courage, neither in the present battle nor any of the following. They maintained their ground gallantly so long as their competence of skill enabled them; but, when that failed them, they were forced, though with reluctance, to slacken in their ardour. However, though far from imagining that the Athenians would presume to begin the attack, and though obliged in a hurry to stand on their defence, they took up their arms, and advanced immediately to meet their foe.

In the first place, therefore, the flingers of stones with either the hand or the sling, and the archers, on both sides, began the engagement; and alternately chased one another, as is generally the case among the bodies of the light-armed. In the next place, the soothsayers brought forwards and immolated the solemn victims; and the trumpets summoned the heavy-armed to close firm together, and advance.

All sides now began to face; the Syracusans to fight for their country; each soldier amongst them for his native soil, to earn, for the present his preservation, and for the future his liberty. — On their enemies side; the Athenians, to gain possession of a foreign country, and not to damage their own by a dastardly behaviour: The Argives, and voluntary part of the confederates, to procure for the Athenians a happy accomplishment of their schemes, and again to visit their own country, to which they were endeared, victorious and triumphant; and that part of the confederacy, which attended in obedience to the orders of their masters, were highly animated by the thought, that they must earn their safety now at once, or, if defeated now, must for the future despair, and then, secretly actuated perhaps by the distant hope, that, were others reduced to the Athenian yoke, their own bondage might be rendered more light and easy.

The

The business being now come to blows, they for a long time maintained the ground on both sides. It happened, farther, that some claps of thunder were heard, attended with lightning and a heavy rain. This caused a sudden consternation in the Syracusans, who now for the first time engaged the Athenians, and had gained very little experience in the affairs of war. But, by the more experienced enemy, these accidents were interpreted as the ordinary effects of the season; and their concern was rather employed upon the enemy, whom they found no easy conquest. But the Argives, having first of all defeated the left wing of the Syracusans, and the Athenians being afterwards successful in their quarter of the battle, the whole Syracusan army was soon thrown into disorder, and began the flight. The Athenians however did not continue the pursuit to any great distance: for, the Syracusan cavalry, as they were numerous and unbroken, put a stop to the chase by assaulting those parties of heavy-armed, whom they saw detached for the pursuit, and driving them back into their own line. Having pursued only so far as they could in an orderly and secure manner, they again retreated and erected a trophy.

But the Syracusans, who had rallied again in the road to Helorum, and were drawn up as well as the present posture of affairs would permit, send a strong detachment from their body for the guard of Olympiæum; apprehensive, that the Athenians might otherwise seize the treasures that were repositied there. And, this being done, with the remainder of their force they retired within the walls of Syracuse.

The Athenians in the mean time made no advances against Olympiæum; but, after gathering together the bodies of their slain, and laying them upon the funeral pyre, they passed the night on the field of battle.

The next day they delivered up their dead under truce to the Syracusans, of whom and their allies there had perished about two hundred and sixty men; and then

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men gathered up the bones of their own. Of the Athenians and their allies about fifty in all were slain. And now, with all the pillage they had made of the enemy, they sailed back to Catana.

This was owing to the season of the year, now advanced to winter. It was no longer judged possible for them to be able to continue the war in their present post before they had procured a supply of horse from Athens, and had assembled others from their confederates in Sicily, that they might not be entirely exposed to the horse of the enemy. They were also intent on collecting pecuniary aids in those parts, and some were expected from Athens. — “ They might also obtain  
“ the concurrence of some other cities, which they  
“ hoped would prove more tractable, since they had  
“ gained a battle: They wanted, farther, to furnish  
“ themselves with provisions and all necessary stores,  
“ which might enable them early in the spring to make  
“ new attempts on Syracuse.” Determined by these considerations, they sailed back to Naxos and Catana, in order to winter there.

The Syracusans, after they had performed the obsequies of their slain, called a general assembly of the people. And on this occasion Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, (a man who was inferior to none in all other branches of human prudence, who for military skill was in high reputation, and renowned for bravery,) standing forth among them, endeavoured to encourage them, and prevent there being too much dispirited by their late defeat.

He told them, “ that in courage they had not been  
“ worsted, but their want of discipline had done them  
“ harm: and yet the harm suffered by that was not  
“ near so great as they might justly have expected; espe-  
“ cially when, no better than a rabble of mechanics,  
“ they had been obliged to enter the lists against the  
“ most experienced soldiery of Greece: That what hurt  
“ them most was too large a number of generals, and  
“ the

“ the multiplicity of commands which was thence occa-  
 “ sioned, (for the number of those who commanded  
 “ was fifteen,) whilst the bulk of their army observed  
 “ no discipline, and obeyed no orders at all: But,  
 “ were only a few skilful generals selected for the trust,  
 “ would they only be intent this winter on training  
 “ their bodies of heavy armed, and furnish others with  
 “ arms who had none for themselves, in order to en-  
 “ large their number as much as possible and inure  
 “ them to settled exercise and use, — he assured them,  
 “ *thus*, in all probability, they must upon the whole be  
 “ too hard for their foes, as their natural portion of  
 “ valour was great, and skill would be attained by  
 “ practice: That both of these would progressively be-  
 “ come more perfect; discipline, by being exercised  
 “ through a series of danger; and inward bravery  
 “ would merely of itself increase in gallant confidence,  
 “ when assured of the support of skill: As to *generals*,  
 “ that few only, and those invested with absolute  
 “ power, ought to be elected and confirmed by a  
 “ solemn oath from the *people*, — that they were per-  
 “ mitted to lead the army where and how they judged  
 “ best for the public service. For, by this means,  
 “ what ought to be concealed would be less liable to  
 “ detection, and all the schemes of war might be di-  
 “ rected with order and a certainty of success.”

The Syracusans, who had listened to this discourse,  
 decreed whatever he proposed. They elected Hermo-  
 crates himself to be a general, and Heraclides the son  
 of Lysimachus, and Sicanus the son of Hexecestus;  
 these three. They also appointed ambassadors to go to  
 Corinth and Lacedæmon, to procure the alliance of  
 those *States*, and to persuade the Lacedæmonians to  
 make hotter war upon the Athenians, with an open  
 avowal that they acted in behalf of the Syracusans;  
 that, by this means, they might either be obliged to  
 recal their fleet from Sicily, or might be less able to send  
 any reinforcements to the army already there.

The

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The Athenian forces, which lay at Catana, soon made an excursion from thence to Messene, expecting to have it betrayed into their power. But all the steps, taken previously for the purpose, were totally disconcerted. For Alcibiades, upon his quitting the command when recalled to Athens, being convinced within himself that exile must be his portion, betrayed the whole project (as he had been in the secret) to such persons at Messene as were attached to the Syracusans. The first step this party took was to put to death all the persons against whom he informed. And, at the time of this attempt being quite in a ferment and under arms, they carried their point, so that those who wished to give it were obliged to refuse admission to the Athenians. The Athenians therefore, after thirteen days continuance on that coast, when the weather began to be tempestuous, when their provisions failed, and no hope of success appeared, returned to Naxos \*\*, †where, having thrown up an intrenchment round their camp, they continued the rest of the winter. They also dispatched a trireme to Athens, to forward a supply of money and horsemen to join them without fail by the beginning of the spring.

The Syracusans employed themselves this winter in fortifying their city. They inclosed Temenites within their new works, and carried their wall through all that length of ground which faceth Epipolæ, that, in case they should be unable to keep the field, the enemy might have as little room as possible to raise counter-works of annoyance. They also placed a garrison at Megara, and another in Olympiæum. And all along the sea they drove rows of piles, wherever the ground was convenient for descents. Knowing, also, that the Athenians wintered at Naxos, they marched out with all their force against Catana. They ravaged the terri-

† In the original is added καὶ Θερῶνας. But all the editors and note-writers give it up, and own they can make nothing of it.

tory of the Catanéans; and, after burning the tents and camp of the Athenians, they returned home.

Having also had intelligence, that the Athenians had sent an embassy to Camarina, under favour of a treaty made formerly with them by Laches, to try if it were possible to procure their concurrence; they also dispatched an embassy thither, to traverse the negotiation. For, the Camarinéans were suspected by them, as if they had not cordially sent in their quota of assistance for the first battle, and lest for the future they might be totally averse from acting in their support, as in that battle they had seen the Athenians victorious, and so, induced by the former treaty they had made with the latter, might now declare openly on their side.

When therefore Hermocrates and others were arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and, from the Athenians, Euphemus and his colleagues in the embassy, an assembly of the Camarineans was held; in which, Hermocrates, desirous to give them a timely distaste against the Athenians, harranged them thus; —

“ O U R embassy hither, ye men of Camarina, hath  
 “ not been occasioned by any fears we were under, that  
 “ you might be too much terrified at the great equip-  
 “ ment with which the Athenians have invaded us;  
 “ but rather by our knowledge with what kind of  
 “ arguments they would impose on your understanding,  
 “ by which, before we had an opportunity to remon-  
 “ strate, they might seduce you into a concurrence.  
 “ Sicily in fact they have invaded, upon such pretext  
 “ as you have heard them give out; but with such  
 “ intentions as we have all abundant reason to  
 “ suspect. And to me it is clear, that their schemes  
 “ have no tendency to replant the Leontines, but ra-  
 “ ther to supplant us all. For, how is it reconcileable  
 “ with common-sense, that a people, who have ever  
 “ been employed in the ruin of the *States* which are  
 “ neighbouring to Athens, should be sincere in re-  
 “ establishing

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“ establishing a Sicilian people ; or, by the bonds  
“ of consanguinity, hold themselves obliged to protect  
“ the Leontines, who are of Chalcidic descent, whilst  
“ on the Chalcidéans of Eubœa, from whom these o-  
“ thers are a colony, they hold fast-rivettèd the yoke  
“ of slavery ? No ; it is the same cruel policy, that  
“ subjugated the Grecians in that part of the world,  
“ which now exerts itself to glut their ambition in this.

“ These are those very Athenians, who formerly, ha-  
“ ving been electèd their common leaders by the well-  
“ designing Ionians and that confederate body which  
“ derived from them their descent, on the glorious pre-  
“ tence of avenging themselves on the Persian mo-  
“ narch, abused their trust by enslaving those who plac-  
“ ed confidence in them ; charging some with desert-  
“ ing the common cause, others with their mutual em-  
“ broilments, and all, at length, with different but spe-  
“ cious criminations. And, on the whole, these Athe-  
“ nians waged war against the Mede, not in the cause  
“ of Grecian liberty, as neither did the other Grecians  
“ in the defence of their own : The former fought, not  
“ indeed to subject the rest of Greece to the Mede, but  
“ to their own selves ; the latter, merely to obtain a  
“ change of master ; a master not inferior in policy, but  
“ far more abundant in malice.

“ But, though Athens, on manifold accounts, be ob-  
“ noxious to universal censure and reproach, yet we are  
“ not come hither to prove how justly she deserveth it,  
“ since your own conviction precludes the long detail.  
“ We are much more concerned at present to censure  
“ and reproach ourselves, since, with all the examples  
“ before our eyes of what the Grecians in those parts  
“ have suffered, who, for want of guarding against their  
“ incroachments, have fallen victims to their ambition,  
“ — since, with the certain knowledge that they are  
“ now playing the same sophistries upon us,—“ the re-  
“ plantation of their kindred Leontines,” — “ the sup-  
“ port of the Egestæans, their allies,” — we shew



“ no inclination to unite together in our common defence, in order to give them most signal proofs, that in Sicily are neither Ionians, nor Hellepontins, nor islanders, who will be slaves, though ever changing their master, one while to the *Mede*, and soon after to whoever will please to govern ; — but, on the contrary, that we are Dorians, who from Peloponnesus, that seat of liberty and independence, came to dwell in Sicily. Shall we, therefore, protract our union, till, city after city, we are compelled to a submission ? we — ? who are convinced that thus only we can be conquered, and when we even behold that thus our foes have dressed up their plan ; amongst some of our people scattering dissensions, setting others to war down each other for the mighty recompence of their alliance, cajoling the rest as may best soothe the pride or caprice of each, and avail themselves of these methods to work our ruin ? We even indulge the wild imagination, that, though a remote inhabitant of Sicily be destroyed, the danger can never come home to ourselves ; and that he who preceeds us in ruin is unhappy only in and for himself.

“ Is there now a man amongst you who imagines, that merely a Syracusan, and not himself, is the object of Athenian enmity, and pronounceth it hard that he must be exposed to dangers in which I only am concerned ? Let such an one with more solidity reflect ; that, not merely for what is mine, but equally also for what is his own, he should associate with me, though within my precincts ; and that this may be done with greater security now, since as yet I am not quite destroyed, since in me he is sure of a steadfast ally, and before he is bereaved of all support may hazard the contention. And let him farther rest assured, that it is not the sole view of the Athenian to bridle enmity in a Syracusan ; but, under the colour of that pretext, to render himself the more secure, by gaining for a time the friendship of another.

“ If

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“ If others, again, entertain any envy or jealousy  
“ of Syracuse, for, to each of these, great *States* are ge-  
“ nerally obnoxious, and would take delight in seeing  
“ us depressed, in order to teach us moderation, though  
“ not totally destroyed, from a regard to his own pre-  
“ servation, — these are such sanguine wishes, as, in the  
“ course of human affairs, can never be accomplished :  
“ Because it is quite impossible, that the same person  
“ shall build up airy schemes to soothe his own passions  
“ and then insure their success. And thus, should  
“ some sinister event take place, quite sunk under the  
“ weight of his own calamity, he would perhaps be  
“ soon wishing again, that I was so replaced as to ex-  
“ cite his envy. Impossible, this, for one who aban-  
“ doned my defence, who refused before-hand to parti-  
“ cipate my dangers, — dangers, though not in name,  
“ yet in reality, his own ! For, if names alone be re-  
“ garded, he acts in the support of my power ; but,  
“ if realities, of his own preservation.

“ Long since, ye men of Camarina, it was incum-  
“ bent on you, who are borderers upon us, and must  
“ be our seconds in ruin, to have foreseen these things,  
“ and not to have abetted our defence with so much re-  
“ missness as you have hitherto done it. You ought to  
“ have repaired to our support with free and voluntary  
“ aid ; with such as, in case the Athenians had begun  
“ first with Camarina, you would have come with ear-  
“ nest prayers to implore from us : So cordial and so al-  
“ lert you should have appeared in our behalf, to avert  
“ us from too precipitate submissions. But these things  
“ never were ; not even you, nor any other people,  
“ have shewed such affection or alacrity for us.

“ From timorousness of heart you will study perhaps  
“ to manage both with us and the invaders, and alledge,  
“ that there are treaties subsisting between yourselves and  
“ the Athenians. Yet these treaties you never made to  
“ hurt your friends, but to repel the efforts of your  
“ foes, should they dare to attack you. By *them* you

“ are bound to give defensive aid to the Athenians  
 “ when attacked by others, and not when they (as is  
 “ the present case) injuriously fall upon your neigh-  
 “ bours. Remember that the Rhegians, though even  
 “ of Chalcidic descent, have refused to concur with  
 “ them in replanting the Leontines, who are also Chal-  
 “ cidéans. Hard, indeed, is your fate, if they, sus-  
 “ pecting some bad design to lie lurking under a fair  
 “ justification, have recourse to the wary moderate be-  
 “ haviour which appearances will not warrant; whilst  
 “ you, on the pretended ground of a rational conduct,  
 “ are eager to serve a people who are by nature your  
 “ foes; and join with most implacable enemies to de-  
 “ stroy your own kindred, to whom nature hath so  
 “ closely attached you!

“ In such a conduct there is no justice: The justice  
 “ lies in abetting our cause, and not dastardly shrinking  
 “ before the terror of their arms. These arms are not  
 “ terrible, would we only all combine in our mutual  
 “ defence; they are only so, if, on the contrary, we con-  
 “ tinue disunited, the point which the Athenians la-  
 “ bour with so much assiduity. For, even when sin-  
 “ gly against *us* they entered the lists, and were victo-  
 “ rious, yet they were not able to effectuate their de-  
 “ signs, but were obliged precipitately to re-embark.  
 “ If united, therefore, what farther can we have to  
 “ fear? What hinders us from associating together  
 “ with instant alacrity and zeal? especially as we  
 “ soon shall receive an aid from Peloponnesus, who in  
 “ all the business of war are far superior to Athenians.  
 “ Reject, I say, the vain presumption, that either it  
 “ will be equitable in regard to us, or prudential in re-  
 “ gard to yourselves, to *take part with neither side*, on  
 “ pretence that you have treaties subsisting with *both*;  
 “ There is a fallacy in it, which, though veiled under  
 “ plausible words, the event will soon detect. For if,  
 “ through your determination to abandon his support,  
 “ the party already attacked be vanquished, and the  
 “ assailant

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“ assailable be invigorated by success, what can such ab-  
“ senting of yourselves avail, but to help forwards the  
“ ruin of the one, and afford free scope to the pernicious  
“ schemes of the other? And how glorious would the  
“ reverse of this conduct be, would you exert your ef-  
“ forts to redress the injured, who also by the ties  
“ of consanguinity have a right to expect it from you;  
“ to guard the common welfare of Sicily; and not suf-  
“ fer your friends, your good friends, the Athenians,  
“ to run out into a course of outrage!

“ In a word, we Syracusans have now only this to  
“ add: That arguments are superfluous, either for the  
“ instruction of you or of others, in points whose ten-  
“ dency you know as clearly as ourselves. But we ear-  
“ nestly conjure you, and, if prayers will not avail, we  
“ boldly protest against you, that, as the worst designs  
“ are formed against us by our eternal foes, the Io-  
“ nians, you would act as you ought;—if not, that by  
“ you we are basely betrayed, Dorians by Dorians.  
“ If such must be our fate, if by the Athenians we  
“ must be destroyed, they will be indebted for their  
“ success to your determinations, but the glory of it  
“ will be totally assumed by themselves. Nay, the  
“ chief reward they will reap from the victory will be  
“ this, to enslave the persons who enabled them to gain  
“ it. But then, should the victory rest with us, you are  
“ the men from whom we shall exact revenge for all the  
“ dangers to which we have been exposed. Examine  
“ things, therefore, and declare your resolution, either  
“ at once, without embarking into dangers, to put on  
“ the Athenian chains; or, with us, to face the storm  
“ and earn your preservation; not basely bending to  
“ the yoke of foreign tyrants, and preventing an enmi-  
“ ty with us which will not quickly be appeased.”

In these words Hermocrates harangued the Camari-  
néans: And, when he had ended, Euphemus, embas-  
sador of the Athenians, replied as follows:

M 4

“ OUR

“ OUR journey hither was intended for the renewal  
“ of a former alliance ; but, as this Syracusan hath tak-  
“ ken the liberty to be severe upon us, we lie under an  
“ obligation to shew the justice of our title to that share  
“ of dominion which we now possess. And the strong-  
“ est evidence of this, he himself hath been pleased to  
“ give, by affirming, that Ionians have been eternal  
“ foes to Dorians. The fact is incontestibly true :  
“ Since we, who are Ionians, have been necessitated to  
“ stand ever upon our guard against the incroaching  
“ designs of the Peloponnesians, who are Dorians, who  
“ are our superiors in number, and are seated upon our  
“ borders. When, therefore, in the close of the Per-  
“ sian invasion, we saw ourselves masters of a navy, we  
“ asserted our own independence from the government  
“ and guidance of the Lacedæmonians, since no sha-  
“ dow of reason could be found why we should be obe-  
“ dient to them any more than they to us, save only  
“ that in this critical period their strength was greater.  
“ We were afterwards appointed, by free election, the  
“ leaders of those Ionians who had formerly been sub-  
“ ject to the *monarch*. And the preference awarded to  
“ us we continue to support ; assured that only thus we  
“ shall escape subjection to the Peloponnesian yoke, by  
“ keeping possession of a power which can effectually  
“ awe all their incroachments. And, farther, (that we  
“ may come to particulars,) it was not with injustice  
“ that we exacted subjection from those Ionians, and in-  
“ habitants of the isles, whom the Syracusans say we  
“ thought proper to enslave, though connected with us  
“ by the ties of blood : For they marched, in company  
“ with the *Mede*, against their mother-country, against  
“ us, their founders. They had not the courage to ex-  
“ pose their own homes to ruin and devastation by an  
“ honest revolt, though we with magnanimity aban-  
“ doned even Athens itself. They made slavery their  
“ choice, and in the same miserable fate would have  
“ been

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“ been glad to envelope us. Thus solid are the  
“ grounds on which we found our title to that extensive  
“ rule we now enjoy. We honestly deserve it : Since,  
“ in the cause of Greece, we equipped the largest fleet,  
“ and exerted the greatest ardour, without the least e-  
“ quivocation ; and since those others, acting with im-  
“ plicit obedience to the *Medæ*, did all they could to  
“ distress us. To which let it be added, that we were  
“ at the same time desirous to obtain a strength suffi-  
“ cient to give a check to the ambition of Peloponne-  
“ sians. Submissive, therefore, to their dictates, we are  
“ not, will not be ; because, either in return for the  
“ repulse of the *barbarian* by our single efforts, or in  
“ requital of the dangers we bravely encountered in de-  
“ fence of the liberty of those Ionians, — greater than  
“ all the rest of Greece, or even they themselves, durst  
“ hazard for their own, — we have an undoubted  
“ right to empire.

“ But, farther, to guard its own liberties and rights  
“ is a privilege, which, without either murmur or en-  
“ vy, will be allowed to every *State* : And now, for  
“ the security of these important points to ourselves,  
“ have we ventured hither to beg your concurrence ;  
“ conscious, at the same time, ye men of Camarina,  
“ that your welfare too coincides with our own. This  
“ we can clearly demonstrate, even from those crimina-  
“ tions which our adversaries here have lavished upon  
“ us, and from those so terrible suspicions which you  
“ yourselves are inclined to entertain of our proceed-  
“ ings. We are not now to learn, that men, who  
“ with some high degrees of horror suspect latent mis-  
“ chief, may for the present be soothed by an insinua-  
“ ting flow of words ; but, when summoned to action,  
“ will so exert themselves as is expedient for their wel-  
“ fare : And, consonant to this, we have already hint-  
“ ed that through fear alone we seized that power  
“ which we now possess in Greece ; that through the  
“ same motive we have ventured hither, to establish our  
“ own

" own security in concert with that of our friends; so  
 " far from the view of inflaving them to ourselves, that  
 " we are solely intent on preserving them from being  
 " inflaved by others.

" Let no man here retort upon us, — that all our so-  
 " licitude for you is unmerited and superfluous. Such  
 " an one must know, that, so long as you are safe, so  
 " long as you are able to employ the Syracusans, the  
 " less liable they will be to send reinforcements from  
 " hence to the Peloponnesians for our annoyance:  
 " And, as this is the real state of things, our concern  
 " should most largely be bestowed upon you. By pari-  
 " ty of reason it also highly concerns us to replant the  
 " Leontines; not in order to render them vassals to  
 " ourselves, as their relations of Eubœa are, but to  
 " make them as strong and powerful as we are able;  
 " that, seated as they then will be on her confines,  
 " they may compensate our remote situation in afford-  
 " ing a diversion to Syracuse. For, if the view be car-  
 " ried back to Greece, we ourselves are there a match  
 " for our foes. The Chacidœan there, whom after un-  
 " justly inflaving we are taxed with absurdity for pre-  
 " tending to vindicate here, is highly serviceable to us;  
 " because he is disarmed, and because he furnisheth us  
 " with a tribute. But, here in Sicily, our interest de-  
 " mandeth, that the Leontines, and the whole body  
 " of our friends, be restored to the full enjoyment of all  
 " their liberty and strength.

" Now, to a potentate invested with superior pow-  
 " er, or to a *State* possessed of empire, nothing that  
 " is profitable can be deemed absurd; nothing secure  
 " that cannot be safely managed. Incidents will arise  
 " with which we must temporize, and determine accor-  
 " dingly our enmity or our friendship. But the latter  
 " makes most for our interest here, where we ought by  
 " no means to weaken our friends, but, through the  
 " strength of our friends, to keep down and disable our  
 " enemies. Of this you ought not to rest incredulous,

" as

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“ as you know, that over our dependents in Greece  
“ we either hold tight or slacken the rein, as squares best  
“ with the public service. We permit to the Chians  
“ and Methymnéans the free use of their liberties and  
“ laws for a quota of shipping; we do the same  
“ to many for an annual tribute, exacted perhaps  
“ with somewhat of rigour. Others amongst them,  
“ who fight under our orders, are absolutely free,  
“ though seated upon islands and easy to be totally re-  
“ duced, because they are commodiously situated to an-  
“ noy the Peloponnesian coast. And hence it may be  
“ depended upon, that we shall make such dispositions  
“ also here as are most expedient for our own interest,  
“ and may best lessen the dread, which, as was said be-  
“ fore, we entertain of the Syracusans.

“ The point at which they aim is an extent of their  
“ rule over you; and when, by alarming your suspicions  
“ of us, they have wrought you to their own purpose,  
“ either by open force or taking advantage of your de-  
“ solate condition, when we are repulsed and obliged  
“ to abandon your defence, they intend to subdue all  
“ Sicily to their yoke. Such the event will unavoidably  
“ prove, if at present you adhere to them: For, never  
“ again will it be easy for us to assemble together so  
“ large an armament to give a check to their ambition;  
“ nor, when we are no longer at hand for your support,  
“ will their strength against you be insufficient. It is  
“ vain in any man to indulge an opinion that this may  
“ not be the case, since the very train of things evin-  
“ ceth its truth. For, when first you invited us hither,  
“ it was not upon the suggestion of any other fear than  
“ this, that, should we suffer you to be subjected by the  
“ Syracusans, the danger then would extend itself to  
“ us. And highly unjust it would be now, if the argu-  
“ ment you successfully enforced with us should lose all its  
“ influence upon you, or should you ground suspicions  
“ on our present appearance against them with a force  
“ superior to theirs, when you ought much more to en-  
“  
“ certain



" certain an endless distrust of them. The truth is this,  
 " that without your concurrence we are not able to con-  
 " tinue here. And in case, with perfidy open and a-  
 " vowed, we make seizure of your cities, yet we are  
 " unable to retain their possession, remote <sup>as</sup> they lie  
 " from Athens; as cities so large we never could gar-  
 " rison; and as they are farther provided in all respects  
 " as well as any on the continent. But, on the contra-  
 " ry, the Syracusans will not rush upon you from a  
 " camp upon the beach; but, posted in a city more  
 " formidable in strength than the whole of our arma-  
 " ment, they are ever mediating your ruin, and, when  
 " they have seized a proper opportunity, will strike the  
 " blow. They have afforded you instances of this al-  
 " ready, and a flagrant one indeed in the case of the  
 " Leontines. And yet they have the effrontery now,  
 " by words, as if you were so to be deluded, to exas-  
 " perate you against us, who have hitherto controuled  
 " their views, and deterred them to this moment from  
 " making all Sicily their prey.

" Our arguments have a tendency directly opposite.  
 " We have nothing in view but your certain and assu-  
 " red preservation, when we earnestly conjure you not  
 " wilfully to betray the means which at present will re-  
 " sult from our union, which we can mutually exert in  
 " one another's behalf; and strongly to represent to  
 " your own reflexions, that, even without the concur-  
 " rence of allies, a road to your reduction will at any  
 " time be open to these Syracusans through their own  
 " superior numbers; but an opportunity exceedingly  
 " seldom afforded you to make head against them  
 " with so large an auxiliary body. And if, from  
 " groundless suspicions, you suffer now so large a body  
 " to depart either unsuccessful or defeated, yet a time  
 " will come when you will ardently wish to see them  
 " return, though in a much less proportion of strength,  
 " and they have it no longer in their power to cross the  
 " sea for your support. Take care, therefore, Cama-  
 " rinéans,

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“ rincans, that neither yourselves nor others be deceived by a too credulous belief of the bold calumniation these Syracusans utter. We have now laid before you the true ground of all those sad suspicions which are fomented against us ; but shall again recall them to your remembrance by a short recapitulation, that they may have the proper influence upon you.

“ We declare, therefore, that we rule in Greece merely to prevent our being enslaved ; but are intent on vindicating liberty in Sicily, to suppress that annoyance which might otherwise be given us from hence ;— that mere necessity obligeth us to embark in many undertakings, because we have many sinister incidents to guard against ; — that now and formerly we came hither to support those Sicilians who have been unjustly oppressed ; not uninvited, but solemnly conjured to take such steps. Attempt not, therefore, to divert our pursuits, either by erecting yourselves into censors of our proceedings, or into correctors of our politics, a point too difficult for you to manage. But, so much of our activity or conduct as you can mould into a consistency with your own welfare, lay hold of that, and employ it to your best advantage ; and never imagine that our politics are equally prejudicial to all the world besides, but highly beneficial to the bulk of the Grecians. For, through every quarter, even those which we cannot pretend to controul, both such as dread impending mischiefs and such as meditate incroachments,—laying hold on both sides of the ready expectation ; the former, that redress may be obtained by our interposition ; the latter, that, if we think proper to oppose them, their own safety will be greatly endangered ;— both sides, I say, are hence obliged ; the latter, to practise moderation, though with regret ; the former, to enjoy tranquillity without previous embroilments of the public peace. The security, therefore, which now offers itself to your acceptance, and is always  
“ ready

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“ ready for those who want it, you are conjured by no  
 “ means to reject ; but relying, like other communi-  
 “ ties, on that quantity of support we are able to af-  
 “ ford you, put the change for once on the Syracusans ;  
 “ and, instead of being ever on the watch against them,  
 “ force them at length to be watchful and alarmed for  
 “ themselves.”

Such was the reply of Euphemus. In the mean time the real disposition of the Camarinéans was this : At bottom they were well-affected to the Athenians, save only for the ambition they shewed of enslaving Sicily ; but had ever been embroiled with the Syracusans, through that jealousy ever to be found in a neighbouring *State*. But, as the dread of victory on the side of the Syracusans, who were close upon their borders, if earned without their concurrence, had influenced their measures, they sent a small party of horse to succour them on the former occasion ; and looked upon themselves as obliged in policy to serve them underhand in future exigences, but with all possible frugality and reserve ; and, at the present juncture, that they might not betray any the least partiality against the Athenians, as they were come off victorious from a battle, to return the same impartial reply to both. Determined, therefore, by these considerations, they answered, — that,  
 “ since a war had broke out between two *States*, each  
 “ of which was in alliance with themselves, they judged  
 “ the only method of acting consistently with their  
 “ oaths would be to observe a strict neutrality.” Upon this the ambassadors of both parties took their leaves and departed. And the Syracusans, within themselves, exerted their utmost applications to get all things in readiness for war.

The Athenians, who were now incamped at Naxos, opened negotiations with the Siculi, to draw over as many of them as was possible into their adherence. Many of these, who inhabited the plains, and were  
 most

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most awed by the Syracusans, stood resolutely out; but the generality of those who were seated in the midland parts, as they were now, and had ever kept themselves, uncontrouled, sided at once with the Athenians. They furnished them with corn for the service of the army, and there were some who supplied them with money. And then the Athenians, taking the field against such as refused to accede, forced some to a compliance, and prevented others from receiving garrisons and aids from Syracuse. During winter also they removed again from Naxos to Catana; and, having repaired their camp, which had been burned by the Syracusans, chose to pass the remainder of the winter there.

They also dispatched a trireme to Carthage, to ask their friendship, and whatever assistance could possibly be obtained. They sent also to Tuscany, as some cities on that coast had made them voluntary offers of assistance. And, farther, they circulated their orders among the Siculi, and dispatched in particular one to the Egestæans, "to send them as large a number of horses as they could possibly procure." They busied themselves in collecting materials for circumvallation, such as bricks and iron, and all other necessary stores; being determined to carry on the war with vigour on the first approach of spring.

The ambassadors, who from Syracuse were sent to Corinth and Lacedæmon, endeavoured in their passage to prevail with the Italians "not to look with unconcern on the Athenian proceedings, since they also were equally involved in the danger." But, when arrived at Corinth, they were admitted to an audience, in which they insisted on a speedy supply, upon the plea of consanguinity; and the Corinthians came at once to a resolution, by way of precedent to others, that, "with all possible ardour, they would join in their defence." They even appointed an embassy of their own to accompany them to Lacedæmon, whose instructions were to second them in soliciting the Lacedæmonians;

monians “ to declare open war at home against the  
 “ Athenians, and to fit out an aid for the service of  
 “ Sicily.”

At the time that these joint-embassies arrived at Lacedæmon from Corinth, Alcibiades was also there. He had no sooner made his escape, attended by his companions in exile, than in a trading-vessel he passed over from Thuria to Cýllene in Eléa; and from thence he repaired to Lacedæmon. But, as the Lacedæmonians had pressed to see him, he went thither under the protection of the public faith; for he had with reason dreaded his reception there, since he had acted so large a part in the affair of Mantinéa.

It happened farther, that, when a public assembly was convened at Sparta, the Corinthians, and the Syracusans, and Alcibiades, all urged the same request, and were successful. Nay, though the College of Ephori, and those who presided at the helm of the *State*, had dressed up a plan, in pursuance of which they were only to send their ambassadors to Syracuse, to hinder all accommodations with the Athenians, and were quite averse to the supplying them with real succours,—yet Alcibiades, standing up, inflamed the Lacedæmonian fury, and wrought them to his purpose by the following harangue :

“ I LIE under a necessity, in the beginning of my  
 “ discourse, to vindicate myself from the calumny  
 “ which hath been charged against me, lest a jealousy  
 “ of me might divert your attention from those points  
 “ which equally affect the common cause. My ancestors, therefore, having, upon some reasonable  
 “ grounds of complaint, renounced the privilege of being the public hosts of your embassies at Athens, I  
 “ am the man who again re-established this hospitable  
 “ intercourse; who in many other respects endeavoured with great assiduity to oblige you, and particularly in the calamity which fell to your share at Pylus.

“ I cheer-

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
“ I cheerfully persevered in these my favourable inclinations towards you, till you yourselves, bent on accommodating your differences with the Athenians, employed my adversaries to negotiate your affairs; and, as, thereby you invested *them* with authority, you of course reflected disgrace on *me*. With reason therefore, after such provocations, you were afterwards thwarted by me, when I supported the interest of the Mantinéans and the Argives, and introduced new measures into the *State*, in opposition to you: Let therefore such of your number as, chagrined at what they suffered then, continue unjustly their resentments against me, weigh now the force of those reasons on which I acted, and return to better temper. If again I suffer in the opinion of any man, because I have ever manifested an attachment to the interest of the *people*, let him also learn that his enmity to me on that account is not to be defended. We have borne, from time immemorial, a steadfast unrelenting aversion to tyrants: now, the whole of opposition to the despotic power of *one* is expressed by this word, the *people*; and on this principle alone our firm and constant adherence to the *multitude* hath been hitherto carried on and supported. Besides, as the *State* of which I was a member was purely *democratical*, I lay under a necessity, in many respects, of conforming my conduct to the established model; and yet I endeavoured to give the public measures a greater share of moderation than the frantic humour of the Athenians was judged capable of brooking. But incendiaries started up; such as, not only in earlier times, but even in our own, have driven the *people* to more furious measures, and have at length effected — the exile of Alcibiades. But, so long as the *State* was in my own management, I thought myself justified, could I preserve it in that height of grandeur and freedom, and on the same model of government in which I found it. Not but

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“ that the judicious part of our community are sensible  
“ what sort of a government a *democracy* is, — and I  
“ myself no less than others, who have such abundant  
“ occasion to reproach and curse it : — but, for mad-  
“ nefs open and avowed, new terms of abhorrence can-  
“ not be invented ; though totally to subvert it we  
“ could in no wise deem a measure of security, whilst  
“ you had declared yourselves our foes, and were in the  
“ field against us. And all those proceedings of mine,  
“ which have proved most offensive to you, are to be  
“ charged entirely to such principles as these. ”

“ And now, in relation to these points, on which  
“ you are here assembled to deliberate, (and I also with  
“ you,) and about which, if I am able to give you a  
“ greater light, I am bound to do it, — attend to what  
“ I am going to declare. Our principal view in the  
“ expedition to Sicily was, if possible, to reduce the  
“ Sicilians to our yoke. After them, we intended to  
“ do the same by the Italians. We should next have  
“ attempted the dominions of the Carthaginians ; nay,  
“ Carthage itself. Had these our views been succes-  
“ ful, either in the whole or the greater part, we  
“ should soon have given the attack to Peloponnesus ;  
“ assembling for that purpose the whole Grecian force,  
“ which the countries thus subdued must have added to  
“ our own ; taking also into our pay large bodies of  
“ Barbarians and Iberians, and other soldiers of those  
“ nations which by general consent are famed for the  
“ most warlike of all Barbarians. We should have  
“ built also great numbers of triremes for the enlarge-  
“ ment of our navy, as Italy would plentifully have  
“ supplied us with timber ; with which blocking up  
“ Peloponnesus on all sides, and with our land-forces  
“ at the same time invading it by land, (after carrying  
“ your cities, some by storm, and some by the regular  
“ siege,) we hoped without obstruction to have warred  
“ you down, and in pursuance of that to have seized  
“ the empire of universal Greece. With money and all  
“ needful



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“ needful stores, adequate to this extensive plan, the  
“ cities to be conquered in those remoter parts would  
“ with all proper expedition have supplied us, without  
“ any demands on our own domestic revenues. Such  
“ were to be the achievements of that grand armament  
“ which is now abroad ; such, you may rest assured  
“ upon the evidence of a person who was privy to every  
“ step, was its original plan ; and the generals who are  
“ left in the command will yet, if they are able, carry  
“ it into execution. And I must farther beg leave to  
“ tell you, that, if with timely succours you do not  
“ interpose, nothing in those parts will be able to stand  
“ before them.

“ The Sicilians are a people unexperienced in war ;  
“ and yet, would they unite and combine together in  
“ their mutual defence, they might possibly even now  
“ be too hard for the Athenians. But then the Syra-  
“ cufans, abandoned as they are by the rest, and who  
“ already have seen their whole force defeated in battle,  
“ and who are blocked up in their own harbours by the  
“ enemy’s fleet, will be unable long to resist the great  
“ force of the Athenians which is already there. If,  
“ therefore, Syracuse be taken, all Sicily is vanquished  
“ at a stroke, and Italy becometh instantly their prey ;  
“ and then the storm, which, as I intimated before,  
“ was to be directed against you from that quarter,  
“ will in a short time gather, and come pouring down  
“ upon you.

“ Let no one therefore imagine that the end of your  
“ present deliberation is the safety of Sicily, when Pe-  
“ loponnesus itself will be endangered, unless some  
“ measures of prevention be executed with speed ; —  
“ unless you send out a naval force, for the preserva-  
“ tion of Sicily, so dexterously appointed, that the  
“ hands, who man the ships and ply the oar, may,  
“ on the instant of their landing, become a body of  
“ heavy-armed ; and, what in my judgement is better  
“ than an army, a *citizen* of Sparta to take upon him



“ the command, that those who are ready he may discipline to service, and force such to join as on choice would refuse their concurrence: for, by such a step, those who are already your friends will be animated with higher degrees of resolution, and those who fluctuate at present will join you with a smaller sense of fear.

“ It behoves you also to make war upon the Athenians at home in a more declared and explicit manner; that the Syracusans, convinced that you have their welfare at heart, may make a more obstinate resistance, and the Athenians be rendered less able to send reinforcements to their troops in Sicily.

“ It behoves you farther to raise fortifications at Decelæa in Attica; a step which the Athenians have ever most terribly apprehended, and think that in that point alone you have not put their resolution to its utmost trial in the present war; and *that* assuredly must be pronounced the most effectual method of distressing an enemy, to discover what he dreads most, and then know how to afflict him in his most tender part: For it is a reasonable conclusion, that they will tremble most at incidents which, should they take place, they are inwardly convinced must most sensibly affect them. As to the benefits which you yourselves shall reap by fortifying Decelæa, and of what they shall be debarred, I shall pass over many, and only concisely point out the most important. — By this, all the natural commodities of the country will fall into your hands; some by way of booty, the rest by voluntary contributions. They will instantly be deprived of the profits of the silver-mines at Laurium, as well as of the rents of their estates and the fees of their courts. The tributes from their dependents will also be paid with less punctuality; since the latter shall no sooner perceive that you are earnestly bent on war, than they will shew an open disregard for Athens.

“ That

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“ That these or any of these points be executed with  
 “ dispatch and vigour, dependeth, ye Lacedæmo-  
 “ nians, on yourselves alone. I can confidently aver  
 “ that all are feasible, and I think I shall not prove mis-  
 “ taken in my sentiments. I ought not to suffer in the  
 “ opinion of any Lacedæmonian, though, once ac-  
 “ counted the warmest of her patriots, I now strenu-  
 “ ously join the most inveterate foes of my country ;  
 “ nor ought my sincerity to be suspected by any as if I  
 “ suited my words to the sharp resentments of an exile.  
 “ I am driven from my country, through the malice  
 “ of men who have prevailed against me ; but not  
 “ from your service, if you hearken to my counsels.  
 “ Your enmity is sooner to be forgiven, who have hurt  
 “ your enemies alone, than their’s, who by cruel treat-  
 “ ment compel friends to be foes. My patriotism is  
 “ far from thriving under the injustice I have suffered ;  
 “ it was merely an effect of gratitude for that protection  
 “ I once enjoyed from my country. Nor have I reason  
 “ at present to imagine, that against my country I am  
 “ now going to march, so much as to recover some  
 “ country to myself, when at present I have none at all.  
 “ And I judge the person to be a true lover of his  
 “ country,—not him who, exiled from it, abandons  
 “ himself without a struggle to his own iniquitous fate,  
 “ but — who, from a fondness for it, leaves no pro-  
 “ ject unattempted to recover it again.

“ As these are my sentiments, I may fairly, ye La-  
 “ cedæmonians, insist upon your acceptance of my ser-  
 “ vice without diffidence or fear, whatever dangers or  
 “ whatever miseries may hereafter result. You well  
 “ know the maxim, which universal consent will evince  
 “ to be good,—that if, when an enemy, I hurt you  
 “ much, when I am now become your friend, I can  
 “ help you more. Nay, for the latter I am better qua-  
 “ lified on this very account, that I am perfectly ac-  
 “ quainted with the state of Athens ; whereas I was on-  
 “ ly able to conjecture at your’s. And, as you are

“ now met together to form resolutions on points of the  
 “ highest importance, I conjure you without hesitation  
 “ to carry your arms at once into Sicily and Attica; to  
 “ the end that, in the former, by the pretence of a  
 “ small part of your forces, you may work out signal  
 “ preservations, and at home pull down the present and  
 “ even the future growth of the Athenians; that, for  
 “ ages to come, yourselves may reap security and  
 “ peace, and preside at the helm of united Greece,  
 “ which will cheerfully acquiesce under your guidance,  
 “ and pay you a free, uncompelled, obedience.”

To this purpose Alcibiades spoke. And the Lacedæmonians, who had before some sort of intention to take the field against Athens, though hitherto they protracted its execution, were now more than ever animated to it when Alcibiades had given them such a detail of affairs, whom they judged to have the clearest insight in them. Thereupon they turned their attention immediately on fortifying Decelæa, and sending out a body of succour for the present service of Sicily. They also appointed Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, to go and take upon him the command at Syracuse; with orders, by concerting measures with the Syracusans and Corinthians, to draw up a plan for the most effectual and most ready conveyance of succours thither.

Gylippus accordingly issued out his orders to the Corinthians, to attend him, without loss of time, at Asine, with two ships; and also to expedite the equipment of the fleet which they designed for this service, and to keep them in readiness to sail when opportunity should require. Having so far concerted measures, the ambassadors departed from Lacedæmon.

The Athenian trireme, also, dispatched from Sicily by the generals on that post to demand supplies of money and a body of horse, was by this time arrived at Athens. And the Athenians, on hearing their demands,
   
drew

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drew up a decree, to send away supplies to that armament, and a body of horsemen.

And here the winter ended ; and the seventeenth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history, came also to an end.

### Y E A R XVIII. †

O N the earliest approach of the spring which led on the following summer, the Athenians in Sicily, hoisting from Catana, shewed themselves on the coast of Megara in Sicily, of which the Syracusans, having dispossessed the inhabitants in the time of Gelon, the tyrant, (as I have already related,) continued matters of the soil. Having landed here, they ravaged the country ; till, approaching a fortress belonging to the Syracusans, and attempting it without success, they retired, some by land and the rest on-board the fleet, into the river Tereas ; from whence going again on-shore, they ravaged the plains and set fire to the growing corn. They also fell in with a small party of Syracusans, some of whom they slew ; and then, erecting a trophy, went again on-board. They next returned to Catana ; and, after victualling there, proceeded from thence, with their whole force, to the attack of Centoripa, a strong fort belonging to the Siculi ; and, having made themselves masters of it by a capitulation, they stood away, burning down in their passage the corn of the Inesséans and Hybléans. Upon returning to Catana, they find there two hundred and fifty horsemen arrived from Athens, though without horses, yet with all the proper furniture, as if they could be better supplied with the former in Sicily ; as also thirty archers, mounted, and • three hundred talents in silver.

† Before Christ 414.

• 58125/.

In the same spring, the Lacedæmonians also took the field against Argos, and advanced as far as Cleonæ; but, the shock of an earthquake being felt there, they again retired. And, after this, the Argives, making an irruption into the Thyreatis, which borders upon themselves, took a vast booty from the Lacedæmonians, which sold for no less than \* twenty-five talents.

And not long after, in the same spring, the popular party at Thespiæ assaulted those in power, but without success. And, though the Athenians marched away to their succour, some of them were apprehended, and others were obliged to take refuge at Athens.

In the same summer, the Syracusans had not sooner received intelligence of the arrival of a body of horsemen amongst the Athenians, and the design of advancing immediately to assault them, than it occurred to their reflexions, that, “in case the Athenians could not possess themselves of Epipolæ, (a spot of ground which is only one continued crag, and lies directly above the city of Syracuse,) it would be difficult to inclose them completely round with works of circumvallation, even though they should be defeated in open battle.” They applied themselves therefore to the guard of all the approaches to Epipolæ, that the enemy might not on a sudden gain the eminence; for by other methods it was impossible for them to carry that post. Excepting those approaches, the rest of the tract is an impracticable steep, inclining gradually quite down to the city, and commanding the view of every thing within it. Hence, therefore, because it riseth with a continual ascent, it was called by the Syracusans *Epipolæ*.

As Hermocrates and his colleagues had now formally taken upon them the command, the whole force of Syracuse marched out, by break of day, into a meadow, on the banks of the Anapus, to pass under review; where the first thing they did was to select seven hun-

\* 4843/. 155.

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dred of the choicest men amongst the heavy-armed, to be commanded by Diomilus, an exile from Andrus. These were appointed for the guard of Epipolæ, and to be ready for service, as they were always to keep in a body, on any sudden emergence. But the Athenians, who had mustered their forces on the preceding day, had stood away from Catana, and were come in the night undiscovered to the spot called Leon, which is distant \* six or seven stadia from Epipolæ, where they disembarked their land-forces, and then sent their ships to lie in the station of Thapsus. Thapsus is a peninsula, joined to the main land by a narrow isthmus, and jutting out into the sea, at no great distance from the city of Syracuse either by land or water. The naval force of the Athenians, having secured their station by a palisado across the isthmus, lay quiet in their posts: But the land-army, without loss of time, made a running march towards Epipolæ; and mounted by the pals of Euryalus, before the Syracusans, who were yet in the meadow busied in their review, discovered or were able to advance to prevent them. And now their whole force was in motion to dislodge them; each man with all possible alacrity, and more particularly the seven hundred commanded by Diomilus: But, from the meadow to the nearest spot where they could come up with the enemy, was a march of no less than † twenty-five stadia. To this it was owing that the Syracusans came to the charge in a disorderly manner; and, being plainly repulsed in battle at Epipolæ, were forced to retire within the city. Diomilus also and about three hundred more lose their lives in this engagement.

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, having erected a trophy, and given up the bodies of the slain under truce to the Syracusans, marched down the next day in order of battle to the very gates of the city: But, as the Sy-

\* Above half a mile.

† Two miles and a half,

Syracusans refrained from sallying out against them, they again drew off, and raised a fort at Labdalum, on the very steepest edge of Epipolæ, looking towards Megara, which they intended as a repository for their baggage and money, whilst themselves might be called off, either to fight or to carry on the works of a siege.

Soon after this they were joined by a body of three hundred Egestæan horse, and one hundred more consisting of Siculi and Naxians, and some others in their alliance. The Athenian cavalry was in all two hundred and fifty: They had procured some horses from the Egestæans and Catanæans, and had purchased the rest; so that now they had got together a body of horse amounting in all to six hundred and fifty.

A garrison was no sooner settled in the fort of Labdalum, than the Athenians approached to Tyche; where taking post they built a wall in *circle* with great expedition, and by the rapidity of their work struck consternation into the Syracusans. Upon this they sallied out with the fixed design of hazarding an engagement, as they saw the danger of dallying any longer. The armies on both sides were now beginning to face each other; but the Syracusan generals, observing that their own army was in disarray and could not easily be formed into proper order, made them all wheel off again into the city, except a party of their horse: These, keeping the field, prevented the Athenians from carrying stones and straggling to any distance from their posts. But, at length, one Athenian band of heavy-armed, supported by the whole body of their cavalry, attacked and put to flight these Syracusan horsemen. They made some slaughter amongst them, and erected a trophy for this piece of success against the enemy's cavalry.

On the day following, some of the Athenians began to raise a wall along the northern side of their *circle*; whilst others were employed in carrying stones and timber, which they laid down in heaps all along the place called

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called Trogilus, near to the line marked out for the circumvallation, which was to reach, by the shortest compass, from the great harbour on one side to the sea on the other. But the Syracusans, who were principally guided by the advice of Hermocrates, gave up all thoughts of sallying out for the future, with the whole strength of the city, to give battle to the Athenians. It was judged more adviseable to run along a wall in length, which should cut the line in which the Athenian works were designed to pass, and which (could they effect it in time) must entirely exclude the enemy from perfecting their circumvallation. Nay, farther, in case the enemy should come up in a body to interrupt the work, they might give them full employ with one division of their force, whilst another party might raise palisades to secure the approaches; at least, as the whole of the Athenian force must be drawn out to oppose them, they would be obliged to discontinue their own works. To raise, therefore, the projected work, they issued out of the city; and, beginning at the foot of the city-wall from below the Athenian circle, they carried on from thence a transverse wall, cutting down the olive-trees in the sacred grove, of which they built wooden turrets to cover their work. The Athenian shipping was not yet come round from Thapsus into the great harbour, but the Syracusans continued masters of all the posts upon the sea, and consequently the Athenians were obliged to fetch up all necessary stores from Thapsus across the land.

When it appeared to the Syracusans that all their palisades and the transverse-wall were sufficiently completed, in which the Athenians had given them no manner of interruption, as they were under apprehensions that, should they divide their force, they might be exposed to a defeat, and at the same time were ardently intent on perfecting their own circumvallation;—the Syracusans drew off again into the city, leaving only  
one



one band of heavy-armed for the guard of their counter-wall.

In the next place, the Athenians cut off the pipes, which by subterraneous ducts conveyed the drinking-water into the city : and, having farther observed that the Syracusans kept within their tents during the heat of the day, but that some had straggled into the town, whilst those posted at the palisades kept but a negligent guard ; they picked out three hundred of their heavy-armed, and, strengthening them with a choice party of their light-armed soldiers, ordered them to march with all possible speed and attack the counter-work. The rest of their force was to march another way, since, headed by one of the generals, it advanced towards the city, to employ the Syracusans in case they sallied ; whilst the other detachment, headed by the other general, attacked the palisade, which covered the sally-port. Accordingly, the three hundred assault and carry the palisade, which those who were posted for its guard abandoned, and fled for shelter behind the works which inclosed Temenites. The pursuers however entered with them ; but were no sooner got in than they were again forcibly driven out by the Syracusans. And here some of the Argives and a small number of Athenians were slain.

But now the whole army, wheeling about, demolished the counter-work, and pulled up the palisade. The piles, of which it was composed, they carried off in triumph, and erected a trophy.

The next morning the Athenians resumed their work of circumvallation, and continued it across the crag which is above the marsh and lies on the quarter of Epipolæ that looks towards the great harbour. This was the shortest cut for their circumvallation downwards, across the plain and the marsh, till it reached the harbour. Upon this, the Syracusans, issuing again, raised another palisade, beginning from the city, and stretching quite across the marsh. They also threw up  
an

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an entrenchment along the palisade, entirely to prevent the Athenians from continuing their works quite down to the sea. The latter, when they had perfected their work along the crag, are bent on demolishing the new palisade and intrenchment of the Syracusans. For this purpose, they had ordered their shipping to come about from Thapsus into the great harbour of Syracuse. They themselves, at the morning's dawn, marched down from Epipolæ into the plain; and then, crossing the marsh, where the mud was hardest and best able to bear, by the help of boards and planks which they laid upon the surface, they carry almost the whole length of the palisade and intrenchment early in the morning, and were soon after masters of the whole. This was not effected without a battle, in which the Athenians were again victorious. The routed Syracusans fled different ways; those, who had composed their right, towards the city; and those, who had composed their left, towards the river. But, with a view of intercepting the passage of the latter, the three hundred chosen Athenians marched with all speed to seize the bridge. The Syracusans, alarmed at this step, as this body consisted of the bulk of their horse, face about on *the three hundred*, and put them to flight, and then break in upon the right wing of the Athenians. By so unexpected a shock the first band in that wing was thrown into disorder. Lamachus, observing it, advanced to their support from the left, with a small party of archers that happened to be near him, and the whole body of the Argives. Having crossed a ditch that lay between, seconded only by a few, whilst the bulk of his party made a full stop, he is instantly slain; \* as were also five

\* *Plutarch*, in the life of *Nicias*, circumstantiates the manner in which this old general lost his life in character. *Callicrates*, a good soldier, but of great impetuosity, rode at the head of the Syracusan horse. Being challenged out by *Callicrates*, *Lamachus* alone engaged personally with him. *Lamachus* received the first wound; he then returned the blow, and dropped. His antagonist fell at the same time, and they both expired together.

or six of those by whom he was accompanied. The Syracusans caught up their bodies with all possible expedition, and bore them off to a place of security on the other side of the river. They were in great measure obliged to make a precipitate retreat, since the rest of the Athenian army was now coming up to attack them.

But now, such of the Syracusans as had fled at first towards the city, having gained leisure to observe such turns in their favour, caught fresh courage from the sight; and, forming again into order, stood their ground against that body of Athenians which faced them. They also send a detachment to attempt the *circle* on Epipolæ, concluding it to be unmanned for the present, and might at once be taken. This detachment in fact made itself master of the out-work, and demolished it for about ten *plembres* in length; but the *circle* itself was defended by Nicias from all their attempts. Nicias, being much out of order, had been left to repose himself within the *circle*. He therefore issued orders to his servants to set fire to all the machines and the timber which were lying before the wall; for he was convinced that thus alone, in such a total want of hands for their defence, any safety could be earned. The event answered his expectation; for, when the flames began to mount, the Syracusans durst not any longer come near, but thought proper to desist and march away.

For now the Athenians, who by this time had chased the enemy from off the plain, were remounting the ascent to defend their *circle*; and, at the same instant of time, their fleet, conformable to the orders they had received, was standing into the great harbour. The Syracusans upon the high-ground beheld the sight; which occasioned them and the whole Syracusan army to retire precipitately into the city; concluding themselves no longer able, without an augmentation of their present strength, to hinder the completion of the Athenian works quite down to the sea.

After

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After this, the Athenians erected a trophy, and, in pursuance of a truce, delivered up their slain to the Syracusans, and received in exchange the body of Lamachus, and of those who fell with him.

The junction of their whole armament, both of their land and naval force, being now completed, they began again, from Epipolæ and the crag, to invest the Syracusans with a double wall, which they were to continue quite down to the sea. The necessary provisions to supply their army were brought in from all the coasts of Italy. Many also of the Siculi, who had hitherto stood aloof, deserted now for the Athenians, and came into their alliance, who were farther joined by three vessels with fifty oars from Hetruria.

All other points equally contributed to elevate their hopes. For the Syracusans had begun to despair of being able to sustain the siege, as they had no glimpse of any approaching succour from Peloponnesus. They were tossing to and fro amongst themselves some proposals for an accommodation, and had even sounded Nicias upon that head, who, by the death of Lamachus, was left invested with the sole command. Nothing definitive was however concluded, though (as might reasonably be expected from men in high perplexity, and more straitly besieged than ever) many proposals were made to him, and many more were agitated within the city. The distresses, also, which environed them at present, struck into them mutual suspicions of one another: Nay, they even divested of their charge the generals who were in authority when these distresses came upon them, as if all was owing to their misconduct or treachery, and chose in their stead Heraclides, and Eucles, and Tellias.

In the mean time, Gylippus, the Lacedæmonian, and the ships from Corinth, were come up to Leucas, designing with the utmost expedition to pass over from thence to Sicily. But terrible accounts came thick upon them here, and all agreed in broaching the same untruth,

truth, that "Syracuse was completely invested on all sides." Gylippus upon this gave up all hopes of saving Sicily; but, having the preservation of Italy still at heart, he and Pythen, the Corinthian, with the small squadron at hand, consisting only of two Laconic and two Corinthian vessels, crossed over the Ionian gulf with all possible dispatch to Tarentum. The Corinthians, besides their own ten now fitting out, were to man two belonging to the Leucadians, and three more belonging to the Ambraciots, and follow them as soon as possible.

The first step of Gylippus, now arrived at Tarentum, was to go in quality of ambassador to Thuria, claiming privilege for it, as his father had been a denizen of that *State*; but, finding himself unable to gain their concurrence, he weighed from thence and stood along the coast of Italy. But in the Terinéan gulf he met with a hard gale of wind, which in this gulf, when in a northerly point, blows generally with great and lasting violence, and now drove him from his course, and blew him out into the open sea, where he stood again the rebuff of another violent storm, but at length reached Tarentum. He there laid his vessels on-ground which had been damaged in the foul weather, and refitted them for service.

When Nicias found that he was in his passage, he betrayed an open contempt of so trifling a squadron, as the Thurians had already done before him. It appeared to him, that so petty a squadron could only be fitted out for piratical cruizes, and therefore he sent out no detachments to hinder his approach.

About the same time of this summer, the Lacedæmonians, with their own domestic forces augmented by the junction of their allies, made an irruption into Argos, and ravaged great part of that territory. The Athenians put out to sea with thirty sail to succour the Argives, which procedure was, beyond all denial, the clearest violation of the treaties between them and the Lacedæmonians.

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monians. Hitherto they had only exercised robberies upon them from Pylus; and, making descents rather on any other coast of Peloponnesus than Laconia itself, had left it to the Argives and Mantinéans to make war against them. Nay, though the Argives had frequently pressed them, that with an armed force they would barely land on the Laconic coast, and, after committing never so small ravage in their company, immediately to retire, they had positively refused. But now, under the command of Pythodorus, and Læspodias, and Demaratus, they made a descent at Epidaurus-Limera and Prasia, committed large devastation on the adjacent country, and afforded the Lacedæmonians a most specious and justifiable pretext to act offensively against Athens.

When the Athenian fleet was sailed homewards from Argos, and the Lacedæmonians also were withdrawn, the Argives broke into Phlissia, where they laid waste part of the Lacedæmonian territory, and made some slaughter of the people, and then returned to Argos.

T H E  
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.  
B O O K VII.

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**G**YLIPPUS and Pythen, when they had refitted their ships, stood along the coast from Tarentum to Locri Epizephyrîi. Here they received more certain information, that Syracuse was not yet completely invested, and that a succour of force might be thrown into the town by the way of Epipolæ. They went next to consultation, — whether, “ keeping Sicily on the right, they should endeavour at all hazards to enter Syracuse by sea ; or, with Sicily on their left, should steer first to Himera ; from whence, attended by the forces of that *State* and whatever additional strength they could persuade to join them, they should march thither over-land.” It was determined to go first to Himera, especially as the four Athenian vessels were not yet arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias at last, upon the certain intelligence that they were now at Locri, had detached to observe them. To be beforehand, therefore, with this detachment, they pass through the straits, and, having touched only at Rhegium and Messene, arrive at Himera : whilst, in the latter place, they prevailed upon the Himeréans to concur with them in the war, and not only to entrust their troops under their command, but even to supply with arms such of the mariners as had navigated the vessels, and were therefore unprovided ; for, their shipping they had drawn ashore, and laid up at Himera. The  
Selinuntians

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Selinuntians also, by a messenger dispatched on purpose, they had summoned to meet them, with all their united strength, at a determined place upon their route. The Geloans also, and some of the Siculi, promised to attend with a party, though by no means considerable. The latter of these were disposed better than ever to the service, since Archonides was lately dead, (who, reigning over some of the Siculi seated in these parts, and having a great influence over them, had declared for the Athenians,) and since Gylippus appeared to them to be sent from Lacedæmon with a full purpose to do them service.

And now Gylippus, — having assembled an army, which consisted of about seven hundred of those who navigated or came on-board his vessels, and for whom he had provided arms; of heavy-armed and light-armed Himeræans, amounting together to a thousand men and one hundred horsemen; of some light-armed Selinuntians; a small party of Geloan horse; and a body of Siculi, in all a thousand; — began his march for Syracuse.

The Corinthians in the mean time were sending out the other ships, as fast as they could equip them for the service, to follow with all possible expedition from Leucas: and Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who with a single ship set out last from Leucas, is the first who arrives at Syracuse; and that but a small space of time before the approach of Gylippus. Finding therefore, upon his arrival, that the Syracusans were going forthwith to hold a public assembly, in which the terms of putting an end to the war were designed to be adjusted, he dissuaded them from so precipitate a step, and animated their drooping resolutions by strong assurances, that “other ships would instantly arrive;” and that “Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, was sent thither by the Lacedæmonians to take upon him the command.” The Syracusans accordingly resumed their spirits, and immediately marched out



of the town, with the whole of their strength, in order to meet Gylippus; for by this time they had received intelligence that he was actually approaching.

Gylippus, upon his route, had made himself master of Iēgas, a fortress belonging to the Siculi; and now, at the head of his army, drawn up in order of battle, he comes up to Epipoizæ. Having mounted by the pass of Euryalus, as the Athenians had done on their first approach, he marched, in conjunction with the Syracusans, toward the Athenian circumvallation. He happened to arrive in that critical juncture, when the Athenians had completely finished ~~seven~~ or eight stadia of the double wall extending to the great harbour; when, in consequence, but a very small part remained incomplete; and on which they were labouring with their highest application. On the other side of their *circle*, towards Trogilus, the stones for completing their work had been laid ready in heaps almost down to the beach, and some parts of their work on that side stood but half completed, though others had received the finishing hand. To such extremity of danger were the Syracusans now reduced.

Gylippus and the Syracusans coming thus suddenly upon them, the Athenians at first were struck with consternation; but formed, however, in order of battle, to give them a reception. But Gylippus, having ordered his forces to halt, dispatcheth a herald to the Athenians, proclaiming that, “in case they would evacuate Sicily within the space of five days, with their arms and baggage, he would readily grant them a truce.” Such offers they received in a contemptuous manner;† and, disdaining to return an answer, ordered

\* About  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a mile.

† Nicias (says *Plutarch*) disdained to return an answer. But some of his soldiers laughed outright, and asked “If, at the arrival of a mantle and staff from Sparta, the Syracusans were become so full of spirits as to despise the Athenians; who had lately given up to the Lacedæmonians three hundred of their countrymen who had been their prisoners, all of them better soldiers, and who combed their hair, too, much better, than Gylippus.”

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the herald to move off. And now both sides were busy in marshalling and disposing their men for battle.

But Gylippus, who had made an observation that the Syracusans were in great confusion and could not easily be formed into proper order, made his army fall back into more open ground. Nicias gave them no disturbance whilst they were making this motion; but, without advancing, stood close under his works: and, when Gylippus found that the enemy would not move forwards to attack him, he made his forces wheel off to the high-ground called *Temenites*, where they reposed themselves for the night.

The next morning he drew up the greatest part of his army before the works of the Athenians, to prevent their sending out succours to more distant posts: for he had detached a party to attack the fort of *Labdalum*, which he carried by storm, and put all the garrison found within it to the sword. *Labdalum* was so situated, in regard to the Athenian posts, that *they* could have no view of what was transacting there. The same day also an Athenian trireme, as it was entering the harbour, is taken by the Syracusans.

After so much success, the Syracusans and allies set about raising a counterwork along *Hippolæ*. Beginning at the city, they carried it upwards towards the single wall which had an oblique inclination; and intended that, in case the Athenians could not stop its completion, it should entirely exclude them from perfecting their circumvallation. The Athenians, having perfected their works to the sea, had now remounted the eminence; and, as some parts of their work were but weak, Gylippus drew out his army by night, and was marching to demolish *those*: but the Athenians, who passed the night without their works, were no sooner aware of it, than they also marched away to defend them. Upon which, Gylippus, finding them alarmed, desisted, and made his army retreat to their former posts. This however occasioned the Atheni-

ans to raise those parts of their wall to a greater height, and to take the guard of it upon themselves, as amongst the body of their confederates they had divided the guard of the rest of their works, allotting a proper charge to each.

Nicias also judged it expedient to fortify the spot called Plemmyrium. Plemmyrium is a point of land over-against Syracuse, which, jutting out before the great harbour, renders the mouth of it very narrow. "If this were fortified," he thought "the importation of necessaries for the army would be better secured; because then, from a smaller distance, they could at any time command the harbour where the Syracusan shipping lay; and, should it be their ill-fortune to be straitened by sea, might easier fetch in supplies than in the present station of their fleet at the bottom of the great harbour." Now also he began, with greater attention than before, to study how to distress them by sea; convinced, since the arrival of Gylippus, how little room he had to hope for success by land. To this spot therefore he ordered his fleet, and drew his land-forces down, and immediately erected three forts. In these the greatest part of the baggage was laid up; and the transports and tight ships were immediately stationed there. To this project, however, the havock that afterwards ensued amongst the seamen is principally to be ascribed: for, as they suffered in this station under scarcity of water, and the mariners were frequently obliged to fetch both water and wood from a distance, since near at hand they were not to be had, the Syracusan horse, who were masters of the country, slaughtered them in abundance. The Syracusans had posted a third part of their cavalry at their fortrets of Olympiæum, to bridle the marauding excursions of the enemy at Plemmyrium.

Now also Nicias received intelligence that the other Corinthian ships were in their passage. To watch their approach, he therefore detached twenty sail, who were appointed

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appointed to cruize about Locri, and Rhegium, and the capes of Sicily, in order to intercept them.

Gylippus in the mean time was employed in building the counter-wall along Epipolæ, making use of the stones which the Athenians had laid ready in heaps for the continuation of their own work. It was also his daily custom to draw up the Syracusans and allies in order of battle, and lead them out beyond the point of the counter-wall; which obliged the Athenians to draw up likewise, to observe their motions. And, when Gylippus judged he could attack them with advantage, he instantly advanced; and, the charge being given and received, a battle ensued in the space between their respective works; but so narrow, that no use could be made of the Syracusan and confederate horse. The Syracusans and allies were accordingly defeated. They fetched off their slain by truce; and the Athenians erected a trophy. But Gylippus, having assembled the army round him, thought proper to make this declaration in the presence of them all: — That “the defeat  
“ was not to be charged on their want of bravery, but  
“ on his own indiscretion: he had deprived them of  
“ the service of their own cavalry and darters, by  
“ ranging his battle in too confined a spot between the  
“ works: that he would now again lead them out in a  
“ more judicious manner.” He exhorted them therefore “to imprint it strong on their remembrance,  
“ that, as in real strength they were not inferior, it  
“ would be intolerably disgraceful, if they, who to a  
“ man were Peloponnesians and Dorians, should not  
“ manifest themselves so resolutely brave, as to conquer and drive out of their country a parcel of Ionians and islanders, and a promiscuous rabble of hungry adventurers.” Having addressed them thus, he lay on the watch to seize a proper opportunity; and, as soon as he had gained it, led them on again to the charge.

It was the opinion of Nicias, and in general of all the Athenians, that, " though it was not their own interest to bring on an engagement, yet it highly concerned them to put a stop to the counterwork which the enemy was raising to hinder their progress:" For, by this time, the wall of the Syracusans had only not over-reached the extreme point to which the Athenians had brought their circumvallation: " And, should it be extended farther, it would give the enemy this double advantage;—a certainty of conquest whenever they thought proper to fight, and a discretionary power not to fight at all." Determined by these considerations, they drew out in order to give the Syracusans battle.

Gylippus soon began the engagement. He had now drawn up his heavy-armed without the works, and at a greater distance from them than before. He had posted the cavalry and the darters on a wide and open spot, yet unoccupied by the works on either side, and posted them so that they flanked the Athenians. In the ardour of the engagement, the cavalry broke in upon the left wing of the Athenians, which was ranged against them, and intirely routed them. In consequence of which, the remainder of the army was soon defeated by the Syracusans, and in the greatest disorder retired for shelter behind their works. And night no sooner came on, than the Syracusans, without loss of time, began to carry forwards their own works, which they soon extended beyond the Athenian circumvallation; by which they gained this great point, that they could no longer be invested on all sides by the Athenians; and the latter, though masters in the field, were henceforwards effectually stopped from perfecting their circumvallation.

After this, twelve ships of the Corinthians, and Ambraciots, and Leucadians, the remainder of the squadron designed for this service, having given the Athenian guard-ships the slip, came into the harbour of Syracuse: They were commanded by Heraclides, a Corinthian.

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rinthian. By these the Syracusans were now assisted in carrying on their work, till it was completely joined to the traverie-wall.

Gylippus now made a circuit over Sicily, in order to promote the common cause ; and to procure additional forces for the services both of land and sea ; and to solicit the concurrence of such *States* as hitherto had manifested, either no great inclination, or an open repugnance, to join in the present war. Other ambassadors also were dispatched, by the Syracusans and Corinthians, to Lacedæmon and Corinth, instructed to solicit a speedy reinforcement, to be transported into Sicily either in trading-vessels, or in boats, or by any other expeditious methods, since the Athenians had also sent for reinforcements from Athens. The Syracusans also assigned complements of men to their shipping, and sedulously trained them to the service of the sea, as designing on this element also to try their fortune ; nay, they laboured with alacrity and application to increase their strength in all respects.

Nicias, being sensible of this, and conscious that the strength of the enemy and his own inability became daily greater, dispatched his messengers also to Athens, a custom he had ever observed, and upon all occasions, to report the particulars of his proceedings. But in his present situation it was more requisite than ever ; since now he was convinced that he was environed with dangers ; and unless, with the utmost expedition, they recalled their troops, or sent them another, and that a strong reinforcement, no hopes of preservation remained. Apprehensive, farther, that the persons he should send, either through want of proper address, or through defect of courage, or a passion to soothe the populace, might suppress the truth, he sent a true account of things in a letter wrote with his own hand. By this method he concluded that his own sentiments of things could not be concealed or invalidated by messengers ; that the Athenians would be informed of the truth, and might accordingly

accordingly adjust their resolutions. These messengers therefore departed, instructed to deliver the letter which he intrusted to their care, and what farther they were to add by word of mouth. Nicias in the mean time kept within the limits of his camp, more anxious to guard his shattered forces from annoyance than to plunge into fresh and spontaneous dangers.

In the close of this summer, Euctemon, an Athenian general, marched, in conjunction with Perdiccas and a large body of Thracians, against Amphipolis; yet could not render himself master of that city. But then, setting out from Imeræum, he brought his triremes about into the Strymon, and blocked it up on the side of the river. And here this summer ended.

In the beginning of winter the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens; where they gave such accounts of things as he had charged them to give, and resolved such questions as were asked them. They also delivered his letter; which the clerk of the *State* stood up and read aloud to the Athenians. The contents were these.

“ATHENIANS,

“THE many letters from time to time received  
 “from me have given you all proper information, so  
 “far as relates to past transactions; and it is now high  
 “time you should be made acquainted with our present  
 “situation, that your councils may be adjusted in  
 “a proper manner.

“After, therefore, we had defeated, in several engagements, the Syracusans, against whom you sent us out, and when we had thrown up those works before their city within which we are this moment lying, Gylippus the Lacedæmonian came upon us, at the head of an army, brought from Peloponnesus, and augmented by the troops of some Sicilian *States*.  
 “In the first battle he is routed by us; but, in the last, pressed hard by their numerous cavalry and  
 “darters

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“ darters, we have been forced to retire within our in-  
“ trenchments. Being therefore obliged, by the su-  
“ perior numbers of the enemy, to discontinue our  
“ circumvallation, we are this moment lying upon the  
“ defensive. Nor indeed are we able to draw out our  
“ whole force for action, as detachments of our heavy-  
“ armed are remotely employed in the guard of our  
“ works. They have farther run up a single wall to  
“ cut our lines ; so that there remains no longer a pos-  
“ sibility for us to complete the circumvallation, un-  
“ less, reinforced by a numerous body of troops, we  
“ are enabled to assault and demolish the counter-  
“ work. And, in consequence of this, we, who de-  
“ signed to besiege others, may with much more pro-  
“ priety be said to suffer a siege ourselves, at least by  
“ land : for we dare not make any distant excursions  
“ into the adjacent country, for fear of the horse.

“ What is more ; they have sent ambassadors to Pe-  
“ loponnesus, to solicit reinforcements. Gylippus also  
“ is making the tour of the Sicilian *States*, with a view  
“ to obtain the concurrence of such as are at present  
“ neutral, and to prevail with the rest to intrust their  
“ additional levies for the service both of land and sea  
“ under his command : and, according to my present  
“ intelligence, they are fully bent to attack, at one and  
“ the same time, our intrenchments, with their land-  
“ forces by land, and with their ships by sea. And,  
“ though I say, *by SEA*, let not the sound be too ter-  
“ rible in your ears : for they know very well the pre-  
“ sent state of our navy ; which, though at first a most  
“ complete equipment, for the cleanness of the ships  
“ and the health and vigour of the seamen, yet at pre-  
“ sent hath scarce a ship which is not leaky ; so long  
“ have they been necessitated to keep the sea, whilst  
“ their hands have daily been mouldering away : for,  
“ in fact, we have no opportunity to lay them dry and  
“ careen them ; as we are under continual apprehen-  
“ sions of being attacked by the ships of the enemy,  
“ equal



“ equal nay superior in number to our own. That  
 “ they will attempt it we have most certain ground to  
 “ believe, but the seasons of doing it are intirely in  
 “ their own option; which also enables them to preserve  
 “ their vessels ever fit for service, as they are not neces-  
 “ sitated to be continually in action to strike awe into  
 “ others: Nay, we should hardly be able to do the  
 “ like, though the number of our shipping were much  
 “ larger than it is, or though we were exempted from  
 “ the necessity we now lie under of keeping guard with  
 “ them all. For, in case we make the least abatement  
 “ of our vigilance, we should be distressed for want  
 “ of necessaries, which even now we fetch in with diffi-  
 “ culty in the very teeth of the enemy. To this must  
 “ be ascribed the great waste of our seamen which hath  
 “ already been made, and whose number lessens from  
 “ day to day; since, obliged to fetch wood, and water,  
 “ and forage, from remote places, they are intercepted  
 “ by the enemy’s horse. Even our servants, who have  
 “ nothing to dread from our ruined condition, desert  
 “ us daily. And such foreigners, as were forced on-  
 “ board our fleet, depart with impunity to their own  
 “ cities; whilst others, who were allured to the service  
 “ by the greatness of our pay, and imagined they were  
 “ rather come to plunder than to fight, when, contrary  
 “ to their hopes, they behold the enemy possessed of a  
 “ numerous fleet, and making a brave resistance in e-  
 “ very quarter, some catch at the least pretext to go o-  
 “ ver to the enemy, and others make shift to skulk a-  
 “ way,—never again to be retrieved in so wide a coun-  
 “ try as Sicily. Nay, some of those, who, having at-  
 “ tended us hither from Athens, and since prevailed  
 “ with the captains of triremes to accept of the service  
 “ of Hyccarian slaves in redemption of their own, have  
 “ by this means subverted our naval discipline.

“ I am writing to men well-inlightened in naval af-  
 “ fairs, and perfectly convinced, that the flower of an e-  
 “ quipment is but of short duration, and how few of those  
 “ on-board

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“ on-board are skilled at steering the vessel or managing the oar. But what gives me most acute vexation is this,—— that, though commander in chief, I am utterly unable to put a stop to these disorders; since your tempers, Athenians, are hard to be managed; and am quite at a loss from whence to repair the waste that hath been made of our seamen. The enemy have abundant resources every where at hand, whereas necessity points out only *one* to us,—— that place, from whence we had who now remain, and who are for ever lost: For Naxos and Catana, the cities which still persevere in our alliance, are unable to recruit us. And, should the enemy get one circumstance more in their favour, —— that the towns of Italy, which at present supply us with food, deterred by the discovery of our low condition and the non-appearance of a reinforcement from Athens, go over to the Syracusans, —— the war will be finished to their hands without costing them a blow, and we shall be left to the mercy of the enemy.

“ I could have sent you much more pleasing accounts of things, but none so proper to give you a clear idea of the posture of your affairs here, and such as you ought to have before you proceed to deliberate upon them; and at the same time,—— as I am by no means a stranger to Athenian tempers, since I know you to be fond of hearing what will give you pleasure, but are afterwards inflamed with anger if any article in event drops short of your expectation, —— I thought it highly concerned my own safety to tell you nothing but the truth. And let me here conjure you, to entertain no resentment either against private soldiers or commanders; since, in labouring those points which are the principal ends of the expedition, they have fully done their duty.

“ But, since all Sicily is in arms against us, and since our enemies expect a reinforcement from Peloponnesus, resolve, without loss of time, that, as your forces  
“ are

“ are not sufficient to keep the enemy in play, they  
 “ must either be recalled, or be reinforced with a body  
 “ not inferior to the first equipment, with both a land  
 “ and a naval force, and a large pecuniary supply.  
 “ For myself, I must insist that a successor be sent me ;  
 “ since I am quite disabled, by a nephritic disorder,  
 “ from continuing in the command : And I think I  
 “ have just title to expect my dismissal from you ;  
 “ since, in the vigour of my life, I have been intrusted  
 “ by you with several commands, in which I did you  
 “ some signal services.

“ Whatever you determine, put it in execution on  
 “ the first approach of spring ; and, above all things,  
 “ keep clear of delays : for the ready supplies, given  
 “ the enemy in Sicily, will soon enable them to act ;  
 “ and those expected from Peloponnesus, though they  
 “ must be longer in coming up, yet, depend upon it,  
 “ that, unless you exert your utmost vigilance, some  
 “ of them will steal hither, as before, through all your  
 “ guards, and some will infallibly be here before you.”

Such were the advices brought them by the letter of Nicias. The Athenians, however, when they had heard it read, would not so far comply with the request of Nicias as to give him his dismissal ; but that, afflicted as he was in body, the whole burden of affairs might not lie too heavily upon him, they appointed two persons, already in Sicily, Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him in the command, till those, who by the public vote should be joined with him in the commission, can arrive. They also decreed him a reinforcement, consisting both of a land and naval force, to be levied amongst the Athenians upon the *roll* and their dependents ; and, for colleagues to share in the command, Demosthenes the son of Alcistenes, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. Eurymedon, by order, began his passage for Sicily about the winter solstice, at the head of ten sail of ships, and with a supply of  
 twenty

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
\*twenty talents of silver ; impowered, farther, to assure them, that “ a large reinforcement will soon come “ up, as the *State* had seriously interested itself in their “ welfare.” Demosthenes stayed behind to forward the equipment, and was intended to set out on the first approach of spring. He was busied in assembling together their contingents from the dependent *States*, and in levying amongst them both money, and shipping, and soldiers.

The Athenians farther send out twenty sail, to cruize on the coasts of Peloponnesus, and to take care that no one passed over from Corinth and Peloponnesus into Sicily. For the Corinthians, upon the arrival of the embassadors, and the advice they brought, that “ the face “ of affairs was much altered for the better,” (priding themselves in the reflexion that their former equipment had arrived in time to contribute to this turn,) became now more alert than ever, and got transports in readiness to carry over a body of their own heavy-armed into Sicily, whilst the Lacedæmonians were intent on doing the same from other parts of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians, farther, manned out five and twenty sail ; designing to hazard an engagement with the guard-ships stationed at Naupactus, or to disable the Athenians who lay there from giving their transports the least molestation, by keeping their own triremes ready ranged in order of battle in the very face of that squadron.

The Lacedæmonians also were preparing for an invasion of Attica, in pursuance of a former resolution, and in compliance farther with the pressing instances of both Syracuans and Corinthians. They had no sooner heard of the reinforcement intended to be sent by the Athenians to Sicily, than, by making a diversion, they designed to stop its execution. Alcibiades also continued warmly importuning them to execute his plan of fortifying Decelæa, and to proceed briskly with the war.

\* 3875*l.* *Stirling.*

But the motives, which at this present juncture animated the Lacedæmonians most, were, that the Athenians, if engaged in a double war both against themselves and against the Sicilians, must become a much more expeditious conquest; and, farther, the Athenians were the first aggressors in violating treaties. In the former war they were well convinced the first offence was chargeable on their own heads, because the Thebans had surpris'd Plataea whilst treaties were in fact subsisting. Nay, contrary to an express stipulation in a preceding treaty, that "arms should never be taken up against the party which was willing to abide by a judicial determination," they themselves had refused to submit to a trial, though claimed by the Athenians. To a conduct so ungenerous they concluded that their ill success in the war ought fairly to be imputed; and reflected, with self-accusations, not only on the calamity they had suffered at Pylus, but on all their other losses in every quarter of the war. But now, since the Athenians, with an equipment of thirty sail, had committed devastations at Epidaurus, at Prasæ, and at other places, and continued to infest their dominions by robberies from Pylus; nay, as often as disputes had intervened about the intent of articles in the last treaty, in which the Lacedæmonians appealed to a judicial determination, the others had haughtily refused it; — concluding hence, that the Athenians were become as guilty aggressors now as themselves had been on the former occasion; with cheerful presages of success, they determin'd for war. In order to it, they demanded this winter, from their allies, their contingents of iron, and got all the needful materials in readiness to execute their plan of fortification. Resolved at the same time to transport an aid to Sicily in vessels of burden, they began to levy it at home, and exacted the quotas of augmentation from their confederates. And thus the winter ended; and the eighteenth year of this war, of which



Isles of Eolus, or  
Vulcanian & Liparian  
Islands

TYRRENE SEA

SICILIAN

LIBYAN

AFRICAN SEA

Plan of

The Great Harbour



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which Thucydides hath compiled the history, came  
also to an end.

Y E A R XIX.†

THE following spring no sooner approached, than, at an earlier date than on any former occasion, the Lacedæmonians and allies invaded Attica; and Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, had the command of the army. At first they ravaged the country, particularly the plains; and this being done, having allotted out the work in portions to the several *States*, they set out about fortifying Decelæa. Now, Decelæa is distant at most but \* one hundred and twenty stadia from the city of Athens, and lies at the same distance, or very little more, from Bœotia: but in the plain; and on the finest spot of ground, from whence effectually to annoy them, was their fortress raised; and might be seen from the very walls of Athens.

In this manner the Peloponnesians and allies erected a fortress within Attica itself; whilst, in the same portion of time, their friends in Peloponnesus embarked a body of heavy-armed on-board their transports, and sent them off for Sicily. For this service the Lacedæmonians picked out from the very best of the Helots and of those citizens of Sparta who were newly enfranchised, from both together, six hundred heavy-armed; and appointed Heccritus, a *Spartan*, to command them. And the Bœotians sent three hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Xeno and Nikon of Thebes, and Hegesander of Thelpiæ. These were *first* embarked at Tænarus in Laconia, and thence put out to sea.

Soon after these, the Corinthians sent away five hundred heavy-armed; some from Corinth itself, others hired from the Arcadians; and appointed Alexarchus,

† Before Christ 413.

\* About twelve miles.



a Corinthian, to command them. The Sicyonians also sent two hundred heavy-armed along with the Corinthians, and at their head Sargeus, a Sicyonian.

But the five and twenty sail of Corinthians, which launched out to sea in the depth of winter, lay ranged in an opposite station to the twenty Attic at Naupactus, to give leisure for the embarkation of the heavy-armed on-board the transports from Peloponnesus. On this account, principally, they were manned and fitted out to sea, that they might divert the attention of the Athenians from the transport-fleet that was now putting out, and fasten it wholly upon the hostile appearance of these triremes.

In the mean time, the Athenians, even during the fortifications in hand at Decelæa, and at the earliest approach of spring, sent out thirty sail to cruize on the coasts of Peloponnesus, under the command of Charicles, the son of Apollodorus. His instructions were, farther, to touch at Argos, and to summon them, in conformity to the treaty of alliance, to embark a body of heavy-armed on-board the fleet.

Demosthenes also, according to promise, they sent away for Sicily, with a numerous fleet, consisting of sixty ships of Athens and five of Chios, on-board of which were twelve hundred *enrolled* Athenians, and as large a number of islanders as with the utmost industry they had been able to draw together. They had also amassed, from their other confederates subject to Athens, all manner of supplies they were able to furnish for carrying on the war with vigour. But Demosthenes was farther instructed to sail at first in company with Charicles, and assist him in the cruize on the coasts of Laconia. Demosthenes therefore, having stood over to Ægina, continued there, till the remainder of his force, which was yet behind, had completely joined him, and Charicles had taken on-board the Argive auxiliaries.

About the same time in this spring Gylippus also returned to Syracuse, at the head of as large a force as  
he

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he had been able to collect from the several *States*, with whom his persuasions had been effectual; and, having convened the Syracusans, he told them that —  
“ they ought to man out as large a number of ship-  
“ ping as they possibly could, and try their fortune in  
“ a naval engagement: such a step, he had reason to  
“ hope, might be attended with consequences which  
“ would amply compensate the danger, and invigorate  
“ the war.”

These instances of Gylippus were well seconded by Hermocrates, who took uncommon pains to encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians by sea. —  
“ The latter, he told them, were far from enjoying  
“ their naval skill as an hereditary right, or a privilege from time immemorial exclusively their own.  
“ In fact, they were by nature landmen much more  
“ than the Syracusans; and necessity alone, in the Mcdish invasion, had forced them to try their fortune  
“ at sea: By enterprising men, as the Athenians were,  
“ such as were most daring in opposing them must  
“ needs be regarded as the most formidable enemies.  
“ True — *they* had been used to intimidate their neighbours, not by a real superiority of strength, but by  
“ their daring enterprising genius; and now, by the  
“ same methods, *themselves* might become formidable  
“ even to Athenians.” He assured them, “ for his  
“ own part, he was perfectly convinced that the Syracusans, if by an effort of bold resolution they would  
“ on a sudden attack the Athenian fleet, might reap  
“ more benefit from the terror which such a step would  
“ strike upon the foe, than could accrue to the Athenians from their superior skill when compared with  
“ Syracusan inexperience.” He pressed them therefore “ to try their fortune by sea, and to bid adieu to  
“ fear.”

Thus animated by Gylippus, and by Hermocrates, and by others, the Syracusans were eagerly bent on action by sea, and manned out their fleet. And, when the

the whole was ready for service, Gylippus, by favour of the night, at the head of his land-army, marched down to the forts at Plemmyrium, intending to assault them on the land-side. The triremes of the Syracusans, at the same instant of time, as had been concerted beforehand, to the number of thirty-five, are sailing up out of the great harbour, whilst forty-five were going about out of the lesser harbour where their dock lay. The latter went round, designing to complete their junction with the other squadron, and then in a body to stand against Plemmyrium, that the Athenians on both sides might be thrown into confusion. The Athenians lost no time, but instantly manned out sixty vessels. With twenty-five of the number they engaged the thirty-five Syracusan in the great harbour; with the rest they went to meet the other squadron, that was coming about from the dock. A smart engagement immediately ensued, in the mouth of the great harbour. The dispute was a long time obstinately maintained; one side exerting themselves to clear the passage, but the other to obstruct it.

In the the mean time, Gylippus, — as the Athenians posted at Plemmyrium had flocked down to the sea-side, and with their utmost attention were looking at the battle on the water, — Gylippus seizeth the opportunity; and, no sooner had the morning dawned, than, to the great surprise of the enemy, he attacks the forts. He first makes himself master of the largest of the three, and afterwards carries the two lesser, the defendants of which, seeing the largest so easily taken, had abandoned their posts: Nay, on the surprisal of the first, those who had manned it, throwing themselves on-board the boats and a transport that lay at hand, found no small difficulty in getting away to the camp; for, as the Syracusans had now the better of the engagement with their squadron in the great harbour, they detached one of their nimblest triremes to pursue the fliers. But, at the time the other two forts were carried, the Syracusans

cusans were plainly vanquished, which gave them who abandoned the last an opportunity to sail away without obstruction. For that Syracusan squadron, that was engaged before the harbour's mouth, having forced their way through the Athenian fleet, by sailing forwards in a disorderly manner and continually running foul one upon another, gave the Athenians an opportunity to regain the day. For this squadron they soon routed, and afterwards *that*, within the harbour, by which they had been vanquished. They also sunk eleven ships of the enemy, and made a slaughter of all their crews, those of three ships excepted, to whom they granted quarter; and all this with the loss only of three ships on their own side. Having afterwards drawn ashore the shatters of the Syracusan fleet, and piled them into a trophy on the little isle before Plemmyrium, they retired to their main incampment.

Thus unsuccessful were the Syracusans in their naval engagement. They had carried, however, the forts at Plemmyrium; and, to signalize each of their acquisitions, they erected three several trophies. One, also, of the two forts that were taken last they levelled with the ground, but the other two they repaired and garrisoned.

In this surprisal of the forts, many were slain and many were made prisoners, and a great stock of wealth repositied there became the prize of the enemy. For, as the Athenians had made use of these forts by way of magazine, much wealth belonging to merchants, and corn in abundance, were found within; much also of the stores belonging to the captains of the ships of war, inasmuch as forty masts for triremes, and other materials of refitment, had been laid up there; and three triremes were hauled ashore to be careened. Nay, this surprisal of Plemmyrium was one of the chief if not the greatest source of all the distress which the Athenian army suffered in the sequel; for no longer was the sea open to them for the secure importation of necessary supplies.

From this time the Syracusans rushed upon them from thence, and awed all their motions. The convoys could no more get in without fighting their way. Besides that, in all other respects, it struck a great consternation, and even a dejection of mind, amongst the troops.

The next step taken by the Syracusans was to send out to sea a squadron of twelve ships, under the command of Agatharcus, a Syracusan. One of these ships was to proceed to Peloponnesus, and land an embassy there, which had instructions, "to notify a present" "hopeful posture of affairs, and to press the prosecution of the war in Greece with all possible vigour." The other eleven stood over to the Italian coast, having received intelligence, that a number of small vessels, laden with stores for the Athenians, were coming up. They intercepted and intirely destroyed most of these; and the timber on-board them, which was ready wrought for the Athenians to frame together into ships, they burnt to ashes on the shore of Caulonia. This done, they stood away for Locri; and, whilst they lay in that road, one of the transports from Peloponnesus, having on-board the heavy-armed from Thespiæ, came in. The Syracusans removed those heavy-armed into their own ships, and returned with them to Syracuse.

The Athenians with twenty sail were stationed at Megara, in order to intercept their return; where one ship alone, with all the crew, fell into their hands. They were not able to come up with the rest; since, eluding all pursuit, they recover with security their own harbours.

There happened also a skirmish, in the harbour of Syracuse, about the piles which the Syracusans had drove down in the sea before their old docks, that their vessels might ride in safety behind them, the Athenians be unable to stand in amongst them and do any damage to their shipping. Close up to those piles the Athenians had towed a raft of prodigious size, on which turrets and parapets to cover the defendants were erected, whilst

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whilst others in long boats were fastening cables round the piles, and, by the help of a machine convenient for the purpose, craning them up; and such as they broke a set of divers sawed off close at the bottom. The Syracusans in the mean time were pouring their missile weapons upon them from the docks, which were plentifully returned by those posted on the raft. In short, the Athenians plucked up most of the piles; but one part of the staccade was exceeding difficult to be demolished, as it lay out of sight; for they had driven down some of the piles in such a manner, that their heads emerged not above the surface of the water. This rendered all access exceeding dangerous; since, ignorant where they lay, a pilot would be apt to bulge his vessel as it were upon a shelve. But even these the divers, for a pecuniary reward, searched out and sawed away. And yet, as fast as this was done, the Syracusans drove down a fresh set of piles. The contrivances both of annoyance and prevention were strenuously exerted on both sides, as might justly be expected from two hostile bodies posted so near one another; the skirmishings were often renewed, and every artifice of war was successively practised.

The Syracusans, farther, had dispatched embassies, composed of Corinthians, and Lacedæmonians, and Ambraciots, to the cities of Sicily, “ to notify the surprisal of Plemmyrium, and to give a just representation of the naval engagement in which they had been defeated, not so much by the strength of the enemy as by their own confusion; in other respects to assure them, that their hopes of success were high, and that they firmly depended on receiving soon an aid from them, composed both of a land and naval force; since the Athenians were also in expectation of a reinforcement from Athens, the approach of which would their friends anticipate, the Athenians at present there must be totally destroyed, and the war brought at once to

“ an end.” Such schemes were now in agitation in Sicily.

But Demosthenes, when he had assembled the whole of the armament with which he was to pass over to the relief of those in Sicily, weighing from Ægina, and standing over to Peloponnesus, he completes his junction with Charicles and the squadron of thirty sail of Athenians under his command; and, as a body of heavy-armed had been taken on-board the latter from Argos, they steered together for the coast of Laconia. And here first they ravaged in part Epidaurus Limeræ; and, proceeding from thence to that part of Laconia which lies over-against Cythera, and where stands the temple of Apollo, having ravaged part of the adjacent country, they inclosed and fortified a neck of land which might serve as a receptacle to such of the Helots as deserted the Lacedæmonians; from thence, banditti-like, as was done from Pylus, to infest the country. This convenient spot was no sooner taken in than Demosthenes stood away for Corcyra, that he might take on-board the auxiliaries there, and make the best of his way to Sicily. But Charicles stayed till he had put the place into a state of secure defence, and fixed a garrison in it. This being done, he carried back his squadron of thirty sail to Athens; and the Argives at the same time received their dismissal.

This summer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred Thracian targeteers, of those called *Machærophori*, and who are originally Dians. This body was intended to have been sent with Demosthenes into Sicily; but, as they arrived not till after his departure, the Athenians had resolved to send them back again to their own homes in Thrace. To retain them merely for the sake of the war waged against them from Decelæa, they thought, would plunge them in too large an expence, since the pay of every soldier was \* a drachma a day. For now, since Decelæa, which had

\* γρ. δ.

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been fortified this spring by the joint-labours of the whole united army, continued to be garrisoned by detachments from the several *States*, which at certain intervals of time relieved one another in a regular succession, it gave terrible annoyance to the Athenians, and caused amongst them such havoc of their effects, and such a destruction of their men, as threw them into great distress. All preceding incursions of the enemy, having been only transient, had left them in the peaceable enjoyment of their lands for the rest of the year; but now, as they awed the country by one continued blockade, and as by intervals they received considerable augmentations to enable them to give greater annoyance, as even the regular garrison was periodically obliged to scour the country and plunder for their own subsistence, and as Agis, king of the Lacedæmonians, who with the utmost diligence prosecuted the war, in person directed all the operations, — the Athenians were sorely pressed: For they were debarred the whole produce of their own lands; more than twenty thousand of their slaves had deserted to the enemy, and a large part of these were mechanics of the city; their whole stock of sheep and labouring cattle was lost beyond retrieve; their horses, — as the horsemen were obliged every day to mount, either to ride towards Decelæa, to awe the excursions of that garrison, or to guard some important posts in the country, — their horses were either lamed by running incessantly over hard or rugged ground, or by wounds were disabled for service; the constant supplies of provisions for the city, which used to be fetched from Eubœa to Oropus, and to be brought in from thence through Decelæa as the shortest passage, were now forced to go round the cape of Sunium by sea, which considerably enhanced their price. For want also of all foreign commodities the city was equally distressed; and Athens was now reduced to be merely a place of arms. To keep guard on the battlements by day, the citizens were obliged successively to relieve one another; but the whole body of the city, except  
the



the *horfemen*, mounted guard by night. The latter, ever under arms *without*, the rest on the constant guard of the city-walls, and this for a summer and winter without any intermission, were reduced to a very low condition. But the point which pressed hardest upon them was having two wars at once upon their hands ; and yet their obstinacy had rose to so high a pitch, as, had it not been visible to all the world, the bare mention of its possibility would have been quite incredible : For who would have believed, that this people, so closely blocked up at home by the Peloponnesians, should scorn to give up Sicily ? nay, should persevere with unabating zeal, to carry on the siege of Syracuse, a city in no respect inferior even to Athens itself ? that they should exhibit such an astonishing proof of their strength and their courage to the eyes of Greece ; where, upon the first breaking out of the war, some people had imagined, that, in case the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, they could not hold out above one year intire, though others had allowed them two, and others three, but nobody a longer space ? and that, in the seventeenth year after the first invasion of this kind, they should attempt the conquest of Sicily ; and, when deeply gashed in every part, by one war already upon their hands, should wilfully plunge into another, as formidable in all respects as that waged against them from Peloponnesus ? But now, when, besides what they had suffered already, they were terribly annoyed from Decelée, and other incidents had exacted from them very large disbursements, their finances were reduced to a very low ebb. At this period, therefore, instead of the tribute paid them by their dependents, they exacted a twentieth of the value of all commodities imported and exported, which they thought would replenish their coffers faster than the former method : For, their disbursements were not as they had been in preceding times, but had been inflamed in the same proportion as the scenes of war had  
been

been enlarged, whilst their annual revenue was constantly decreasing.

Unwilling, therefore, in the present ebb of their treasures, to defray the charge of this body of Thracians, who came too late for Demosthenes, they sent them back to their own country with all possible haste. Diitrephes was the person pitched upon to conduct them home; and was instructed, that, "in the passage, (for they were to go through the Euripus,) he should employ them, if opportunity offered, against the enemy." He landed therefore near Tanagra, and in a hurrying manner carried off a booty from thence. About the shut of evening he also crossed the Euripus from Chalcis of Eubœa; and, having landed his Thracians in Bœotia, led them against Mycaleffus. His design was not discovered that night, though he halted at the temple of Mercury, which is distant from Mycaleffus but \* sixteen stadia at most. But, early the next morning he assaulted this city, which is of large extent: He carries it on the first attack, as there was no guard to resist him, and the inhabitants could never have imagined that a maritime body would have marched so far into the country to make attempts upon them. The wall, besides, was weak; in some places it was fallen, and the remaining part of it was low; and the gates, from too great a confidence of security, had been left open. No sooner were the Thracians broke into Mycaleffus, than they gutted both houses and temples; they massacred the inhabitants, shewing no regard to either old-age or youth, but venting their fury on all that came in their way; they butchered even the women and the children; nay, all the labouring cattle, and every creature that had life which came before their eyes: For the Thracians, when once their fury is inflamed, are as insatiable of blood as any other the greatest savages in the barbarian world. On this occasion the confusion was terrible, and every ghastly method of destruction

\* More than a mile and a half.

was exemplified in act : They even fell upon the public school, which was a very large one, when the youth of the town were but just got in, and hacked all the children to pieces. And thus this whole city was involved in a calamity, a greater than which no city had ever felt ; nay, a calamity unexpected and dreadful indeed !

The Thebans had no sooner intelligence of it, than they marched to their assistance ; but came not up with the Thracians till they were retired to some distance from the town, where they recovered from them their booty, and, having put them to flight, continue the chase down to the Euripus and the sea, where the vessels which had brought them lay at anchor. Here they make a slaughter of most of those who endeavoured to get on-board, but could not swim ; since the persons left in the vessels, when they saw what passed on the shore, put them off beyond their reach. But, in the other parts of the retreat, the Thracians behaved with some gallantry against the Theban horse, which attacked them first ; since, rallying frequently out on the pursuers, and rallying again after the discipline of their country, they made good their retreat ; and thus few of this body were destroyed. A number, farther, who staid behind in the city to plunder, were found there and put to the sword. The whole number of the slain, amongst this body of thirteen hundred Thracians, amounted to two hundred and fifty men ; though, in return, they killed, of Thebans, and others who accompanied by way of aid, of horse and heavy-armed together, about twenty, and Skirphondas of Thebes, one of the *rulers* of Bœotia ; the lives of some more Mycæssians were also lost in their company. Such was the calamity which fell to the unhappy lot of Mycæssus ; and which, for excess of horror, is more to be deplored than any other of the tragical events of this war.

Demosthenes, who, after marking out the fortification, had stood away from Laconia to Corcyra, sur-  
prising a transport-vessel which rode at anchor in the  
road

road of Phia of the Eléans, on-board of which a number of heavy-armed Corinthians were to pass over into Sicily, sinks that vessel. But the mariners, having saved themselves by flight, found afterwards another vessel, and proceeded in the voyage.

From hence Demosthenes came up to Zacynthus and Cephallene; where he took their heavy-armed on-board, and sent for those of the Messenians from Naupactus. He also crossed over to the opposite continent of Acarnania, to Alyzia and Anaëtorium, both belonging to the Athenians. Thus employed as he was in augmenting his force, Eurymedon, returning from Sicily, whither he had been sent in the winter to carry a supply of money for the army, meets him; and, amongst other intelligence, relates, that "he had heard, " since he was upon his return, that Plemmyrium had " been taken by the Syracusans." Conon also, who commanded at Naupactus, came to them, with advice, that "the five and twenty sail of Corinthians which " lay over-against their squadron had not quitted that " station, and even threatened them with an engagement." He exhorted, therefore, these commanders to detach some vessels thither, since their squadron at Naupactus, consisting only of eighteen ships, was not a match for the enemy, whose squadron amounted to twenty-five. Upon this, Demosthenes and Eurymedon detach ten of the prime sailors, amongst those under their own command, to follow Conon for the reinforcement of the squadron at Naupactus.

The two former continued to assemble forces for the grand expedition. Eurymedon, for this purpose, sailed to Corcyra, commanded them to man out fifteen ships, and selected himself the heavy-armed for the service; for, as he was returned from carrying the stores, he joined himself with Demosthenes in the command, in pursuance of the prior nomination. Demosthenes was collecting a body of slingers and darters from the towns of Acarnania.

The

The ambassadors from Syracuse, who were sent round to the Sicilian cities after the surprisal of Plemmyrium, had succeeded in their negotiations ; and, having assembled a large body of succours, were intent on bringing them up. Nicias, who had gained an early intelligence of their motion, sends to such of the Siculi as lay upon their route and were in his alliance, (namely, the Centoripes and Halycyæans and others, “ by no means to yield a free passage to the enemy, but to assemble in a body and obstruct their march.” It was impossible for them to reach Syracuse by any other route ; for the Agrigentines had refused them a passage through their territories. Now, therefore, the Sicilians being on their march, the Siculi, in compliance with the request of the Athenians, had placed three different ambuscades in their way. From these rushing suddenly upon them, as they were advancing in a careless manner, they destroyed about eight hundred men, and all the ambassadors, excepting one Corinthian. And this Corinthian brought up afterwards to Syracuse all those who escaped by flight, the number of whom amounted to fifteen hundred.

About the same time the Camarinéans also send up a body of succours, consisting of five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred darters, and three hundred archers. The Geloans also sent them a squadron of about five sail, beside four hundred darters and two hundred horsemen.

Now almost all Sicily except the Agrigentines, (for these still adhered to their neutrality,) all the rest of the island, I say, who hitherto had stood aloof to observe events, united themselves against the Athenians, in behalf of Syracuse : though the Syracusians, after the blow they had just received from the Siculi, thought it not proper to attack the Athenians again upon a sudden.

But Demosthenes and Eurymedon, having now completed their embarkations at Corcyra and on the continent,

ment, at the head of this united and powerful armament, crossed over the Ionian to cape läpygia ; and, standing away from thence, reach the Chærades, islands of läpygia. Here they take on-board their fleet a party of läpygian darters to the number of fifty, and one hundred more of the Messapian nation : and, after they had renewed a friendship of ancient date with Artas, (who, being lord of these islands, supplied them with the darters,) they proceed to Metapontium in Italy. Upon the plea of an alliance subsisting between them, they prevail upon the Metapontians to furnish them out three hundred more, and two triremes, with which augmentation they stood along the coast to Thuria ; where, on their arrival, they find that the party, who had acted against the Athenian interest, had in a late sedition been driven out of the city. Desirous here to take a view of the whole armament, and to know whether any part had straggled and was left behind ; hoping, farther, to prevail upon the Thurians to join them with their forces in the most cordial manner, and, since their welfare was connected with that of Athens, to declare the friends and foes of the Athenians to be equally their own ; they staid some time at Thuria, and completed their designs.

To return to the Peloponnesians. About the same portion of time, their squadron of five and twenty sail, which, to favour the passage of the transports to Sicily, lay ranged in opposition to the fleet at Naupactus, having now made all things ready for an engagement, and equipped out some additional vessels, which had almost equalized their number to that of the Athenian ships, take their station in Rhypica, near Erineus of Achaia. As the place in which they rode was bent in the form of a crescent, the land-force of the Corinthians and adjacent confederates, who marched to their assistance, was posted upon each wing of the squadron, on the jutting necks of land, whilst the ships drawn up close together

together composed the center of their arrangement, and Polyarches, the Corinthian, commanded the fleet.

The Athenians, with three and thirty sail, under the command of Diphilus, weighed from Naupactus, and stood in against them. At first, the Corinthians lay still without motion; but, so soon as it was judged necessary for them to act, and the signal-flag was accordingly hoisted, they advanced to charge the Athenians, and an engagement ensued. The contention was maintained a long time on both sides. Three of the Corinthian vessels are destroyed, whilst not a single ship on the Athenian side was sunk, though seven were disabled for service by blows they had received from the enemies' beaks, by which their forecastles had been shattered by the Corinthian ships, made firm and compact for this very purpose by stays on each side of the beak. The event of the engagement remaining doubtful, from whence both sides took occasion to claim the victory, the Athenians however being masters of all the shatters of the enemy's fleet, which the wind drove right into the sea, and which the Corinthians made no efforts to recover, they dropped away from each other. Yet no kind of pursuit was attempted, and no prisoners were taken by either: for the Corinthians and Peloponnesians, who fought close under the shore, were by that enabled to make an easy escape; but, on the Athenian side, not even a single ship was sunk. And yet, when the Athenians were sailed back to Naupactus, the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy, as if the victory was their own, because they had disabled a larger number of the enemy. They farther looked upon themselves as not defeated, because their enemies were not clearly victorious: for it is the way with the Corinthians to pronounce themselves victors if they are not sadly beaten; whereas the Athenians esteem themselves defeated if they have not made a signal conquest. But, farther, when the Peloponnesians were retired from their station, and the land-army was dismissed, the Athenians

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thenians erected a trophy. The spot they chose, whereon to place this token of their victory, was distant about \* twenty stadia from Erineus, the station in which the Corinthians rode. Such was the event of this naval engagement.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon, so soon as the Thurians had got in readiness seven hundred heavy-armed, with three hundred darters to attend them in the expedition, ordered the fleet to coast along the shore towards the Crotoniatis; whilst themselves, after having taken a review of all their land-army upon the banks of the Sybaris, marched them over land through the Thuriatis. But, when they were advanced to the river Hylias, they were met by a message from the Crotoniata, intimating to them, that “ their consent should never be given for the passage of this army through their dominions;” upon which they wheeled off downwards towards the sea and the mouth of the Hylias, where they halted a night, and were joined by the whole body of the fleet.

The next morning they re-embarked and proceeded along the coast, touching at every city except Locri, till they arrived at Petra in the district of Rhegium.

But, during this interval, the Syracusans, who had received advice of the approach of the reinforcement, determined to make another attempt with their fleet and the whole augmented body of their land-army, which they had assembled together for this very design of attacking the Athenians again before the reinforcement arrived. But, like men who in the former action had clearly perceived what would give them advantages over the enemy, they had made some alteration in the structure of their vessels: Having shortened the heads of their ships, they made them more firm and compact, and fastened very substantial stays to each side of the beak; they strengthened these again by rafters of six cubits in length, which were laid along the ribs both

\* About two miles.



within and without, in the same manner as the Corinthians had strengthened the whole prow of their ships for the last naval engagement against the squadron at Naupactus. By these means the Syraculans concluded they should gain an advantage over the ships of the Athenians, which were of a different structure, as in the prow they were but weak, because of their usual practice, in an engagement, not to charge a-head, but by tacking about to strike upon the sides : — that, farther, should the battle be fought in the great harbour, where sea-room would be small and the ships be crowded, this must be also an advantage in their favour ; since, darting themselves a-head, they must needs shatter the prows of the enemy, when with compact and solid beaks they struck against such as were hollow and weak : — that again, for want of sea-room, the Athenians would be too much straitened to make their tacks, or to run through their lines, which were points of art on which they chiefly relied ; they were determined to the utmost of their power to check all attempts of the latter sort, and the narrow space in which they must engage would of itself prevent the former ; and now they intended with dexterity to turn to their own advantage the method of striking a-head, which on the former occasion appeared to be an error in the masters ; that hence infallibly the day must be their own ; for the Athenians, if once repulsed, would not have room to go round and return to the charge, since thus they must directly be forced on the shore, which lay but a small distance from their camp and would sadly cramp them up ; that they themselves must be masters of the rest of the harbour, whilst the enemy, crowded together, in case they should be forced to give way, must be driven into narrow compass, and even, falling foul on one another, a total confusion and disorder must certainly follow ; for, what hurt the Athenians most, in all their naval engagements, was their inability to make use of the whole harbour for tacking about or returning to the charge, in the same manner

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manner as the Syracusans: — that, finally, the Athenians could not possibly get out into wider sea, as the entrance of the harbour and the space behind the lines of battle were in their own command; nay, other obstacles would co-operate, such as Plemmyrium, which would now oppose any attempt of this kind, and the very nature of the harbour's mouth, which was exceeding narrow.

By such a project the Syracusans had given an increase to their former skill and strength; and, animated more than ever by the thought of having improved from their errors in the former engagement, they sallied out to encounter the enemy both with their land and naval force. Gylippus shewed himself, a small portion of time before the rest, at the head of the infantry; whom, sallying out of the city, he drew up near the Athenian intrenchment, in that quarter where it faced the city. Then the garrison of Olympiæum, to a man, as well heavy-armed as horsemen, with all the light-armed parties of the Syracusans, came and drew up on the other quarters; and, immediately after, the ships of the Syracusans and their allies came sailing forwards.

The Athenians at first imagined that at present they were threatened only with an assault by land; but when, on a sudden, they saw the fleet bearing down against them, they were struck with confusion. Some of them were taking post *upon* and *without* the intrenchments, to make head against the assailants; others were sallied forth to encounter the troops from Olympiæum, and those from remoter parts coming on with full speed, a numerous body of horsemen and darters. The rest were hurrying on-board to man the ships, or to give what assistance they could upon the beach: and no sooner were the proper complements on-board than seventy-five ships stood out to meet the enemy; but then the number of the enemy's vessels was about eighty.

Great part of this day was spent in advancing towards, and retiring from, one another, and in reciprocal endeavours to seize advantages; but neither side was able to execute any remarkable piece of service, excepting that the Syracusans sunk one or two of the Athenian ships; upon which they parted, and at the same time the land-army drew off from the intrenchments.

The day following the Syracusans lay quiet, affording the enemy no room to guess at their future designs.

But Nicias, conscious to himself that hitherto no advantages had been gained by sea, and fully expecting that the enemy would repeat their attempt, obliged the captains of the triremes to repair their ships if any were damaged, and stationed the transports before the piles, which they had driven down in the sea, to secure the ships, and lock up as it were that space in which they lay. The transports he ranged in a line, at the distance of the breadth of two \* *plethra* from one another; that, in case a ship was repulsed, it might run in hither as a place of security, and might again stand out without any molestation. In perfecting these dispositions the Athenians were all this day employed from morning to night.

The next day, the Syracusans, earlier in the morning than before, and with the same parade of their land and naval force, came out to attack the Athenians. Now again, facing each other in the lines of engagement, they spent great part of the day in the same endeavours as before to over-reach and surprise one another; till, at length, Aristo, the son of Pyrricus, a Corinthian, and the most expert seaman in the fleet of Syracuse, persuades the commanders of that fleet to dispatch their orders to the magistrates within the city,—  
 “ with all expedition to bring the provisions which  
 “ were for sale down to the beach of the sea, and hold  
 “ the market there; nay, farther, to compel all those

\* A *plethron* is said by some to contain 1444, by others, 1000 square feet.

“ who

“ who had any meat to sell to offer it instantly on the beach, that the mariners might come ashore and dine under the sides of their vessels; so that, after a short repast, they might this same day unexpectedly fall upon the Athenians.” This counsel being approved, the necessary orders were dispatched away, and the market was furnished out. Then suddenly the Syracusan fleet fell back, and stood away towards the city; where, disembarking with all possible haste, they took their repast.

But the Athenians, who ascribed this dropping-off of the enemy to a consciousness of their own inferiority, quitting their own ships as if there was nothing farther to be done, diverted their attention to their own affairs, and especially to prepare a refreshing meal for themselves, confident there would be no engagement on this day. But, on a sudden, the Syracusans, repairing on-board, stood out a second time to give them battle. Then the Athenians, in much hurry and confusion, and most of them still fasting, re-embarking without any regularity or order, with great difficulty, after a considerable interval, stood out to receive them. For a certain space, each side stood upon their guard, and declined the charge. At length it occurred to the Athenians, that it was imprudent to dally so long, and exhaust their spirits by the mere labour of the oar, which ought rather to be exerted on an expeditious attack. Upon which, animating one another with a shout, they darted upon the enemy, and the engagement began.

The Syracusans received the shock without giving way, and, keeping the heads of their vessels right against the enemy, executed their project, and with their strengthened beaks shattered the forecastles of the Athenian ships; whilst their darters, who were ranged along the decks, galled the Athenians sorely with their missile weapons; though not near so much as did the crews of some light Syracusan boats, which scoured about the enemy's fleet; sometimes getting under their

wards and gliding along the sides of their vessels, and from these close positions aiming their darts at the mariners. In fine, the Syracusans, persevering in this manner to gall their foes, were masters of the day; whilst the Athenians, being put to flight, were obliged to retire, through the intervals of the line of transports, into their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued as far as to this line of transports; but were obliged to stop there, for fear of the \* machines which hung upon the yards of the transports to bar all approach. Two ships, indeed, of the Syracusans, elevated with success, approached too near, and were sunk; and another, with all her crew, was taken by the enemy. And now the Syracusans, who in the action had sunk seven ships of the enemy, had damaged many, had taken many prisoners, and made great slaughter, judged it proper to retire. They then erected trophies, as victorious in two engagements, and plumed themselves in the assurance, that, by sea, they had the superiority over the enemy; presuming, at the same time, that they must soon be victorious also by land: upon which they got every thing in readiness to attack them once more on both elements.

But, at this crisis, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrive, at the head of the reinforcement from Athens; which consisted, of seventy-three sail of ships, including foreigners; of about five thousand heavy-armed of their own and their confederate troops; beside a considerable number of darters, as well Barbarian as Grecian, and slingers, and archers, and a complete supply of all military stores. The first appearance of this grand reinforcement struck the Syracusans and their allies with no small consternation. It looked as if the war must be endless, and themselves exposed to dangers that knew no bounds. They saw that, in spite of

\* Called *dolphins*, from their form. They were massy, made of lead, and hung upon the sail-yards by cords and pulleys; and, when thrown into the enemy's ships, either burst or sunk them.

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the annoyance which Decelæa, now fortified, gave them, the Athenians were arrived before Syracuse with another armament as great and as formidable as the former; and that, in every view, the strength of Athens must be quite unsurmountable. And now also the Athenians, who remained of the former armament, respired from that dejection of spirit into which a series of misfortunes had plunged them.

Demosthenes, after taking a view of the present posture of affairs, thought it absolutely necessary to avoid delays, and keep clear of those errors which had done so much prejudice to Nicias: for Nicias, at his first appearance, struck an universal consternation; and yet, by declining the immediate attack of Syracuse, and loitering a whole winter away at Catana, he became an object of contempt; and Gylippus had time to land a succour from Peloponnesus, which disconcerted all his measures. That succour, however, the Syracusans could never have sent for, had Nicias assaulted them on his first approach: for, deluding themselves with the thought that they were a match for their foes, they would have found, by sad experience, that they had indulged a cruel mistake, and must the same moment have been invested on all sides: and, in such a state, though they had invited those succours, yet no effectual relief could have been obtained from them.

Demosthenes, therefore, reflecting on these past mistakes, and sensible that he himself, this very moment, on the first day of his arrival, appeared most terrible in the eyes of the enemy, resolved without loss of time to improve the present consternation which his reinforcement had struck amongst them. He farther took notice, that the counterwork of the Syracusans, by which the Athenians had been excluded from perfecting their circumvallation, consisted only of a single wall; and, in case the heights of Epipolæ could again be regained, with the camp which at first had been occupied there, *that* work might easily be carried, since the defendants

could not now be able to withstand the Athenian strength; — he determined therefore to put this project in execution; judging that, in case it succeeded, it would be a means of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion: for, if the scheme took place, the surrender of Syracuse must soon follow; at worst, he would draw off the army, and not waste the lives of those Athenians who were employed in this service, and the strength of the whole *State*, to no manner of purpose.

Now, therefore, the Athenians began to act offensively; and, in the first place, sallying out from their camp, they ravaged the country along the banks of the Anapus, and were now again, as on the first approach, masters without controul both by land and sea: for in neither element durst the Syracusans any longer come out to check their motions, abating what small resistance was made by the cavalry and darters from Olympæum.

In the next place, Demosthenes thought proper to try what could be done against the works of the enemy by the help of machines. But when, upon applying them, those machines were fired by the Syracusans, who from the top of their works made a gallant defence; and, though the army attacked in several quarters at once, they were every where repulsed; he determined to waste no longer time upon the trial: but, having prevailed with Nicias and his other colleagues in command to assent to the scheme he had formed to recover Epipolæ, he proceeded to put it in execution. Yet, by day-light, it was judged impossible for them either to march or to mount the ascent without being discovered. Upon this, having issued out his orders, that every man should take with him subsistence for five days, and that all the masons and carpenters should attend the march, with proper store of missive weapons, and all needful materials for raising new works in case the attempt was successful, he put himself, about the first sleep, at the head of the whole army, and, assisted  
by

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by Eurymedon and Menander, marched towards Epipolæ. But Nicias was left behind in the intrenchments.

When now they were advanced to the pass of Euryalus, by which the first army gained formerly the ascent, they are yet undiscovered by the Syracusan guards; and, mounting the heights, surprise the fort which was there manned by the Syracusans, and slaughter some of the defendants. But the majority flying again towards the camps, of which there were three among the advanced intrenchments of Epipolæ, (one of Syracusans, a second of other Sicilians, and a third of the confederates,) they spread the alarm, and also notified the enemy's approach to the six hundred Syracusans, who at first were selected for the guard of this quarter of Epipolæ. These sallied out instantly to stop their progress; and Demosthenes, with his Athenians, falling in with them, put them to flight, after they had made a gallant stand. Upon this success, they immediately pushed forwards, that they might improve the present ardour of the soldiers to the immediate completion of those points for which they had made this bold attempt. Another party, which had been advancing all along without a check, surprised the counterwork of the Syracusans; of which, since abandoned by its defendants, they were throwing down the battlements.

But now the Syracusans, and their confederates, and Gylippus with the body under his command, marched out of their intrenchments: yet, having been attacked in so daring a manner amidst the darkness of the night, they had not recovered their surprise when they fell in with the Athenians; and thus, not able to stand the first shock, they were obliged to give way for a time. But, as the Athenians pushed forwards with great irregularity, as if the victory was quite their own; eager, farther, to make themselves masters of all the tract not yet cleared of the enemy, for fear lest, should they slacken in their ardour, the enemy might have time to rally



rally into a body, — the Boeotians first put a stop to their career ; and, rushing boldly upon them, routed and put them to flight. By this turn the Athenians were thrown into so much disorder and confusion, that the particulars which followed cannot easily be gathered, neither from themselves nor their antagonists : for, even in day light, when objects are clearest to the sight, men present in a battle are not able to see all that passeth ; each single combatant can barely relate what happened about his own person. When, therefore, armies engage amidst the darkness of the night, (though this is the only instance of it between powerful armies in the present war,) how is it possible to come at the knowledge of the several incidents ? The moon indeed shone at this time ; but then they only saw one another as objects appear by moon-light, so as to discern the appearance of human bodies, but not to distinguish between friends and enemies. The heavy-armed, farther, numerous on both sides, were too much crowded for want of room. One party of the Athenians was already clearly defeated ; another, unbroken by the first attack upon them, was pushing forwards. Of the remainder of their army, a great part had already mounted the ascent ; yet some were still busied in mounting up ; but none of these, when they were got upon the eminence, knew which way to advance : for, before them, (as the rout was begun,) there was one grand medley of confusion, and the tumult was so loud that no sounds could be distinctly heard. The Syracusans and their confederates were animating one another with loud exultations (for the season of the night made all signals useless) to complete the blow, and were clearing before them all that came in their way : but the Athenians were prying about for one another, and regarded every thing they met, even though they fell in with their own friends, as the flight was now begun, for an assured enemy. Obligated, farther, by frequent iterations to demand the *word*, as the only method to distinguish one another,

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another, (all calling out aloud for it at the same instant of time,) they heightened the general distraction, and clearly discovered their own *word* to the enemy. But then they had not equal opportunities to discover that of the enemy; because, as the latter were now the victors and kept more in bodies, it was less liable to detection. Hence it came to pass, that, though a stronger party of the Athenians fell in with a weaker party of their foes, yet they judged it best to fly; because they were sensible that their own *word* was divulged; and, as they could not return the *word* of the Syracusans, they must unavoidably be cut to pieces. But what had the greatest effect, and did most hurt to the Athenians, was the singing the *pean*; since *that* used on both sides, being nearly the same, raised the utmost confusion. And, when the Argives and Corcyræans, and all others of Doric descent, who were with the Athenians, began from time to time their *pean*, it struck the same alarm into the Athenians as when the enemy themselves sang it: so that, in short, falling in amongst one another in different quarters of the army, when once the confusion was rose to a height, (friends against friends, and citizens against fellow-citizens,) they not only impress a reciprocal terror, but proceed to blows with so much fury that they could not easily be parted. The pursuit was briskly followed; in which many of them, plunging headlong down the precipices, were dashed in pieces, because the pass downwards from Epipolæ was too narrow for their numbers. But, of those who from the heights got down into the plain; many, and all in general who came in the first armament, since better experienced in the country, escaped in safety to the camp: whereas, of the last comers, some, straggling into by-ways, were bewildered in a country to which they were utter strangers, and at break of day were cut to pieces by the Syracusan horse, who scoured the plains.

On

On the day following, the Syracusans erected two trophies on Epipolæ; one on the summit of the pass, and the other where the Bœotians first stopped the enemy's progress. The Athenians also obtained a truce, to fetch off their dead; the number of which was large,\* both in their own troops and those of their allies; and yet more arms were taken by the enemy than bore proportion to the slain: for, of the number of light-armed who were pushed to the brink of the precipices, and, throwing away their shields, were obliged to leap down, though some perished by the fall, yet others escaped with life.

But, after this, the Syracusans, highly animated again with this fresh unexpected turn in their favour, sent out Sicanus, at the head of fifteen sail, to Agrigentum, now embroiled in a sedition, with orders to exert the utmost of his power to reduce it to their obedience. Gylippus also made once more the tour of Sicily, to levy another army; confident that, with such a reinforcement, he could carry the very intrenchments of the enemy by storm, since affairs had taken such a favourable turn on Epipolæ.

In the mean time, the Athenian generals were employed in the needful consultations since the last misfortune and the present universal dejection of their troops. They saw that all their attempts were blasted by ill success, and that the soldiers were chagrined at the continuance of so fruitless a service: for a sickness spread amongst their people from a double cause; from the present season of the year, in which the human body is most subject to disorders, and the marshy unwholesome ground on which they were encamped; besides that, in every respect, their situation appeared desperate and quite beyond the power of redress.

The opinion of Demosthenes was therefore totally repugnant to a longer continuance before Syracuse. He

\* *Plutarch* puts it at two thousand; but *Diodorus Siculus* says it was two thousand five hundred.

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urged “ the immediate execution of the scheme he had  
“ formed before he made the late dangerous attempt  
“ upon Epipolæ ; which since it had miscarried, they  
“ should no longer protract their departure, whilst yet  
“ the season of the year was proper for their voyage  
“ homewards, and they had strength enough in the  
“ last reinforcement to force their passage in spite of  
“ the enemy.” He affirmed, “ it would be more con-  
“ ducive to the public welfare to turn their arms against  
“ those who were erecting fortifications within Attica  
“ itself, than against the Syracusans, whose reduction  
“ now was almost impracticable ; and that it was mad-  
“ nels to persist any longer in a siege which dissipated  
“ the wealth of the *State* in fruitless vain expences.”  
In this manner Demosthenes declared his sentiments.

As for Nicias, though convinced within himself that their affairs were in a bad situation, yet he was unwilling with his own mouth to confess their low condition, or that a departure should be fixed by the general votes of a public council, where all that passed must be reported to the enemy ; because, should the determination be formed in this manner, the execution could not go forwards without the enemy’s privity. Besides, as he knew the state of the enemy somewhat more perfectly than others, he imagined there were grounds to hope that the state of the latter would soon become worse than their own, would they only continue to press the siege. A want of supplies must soon reduce them to great straits ; and this the sooner, as, by the accession of the last squadron, themselves were now again masters of the sea. And, what is more, in Syracuse itself there was a party which wished to see the city fall into their hands. These had dispatched their agents to Nicias, and insisted he should not quit the siege. Yet, thus enlightened as he was, in reality he knew not how to act, as his mind was balanced between two measures, which equally required mature deliberation. But, for the present, he openly declared himself in council  
against

against drawing off the army. He told them, " he  
 " was perfectly well assured that the Athenians would  
 " never forgive him, should he carry their troops from  
 " Sicily without peremptory orders : That the affair  
 " would not then lie under the cognizance of such as  
 " here advised it, and with their own eyes were con-  
 " vinced of the necessity of such a step ; but of men  
 " who would form their judgements upon the spiteful  
 " calumniations of others, and the influence some ma-  
 " licious demagogues would have over their under-  
 " standings, by which their fate would be determined."  
 He farther represented, that " many, nay, the greater  
 " part of the soldiers, who now formed the troops, and  
 " make such tragical outcries about the perils that en-  
 " viron them at present, would change their notes so  
 " soon as they were landed again at Athens, and as-  
 " cribe their return to the treachery and corruption of  
 " their commanders." For such reasons, he declared,  
 " as he was well acquainted with Athenian tempers,  
 " he would choose, rather than be undone at Athens  
 " by base criminations and an unjust sentence, to ha-  
 " zard the last extremity, and perish, if so it must be,  
 " under the violence of the enemy." He maintained,  
 however, that " the state of the Syracusans was worse  
 " than their own. The demand upon them for the  
 " pay of foreigners was large ; their expences in secu-  
 " ring the outworks of Syracuse were high : they had  
 " now supported a large navy for the space of an en-  
 " tire year ; want therefore must soon come upon them,  
 " and they must shortly be totally distressed ; because  
 " the sum of \* two thousand talents they had already  
 " expended of their own stock, and had even con-  
 " tracted a large debt beside. And, in case they a-  
 " bate of their present punctuality or making good the  
 " appointments of the forces they have on foot, their  
 " strength must moulder away ; since it consisted, not  
 " like the Athenians, of troops which must serve, but

\* 387500*l.* *Sterling.*

“ of such as were only discretionary aids.” He concluded with “ the necessity they lay under, from the  
 “ ties of duty, to continue the siege with vigour, and  
 “ by no means expose a superior strength to ruin,  
 “ through a false presumption that they were inferior  
 “ in point of supplies.”

Nicias expressed himself on this occasion with an air of neat confidence, as a person perfectly well acquainted with the state of Syracuse and the failure of money there, and because there was a party within the city which acted in favour of the Athenians, and had advised him, by their agents, “ by no means to raise the  
 “ siege.” And, what is more, he placed a stronger dependence now upon the fleet than ever he had done before the late unsuccessful engagement.

As to the proposal of continuing the siege, Demosthenes would not yield the least degree of attention to it: “ If the army must not evacuate Sicily without a  
 “ peremptory order from Athens, but must persist in  
 “ this destructive service, he judged it would be better  
 “ to draw them off to Thapsus or to Catana, where  
 “ they might find opportunity enough to make incur-  
 “ sions with the land-army upon the territories of the  
 “ enemy, and, by committing devastations, might  
 “ highly distress them. Their fleet might then en-  
 “ gage in the open sea; not in a space confined and  
 “ straitened, which was the greatest advantage to the  
 “ enemy, but in sufficient sea-room, where all their su-  
 “ perior skill might fairly be exerted, where they  
 “ would be able to make their tacks, and bear down a-  
 “ gain upon the foe with greater agility, and more vio-  
 “ lent shocks, than could be done in the liminary space  
 “ of a close pent-up harbour. Upon the whole, he af-  
 “ firmed, that his consent should never be given to a  
 “ longer continuance in their present posts, but he was  
 “ for moving off with all possible expedition, and they  
 “ had not a moment to lavish upon delay.”

Eurymedon

Eurymedon then declared that his sense of things coincided with that of Demosthenes; and, Nicias persisting in the contrary opinion, a fit of languor and suspense ensued, attended with the secret imagination that the positiveness of Nicias resulted from some stronger hopes of success he had conceived above his colleagues. And in this manner the Athenians fell into dilatory measures, and continued in their camp before Syracuse.

But in this interval Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse: Sicanus, truly, disappointed of Agrigentum, for he was advanced no farther than Gela when the sedition in favour of the Syracusans was brought to an amicable period; but then Gylippus was returned at the head of a numerous body, consisting of levies made in Sicily, and the heavy-armed troops from Peloponnesus, who in the spring had put to sea on-board the transport, but came over last from Africa to Selinus; for into Africa they had been driven by contrary winds; and, having there been furnished by the Cyrenæans with two triremes and a set of pilots, as they coasted along the African shore, they relieved the Evesperitæ, then blocked up by the Libyans. The latter they defeated in a set battle; and, proceeding from thence along the shore, they reached Neapolis, a Carthaginian mart, from whence lies the shortest cut to Sicily, being only a passage of two days and a night. Hence therefore they stood across, and landed at Selinus.

With this accession of strength the Syracusans instantly prepared to attack the Athenians again both by land and sea. But the Athenian generals,—finding they had received so large an augmentation, and that the posture of their own affairs was so far from being changed for the better that day after day it grew worse in every respect, and, what was worst of all, that their troops were quite exhausted with fatigue and sickness, — they repented now in earnest that they had not drawn off in time; and, as Nicias now no longer opposed that step with the same vehemence as he had done before, but merely en-

deavoured

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deavoured that it should not be determined in public council, they issued out orders, with the utmost secrecy, that the whole armament should hold themselves in readiness to put to sea upon a signal given. But, all things now ready, the very moment they are going to embark the moon is eclipsed, for it was now the time of the *full*. The bulk of the army, struck with the awful appearance, called out upon the generals to halt; and Nicias, always addicted too much to superstition and such vulgar scruples, positively declared, that “it should no more be debated whether they should remove or not, till the three times nine days were past which the soothsayers prescribe on such occasions.” So, for this reason, a longer stay was forced upon the Athenians, who had been too dilatory already.\*

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\* That the bulk of an army or a fleet should be frightened at such appearances, is no wonder at all: They are ever ignorant; and the most daring of them in other respects have been much addicted to superstition. But one cannot help being surprised at the ignorance and superstition of Nicias; one cannot help pitying and deploring the foible of a man who had so good a heart. *Plutarch* expatiates largely on this occasion. “Even the vulgar, says he, at this time were well apprised that an eclipse of the sun was often occasioned, about the time of the change, by an interposition of the moon: but, as to the moon, by the interposition of what body, and how on a sudden, at the *full*, its light fades away or emits variety of colour, was not easy for them to conceive. They thought it a strange occurrence, and sent from God as a prognostic of great calamities. The first person, who wrote a clear and bold solution of the enlightening and obscuration of the moon, was *Anaxagoras*, who now had not been long dead; nor was his account in every body’s hands, but concealed, imparted only to a few, and that with caution and assurances of secrecy. The world could not bear that Naturalists and Meteor-mongers, as they were then stiled, should seem to restrain the divine power by quaint argumentations, invisible operations, and necessary consequences. For such attempts *Protagoras* was banished; and *Pericles*, with much ado, procured the release of *Anaxagoras* when thrown into prison. Nay, *Socrates*, who never meddled with any of these points, was however put to death upon the charge of *impiety*. It was not till late that the glory of *Plato* shone abroad; who, by his irreproachable life, and subjecting natural necessities to a divine and sovereign power, cleared away all bad imputations from studies of this kind, and by a mathematical beginning opened a field to other sciences. And thus his friend *Dion*, at what time he was setting sail from *Zacynthus* against *Dionysius*, was not at all disheartened by an eclipse of the moon, but landed safe at *Syracuse*, and ejected the tyrant. It was the misfortune of *Nicias*, at this juncture, not to have even



The Syracusans, who had soon an intelligence of their designs, were now more animated than ever to press briskly on the Athenians, as on men who had given proofs of their own inward conviction that they were no longer a match for their foes either by sea or on land; since, with other thoughts, they never could have projected a re-embarkation. Apprehensive, at the same time, that, should they remove to any other quarter of Sicily, they would become more difficult of reduction, they saw the necessity of engaging them by sea without a moment's loss, whilst yet they had an advantage in compelling them to fight. Upon this, they ordered the complements of men on-board their ships, and exercised their crews as many days as was judged sufficient. But, when opportunity offered of acting with advantage, on the first day they assailed the Athenian intrenchments; and, a party of heavy-armed and horsemen, though not numerous, sallying out at some of the ports to beat them off, they cut off some of the heavy-armed from the rest of that party, and, having put them to flight, follow the pursuit. As the spot, farther, on which the assault is made, was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses and a small number of their heavy-armed. Nothing more happened on this day, as the army of the Syracusans now made their retreat.

“ a skilful soothsayer with him; for his intimate, Stilbides, who had cured much  
 “ of his superstition, had died a little before; since this portent (as Philochorus  
 “ says) was not a bad one, but an excellent good one, for a flying army; since asts  
 “ which are accompanied with fear stand in need of concealment, and light is ever  
 “ an adversary to them. Besides, after eclipses of the sun or moon, it was the u-  
 “ sual custom (as Autoclides hath informed us) to hold only a three days cessation  
 “ from business. But Nicias persuaded himself that a complete revolution of the  
 “ moon ought to be waited for; as if with his own eyes he had not seen her shine  
 “ bright again, when she had passed the shadow and the earth's interposition. Yet  
 “ throwing up all attention to other points, he minded nothing but sacrificing, till  
 “ his enemies attacked him.” *Life of Nicias.*

But,

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But, on the day following, they stand out with their \* fleet, to the number of seventy-six ships ; and, at the same time, the land-army marched up to the intrenchments. The Athenians launched out, with fourscore and six, to give them a reception ; and thus, charging one another, an engagement ensued. Eurymedon commanded the right wing of the Athenian fleet, and endeavoured to over-reach and surround the ships of the enemy. For this purpose, he opened his line, and stood along too close to the land ; which gave the Syracusans and their allies, who had now defeated the center of the Athenians, an opportunity to intercept him in the bottom and recess of the harbour, where they slay Eurymedon himself, and destroy the ships which had separated in his company : and, this done, they gave chase to the whole Athenian fleet, and drove them ashore.

Gylippus, now, perceiving that the ships of the enemy were defeated and drove aground quite wide of the piles and their camp, formed instantly a design to make slaughter of the men as they were leaping on shore, and of giving the Syracusans an opportunity easily to draw off all the ships from land of which they were entire masters. At the head, therefore, of one division of the land-force, he marched down to the pier to second the fleet. The Tyrrhenes happened to have been posted nearest by the Athenians ; who, seeing a body of the enemy running down thither in a disorderly manner, advanced eagerly to meet them ; and, charging briskly on the van, put them to flight and drive them into the lake of Lysimelia. But, soon after, a reinforcement of Syracusans and their allies coming up, the Athenians

\* *Plutarch* adds, that, " on this occasion, the very lads came out in fishing-boats and skiffs, taunting and insulting the Athenians. One of these lads, Heracles, of a noble family, who had advanced too near, was in great danger of being intercepted by an Athenian vessel. But Pollichus, the uncle of the lad, alarmed for his safety, charged instantly with the ten triremes he had under his command. The rest of the Syracusan fleet, now alarmed for Pollichus, ran in at once, and brought on a general engagement." *Life of Nicias.*

also advanced with speed to succour their friends, and, trembling for their ships, soon came to an engagement with them, and, after routing, pursued them amain. They slaughtered now a great number of the heavy-armed; and, what was more, preserved the far greater part of their fleet, and towed again to their former moorings all their ships, except eighteen, which the Syracusans and their allies made prizes, and put all the men on-board them to the sword. With a view, farther, to destroy the rest by setting them on fire, they filled an old transport-ship with fascines and combustible matter, and, as the wind blew right upon the Athenians, set her on fire, and let her drive in amongst them. The Athenians, trembling for the ships, put all their engines instantly at work to extinguish the flames; which having at length effectuated, and kept this fire-ship clear of their own vessels, they were delivered from this imminent danger.

After this the Syracusans erected a trophy for their victorious engagement on the water, and for the interception of the party of the heavy-armed before the intrenchments, where they had taken so many horses. The Athenians also did the same, for the repulse given by the Tyrrenes to the land-forces of the enemy, and their being chased into the lake, and the larger success they afterwards obtained with the rest of their army.

But now, when, beyond the reach of doubt, the Syracusans, though at first alarmed at the large reinforcement of shipping brought against them by Demosthenes, had gained a signal victory by sea, the Athenians were plunged into a total dejection of spirit; they were thunderstruck by the reverie of misfortunes so little expected; and began to repent, with much more bitterness of thought, that they had ever engaged in so fatal an expedition. They had invaded *States*, whose polity was already of a piece with their own, whose form of government was *popular*, like that of Athens, and which flourished in shipping, in horses, and each article

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cle of power: And yet, finding themselves unable to give any measure of success to their projects by introducing dissensions amongst them through political embroilments, nor even by a powerful force, superior to that of their foes, able to ward off the many blows they had received, they had fallen beforehand into great anxieties; and now, sadly beaten as they were at sea, one thought of which they never could hitherto have conceived, their despondency became more violent than ever.

From this time the Syracusans scoured the whole harbour without having any thing to fear. They had also formed a scheme of barring up its mouth; that the Athenians, though never so intent upon it, might for the future not have it in their power to steal away. Their care and diligence were no longer employed on the view alone of their own preservation, but on the larger view of ruining the Athenians. They concluded, and justly too, that the latter turns in their favour had given them the ascendant over these invaders; and, could they but compass the total overthrow of this body of Athenians and their allies, the grand achievement would strike all Greece with admiration. Nay more, all other Grecians must reap the fruits of such success; of whom some would in an instant recover freedom, and others be delivered from the fear of losing it: For the remaining strength of Athens would never be able to stand against that weight of war with which she must be soon compassed about. And thus, could they (Syracusans) be the glorious authors of such desirable events, they must infallibly become objects of wonder, not only to all the present age, but to latest posterity. And of a truth, considered in such a light, it was great and glorious ambition, to aim at the conquest, not only of the Athenians, but also of their whole extensive and combined alliance; and this, not merely to earn laurels for themselves, but for the auxiliaries also who had engaged in their cause; since, exposed in the front of the war  
with

with the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians, they had objected their own *State* to the fury of a storm which threatened them all, and, by their own personal valour in naval engagements, had contributed most to such a height of success.

The various people, now got together at this one city of Syracuse, were so very numerous, as to be exceeded only by the comprehensive roll of those who, in the series of the present war, sided either with the *States* of Athens or Sparta. The catalogue is subjoined of those, who mustered in the offensive and defensive armies at Syracuse; who fought against or in behalf of Sicily; who joined for the reduction or preservation of this island, not so much from just and lawful motives, or a concurrence resulting from the ties of blood, as from policy, or interest, or direct compulsion.

The Athenians, truly, in quality of Ionians, had voluntarily come hither against the Syracusans, who were Dorians; attended by those who spoke the same dialect and used the same institutions with themselves, the Lemnians, and Imbrians, and those Æginetæ who were the present possessors of Ægina. The Hestîæans, farther, now inhabiting Hestîæa in Eubœa, as an Athenian colony, had joined in the expedition. Of the remaining numbers, some came along with them because they were dependents; some, though independent, because they were confederates; and some there were who attended merely for their pay. The dependents and tributaries were the Eretrians, and Chalcidæans, and Styrensiens, and Carystians, from Eubœa; from the islands, the Céans, and Andrians, and Teïans; from Ionia, the Milesians, and Samians, and Chians; of these the Chians, being not subjected to a tribute, but only to furnish a quota of shipping, though independent at home, yet followed their arms. And all these hitherto recited were Ionians and Athenian colonies, excepting the Carystians, for these last are Drvopes; but, as subjected to Athens, not so much from choice as Ionians,

as

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as by mere compulsion, they now followed their masters against Dorians. To these were added Æolians; the Methymnéans, for instance, who were to furnish shipping, but were exempted from tribute; the Tenedians, farther, and Ænians, who were tributaries: But these, being Æolians, were now compelled to fight against other Æolians; namely, their own founders, the Bœotians, who adhered to the Syracusans. The Plataeans did the same, and were the only Bœotians that acted against Bœotians upon the justifiable pretext of lasting enmity. The Rhodians, farther, and Cytherians, attended, though both of Doric descent: The Cytherians, truly, who are a Lacedæmonian colony, bore arms at this juncture on the Athenian side, against the Lacedæmonians under the command of Gylippus; and the Rhodians, Argives by descent, were obliged to turn their arms against the Doric Syracusans; nay, against the Geloans, a colony of their own, now acting in concert with the Syracusans. Of the people of the isles on the coast of Peloponnesus came the Cephallenians and Zacynthians; independent in fact, but through their situation controuled in some measure by the Athenians, who are masters of the sea. The Corcyréans, farther, who were not only of Doric, but, what is more, were even of Corinthian, original, as being a colony of the latter, and by blood allied to the former, from compulsion, as they gave out for a colour, though in truth from deliberate malice, since opposing the Corinthians, whom they hated, followed the Athenians with an ardour inferior to none. The Messenians also, now stiled Messenians of Naupactus, and those from Pylus, which was still held by the Athenians, were brought along to the war; to whom must be added a small party of Megaréan exiles, who by a sad reverse of fortune now took part against the Selinuntians, who were also Megaréan. The residue of the confederates were engaged rather upon free and spontaneous choice. The Argives, for instance, not more from obligations of subsisting treaties,

than the rancour they bore the Lacedæmonians, and the gratification of private spleen, though Doric, yet followed the Ionic Athenians against their Doric kindred. But the Mantinéans and the rest of the Arcadians, who are mercenaries, and eternally habituated to act against any foe pointed out to them, were now so far influenced by gain as to regard those Arcadians as their enemies who came over on this occasion in company with the Corinthians. The Cretans also and Ætolians were there, allured by an advantageous pay; and thus it happened that the Cretans, who, in concert with the Rhodians, had founded Gela, readily took part, for the sake of gain, not *with* but *against* a colony which themselves had planted. There was also a body of Acarnanian auxiliaries, partly induced to join by the pay they received, but principally by their personal regard for Demosthenes and their attachment to the Athenians. And thus have we run them over to the utmost boundary of the Ionian gulf. Of the Italic nations, the Thurians, and those Metapontians whom intestine feuds had reduced to the necessity of fighting for subsistence, joined their arms; and, of the Sicilian, the Naxians and Catanéans; of barbarian, the Egestéans, who were the first movers of this grand contention, and the major part of the Siculi; and, out of Sicily, some of the Tyrrhenes, from enmity to the Syracusans, and the mercenary Iapygians. So many nations were assembled together at present under command of the Athenians.

The auxiliaries, on the side of the Syracusans, were the Camarinéans, who border close upon them, and the Geloans, who are situated next the Camarinéans. To proceed regularly: As the Agrigentines were neutral, the Selinuntians next occur, who are seated beyond the Agrigentines, since they inhabit that tract of the island which faceth Afric. Then the Himeréans, the only Grecian people who inhabit that part of the island which lies off the Tyrrhene sea, and were the only body which came from thence to the aid of Syracuse. The  
several

several nations of Greek descent settled in Sicily, being all Doric, and independent, acted together in concert. Of the barbarous people they had those Siculi alone who did not openly revolt to the Athenians; but, out of Sicily, the Lacedæmonians sent them a *citizen* of Sparta to command, and a body of *Neodamodes* and *Helots*. By a *Neodamas* is meant a citizen newly enfranchised. The Corinthians alone aided them both with shipping and a land-force, in conjunction with the Leucadians and Ambraciots, by blood allied to Syracuse. From Arcadia also came a body of mercenaries, sent by the Corinthians; and the Sicyonians, who acted on compulsion; and of those who dwell without the Peloponnesus were the Bœotians. But, beside these foreign aids, the Sicilians, as possessed of great and powerful cities, furnished out in all respects a much greater and well-appointed force: For by them a numerous body of heavy-armed, of ships, and horses, and other kinds of military force, in an amazing abundance, were raised and brought to Syracuse. And yet it must be said, that the domestic force of the Syracusans was more to be considered than all the rest, from the greatness of their *State* and the immediate urgency of those perils with which they were environed.

These were the aids, the numerous aids, assembled together by the contending parties; and at this juncture all these were present on each side of the contest; and from this crisis neither party received any accession.

The Syracusans therefore and their confederates thought, since the signal victory they had gained upon the water, it would be a brave exploit, and highly for their glory, to make the whole extensive camp of the Athenians their prize, and cut off their retreat on both elements, both by land and sea. With this project, they immediately barred up the great harbour, the mouth of which is about \* eight stadia over, with a

• Near a mile.



line of triremes placed side by side, and other vessels and boats moored fast together by anchors; and got everything besides in readiness, in case the Athenians should venture on another engagement. Their every view was now become large and aspiring.

When the Athenians saw the harbour thus barred up, and perceived, farther, the whole of the enemy's designs, it was judged high time to go to consultation. The commanders of the different bodies were called to council, with the generals; in which,—upon representations made “ of the great distress to which they were  
 “ reduced, and that they had not a stock of provisions  
 “ ample enough for their immediate subsistence, (for,  
 “ bent on sailing away, they had sent already to Catania  
 “ to countermand any fresh convoys,) and, unless they  
 “ could recover their mastery at sea, it would be im-  
 “ practicable for the future to obtain a supply,”—they came to a final resolution, “ To quit their intrench-  
 “ ments on the higher ground, and before the station  
 “ of their shipping to raise a circular work, of as little  
 “ compass as possible, but sufficient to serve for a ma-  
 “ gazine and hospital, and to this only to assign a  
 “ guard; as for the rest of the land-army, they were to  
 “ oblige every soldier to go on-board, that all the ships,  
 “ which yet were undamaged, or had been laid up for  
 “ want of hands, might be completely manned; and  
 “ thus they must fight their passage out of the har-  
 “ bour; and, if it succeeded, make directly for Cata-  
 “ na; but, if repulsed, they would burn their ship-  
 “ ping, and, moving off in one body by land, would  
 “ endeavour, by the most expeditious marches, to  
 “ reach the nearest place that would receive them, whe-  
 “ ther barbarian or Grecian.”

Such was the plan resolved on, and which they began immediately to execute; for now, abandoning their upper intrenchments, they drew down to the beach, and manned the whole of their shipping, on-board of which they forced, without exception, all such as  
 had

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had youth and vigour enough to be of service there. The whole number of ships they were by this means enabled to man amounted to a hundred and ten. They also placed on-board the fleet a large number of archers, the darters of the Acarnanians, and other foreign auxiliaries ; and provided in all other respects for action, as well as their condition would permit or the nature of the project required.

When things were thus in great forwardness, Nicias, taking notice that the soldiery was much dejected by the great defeats, which, contrary to their wonted custom, they had received by sea, and yet desirous to hazard another engagement as soon as possible, because pinched for want of necessary subsistence, he gathered them all round about himself, and endeavoured to raise their drooping spirits by the following exhortation, the first of the kind he had ever made.

“ M Y fellow-soldiers, whether of the Athenian or  
“ the confederate troops ! the bold attempt we are now  
“ going to make is of equal concern to each individual  
“ amongst us ; since, not more for victory over our  
“ foes than for the preservation of ourselves and our  
“ country, we are now to fight ; and, if our naval ef-  
“ forts be crowned with victory, each of us may again  
“ be blessed with the sight of his own native city. A-  
“ way, therefore, with these faces of despair, this pain-  
“ ful dejection, fit only for a raw unexperienced multi-  
“ tude, who, unsuccessful in their first attempts, for  
“ ever after bid adieu to hope, and by unmanly fears  
“ anticipate misfortunes !

“ As for you, Athenians, who form so considerable  
“ a part of this assembly, experienced as you are in  
“ such variety of warfare ! — and you also, our allies,  
“ who have ever fought under our banners ! — recal  
“ to your reflexion the unexpected turns of war ; en-  
“ courage the hope that fortune may at length declare  
“ for us, and determine once more to engage the foe  
“ with

“ with a spirit worthy of that numerous strength of  
“ which by ocular demonstration you see yourselves  
“ this moment possessed. Those points, of which we  
“ perceive we may avail ourselves against the narrow-  
“ nels of the harbour’s mouth, against such a multi-  
“ tude of vessels as will be crowded together, and  
“ against that particular disposition of soldiers on their  
“ decks, from which on the former occasion we suf-  
“ fered so much, — all these, I must tell you, are as  
“ well adjusted as our present condition will permit,  
“ by the united care of us your generals and your own  
“ masters: for many archers and darters shall now line  
“ your decks, and that crowd of soldiers, which, when  
“ we engage in the open sea, we never can use, be-  
“ cause the vessels would be too heavily laden to allow  
“ the proper exertion of our skill; that crowd, I say,  
“ in this pent-up contracted space, shall give to our  
“ naval battle the strength and stability of a land-  
“ engagement. We have also devised the proper  
“ means to compensate the inferior structure of our  
“ ships; and, in return for the consolidated beaks of  
“ our enemy, have provided the ships with grappling-  
“ irons, which will hold fast a vessel that hath run a-  
“ gainst you from getting clear, provided those on-  
“ board will perform their duty: because, as necessity  
“ inforceth us now to fight a mere land-battle from  
“ our decks, it highly concerns us neither to be beat  
“ off ourselves, nor to suffer them to get clear from  
“ our grapple; especially when all the ambient shore,  
“ excepting the small tract now occupied by our own  
“ army, is hostile in regard to us. Mindful of these  
“ things, it behoves you to fight it out so long as  
“ strength and vigour shall enable you, and never suf-  
“ fer yourselves to be driven on *such* a shore; but,  
“ when once your ship hath grappled with a foe, never  
“ once to think of losing your hold, till you have  
“ cleared the enemy’s decks of all the defendants.  
“ But these points I give in charge to the heavy-armed;

• “ not

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“ not less than to the seamen ; since this method of  
“ engagement is more particularly your province, and  
“ since it still remains within your power to earn a  
“ glorious victory, by putting your land-method into  
“ practice. But the seamen I exhort, and with my  
“ exhortations mingle my intreaties, not to shrink too  
“ much under the sensibility of past defeats, as your  
“ decks are now better armed in all respects than they  
“ were before, and as the number of the shipping is  
“ enlarged. Recal the idea of that heart-delighting  
“ privilege, of which you are now to secure the con-  
“ tinuance :— To you I speak, who, though not of  
“ Athenian extraction, have hitherto been regarded  
“ and honoured as Athenians ; and, for speaking well  
“ our language, and appropriating our manners, have  
“ been admired through the whole extent of Greece,  
“ have participated the benefits of our large-extended  
“ empire, not less than ourselves in point of profit,  
“ and much more than ourselves in striking awe into  
“ your vassals, and being exempted from the attacks  
“ of injustice. Since, therefore, you alone have freely  
“ shared our empire with us, you are bound by all the  
“ ties of honour by no means to desert its present vin-  
“ dication. Then, in open despight of those Corin-  
“ thians whom you have so often conquered, and of  
“ those Sicilians not one of whom durst look us in the  
“ face so long as the vigour of our fleet was unim-  
“ paired, drive your foes before you, and strike into  
“ them the plain conviction — that your military skill,  
“ though struggling with weakness and misfortunes, is  
“ yet far superior to all their strength and luck united.

“ But to the native citizens of Athens amongst you  
“ I must once more suggest, that you have now no  
“ longer in your docks such another fleet as *this*, nor  
“ have left behind you such another body of heavy-  
“ armed. If, therefore, your immediate fate be any  
“ thing less than victory, your enemies will sail and be  
“ directly at Athens ; and the remainder of our forces

“ there

" there will no longer be able to repulse the united af-  
 " faults of their domestic foes and such foreign inva-  
 " ders. Nay, the infallible result must be, that you at  
 " once put on the chains of Syracusans, against whom  
 " you are conscious with what intentions you at first  
 " came here, whilst your country must be forced to  
 " submit to a Lacedæmonian bondage. Now, there-  
 " fore, summon all your courage, to earn the day in  
 " which your own liberty and that of Athens is to be  
 " the victor's prize : and let each individual amongst  
 " you invigorate himself with the thought ; nay, let it  
 " throw spirit and life into the whole army, — that  
 " *those* who are now to engage on-board this present  
 " fleet are the whole of the land and naval force of  
 " your country ; are the surviving supports of the  
 " State, and the great NAME of Athens. In so mo-  
 " mentous a conflict, whoever amongst you excels in  
 " military skill or inward bravery, that person had ne-  
 " ver so fine an opportunity to give demonstration of  
 " his superior worth, or to perform a great service for  
 " himself or for the welfare of his country."

Nicias, after he had finished this earnest exhortation, ordered them to repair directly to their posts on-board the fleet.

As all this hurry of preparation lay within their view, Gylippus and the Syracusans could not escape the conviction that the Athenians were bent on another engagement. They had, moreover, received intelligence of the new project of the grappling-irons. As, therefore, they had provided against every thing besides, they also made provision to counterwork that project. For this purpose, they had covered the prows and almost the whole gunnel of their ships with hides ; that, when the grappling-iron was thrown, it might slip off and catch no hold. And no sooner were all their preparations completed, than the Syracusan generals, in concert with  
 Gylippus,

Gylippus, animated their men to engage with resolution, by the following harangue.

“ THAT your past achievements have been glorious  
 “ indeed, and for the acquisition of greater honour  
 “ and glory that you are now on the brink of engaging,  
 “ the generality of you, ye Syracusans and confederates,  
 “ are well convinced, and need not at present to  
 “ be informed; for otherwise you could never have  
 “ persisted so far in this warm career of bravery and success:  
 “ But, if there be a man amongst you whose sense  
 “ of things drops short of their real position, we shall  
 “ now throw upon it the needful illustration.

“ This land, our property, the Athenians have invaded;  
 “ aiming, in the first place, at enslaving Sicily;  
 “ and, had this design succeeded, at inflicting an equal  
 “ fate on Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece. And  
 “ yet these very Athenians, who enjoy already the largest  
 “ tract of empire that any ancient or modern State  
 “ of Greece hath at any time enjoyed, you are the first  
 “ who have bravely resisted; and of that navy, on  
 “ which they erected their incroaching pile of power, are  
 “ plainly the victors in several engagements; as again, in  
 “ that which now approacheth, you will assuredly beat  
 “ them. For men, who have received such severe  
 “ checks in a point for which they so highly plumed  
 “ themselves, will for the future have a much worse  
 “ opinion of their own merit than if they had never conceived  
 “ so high a value of it; and, when all their towering  
 “ pretensions are so unexpectedly blasted, their  
 “ subsequent efforts must of course drop short of their  
 “ real strength: And this, you may rest assured, is the  
 “ present state of *yonder* Athenians. And by parity, in  
 “ regard to ourselves, that proportion of strength we  
 “ enjoyed at first, with which, though far inferior in  
 “ skill, we boldly and successfully presumed to withstand  
 “ them, must now be suitably enlarged; and,  
 “ with the farther accession of this inward assurance,  
 “ that

“ that we are really the best, since we have beat the  
 “ best, seamen in the world, our hopes of success are  
 “ in every light redoubled ; and then human experience  
 “ teacheth us, that, in every competition, the warmest  
 “ hope is ever accompanied with the greatest resolu-  
 “ tion.

“ But farther, those late alterations which they have  
 “ introduced among their shipping, in order to equalise  
 “ and balance ours, have been a long time familiar to  
 “ our own practice ; and each of their new preparations  
 “ we shall dexterously improve to our own advantage :  
 “ For when, contrary to the long and inveterate disci-  
 “ pline of their fleet, there are crowded together upon  
 “ their decks a numerous body of heavy-armed, as well  
 “ as another numerous body of mere *terra firma* dart-  
 “ ers, as they may properly be stiled, — when thus A-  
 “ carnianians and other landmen are forced on-board,  
 “ who even sitting would be unable to poise and direct  
 “ their weapons,—how can they avoid endangering their  
 “ vessels ? or, jumbled confusedly together, and tot-  
 “ tering under motions to which they are not inured,  
 “ how can they escape a total disorder ?

“ What still makes more against them, the multi-  
 “ tude of their shipping will only serve the more to  
 “ embarrass them ; and let this dispel the fears of those  
 “ who may be afraid of engaging against their superior  
 “ numbers ; for a multitude of ships in a contracted  
 “ space will be more slow in executing orders, and are  
 “ at the same time most easily exposed to the annoy-  
 “ ance which our preparations are contrived to give  
 “ them. And now attend to the true and real situation  
 “ of the foe, as from good intelligence we are enabled  
 “ clearly to declare it to you.

“ Environed on all sides with misfortunes, and dis-  
 “ tressed in a present want of the necessaries of life, they  
 “ are become quite desperate : And hence, though  
 “ they have resigned all confidence in their real  
 “ strength, yet in the fury of despair they are throwing  
 “ themselves

“ themselves upon the decision of fortune ; that either,  
 “ if the passage can be forced, they may launch out to  
 “ sea ; or, that project failing, may attempt a retreat  
 “ by land ;—as if to a worse condition than their present  
 “ it were not in the power of fortune to reduce them.  
 “ Warmed, therefore, with brave resentment, let us  
 “ also try the encounter against such wild confusion,  
 “ and against the fortune of our inveterate foes now  
 “ treacherously bent to finish their destruction. Let us  
 “ charge with the full conviction, that on an enemy,  
 “ who would justify their invasion on the principle  
 “ of redressing wrongs, it is most fair and equitable to  
 “ satiate all the fury of revenge ; nay more, that ven-  
 “ geance on a foe is an appetite of our nature, and  
 “ commonly said to be the sweetest of all human enjoy-  
 “ ments. But that those men *yonder* are our foes, our  
 “ most bitter unrelenting foes, you need no farther  
 “ proofs ; since, bent on enslaving this our country,  
 “ they first made the voyage ; and, had this their o-  
 “ dious project been successful, on our citizens they  
 “ had inflicted the most cruel torments, on our wives  
 “ and children the most indecent enormities, and on  
 “ Syracuse the most ignominious appellation. In a  
 “ work of so just retaliation, to indulge a tenderness  
 “ of mind, or to think it gain to let them depart with-  
 “ out additional revenge, will be a matter of just re-  
 “ proach ; for the latter is all they will be able to ef-  
 “ fect, even though at length they may be victors.  
 “ But to us, could we execute the fair and equitable  
 “ wishes of our hearts, by inflicting upon *them* the pu-  
 “ nishment they well deserve, and in setting the liberty  
 “ of all Sicily, as it hath been ever enjoyed by us, be-  
 “ yond the reach of any future insults, how glorious  
 “ must such achievements be ! For such critical mo-  
 “ ments of adventure are most rarely to be met with ;  
 “ which, if unsuccessful, can do the least disservice ;  
 “ but, if successful, draw after them the most valuable  
 “ acquisitions.”



When the Syracusan generals, seconded by Gylippus, had finished this their exhortation to their own soldiers, they also, in their turn, repaired immediately on-board their fleet, as they found was already done by the Athenians.

But Nicias, whose mind was furcharged with present cares, sensible how extreme the danger, and how nearly approaching! since this very moment they were only not in motion; and once more reflecting, that, as generally happens in affairs of such prodigious moment, some points might yet be left imperfect, something of energy, and weight, and influence, be yet left unaid; he called out again upon every single captain in the fleet, addressing himself separately to them, with the honourable mention of their *fathers, themselves, and their tribe*; and conjuring each, by his own distinguishing splendor, whatever it was, “not now to betray it, nor tarnish “those hereditary virtues on which their ancestors had “founded their glory;” reminding them earnestly “of the uninterrupted freedom of their country, and “the privilege they had ever enjoyed of living in it “quite free and uncontrouled;” asserting other arguments, such as, with men who had their *all* so much at stake, might have influence and weight; no matter now how trite or hackneyed by frequent repetitions, or how equally applicable to every case, as fetched from the endearments of their wives, and their offspring, and their paternal gods; such as from every topic, in a plunge of horror and distress, are rung in the ears of men, as likely to animate and persuade. And thus at last, though fearful that not even yet he had said enough, but all that the time would permit, he parted from them; and, placing himself at the head of the land-army, marched down to the beach; where he drew them up in as large a line as they could possibly form, that their appearance might have the greater effect in emboldening those on-board the fleet.

And

And now Demosthenes, and Menander, and Euthydemus, (for these went on-board to command the fleet,) getting clear from their moorings, stood away directly towards the barricade of the harbour, and that interval its mouth not yet completely barred, in order to the passage. The Syracusans also and their allies now launched forth against them with their usual number of ships. A detachment of these were so stationed as to guard the passage; the rest were spread circularly quite round the harbour, that on all sides at once they might attack the Athenians, and their land-army on the beach might second them on approaches to the shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus and Agatharcus, who were respectively stationed in each of the wings, whilst Pythen and the Corinthians composed the center.

When the Athenians were come up to the barricade, they run boldly at it; and by the violence of the first shock they beat off the vessels ranged about it, and were intent on clearing away the whole barricade. But here, the Syracusans and allies falling in amongst them from every quarter, a general engagement ensued, not only at the barricade, but in every part of the harbour. Obstinate it really proved, and such a battle as they had never fought before. Great, in truth, was the ardour of the seamen on both sides, in running upon the enemy, whenever the word was given; and great was the art exerted by the officers, in attack, and defence, and reciprocal contention. The soldiers on-board exerted all their efforts, that, when ship came to close with ship, no stretch of military skill should be omitted on the hatches. Every individual, abiding firmly in his post, strained all his diligence to signalize his own behaviour. But, as numerous ships were falling in together amongst one another in little sea-room, and so large a number never fought before in so small a space, (since the amount of both fleets fell little short of two hundred,) the direct incursions with the beak were few,

because room was wanting for tacks and passages; but boardings were frequent, as the vessels were continually running foul on one another, or in sheering off met with others which were coming on. And, so long as a vessel was in her approach, those on the hatches poured plentifully against her whole showers of javelins, and arrows, and stones; but, when they were once come to grappling, the soldiers, closing in firm battalion, endeavoured by force to board one another. Nay, it most frequently happened, through the straitness of sea-room, that, the very moment one party boarded the enemy, the very same moment they were also boarded themselves, as two vessels lay often along-side of an enemy; nay, sometimes more, by necessity mingled and squeezed fast together. In the mean time, the care of the officers was not confined to one single point, but distracted on all sides by a whole round of perils: they were here intent on their own defence, and there on the annoyance of the enemy. And, farther, the prodigious crash that was made by such a number of ships, running at the same instant upon one another, struck such dismay and loss of hearing, that the voices of those who issued out orders could no longer be distinguished. Loud, besides, were the exhortations and shouts of the officers on both sides, partly in conformity to rule, though swelled at present by the ardour of contention. Amongst the Athenians it was shouted amain — “To force the passage, and now or never to exert their utmost stretch of bravery to earn a safe return to their native country:” — Amongst the Syracusans and their allies — “How glorious it would be to hinder their escape, and by present victory for every one amongst them to increase the growing honours of his country!” The commanders also, on both sides, if they saw a vessel dropping off before it was overpowered by the enemy, called out aloud by name on the captain, demanding, on the Athenian side, “Did they retire on the wild presumption that yonder most hostile shore

## II. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 261

more would prove more friendly to them than the open sea, which by long prescription they had claimed as their own province?" — But, on the Syracusan — Would they, who were perfectly assured that the Athenians wanted nothing so much as to escape — could they fly first from those who were flying?"

On land-army, farther, of each party upon the beach, whilst yet the battle was alternately fluctuating on the water, felt the utmost anxiety and the most painful conflict of mind; earnestly bent, as the one *domestic* party was, "on gaining accumulated honours;" but fearful, as the other *invading* party was become, that "their condition might soon become worse than it was already:" For, the whole hope of the Athenians centering at present in that *fleet*, their anguish for the event was more acute than ever they had felt, and was aggravated by their own position on the beach, which gave them a clear uninterrupted prospect of all that passed in the battle upon the water. The scene was but at a trifling distance from their eyes; and, as the looks of all of them were not at the same instant fastened upon the same spectacle, if any saw their own party prevailing, they grew at once exalted, and immediately began an invocation to the gods, that the efforts of their friends might be crowned with success; whilst another party, beholding those who were vanquished, uttered a loud shriek which ended in a groan; and, by the sight of such affecting turns, were more subdued in spirit than those who were actually engaged in this medley of horror. Others, farther, who were intent upon a quarter of the engagement, where the event was yet in suspense, and no judgement amidst such confusion could be formed, adjusted the contortions of their bodies to their own inward fears, and passed that interval in extremity of anguish; for, each single moment, they were within a little of escaping or being sunk. And thus, in one and the same army of Athenians, so long as the event was under decision, a whole medley of

noises was heard together;—*screaking—shouting—victory!—undone!—undone!*—and all other sounds, of various import, which, in such extremity of danger, a numerous body of men may be forced to utter.

Those, farther, on-board, were equally sensible of all the quick alternatives of passion; till at last, after the battle had for a long time been obstinately maintained, the Syracusans and allies put the Athenians to open flight; and, plying briskly in the chase, with obstreperous clamour and loud exultations drove them upon the beach. And here, the land-soldiers which had served on-board, excepting such as had been taken in the deeper water, leaping in all parts, as they severally could, on the shore, run in great confusion for shelter to the camp. The army on the beach, with passions no longer diversified, but with one and the same uniform vehemence, having expressed their resentment of the horrible conclusion by a loud shriek and a hearty groan, some hurried along the beach to succour the shipping; others to defend what yet remained of their intrenchments; whilst a third party, and the bulk of the army, confined their whole care to themselves, and were solely intent on their own personal preservation. The horrid consternation, in which this moment they were universally plunged, was greater than Athenians had ever felt before. They suffered now what on a former occasion they had made others suffer at Pylus. *There* the Lacedæmonians, having first lost their fleet, had the farther mortification to see all their gallant Spartans in the island undone. And now the desperate condition of the Athenians offered no glimmering of safety on the land, unless some miraculous contingency should take place in their favour.

After an engagement so hardy and well disputed, after the sinking of a large number of ships and the death of numbers on both sides, the Syracusans and their allies, who were masters of the day, took up the shatters and the dead. This being done, they sailed in triumph to the city, and erected a trophy.

But

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But the Athenians, quite sunk with the weight of their present misfortunes, never so much as once entertained the thought of recovering their shattered vessels or their dead, but were contriving how to decamp by favour of the approaching night. Demosthenes, upon this, repairing to Nicias, declared it as his own opinion, that, “manning at once the whole number of their vessels, they should exert their utmost efforts to force their passage out of the harbour early the next dawn;” affirming that “they had still a larger number of shipping fit for service than the enemy:” For the Athenians had yet about sixty left, whereas those of the enemy were under fifty. Nicias came into the proposal; but, when both joined in issuing proper orders for the execution, the seamen flatly refused to go on-board. Dispirited as they were by the last great blow, they had resigned all hope of ever beating these enemies again. No measure now remained but a retreat by land, on which the universal attention was henceforth employed.

Hermocrates, the Syracusan, had conceived a suspicion that such a step would be taken by them; and, foreseeing what difficulties might arise if so large an army should march across the country, and, posting themselves afresh on Sicilian ground, should again resume their spirits and renew the war against Syracuse, he waited upon those in authority, and suggested to them, that “they ought not, by any rules of policy, to let the enemy steal off by night; (inserting here his own sentiments of the affair;) but that all the Syracusans and their allies, falling out in a body, should pre-occupy and secure the roads, and in good time beset and put strong guards in all the passes.” The magistrates were sensible, as much as he who gave this advice, how reasonable it was, and declared themselves for its execution: But then, “the men, who now, indulging their joy for the late victory, were intent on recreations, and as besides it was a festival-time, (for this very day

“ day they were performing the anniversary sacrifice  
 “ Hercules,) in all probability would refuse to march  
 “ because, transported as they were with success, &  
 “ generality no doubt were celebrating the festival with  
 “ good cheer and wine ; and any thing might sooner  
 “ hoped from them, than obedience to an order for  
 “ king up their arms and falling forth at a minute  
 “ notice.” As the magistrates were convinced that  
 things would so turn out, the scheme was judged impracticable, and Hermocrates could in no wise prevail. But he thought of an artifice to play off against the foe : Afraid lest the Athenians, dislodging quietly by night, might possess themselves of the most difficult passes before any opposition could reach them, he dispatcheth some of his most trusty friends, under an escorte of horse, to the Athenian camp so soon as it was dark ; who, riding up so near to the intrenchments that their words might be distinctly heard, and calling out aloud on some persons to come forth, since they were a party sent from his friends in Syracuse to bring Nicias some intelligence, charged them to carry word immediately to Nicias, “ by no means to draw off the army by night,  
 “ because the Syracusans had beset the roads ; but to  
 “ defer his march till day-light, when he had leisure to  
 “ make the proper dispositions.” And after delivering this message they rode off, whilst those who received it went and reported it faithfully to the Athenian generals.

Wrought upon by this piece of intelligence, in which they were far from suspecting any fraud, they continued all night in their posts ; and then, as they had not dislodged at once in a hurry, they thought it adviseable to stay there *but* one day longer, that the soldiers might pack up and carry away with them as large a part as was possible of their necessary stores. The rest of the baggage it was agreed should be abandoned to the enemy ; they were only to carry off, each person for himself, what was absolutely necessary for food and raiment.

But,

## b. VII. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 265

But, in this interval, the Syracusans and Gylippus, by falling out with the land-forces, had gained a march before them, had blocked up the roads along the country by which it was judged the Athenians would march, and had posted strong guards upon all the fords of brooks and rivers; nay, their detachments stood ready drawn in battalia to beat off the enemy from the most convenient passes. Standing out farther into the harbour with their fleet, they dragged from the shore the Athenian shipping. Some few of these they burnt, as the Athenians themselves had designed to do; but the residue at their leisure, from the spot where each lay stranded, they took in tow and carried away to the city. And, this being done, when Nicias and Demosthenes judged that they had completed such preparations for their march as were absolutely needful, the dislodgement of the whole army was put in execution on the third day from the naval engagement.

Terrible indeed it was, not only when viewed in one particular light, as that they retreated because they had lost the whole of their fleet, and all their mighty hopes had terminated in such personal dangers to themselves, and such as even boded the ruin of Athens; but the very abandoning of the camp presented to their sight the most cutting spectacles, and struck each soul amongst them with heart-piercing anguish: For, as the dead lay uninterred upon the surface of the earth, when the remains of an old acquaintance, thus miserably laid out, arrested the eyes of a soldier, he was instantly seized with regret and horror. But the living, who on account of wounds and sickness were left behind, were causes of much greater affliction to the sound than were even the dead, and in truth were much more to be deplored than those who had no longer a being: For, bursting out into prayers and lamentations, they occasioned a wild irresolution of thought; earnestly intreating that they might not be left behind, and screaming out aloud on each by name, as they saw a friend, or an acquaintance,
   
 or



or an old comrade; moving off; throwing their arms about their necks, and so dragged along whilst they could keep their hold; but, when strength and bodily vigour failed and left them destitute of resource, they gave them the last adieu, not without a shower of curses and a hideous howl. By such cutting incidents the whole army was filled with tears and a wild irresolution, so that they could not depart without the highest regret, though from a spot so hostile, where they had suffered more than tears could alleviate; and the dread of more, which yet might be impending, was inexpressible. Dejection of the head and self-accusation were general through all the troops; and they resembled nothing less than a large subjugated city, whose numerous inhabitants were escaping from the fury of a sack; for the amount of those, who were now marching off together, was not less than forty thousand men.

Of these, the generality carried off merely what necessary subsistence they had scraped together; but the heavy-armed and horsemen, contrary to custom, were now obliged to carry their own sustenance themselves beneath their armour; some, because they had none; others, because they durst not trust their servants. The desertions had for a long time been large, but of late in greater numbers than ever. Neither were they thus provided with sufficient stores; for there was no longer any corn to be found in the camp. Nay, truly, the general calamity and equability of misfortunes, which in many cases alleviate the pain as numbers are involved, were unable to render the present evils in any degree supportable; especially when the thought occurred, from *what* a height of splendor and preceding glory, to *what* a plunge and miserable state they were now reduced! For, a most cruel turn of fortune this really proved to a Grecian army; who, coming hither to enslave others, were departing now with the sad alternative of fearing to be made slaves themselves; and, instead of the prayers and pæans with which they first began

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gan the voyage, were now dislodging with omens that attended nothing but misery: Those, farther, who came hither as lords of the ocean, were now stealing away by land, from henceforth to be saved, not by naval skill, but the perseverance of a land-army. However, all these reflexions put their patience nothing on stretch, in comparison of that weight of misery which this very instant was hovering over their heads.

Nicias, perceiving the whole army to be overwhelmed in despair and sunk in this plunge of distress, addressed himself severally to the troops, exhorted, and comforted, by every topic which occurred, each single party, whom he visited by turns, elevating his voice far beyond the ordinary pitch, to suit the earnestness of his heart, in hope that, the louder he spoke, the more extensive effect it might have upon the hearers.

“ EVEN yet, and in the present low ebb of our  
 “ fortune, my dear countrymen and confederates, we  
 “ ought to encourage hope. Instances may be given  
 “ of armies who have been rescued from a deeper  
 “ plunge of dangers than that which is now our por-  
 “ tion. Nor ought you to torture yourselves with too  
 “ painful regret at what you suffer, or at the unme-  
 “ rited miseries which this moment environ you about.  
 “ Even I myself, who have much less room to boast  
 “ of a constitution superior to hardships than the meanest  
 “ soldier in your ranks, (for your own eyes can witness  
 “ to how low a state my bodily infirmities have redu-  
 “ ced me,) who, however, in the continued happi-  
 “ ness of my former course of life, or in any other re-  
 “ gard, am inferior to none amongst you, — yet am  
 “ buffeted now, by the storms and outrages of fortune,  
 “ as cruelly as ever were the vilest and most abject of  
 “ my fellow-creatures. It is true, I have ever habitu-  
 “ ally worshipped the gods, with a conscientious de-  
 “ ference to established laws; and have made justice  
 “ and beneficence to man the constant practice of my  
 “ life.

“ life. Upon the strength of this, when I look for-  
 “ wards to the future, my mind is enlivened with invi-  
 “ gorating hope; though I own these misfortunes, so  
 “ far undeserved, strike no little terror on my  
 “ thoughts. But better times, perhaps, may be ap-  
 “ proaching; for sure our enemies have been blessed  
 “ with an ample measure of success; and, though some  
 “ deity may have frowned at first on this our expedi-  
 “ tion, yet by this time his wrath must be fully wreaked  
 “ upon us. We are not the first instance of a people  
 “ who have wantonly invaded the possessions of ano-  
 “ ther; many such offences have taken their rise from  
 “ the impulse of human passions, and have been pu-  
 “ nished with such a measure of vengeance as human  
 “ nature was able to endure. Good reason, therefore,  
 “ have we now to hope for a milder fate from the of-  
 “ fended deity; who, depressed as we are, seem objects  
 “ of compassion more than of resentment. Cast, there-  
 “ fore, your eyes on the fine bodies of heavy-armed,  
 “ and the goodly numbers, which even now compose  
 “ your retreat; and let the sight revive and cheer your  
 “ drooping spirits. Conclude that, wherever you choose  
 “ to halt, you are of yourselves that instant a mighty com-  
 “ munity; such as no other Sicilian people can presume  
 “ to stand before, should you attack; nor to dispossess,  
 “ wherever you think proper to settle. But, that your  
 “ march be orderly and safe, be that the care of each  
 “ individual amongst your ranks, made warm and ear-  
 “ nest by the thought, — that, on whatever spot you  
 “ may be compelled to fight, on that, if crowned with  
 “ victory, you regain a country and a bulwark of your  
 “ own. But then, our march must be continued both day  
 “ and night, with unabating speed, because our stock  
 “ of provision is but scanty; and, can we but reach  
 “ some friendly territory belonging to the Siculi, who,  
 “ from their excessive dread of the Syracusans, will ever  
 “ preserve their attachment to us, conclude yourselves  
 “ that moment to be beyond the reach of danger:

“ Send,

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Send, therefore, your messengers beforehand to them, with orders to meet us on our route and bring us the needful supplies of food. On the whole, my fellow-soldiers, rest assured that the last necessity enjoins you to be resolutely brave; since to cowardice now no place of shelter is any longer open; and only if you stem the efforts of your foes—*can* you again be happy in the enjoyment of those scenes your eyes so fondly regret; and can Athenians re-erect the extensive power of the Athenian *State*, how low soever it may be fallen at present: For they are *men* who make a *State*, not walls nor ships by men abandoned.”

With these words of encouragement Nicias ran regularly through all the ranks of the whole army; careful, at the same time, if he saw any parties straggling from the main body, and quitting the order of the march, to fetch them up and replace them. Demosthenes exerted himself as diligently in his own department, encouraging his troops with the same energy and ardour of address. The body under Nicias, drawn up in a square, led the van of the march; that under Demosthenes brought up the rear; whilst the baggage-men, and the numerous crowd that attended the camp, marched within the center of the heavy-armed.

When they were advanced to the place of fording the Anapus, they find a body of Syracusans and allies drawn up in battalia there to oppose the passage. But, putting these to flight, they gained the passage of that river, and advanced into the country beyond; though their march was terribly harrassed by the incursions of the Syracusan horse, and by the missile weapons which the light-armed of the enemy poured in from time to time amongst them. And yet, in this day's march, the Athenians wrought about \* forty stadia, and halted for the night upon an eminence.

\* About four miles.

On the ensuing day, by early dawn, they were again in motion, and advanced about † twenty stadia; when, descending into a certain plain, they halted and formed an incampment. Their design in this was to fetch in some provisions, for the adjacent country was inhabited, and to get a proper supply of water to carry along with them; for in the country beyond, through which their route was fixed, no springs were to be met with for the length of several stadia. But, during this halt, the Syracusans, advancing beyond them, throw up a work across their route to stop their farther progress. The spot chosen for this was a strong eminence, flanked on both sides by an inaccessible crag, and known by the name of Acræum-Lepas.

On the day following the Athenians resumed their march; but the horse and numerous darters of the Syracusans and allies stopped their advance, the latter pouring in their weapons upon, and the former riding up and disordering, their ranks. For a long time, it is true, the Athenians maintained the skirmishes against them; but at length they retreated again to their last incampment. And now all farther supplies of provisions were totally cut off; it being no longer possible to fetch in any, for fear of the horse.

But, decamping early in the morning, they continued their march, and forced their progress to the eminence which was fortified by the new work. Here they found the Syracusan infantry drawn up before them in firm and deep battalia, posted also on the strong eminence they had occupied on purpose; for the pass was very narrow. The Athenians marched up and assaulted the work; but, being pelted by showers of darts from the eminence, which was very steep, and so gave those upon it a great advantage in throwing their weapons home, and finding themselves unable to force it, they again drew off, and attempted it no farther. It happened, at the

† Two miles.

ne time, that some claps of thunder were heard, accompanied with rain, effects not unusual in this season, the year was now in autumn; and yet these accidents tributed still more to dispirit the Athenians, who concluded that every thing now acted in combination for destruction. During this interval of inaction, Gyas and the Syracusans send off a detachment of their forces, to throw up a work in their rear, where the enemy had already passed. But the Athenians sent also a detachment of their own body, which prevented its execution; and, after this, wheeling off with their whole body more into the plains, they halted there for the night.

The next morning they began to move forwards again. And now the Syracusans, besetting them quite round in a circle, poured vollies of darts and arrows amongst them, and wounded numbers. If, indeed, the Athenians sallied out against them, they retreated; but, when the Athenians drew back, they then pressed upon their retreat; and, falling in chiefly amongst their rear, if at any time they put small parties to flight, they struck a consternation into the whole army. But for a long time, in such a train of skirmishings, the Athenians made good their ground; and, advancing afterwards the length of \* five or six stadia, they halted in a plain. Here also the Syracusans no longer molested them, but withdrew to their own camp.

This night it was determined by Nicias and Demosthenes, that, — since the army was reduced to so low a condition, and began already to be pressed with a total failure of provisions; since, farther, large numbers had been wounded in the many incidental assaults of the enemy; — they should first kindle a great number of fires, and then march the whole army off, no longer by the route which they had first projected, but by another towards the sea, quite contrary to that which the Syracusans had already pre-occupied and guarded. The re-

\* About  $\frac{1}{2}$  a mile.

fidue of the march was no longer pointed towards Catana, but to the other coast of Sicily, towards Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in that quarter, both Grecian and Barbarian. In pursuance of this, a large number of fires being kindled, they dislodged in the dead of night.

This part of their retreat (as is the general fate of armies, but especially of the greatest, ever subject to fears and panics, particularly when moving in the night and on hostile ground, and conscious, farther, that the enemy is close at their heels) was made in a sad and disorderly manner. The column, indeed, under Nicias, which composed the van, kept firm together in a body, and quite out-matched the rest of the army: but that under Demosthenes, being one half at least, if not the major part, of the whole force, was separated from the van, and came on in great confusion and disorder. However, by the dawn of day, they reach the coast; and, gaining the great road which is called *the Helorine*, took their route along it, that, after they had reached the river Cacyparis, they might pierce upwards along the course of that river into the heart of the country; for thus they hoped to meet with the Sicili, whom they had summoned to be ready on their route. But, when they had gained the sight of that river, they found its banks already occupied by a Syracusan guard, busy in throwing up a rampart and palisado to defend its passage. This party they soon dispersed, and passed the river, and from thence advanced towards another river, the Erineus; for thus their guides had planned their route.

In the mean time the Syracusans and allies, when the day was clearly broke, and they knew the Athenians were stole off, began in general to throw heavy imputations on Gylippus, as if the Athenians had made their escape through his connivance. Yet, beginning the pursuit with all possible expedition, (and it was easily discoverable what route they had taken,) they come up  
with

B. VII. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 273

with them about the hour of repast : And, as they felt in first with the column under the orders of Demosthenes, which composed the rear, and had moved in a more slow and disorderly manner than the van, because the darkness of the night had so highly incommoded and confounded their march, they immediately charged them and fought. The Syracusan cavalry beset them quite round, (the more easily, indeed, as they were separated from the van,) and drove them into one crowded heap. But the column under Nicias was now \* fifty stadia before them ; for Nicias led them forwards with great celerity, concluding that their safety consisted, not in lingering voluntarily at so critical a period, or exposing themselves to an engagement, but in pushing forwards with their utmost speed, and fighting only when by absolute necessity they were compelled to fight. But then Demosthenes was involved in a much more laborious and continued toil ; because, as he filed off last, the enemies were left upon his rear ; and, soon convinced that they had begun the pursuit, he was obliged, not so much to move forward, as to draw up his troops in the order of battle, till by such necessitated lingering he is environed by them, and himself and the body of Athenians under him are thrown into high tumult and confusion. • For now, hemmed in as they were on a certain spot, surrounded quite round by walls, and whence the issues both on one side and the other were full of olive-trees, they were terribly galled on their flanks by the darts of the enemy. This kind of annoyance the Syracusans wisely chose to give them, and to decline all close engagement ; because, to hazard the latter against enemies now become quite desperate, they judged would make more for the advantage of the Athenians than of themselves : Though, at the same time, a kind of frugality, inspired by the great career of success they had already obtained, taught them not to exhaust their strength on superfluous encounters, and per-

\* Above five miles.



suaded them that *thus* they might effectually subdue and make this great army their prisoners. When, therefore, for the whole remainder of the day, they had galled them on all sides with missive weapons, and now perceived that the Athenians and their allies were reduced to a miserable plight by the wounds which they had received and the other calamities which lay hard upon them, Gylippus, in concert with the Syracusans and allies, causeth a herald to proclaim: — First, that “such inhabitants of the isles as would come over to them should rest in the secure enjoyment of their liberty;” — upon which, some cities, though not many, went over to them: — And, in the next place, after some time, a surrender is agreed on of the whole body of troops commanded by Demosthenes, on the terms, that “they should deliver up their arms, and no one should suffer death, either by public execution, or the miseries of a prison, or the want of necessary subsistence.” Thus this whole body, to the number of six thousand men, surrendered themselves prisoners, and produced all the silver they had about them, which they were commanded to throw into the hollows of shields, four of which in this manner were filled full with spoil; and these prisoners the victors immediately led away to Syracuse.

But Nicias and the column under his command arrived the same day on the banks of the Erineus; and, having passed that river, halted on an eminence. The day following, the Syracusans, coming up to his post, notified to Nicias, that “those under Demosthenes had surrendered,” and summoned him to follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, he begs leave to send out a horseman to discover the truth; who upon his return affirming that “they had actually surrendered,” Nicias sends an intimation to Gylippus and the Syracusans, that he was ready to stipulate, in the name of the Athenians, that “whatever sums the Syracusans had expended in this war should be fairly  
“reimbursed,

“reimbursed, on condition the forces under his command might have free departure; but, till the money could be paid, he would leave with them a number of Athenians as hostages for performance, a man for a talent.”

Gylippus and the Syracusans refused the offer; and, resuming offensive measures, ranged their parties quite round the eminence, and poured in their missive weapons upon them till the evening. This body of troops was also sadly distressed for want of bread and necessary subsistence. Watching, however, for the dead and silent hours of the night, they were then determined to continue their march. They accordingly take up their arms; the Syracusans perceive it, and sing the pæan of alarm. The Athenians were *thus* convinced that they could not dislodge without being discovered, and so grounded their arms again, all but one party of three hundred men; for these, having forced themselves a passage through the guards, made off in the night as fast as it was possible.

So soon as the day appeared, Nicias, at the head of his troops, led them forwards. But the Syracusans and allies pressed upon him on all sides in the usual manner, pouring in volleys of darts and javelins. The Athenians made the best of their way to reach the river Assinarus; not only because, annoyed on all sides by the irruption of the numerous cavalry and skirmishing parties, they concluded they should be eased of these should they once pass that river, but also through bodily fatigue and a vehement desire to extinguish their thirst. When, therefore, they are upon the bank, they rush into the river; no longer observant of order, but each single soldier intent on passing the first of the army. And the enemy, who now pressed hard upon them, had rendered the passage already a business of toil: For, obliged as they were to go down in confused heaps, they fell and trampled upon one another; some, embarrassed by their spears and luggage, met with instant destruction; others,

others, entangled in the croud, were carried away by the current. The hither bank of the river was now filled with Syracusans; and, it being naturally steep, they poured down their darts upon the Athenians, numbers of whom were drinking greedily of the stream, confusedly hampered together in the hollow of the channel. The Peloponnesians, plunging in after them, made a great slaughter of those who were in the river. The water was immediately discoloured with blood: But the stream, polluted with mud and gore, deterred them not from drinking it greedily, nor many of them from fighting desperately for a draught of it. But, in short, when the carcases of the dead began to lie heaped one upon another in the river, and the whole army was become a continued carnage; \* of some in the river; of those who were making off from the banks, by the horsemen of the foe; Nicias surrenders himself prisoner to Gylippus, into whose power he chose to fall sooner than into that of the Syracusans. He told him, that “ he himself and the Lacedæmonians might decide his fate as best pleased themselves; but intreated that a stop might be put to the slaughter of his soldiers.” Upon this, Gylippus issued out orders to give quarter; and thus they carried off the remnants of this body as prisoners of war, such excepted as were secreted by their captors, the number of which was large. Having, farther, detached a party in pursuit of the three hundred, who in the night had broke through the guard, they also made them prisoners. The whole number now collected together as the public prize was not large; but very numerous were they who were clandestinely secreted. Not a town in Sicily but was crouded with them, since these had not surrendered upon terms like those under Demosthenes. A considerable number had also perished: For this was a terrible slaughter; nay, there was no one greater in the course of the Sicilian

\* According to *Diodorus Siculus*, the number of the slain amounted to eighteen thousand men.

war: And in the preceding skirmishes, which had happened very frequently during the march, not a few had been slain. Yet, notwithstanding all this, many made their escape; some from the scenes of action, and others from their prisons, from whence they afterwards gained an opportunity to run away. These repaired to Catana, as a safe resort.

And now the Syracusans and allies in one grand collective body, having amassed together as large a number of prisoners as they possibly could, and all the spoils, returned in triumph to Syracuse. The bulk of prisoners, whether of the Athenians or their confederates, whom they had taken, they thrust down into the quarries, concluding that from such a confinement they could not possibly make escapes; but Nicias and Demosthenes, in spite of all the remonstrances of Gylippus, they butchered: For Gylippus imagined, that the finishing of this war would invest himself with pre-eminent degrees of glory, if, besides the rest of his achievements, he could carry home to the Lacedæmonians the generals of the enemy. It had, farther, so happened, that one of these, that is, Demosthenes, was regarded as their most inveterate enemy, because of his exploits against them in the island Sphacteria and Pylus; and the other (Nicias) as their most sincere well-wisher, from his behaviour on those very incidents. For Nicias had strenuously exerted himself in behalf of those Lacedæmonians who were made prisoners in the island. It was he who prevailed with the Athenians to sign the treaty, in pursuance of which they were released. For such services done them, the Lacedæmonians had a kindness for him; and it had been chiefly owing to his assurance of this that he surrendered himself prisoner to Gylippus. But a party of the Syracusans, as was generally reported, fearful, because they had kept up a correspondence with him, lest, if put to the torture, he might now, amidst the general prosperity, involve them in trouble; others also, and,

not least of all, the Corinthians, lest as he was rich he might purchase the connivance of his keepers to get his liberty, and then again might have influence enough to foment fresh stirs to their prejudice; obtained the concurrence of their allies, and put him to death. For these, or reasons most nearly neighbouring to these, was Nicias doomed to destruction; though the man, of all the Grecians in the present age, who least deserved so wretched a catastrophe, since his whole life was one uniform series of piety towards the Deity.\*

As for those who were doomed to the quarries, the Syracusans treated them at first with outrageous severity. As great numbers were crowded together in this hollow dungeon, the beams of the sun, in the first place, and then the suffocating air, annoyed them in a more terrible manner, because the aperture was left uncovered; and each succeeding night, the reverse of the preceding day, autumnal and nipping, through such vicissitudes threw them into strange disorders. Thus straitened as they were for room, they did whatever they had to do on one and the same spot; and the carcases of those who died lay heaped up promiscuously together, as some expired of their wounds, and others perished through the vicissitudes of air they suffered, or some other such deadly cause. At length the stench became intolerably noisome; and they were farther oppressed with hunger and thirst: For, during the space of eight months, the allowance to each was only a † *cotyl* of water and two ‡ *cotyls* of bread a day. Nay, whatever species of misery numbers cooped up in so close a confinement might be liable to suffer, not one of these but pressed cruelly upon them. They were all thus thronged and dieted together for seventy days: But, after this term, all but the Athenians, and such

\* Mr. Hobbes, in his translation, has omitted this last comma.

† Little more than half a pint.

‡ About 32 solid inches.

## B.VII. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 279

of the Sicilians and Italians as had joined with them in the invasion, were sold out for slaves. §

What the whole number of prisoners was, it is hard exactly to relate; but, however, they could not be fewer than seven thousand. And this proved to be the greatest Grecian exploit of all that happened in the course of this war; and, in my opinion, of all that occur in the whole history of Greece; since the event to the victors was most glorious, and to the vanquished most calamitous: For in every respect they were totally overpowered, and their miseries in no respect had any mitigation: In short, root and branch, as is commonly said, their land-armies and their shipping were now ruined; nay, nothing belonging to them was exempted from destruction; and few, out of all their numbers, had the good fortune to revisit their native country.


Such were the transactions in Sicily. ||

§ “ The decent and engaging behaviour of the Athenians was of great service to them; for by it they either soon obtained their liberty, or were highly esteemed and caressed by their masters. Some of them were indebted for their freedom to Euripides. The Sicilians, it seems, were fonder of the muse of Euripides than were even the people who lived in Greece itself. If the strangers, who were often resorting to Sicily, brought them any specimens or morsels of his poetry, they learned them by heart, and with high delight communicated them to their friends. It is said, that several, who by this means earned their liberty, went afterwards to wait upon Euripides, in token of their gratitude; assuring him, some of them, that they had been released from slavery for teaching their masters what pieces of his writing they were able to repeat; and others, that, when vagabonds after the defeat, they had been supplied with meat and drink for singing some of his lines. This is not to be wondered at; since even a Caunian vessel, which, being hard chased by pirates, and endeavouring to get for refuge into a Sicilian harbour, was however kept off by force; till at length, being asked whether they could repeat any of Euripides’s verses, they answered in the affirmative; upon which they obtained immediate reception and refuge.” *Plutarch in the Life of Nicias.*

|| Some Iambic verses of an unknown author are found at the end of this book in the latter Greek editions; and I beg the reader to accept the following translation of them.

The pride of glory, the exalted height,  
The frequent trophies on the land and sea,  
The long career of well-deserv’d success,  
On which their great forefathers tow’r’d aloft,

Whi'lt Persia trembled at th'Athenian name,  
Now droop'd at once ! — A chaos soon succeeds,  
Of anarchy, destruction, and distress :  
Low ebb'd the *State*, as high it erst had flow'd.



THE

T H E  
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.  
B O O K VIII.

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WHEN the news was reported at Athens, no belief for a long time was given, — even though the most creditable part of the soldiery, who had made their escape from this disastrous business, proved it by a circumstantial relation, — that so total a destruction was become their lot. But no sooner were they convinced of its \*reality, than their resentments burst forth against those of the orators who had advised and recommended the expedition, as if their own suffrages had never concurred to its execution. They farther vented their gall against those retailers of oracles and foretellers of future events, against all in general, who, pretending privacy

\* *Plutarch*, from report, tells an odd story on this occasion.—“ A stranger, who  
“ (it seems) had come ashore at the Piræus, and had set him down in a bar-  
“ ber’s shop, began to talk about the overthrow in Sicily, as of a point we’ll  
“ known at Athens. The barber, hearing it before any other person had the  
“ news, ran with all speed up into the city; and, having first informed the  
“ magistrates of it, spread the report in an instant all over the forum. Consterna-  
“ tion and tumult at once ensued. The magistrates convened an assembly of the  
“ people, and produced the barber before them. He was called upon to tell from  
“ whom he had the news; and, when he could not name the person, being looked  
“ upon as an idle fellow and a disturber of the public peace, he was immediately  
“ tied upon the wheel, and a long time whirled round upon it, till several per-  
“ sons arrived who gave a minute and circumstantial account of the whole.”  
*Life of Nicias.*



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to the will of heaven, had elevated their hopes with the  
certain conquest of Sicily. On all sides now all manner  
of disasters environed them about; and never had A-  
thens been thrown into so great a consternation and de-  
jection as at the present juncture: For now, beside  
what each private family suffered, as the *public* at the  
same time had lost the bulk of its heavy-armed and  
horsemen, and that flower of its youth which they saw it  
impossible to replace, they were sorely dejected. Con-  
scious, farther, that they had not shipping sufficient in  
their docks for a fresh equipment, nor money in the  
public treasury, nor even hands to man what vessels  
they had left, they gave up all hope of deliverance in  
the present plunge. Their enemies from Sicily, they i-  
maged, would soon enter the Piræus with a powerful  
navy, especially as they were flushed with such a career  
of success; and their enemies nearer home would  
now, for a certainty, redouble their preparations, and  
with the utmost resolution fall upon them at once both  
by sea and land, and be farther strengthened by the re-  
volt of their own temporising confederates. At last,  
however, they agreed it was their duty to do what might  
yet be done; not basely to abandon their own preser-  
vation, but to fit out a navy, by collecting from all  
possible resources both timber and money;—and timely  
to secure their own dependent *States*, above all Eubœa;  
— and to reduce the expences of the civil administration  
with all possible œconomy; — and to lodge the sove-  
reignty in the hands of a select body of old experienced  
statesmen, whose maturer counsels might, if possible, yet  
extricate the *State* from its present misfortunes. Such  
an effect had the general consternation now upon them,  
an effect not unusual with a *people*, that they became  
heartily disposed to order their government aright.  
And, as to such resolutions they came, they proceeded,  
farther, to put them in execution: And the summer  
ended.

In

## B.VIII. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 283

In the beginning of the ensuing winter, animated by the terrible blow the Athenians had received in Sicily, the whole body of Greece was alert against them. Even such as had hitherto observed a strict neutrality, without so much as waiting for a formal invitation to accede, thought it incumbent upon themselves no longer to be absent from the war, but voluntarily to enter the lists against the Athenians. Not a *State* but reasoned thus,—that “themselves also these Athenians, had they succeeded in Sicily, would undoubtedly have attacked ;” and then concluded, — that, “as the war for certainty was very nearly finished, it would be glorious for them to have a hand in its completion.” But the old confederates of the Lacedæmonians, as their desires were greater, so they exerted themselves now with higher alacrity than ever to procure a speedy relaxation of their heavy burdens. Yet, in a most remarkable manner, such *States* as were dependent upon Athens manifested their readiness to revolt, even beyond the bounds of caution ; since now they formed their judgments in all the warmth of indignation, and could discern no probable method by which the Athenians could retard their ruin for another summer.

All these circumstances coinciding, the Lacedæmonian state became prodigiously alert ; and, above all, with the expectation, that their confederates of Sicily, with a powerful reinforcement, as their navies must now of necessity act in concert, would be with them, in all probability, very early in the spring. In every view their hopes were gallant and elate. They determined to go on with the war without any delay ; concluding that, if once brought well to a conclusion, they should ever for the future be released from such dangers as had lately threatened from Athens, in case Sicily had been reduced ; and, should they now demolish their competitors, must remain for the future supreme leaders of Greece, without fear of a reverse.

Instantly,

Instantly, therefore, Agis their king, though in the depth of winter, sallying forth with a body of troops from Decelæa, marched round the confederacy, levying sums of money for the service of the marine. Turning his route to the Melian gulf, he took a large booty from the Cætæans, against whom their enmity had been of long duration, which he converted into money. He also compelled those Achæans who were seated in the Pthiotis, and other *States* in this quarter dependent on Thessaly, spite of all the complaints and murmurs of the Thessalians, to give him some hostages for their good behaviour, and to furnish him with money. He disposed of these hostages into safe custody at Corinth, and spared no pains to get them over into the alliance.

The Lacedæmonians, farther, circulated an order among the *States*, for the building of one hundred sail of ships. They taxed themselves and the Bœotians to furnish, respectively, twenty-five; the Phocians and Locrians fifteen; the Corinthians fifteen; the Arcadians, and Pellenians, and Sicyonians, ten; the Megaréans, and Trœzenians, and Epidaurians, and Hermionians, ten. They went to work with all other needful preparations, that they might prosecute the war briskly upon the first approach of spring.

The Athenians, on the other hand, were not remiss in preparing for their own defence; since, in pursuance of the plan they had formed, they were busy during all the winter in building of ships, having collected proper quantities of timber; and in fortifying Sunium, that the navigation of their victuallers round that cape might be preserved from molestation. They also evacuated the fortrefs in Laconia which they had raised in the voyage to Sicily; and in all respects, where they judged themselves involved in any less needful expence, they contracted their disbursements with the utmost frugality. But their principal care was keeping a close eye upon their dependents, that they might not revolt.

Amidst

## B.VIII. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 285

Amidst these employments of both parties, which were nothing less than most earnest preparations on all sides, as if war was just in its commencement, the Eubœans took the lead, and sent ambassadors this winter to treat with Agis about a revolt from the Athenians. Agis accepted what terms they proposed; and sends for Alcámenes, the son of Sthenelaïdas, and Melanthus, from Lacedæmon, to pass over as commanders into Eubœa. Accordingly they arrived, with a body of \*citizens newly enfranchised, to the number of about three hundred; and Agis was preparing for their transportation. But in this interval the Lesbians arrived, with declarations of their readiness to revolt; and, as they were seconded by the recommendations of the Bœotians, Agis is persuaded to put off for a time the affair of Eubœa, and began to expedite the revolt of the Lesbians, having assigned them Alcámenes for their governor, who was to have passed over to Eubœa. The Bœotians promised to send them ten ships, and Agis ten. These points were transacted without the privity of the Lacedæmonian *State*: For Agis, so long as he continued at Decelæa, having under his command the army of the *State*, was invested with a power of sending detachments whithersoever he thought proper, and to levy men and money at his own discretion; and it may with truth be affirmed, that the confederates, during this period, paid a much greater deference to him than to the *State* of Lacedæmon; for, having a powerful force under his own orders, he was formidable in his every motion. And thus he arbitrarily settled the negotiation of the Lesbians.

But then the Chians and the Erythræans, who were also desirous to revolt, addressed themselves, not to Agis, but at Lacedæmon. In their company also went thither an ambassador from Tissaphernes, who was lieutenant for Darius, the son of Artaxerxes, in the mari-

\* Neodamodes.

time provinces of Asia. Even Tissaphernes concerned himself now to inflame the Peloponnesian ardour, and promised them large supplies. For lately he had been summoned by *the king* to make returns of the revenue of his government; which not being able to exact from the Grecian cities, because of the Athenians, he was run into a large arrear. He concluded, therefore, that, could he demolish the Athenians, he then with great ease might levy the tributes; what is more, might make the Lacedæmonians confederates to *the king*; and might at length convey to him, either alive or dead, Amorges, the bastard-son of Pissuthnes, who had revolted in Caria, as the king had expressly commanded. The Chians, therefore, and Tissaphernes, were now negotiating this point in concert.

Calligitus, the son of Laophon, a Megaræan, and Timagoras, the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both exiles from their native places, and refuged with Pharnabazus, the son of Pharnabacus, arrive at Lacedæmon about the same point of time, commissioned by Pharnabazus to procure an aid of shipping for the Hellespont, by which he might be enabled (the very same thing as Tissaphernes desired) to work the revolt of the cities within his district from the Athenian obedience, because of the tributes, and expeditiously to gain for himself the credit of having procured for his master the alliance of the Lacedæmonians. As the agents of Pharnabazus and those also of Tissaphernes were negotiating the same point, though apart from each other, a great debate arose among the statesmen at Lacedæmon; one party insisting, with vehemence, that an aid of shipping and a land force should be sent to Ionia and Chios; another party, that they should be sent first to Hellespont. The Lacedæmonians, however, complied by far the soonest with the demands of the Chians and Tissaphernes. Alcibiades, indeed, espoused the cause of the latter, from an extraordinary zeal to mark hereditary friendship to Endius, who at this juncture presided in the college of *Ephori*.  
On

## B. VIII. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 287

On this account it was, that the family of Alcibiades, in compliment to this friendship, had taken a Lacedæmonian name; for this Endius was the son of an Alcibiades. Yet, previously, the Lacedæmonians dispatched Phrynus, a person born and educated in those parts, to Chios, to inspect the state of affairs there, and report, whether they had so large a number of shipping as they pretended, and their situation in other respects equalized the fine account they had given of it. Accordingly, when Phrynus had reported, "that all the accounts they had heard were true," the Chians and Erythræans were instantly admitted allies. They voted, farther, to send them forty sail of shipping, as there were already assembled at Chios not fewer than sixty from places which the Chians named. Ten of these they designed to dispatch, as soon as possible, under the command of Melanchridas, who was appointed admiral. But afterwards, the shock of an earthquake being felt, instead of Melanchridas they sent Chalcideus; and, instead of ten, equipped in Laconia only five, ships for this service.

Here the winter ended; and the nineteenth year of this war came also to an end, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history.

## Y E A R XX. †

S U M M E R now coming on, as the Chians were most earnestly soliciting the dispatch of the ships, and also afraid lest the Athenians should get notice of their transactions,—for the whole of the negotiation had been carried on without the knowledge of the latter, — the Lacedæmonians send to Corinth three citizens of Sparta, to prevail with that *State* for the transportation of their ships with all possible expedition across the isthmus,

† Before Christ 412.

from the other sea into that which lies towards Athens, that all in a body might stand away for Chios; as well those which Agis had destined for the service of Lesbos<sup>1</sup> as the rest. The whole number of shipping belonging to the alliance, now assembled together there, amounted to thirty-nine.

But Calligitus, truly, and Timagoras refused, in the name of Pharnabazus, to have any participation in the expedition to Chios; nor would part with the money they had brought with them, which was \* five and twenty talents, to disburse this equipment. They intended to get another fitted out, which should sail away under their own orders.

As for Agis, when now he perceived that the Lacedæmonians were determined to go *first* to Chios, he no longer suffered his own projects to clash with those of the *State*; but the confederates now assembling at Corinth proceeded to draw up a plan of operations. It was accordingly agreed, that they should go first to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who fitted out the five ships in Laconia; from thence to Lesbos, under the command of Alcámenes, whom Agis had destined for that service; in the last place they should proceed to Hellespont, and in this service it was agreed beforehand, that Clearchus, the son of Ramphias, should take upon him the command. But the first step should be the transportation of a moiety of their shipping across the isthmus, which were immediately to stand out to sea, that the attention of the Athenians might be less engaged upon such as were already in their course than on those which were to follow; for now they determined to cross the sea in an open insulting manner, as they contemned the present impotence of the Athenians, because they had no considerable force any where at sea.

When these resolutions were formally completed, they immediately transported one and twenty ships.

\* 4843*l.* 15*s.* *Sterling.*

Expeditious sailing was earnestly solicited; but the Corinthians declared a reluctance to go the voyage till they had celebrated the Isthmian games, which were at hand. To remove this obstacle, Agis declared himself ready to have the whole procedure charged to his own account, that they might be cleared from a breach of the Isthmian cessation. The Corinthians not complying with this proposal, and delay necessarily resulting from it, the Athenians gained by this an earlier discovery of the negotiation of the Chians; and, dispatching Aristocrates, one of their generals, charged them openly with the guilt of such a procedure. The Chians as strenuously denying the charge, they commanded them to send away their shipping forthwith to Athens by way of pledge for their safety.

The Chians accordingly sent seven. But the detachment of these was intirely owing to the *popular* party of that island, who had been kept in utter ignorance of the late negotiation. The *few*, who were privy to it, had no mind to incur the popular resentment before they were enabled to stem its fury; especially as now they had resigned all hope of the arrival of the Peloponnesians, whose motions were exceeding dilatory.

In the mean time the Isthmian games were solemnized; and at these the Athenians, who had the regular invitation sent them, assisted in form. The practices of the Chians became here more apparent to them than ever. No sooner, therefore, were they returned to Athens, than they put all the needful expedients in readiness, to prevent the squadron, which was to sail from Cenchreæ, from passing undiscovered.

When the festival was over, the latter, with one and twenty sail, under the command of Alcarnenes, stood out to sea in order for Chios. And the Athenians, advancing against them, at first with an equal number of ships, stood off again into open sea; but, when the Peloponnesians would not follow them far, but stood in to the land, the Athenians disappeared; for, having



amongst their number the seven ships of the Chians, they thought it not safe to trust them. But, having afterwards manned out others, to the amount of thirty-seven, they drive the enemy along the coast into Piræus of the Corinthians: This is a desert harbour, and the last upon the confines of Epidauria. One ship, indeed, which the enemy came up with at sea, the Peloponnesians lost; but all the rest they draw together to a station within the harbour. Here the Athenians attacked them, on the water with their ships, and by land with a party sent purposely on-shore. The attack was attended with great confusion, and carried on in a disorderly manner. The party of the Athenians, which attacked from the land, disable the bulk of the squadron, and kill the commander, Alcámenes; some also of their own people perished in the action. But, when the dispute was ended, they posted a sufficient number of their ships to lie facing those of the enemy; and with the remainder anchor near a little isle, on which, as it lay at a small distance, they form an incampment, and send away to Athens for a reinforcement.

In favour of the Peloponnesians came up, on the day following, not only the Corinthians, but soon after a number also of others, from the adjacent country, in aid of the squadron; who, perceiving that the preservation of it would be a work of laborious toil on so desert a coast, were sadly perplexed. Some argued vehemently for setting the ships on fire; but at length it was concluded to draw them ashore, and, incamping with their land-forces round them, to guard them from the enemy till some convenient opportunity should offer of getting them away. Agis, also, when informed of their situation, sent to them Thermo, a citizen of Sparta.

To the Lacedæmonians the first advice that had been sent was this,—that “the squadron had set sail from the isthmus;” for orders had been given Alcámenes by the *Ephori*, that, when this point was executed, he should

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should dispatch a horseman to them. And immediately then they had determined to dispatch away the commander Chalcideus, accompanied by Alcibiades, with the five ships of their own equipment; but, at the instant they were ready to move off, the news arrived,—that “the squadron had been drove into Piræus.” Dejected by this unexpected event, because they had stumbled in the very first entrance on an Ionian war, they no longer persisted in the design of sending away their own ships, but even thought of recalling some of those which were already at sea. But, as this was discovered by Alcibiades, he again persuades Endius, and the other *Ephori*, by no means intirely to give up the expedition; assuring them, that “by a timely dispatch they  
“ yet might make that island, before any information  
“ of the disaster which had befallen the squadron  
“ could reach the Chians; and of himself, were he  
“ once in Ionia, he could easily effectuate the revolt  
“ of the cities, by opening their eyes in respect to the  
“ weakness of the Athenians and the hearty and vigorous interposition of the Lacedæmonians, since on  
“ these topics he should be heard with greater deference  
“ than any other person whatever.” \* He also privately encouraged Endius with the prospect of “great glory to  
“ himself, if through him Ionia could be brought to  
“ revolt, and the *king* be made confederate to Lacedæmon, whilst Agis had no hand in these masterly  
“ strokes of policy;” for he happened now to be at  
“ variance with Agis. By such insinuations Alcibiades  
U 2 prevailed

\* No reasons are here assigned for the variance between Alcibiades and Agis. Numbers of probable ones might occur from the different tempers and manners of the persons; but we learn, from *Plutarch*, that Alcibiades had been intriguing with Timæa, the wife of Agis, and had had a son by her, who was called Leotychides, disowned afterwards by Agis and incapacitated from succeeding to the throne. Alcibiades was always dissolute; and yet this (it seems) was merely to gratify his pride, since he declared his intention in this intrigue to have been that his descendants might reign at Sparta. This fine gentleman from Athens was exceeding agreeable in the eyes of her Spartan majesty; even though his deportment at Sparta was such as if he had

prevailed upon the *Ephori* and Endius, and sailed away with the five ships, in company with Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian; and the voyage they performed with all possible expedition.

About the same time, the sixteen ships, which had been at the war of Sicily under the orders of Gylippus, regained in safety the Peloponnesian ports. They had been intercepted near Leucadia, and terribly harrassed by twenty-seven sail of Athenians, commanded by Hippocles, the son of Menippus, who was stationed there to watch the return of the fleet from Sicily. Yet only a single ship was lost. The rest, escaping the Athenian chase, arrived safe in the harbour of Corinth.

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who were now upon their voyage, stopped and detained whatever they met, that their course might not be divulged: And, touching first at Corycus on the main, and there setting at liberty such as they had detained, and gaining a conference with some of the Chians who were privy to their designs, by whom being advised to make directly for the harbour of Chios, without any formal notification, they arrive there, entirely unexpected by the Chians. By this, the *many* were thrown at once into astonishment and terror; but the *few* had so conducted matters, that the *council* was that moment sitting; in which Chalcideus and Alcibiades being admitted to speech it — that “many other ships are coming up,” — but, suppressing all mention of the squadron blocked up at Piræus, the Chians declare a revolt from the Athenians; and the Erythræans soon follow their example.

So far successful, they passed on with three ships to Clazomenæ, and cause that city also to revolt. Instantly upon this, the Clazomenians ‘crossed over into the continent, and fortified Polichne, to be a place of

had been trained from his birth in the severe discipline of Lycurgus. He was a thorough Spartan,—shaved close, plunged into cold water, could make a meal on dry bread, and feast on black broth. One would think, says *Plutarch*, he had never kept a cook in his life, never seen a perfumer, nor ever worn a Milesian robe, *Life of Alcibiades*.

safe

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safe resort for themselves, in case obliged to quit the little isle they occupied at present. All the revolvers, in short, were warmly employed in fortifying their towns, and making preparations for war.

At Athens soon the news arrives of the revolt of Chios. They were now convinced that horrid and apparent dangers already environed them about, and that the rest of their dependents would not long be quiet, when the most powerful *State* amongst them had thrown off the yoke. Now, therefore, the \* thousand talents, which through all the course of the war they had religiously refrained from touching, the penalties being discharged which the law inflicted upon him who should move, or whoever should vote it, amidst their present consternation, they decreed “ should be employed in  
“ the public service, and that a large number of ships  
“ should by this means be equipped ; — that, farther,  
“ from the squadron which blocked up Piræus eight  
“ ships should immediately be detached ;” which, accordingly, quitting the blockade, pursued the squadron under Chalcideus, but, being unable to come up with them, returned again. This detachment was commanded by Strombichides, the son of Diotimus — that  
“ soon after twelve others, under the orders of Thra-  
“ cycles, should repair to Chios, there also to be de-  
“ tached from the same blockade.” Having, moreover, fetched off the seven vessels belonging to the Chians, which assisted in forming the blockade at Piræus, they set at liberty the slaves who were on-board them, and threw all the freemen into prison. But, to replace the whole number detached from the blockade of the Peloponnesians, they lost no time in fitting out other vessels and sending them to that post. They had also a scheme for the expeditious equipment of thirty more. Great, indeed, was their ardour ; and nothing of small

\* 193750*l.* *Sterling.*

importance was taken in hand, as the point in agitation was no less than the recovery of Chios.

In the mean time, Strombichides, with the eight sail of ships, arrived at Samos; and, taking with him one Samian vessel, stood onwards to Teos, and required of them "to have no participation in the present commotions." From Chios, also, Chalcideus was now coming over to Teos, with a fleet of three and twenty sail; and the land-force of the Clazomenians, and also of the Erythræans, attending his motions, was marching thither by land: But Strombichides, having timely notice of their approach, put out again before their arrival. Standing out aloof into open sea, he had a view of this numerous fleet in their course from Chios; upon which he fled again to Samos. But the enemy followed in pursuit.

The Teians, who at first refused admittance to the land-forces, when now the Athenians plainly fled, thought proper to open their gates. Here the bulk of them were inactive for a time, attending the return of Chalcideus from the pursuit. But, when time wore on without his appearing, they demolished of their own accord the wall which the Athenians had built on the side of Teos facing the continent. In this they were also assisted by a small party of Barbarians, who in this interval had joined them, and were commanded by Tages, the deputy of Tissaphernes.

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides into Samos, having furnished the mariners of the Peloponnesian vessels with proper arms, leave them as a garrison in Chios. Having manned their vessels afresh at Chios, with an addition of twenty others, they stood away for Miletus, as meditating its revolt. This was owing to Alcibiades; who, having an interest in persons of the first rank among the Milesians, made it a point to effectuate their accession before the fleet should come up from Peloponnesus, and to secure the whole honour to the Chians and himself, and

Chalcideus

Chalcideus and Endius who had sent him, in pursuance of his engagements to work the revolt of the cities with the sole power of the Chians and with Chalcideus. Having therefore performed the greatest part of their voyage thither without being discovered, and prevented by a small portion of time Strombichides, and also Thra-sycles, who was lately come up from Athens with twelve ships, and in junction with the former followed after them, they cause Miletus to revolt. The Athenians, indeed, with nineteen sail, arrived upon their heels; but, as the Milesians denied them a reception, they took their station at Lade, an adjacent isle.

The first alliance between *the king* and the Lacedæmonians was made immediately after the revolt of Miletus, by Tiffaphernes and Chalcideus, as followeth.

“ ON these terms the Lacedæmonians and confederates make an alliance with *the king* and Tiffaphernes. —

“ Whatever region or cities the *king* possesseth, and the ancestors of the *king* possessed, be those the *king's*.

“ And, out of those cities, whatever sums of money or any other supply went to the Athenians, let the *king* and the Lacedæmonians and confederates jointly stop, that the Athenians may no longer receive those sums of money, nor any other such supply.

“ And the war against the Athenians let the *king* and the Lacedæmonians and confederates jointly carry on.

“ And be it unlawful to put an end to the war against the Athenians without the consent of both the contracting parties; of the *king* on one side, of the Lacedæmonians and confederates on the other.

“ If, farther, any revolt from the *king*, be they declared enemies to the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

“ And, if any revolt from the Lacedæmonians and  
 “ confederates, be they declared enemies, in the same  
 “ manner, to the *king*.”

This alliance was now formally concluded.

Immediately after this, the Chians, who had manned out ten additional ships, stood away to Anæa, being desirous to pick up some information of what was doing at Miletus, and at the same time to cause the revolt of the cities. Here, being reached by an order from Chalcideus to return back to Chios, with an intimation that Amorges with a land-army would soon be upon them, they sailed away to the temple of Jupiter. From hence they descry sixteen ships, which Diomedon was bringing up from Athens, from whence he had sailed somewhat later than Thrasycles. Upon this discovery they fled amain with a single ship to Ephesus, but with the rest of their fleet to Teos. Four indeed of the number, which their crews had abandoned, the Athenians take; yet all the hands escaped on shore; but the remainder reach in safety the city of the Teians. After this, the Athenians stood away into Samos. But the Chians, putting again to sea with the residue of their ships, and attended by a land-force, caused Lebedos to revolt, and also Eræ. And, these points carried, both the land-force and the squadron returned respectively to their own homes.

About the same time, the twenty sail of Peloponnesians, which had been chased into Piræus, and lay blocked up there by an equal number of Athenians, having made an unexpected sally upon the enemy, and got the better in a naval engagement, take four of the Athenian ships; and, sailing away for Cenchreæ, were again fitting out for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Alistyochus also came down thither from Lacedæmon as admiral, in whose hands the whole command at sea was now lodged.

When

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When the land-army had quitted Teos, Tiffaphernes in person came thither with a body, and, after completely demolishing those parts of the wall before Teos which were yet left standing, marched away.

Not long after his departure, Diomedon, arriving there with ten sail of Athenians, in order to gain a reception, made a truce with the Teians. From thence he coasted along to Eræ, and assaulted the place; but, not being able to take it, he sailed away.

Coinciding with this in point of time, an insurrection was made at Samos by the *people* against the *nobility*. The Athenians, who with three ships were then lying at Samos, assisted the former. On this occasion the Samian *people* massacred about two hundred persons, all of the *nobility*. Four hundred others they condemned to exile; and, having divided amongst themselves their lands and houses, and obtained from the Athenians a decree of being governed by their own constitutions, as men whose fidelity was no longer to be suspected, they assumed the whole civil administration, leaving no share of it in the hands of the *landed gentry*, and absolutely prohibiting to the *people* all alliance for the future with them, so as neither to give their daughters to them nor ever to marry theirs.

After these transactions, during the same summer, the Chians, proceeding with unabating ardour, left nothing undone to compass the revolt of the cities. Even without Peloponnesian aid they made them visits with their own single force; and, desirous at the same time to involve as large a number as possible in their own dangers, they undertake a voyage with thirteen sail of ships to Lesbos. This squared exactly with the Lacedæmonian plan; which was to make the second attempt upon that island, and from thence to proceed to Hellepont. The land-force, at the same time, of such Peloponnesians as were at hand, and their adjacent allies, attended their motions by the route of Clazomenæ and Cyme: These were commanded by Eualas, a Spartan; but



but the fleet was under the orders of Deixiadas, a native of those parts. And those ships, steering first towards and arriving at Methymne, cause its revolt.† \* \* \* \* \*

But Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian admiral in chief, putting to sea from Cenchreæ, where he had taken upon him the command, with four sail of shipping, arrives at Chios. And, the third day after his arrival there, twenty-five sail of Athenians, commanded by Leon and Diomedon, reached the isle of Lesbos; for Leon had been lately sent from Athens with a reinforcement of ten. On the very evening of that day, Astyochus put out again to sea, with the addition of one Chian ship, and stood away for Lesbos to give them all the assistance in his power. Accordingly he toucheth first at Pyrrha, proceeding from thence the day following to Ereffus, where information meets him that Mitylene had been taken by the Athenians at a shout; for the latter, as their arrival was intirely unexpected, standing boldly into the harbour, seized at once all the Chian vessels; and then landing, and gaining a victory over such as made head against them, became masters of the city. Astyochus, informed of this event by the Ereffians, and the Chian ships under the command of Eubulus from Methymne; — which, having been left in the harbour of that place, had fled at once when Mitylene was taken; three of them came up safe to Astyochus, but one had fallen into the hands of the Athenians; — Astyochus now desisted from proceeding to Mitylene. Having effectuated the revolt of Ereffus, and provided the inhabitants with arms, he ordered the soldiers from on-board his own squadron to march by land, under the command of Eteonicus, towards Antissa and Methymne; whilst himself, with his own ships and the three Chian, advanced along the shore towards

† From what follows it looks as if some words were wanting here. The Latin translators have endeavoured to supply it, thus: — “ And the Chians, leaving four ships here for the defence of the place, stood away with the rest to Mitylene, and caused it to revolt.”

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the same places. He hoped the Methymnéans, upon the sight of this succour, would resume their spirits and abide by their revolt. But, when every thing in Lesbos seemed to act in concert against his scheme, he took his landmen again on-board, and made the best of his way back again to Chios. The forces, farther, that had attended the motions of his squadron, and which were to have proceeded with him to Hellespont, were dismissed to their respective cities. After this, they were joined at Chios by six ships, which were sent thither by the confederate fleet of Peloponnesians assembled at Cenchreæ.

The Athenians in the mean time were employed in resettling the state of affairs in Lesbos. Standing across from thence, and demolishing Polichne, on the continent, lately fortified by the Clazomenians, they removed all the latter back again to their city in the isle, excepting such as were authors of the revolt; for these had retired to Daphnus. And thus Clazomenæ once more became subject to the Athenians.

The same summer, the Athenians, who with twenty ships had stationed themselves at Lade to awe Miletus, having made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, kill Chalcideus the Lacedæmonian, who with a handful of men endeavoured to repulse them. The third day after this action, they re-embarked; but first erected a trophy; which the Milesians thought proper to demolish, as not fixed on a spot which was the property of the victors.

Leon also and Diomedon, at the head of the Athenian fleet on the station of Lesbos, assembling together what force they could from the Oinussæ-islands, which lie before Chios, and from Sidusa and Pteleum, fortresses of their own in Erythræa, stood away from Lesbos in a body, and carried on the war by sea against the Chians. The land-soldiers on-board them were some of the heavy-armed of the public *roll* of Athens, now pressed into this service. At Cardamyle they landed;

and

and at Bolissus, having routed in battle a body of Chians that made head against them, and done great execution upon them, they reduced all the places in that quarter of the island. At Phanæ also they fought a second time with great success; and, a third time, at Leuconium. But as, after these repeated defeats, the Chians no longer shewed themselves in the field to oppose them, the victors made cruel ravage on that rich and fertile country; and which, from the invasion of the Medes to the present period of time, had been totally exempted from the miseries of war. For, next to the Lacedæmonians, the Chians are the only people who (as far as I have been able to observe) have enjoyed a series of public prosperity with a steady and uniform moderation, and, in proportion as their *State* increased in wealth and power, made suitable accessions to its domestic splendor and security. Nay, even their late revolt, if this should chance to be ascribed to a want of judicious and cautionary measures, they never ventured to declare, till they had fortified the hazardous step with numerous and gallant confederates, and saw plainly that the Athenians, (as even the Athenians themselves could not possibly deny,) after the blow received in Sicily, were plunged into the lowest depth of impotence and distress. If, therefore, they proved mistaken, it was one of those cases inseparable from the constant mutability of human affairs, where numbers were involved in the same mistake with themselves, who yet in their judgement were perfectly convinced that the entire ruin of Athens was fast approaching.

Now, therefore, blocked up as they were by sea, whilst their lands all around were ravaged by the enemy, a party amongst them were concerting the method of delivering up the city into the hands of the Athenians. But those in the administration, getting wind of their design, refrained indeed from making a bustle about it in public; but, fetching over Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian admiral in chief, with his four ships,  
from

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from Erythræ, they consulted how to prevent the execution of the plot by the mildest and most gentle methods, either by taking hostages for the fidelity of the suspected, or some other such cautionary expedients. In this posture stood affairs at Chios.

But, from Athens, in the close of the same summer, one thousand five hundred heavy-armed Athenians and a thousand Argives, (for, five hundred Argives, who were but light-armed, the Athenians had equipped in the manner more complete,) with the addition of a thousand confederates, in eight and forty sail of ships, including the transports of the heavy-armed, and put under the command of Phrynichus and Onomacles and Skironidas, sailed away to Samos, and, thence stretching over to Miletus, encamped themselves before it. The Milesians marched out into the field, to the amount of eight hundred heavy-armed, assisted by the Peloponnesians who came over with Chalcideus and a body of foreign mercenaries furnished by Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes also assisted them in person with an aid of cavalry: And thus battle was joined against the Athenians and confederates. The Argives, of whom a whole wing was composed, advanced before the rest of the line; and, contemning their enemy too much, as Ionians and unable to stand their shock, they charged in a disorderly manner, are routed by the Milesians, and no less a number than three hundred of their body are destroyed. But the Athenians beat first the Peloponnesians, and then cleared the field of the Barbarians and all the rabble of the enemy, yet came not at all to an engagement with the Milesians: For the latter, returning towards the city from the chace of the Argives, no sooner perceived that their own side was vanquished than they quitted the field of battle. The Athenians, therefore, as victors, posted themselves under the very walls of Miletus. It is observable, that, in this battle, the Ionians had on both sides the better of the Dorians; For the Athenians beat those Peloponnesians who were  
ranged

ranged against them; and the Milesians did the same by the Argives. But now, after erecting a trophy, as the town was seated on an isthmus, the Athenians were preparing to cut it off by a work of circumvallation; concluding that, "if they once could get possession of Miletus, they should easily complete the reduction of the other *States*."

It was now about the shut of evening, and advice is brought them that "five and fifty sail of ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily are only not at hand." For, from Sicily, where Hermocrates the Syracusan strenuously advised to go on with what yet remained in regard to the total demolition of the Athenians, twenty sail of Syracusans and two of Selinuntians came over. The Peloponnesian fleet, which had been fitting out, was now ready for service; and both these were sent out in conjunction, under the orders of Theramenes the Lacedæmonian, who was to carry them to Aftyochus the admiral in chief. They arrived first at Eleus, an island before Miletus. Being there informed that the Athenians lay before Miletus, they departed thence; and, steering first into the gulf of Iæsus, were desirous to pick up information how things went at Miletus. Alcibiades had now rode to Teichiussa in the Milesian; in which quarter of the gulph the fleets had come to anchor for the night, and receive there a full account of the battle. Alcibiades had been present at it, and had given his assistance to the Milesians and Tissaphernes. He therefore earnestly pressed them, "unless they were desirous to see all Ionia lost, and all their great expectations blasted at once, to repair with all possible expedition to the succour of Miletus, and by no means to suffer it to be invested by a circumvallation." In pursuance of this it was resolved, that at the first dawn of day they would stand away to its succour.

But Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, when advised from Lerus of the certain arrival of this united fleet,

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fleet, even though his colleagues declared openly for keeping their ground and hazarding an engagement by sea, protested boldly, that “ such a step, for his own  
 “ part, he could not take; and, were he able to hinder it, that neither they nor any one should force  
 “ him to it: For, since it would be afterwards in their  
 “ power, when they had got better intelligence of the  
 “ numbers of the enemy, and made what possible acc-  
 “ cessions they could to their own, and when they had  
 “ prepared for action in an ample and leisurely man-  
 “ ner, — since it would be still in their power to fight,  
 “ the dread of a shameful or reproachful imputation  
 “ should not bend him to risk an engagement against  
 “ his judgement. It could be no matter of reproach  
 “ to the Athenians to retire with their fleet when the  
 “ exigences of time required it; but, in every respect,  
 “ it would be highly reproachful to them should they  
 “ fight and be vanquished. He would not, therefore,  
 “ involve the *State*, not only in reproach, but in the  
 “ greatest of dangers; — the *State* which, but just now  
 “ respiring from the terrible blows it had received,  
 “ scarce thought it prudential with most ample prepa-  
 “ ration to choose voluntary hazards, or even, when  
 “ the last necessity demanded, to strike first at the ene-  
 “ my, — why now, when no necessity compelled, must  
 “ it be thrown into wilful spontaneous dangers?” He  
 exhorted them, therefore, “ without loss of time to  
 “ carry the wounded on-board, to re-embark their  
 “ troops, and, securing what baggage they had brought  
 “ along with them, to leave behind what booty they  
 “ had got from the enemy, that their ships might not  
 “ be too deeply laden, and make the best of their way  
 “ to Samos; and from thence, after collecting together  
 “ what additional force they could, to watch for and  
 “ seize the seasons of advantage to attack their foes.”

The advice of Phrynicius, thus given, was prevailing, and accordingly was put in execution. He was regarded, not only on the present but on future occasions,

not

not only for this, but all the subsequent instances of his conduct, as a man of an excellent understanding.

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, so soon as the evening was closed, made the best of their way to Miletus, and left the victory imperfect. And the Argives, without making the least stay, chagrined as they were at their late defeat, departed immediately from Samos to return to Argos.

The Peloponnesians, early the next dawn, weighing from Teichiussa, stand into Miletus. After one day's stay in that harbour, on the next, having augmented their Squadron with the Chian ships which had formerly been chased in company with Chalcideus, they determined to go back again to Teichiussa to fetch off what stores they had landed there. Accordingly, when they were thus returned, Tissaphernes, being come up with his land-army, persuades them to stand directly against Iäsus, in which his enemy Amorges at that instant lay. Thus, falling on Iäsus by surprise, the inhabitants of which expected none but an Athenian Squadron, they become masters of it. In this action the Syracusans were the persons who gained the greatest honour. Amorges, farther, the bastard-son of Pissuthnes, who was a revolter from *the king*, was taken prisoner by the Peloponnesians. They delivered him up to Tissaphernes, that if he pleased he might send him to *the king*, in obedience to his orders. Iäsus, farther, they put to the sack; and the army made on this occasion a very large booty, for this city had ever been remarkable for its wealth. They gave quarter to the auxiliaries in the service of Amorges; and, without committing the least insult upon them, took them into their own troops, as the bulk of them were Peloponnesians. They delivered up the town into the hands of Tissaphernes, as likewise all the prisoners, whether slaves or freemen, upon covenant to receive from him a \* Daric stater for each.

\* 1*l.* 121. 3*d.* 1.

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This being done, they again repaired to Miletus ; and from hence they detach Pædaritus, the son of Leon, whom the Lacedæmonians had sent expressly to be governor of Chios, to march over land to Erythræ, having under his command the auxiliaries who had served under Amorges ; and appoint Philippus to command at Miletus. And the summer ended.

The winter now succeeding, after Tissaphernes had garrisoned and provided for the security of Iâsus, he repaired to Miletus, and distributed a month's subsistence, in pursuance of his engagements at Lacedæmon, to all the ships, at the rate of an \*Attic drachma to each mariner by the day ; but for the remainder of time he declared he would only pay at the rate of ‡three oboli, till he had consulted the *king's* pleasure ; and, in case his master's orders were for it, he said, he would make it up a complete *drachma*. But, as Hermocrates, the Syracusan commander, remonstrated sharply against this usage, (for Theramenes, not regarding himself as admiral, since he was now at the head of the fleet merely to carry it up to Astyochus, was very indolent about the article of pay,) it was at length compromised, that excepting the five supernumerary ships, the crews of the rest should receive more than three *oboli* a man : For to the five and fifty ships he paid † three talents a month ;

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and,

\* 7d.  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

‡ Half a drachma.

† There is manifestly a fault here ; for *τρία*, *three*, in the original, should be read *τριάκοντα*, *thirty*, talents a month. Mr. Hobbes hath taken the pains to compute, and finds that the Peloponnesian ships carried eighteen men apiece. What ? only so small a crew as eighteen men for a ship of war with three banks of oars ? or, where the complement was perhaps two hundred, did Tissaphernes only pay a tenth part of that number ? *Xenophon*, in the first book of his *Greek history*, enables us to set all to rights. Lysander is negotiating with Cyrus for an increase of pay. Cyrus insists upon the former agreement, made by Tissaphernes, that every ship should receive but thirty *miræ* a month. The daily pay of each was of course one *mina*, or one hundred *drachmas* : Whence it appears, that, at three *oboli*, or half a *drachma*, a man, the pay of sixty ships, each carrying two hundred men, would be just thirty *talents*. Thirty *talents*, therefore, paid to fifty-five ships for a month, was two *talents* and a half above



and, for the rest, as many as exceeded that number, pay was to be furnished at the rate of only three *oboli* a day.

The same winter, the Athenians now lying at Samos had been reinforced by the arrival of five and thirty sail from Athens, under the command of Charminus, and Strombichides, and Euctemon; and they had farther assembled all their ships from Chios, and others. A resolution was therefore taken, after assigning each his peculiar command by lot, to make up against it with a naval force, and awe Miletus; but to send against Chios both a naval and a land force; and this accordingly they put in execution. For, in fact, Strombichides, and Onomacles, and Euctemon, with a squadron of thirty sail and a body of transports, which had on-board a detachment from the thousand heavy-armed which came against Miletus, stood away for Chios, as this service had fallen to them by lot; but the rest of the commanders who now remained at Samos, having under them seventy-four ships, were quite lords of the sea, and sailed boldly up to awe Miletus.

Altyochus, who happened at this juncture to be in Chios, selecting hostages as a prevention against treachery, thought proper for the present to desist, when he heard of the arrival of the squadron under Theramenes, and that their engagements with Tissaphernes were

above three *oboli* a day. And hence it seems pretty clear, that the complement of a Peloponnesian ship of war was two hundred men.

I have another proof at hand, which will confirm what hath already been said, and serve at the same time to ascertain the number of men on-board a ship of war. In the sixth book Thucydides says, the Egestæans brought to Athens sixty *talents*, as a month's pay for sixty ships. He says also, that in the Sicilian expedition the daily pay of the Athenian seamen was raised to a *drachma* a man. Now a *talent* a month, reckoning thirty days to the month, is two *minæ* a day; and two *minæ* are just two hundred *drachmas*. Hence, it is plain, the complement of an Athenian ship was two hundred men; and, according to the former computation, that of a Peloponnesian ship was, as might reasonably be expected, exactly the same. This is a farther confirmation that there is a mistake in the printed copies of the original, as was said above; where, instead of *three talents*, which amount but to 581*l.* 5*s.* *sterling*, should have been read *thirty talents*, amounting in English money to 5812*l.* 10*s.*

much

much altered for the better. But, taking with him ten sail of Peloponnesians and ten of Chians, he putteth to sea; and, having made an attempt upon Pteleum, though without success, he crossed over to Clazomenæ. He there summoned such of the inhabitants as were attached to the Athenians to remove with their effects up to Daphnus, and leave him in possession of the place; Tamus, farther, the sub-governor of Ionia, joined with him in the summons. But, when the inhabitants rejected this offer, he made an assault upon the city, which had no fortifications; yet, miscarrying in the attempt, he put off again to sea in a hard gale of wind, and reached, with those ships that kept up with him, to Phocæa and Cyme; but the rest of the squadron was by stress of weather forced over to the isles which lie near to Clazomenæ,—Marathusa, and Pele, and Dri-mussa; and, whatever effects belonging to the Clazomenians had by way of security been deposited there, during eight days continuance, which the stormy weather obliged them to stay; they partly plundered and partly destroyed; and, having secured their booty on-board, got away to Phocæa and Cyme, and joined Astyochus. But, whilst he was yet in this station, ambassadors reach him from the Lesbians, imparting to him their desires to revolt. Him, indeed, they persuade; but, when the Corinthians and the rest of the confederates declared their repugnance, because of the former miscarriage, he weighed from thence and made sail for Chios. And now, a storm dispersing his squadron, at last they all come in, though from different quarters to which they had been driven, and rejoin him at Chios.

The next step to this was the junction of Pædaritus; who, being now at Erythræ, after marching by land from Miletus, passed over in person with the troops under his command to Chios. He had also with him about five hundred soldiers, taken out of the five ships under Chalcideus, who had been left behind with their arms.

But now, the Lesbians notifying again their readiness to revolt, Aſtyochus, in a conference with Pædaritus and the Chians, “ maintains the neceſſity of going thither with a ſquadron to ſupport the revolt of Lesbos ; ſince, in conſequence of it, they muſt either enlarge the number of their confederates, or, even though miſcarrying in the deſign, muſt hurt the Athenians.” But they were deaf to this remonſtrance ; and Pædaritus poſitively declared that he ſhould not be attended by the ſhips of Chios. Upon this, taking with him five ſail of Corinthians, a ſixth ſhip belonging to Megara, and one more of Hermione, and all the Laconian which he himſelf brought thither, he ſtood away from thence to his ſtation at Miletus, uttering grievous threats againſt the Chians, that, “ how low ſoever they might be reduced, they ſhould never receive any ſuccour from him.” Accordingly, touching firſt at Corycus of Erythræ, he moored there for the night. The Athenians, who, from Samos, with a conſiderable ſtrength, were now bound againſt Chios, were lying at the ſame inſtant of time on the other ſide of the cape, but ſo ſtationed that neither party knew of the nearneſs of the other. At this juncture, a letter being delivered from Pædaritus, that “ a party of Erythræans, who had been priſoners at Samos and releaſed from thence, are coming to Erythræ to betray that place,” Aſtyochus puts out again immediately for Erythræ ; and thus narrowly, on this occaſion, did he eſcape falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pædaritus, farther, had made the paſſage upon this affair ; and both having joined in making all neceſſary enquiries about thoſe who were accuſed of this piece of treachery, when they found the whole to have been a plot of the priſoners at Samos merely to recover their liberty, they pronounced them innocent, and ſo departed ; the latter to Chios ; but the other, in purſuance of his firſt designation, made the beſt of his way to Miletus.

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In the mean time, the armament of the Athenians, having sailed round from Corycus to Arginum, falls in with three long vessels of the Chians, and no sooner had descried than they gave them chase. And now a violent storm ariseth, and the vessels of the Chians with great difficulty escape into harbour : But, of the Athenian squadron, three, which had most briskly followed the chase, are disabled and drive ashore at the city of the Chians : The crews of them were partly made prisoners, and partly put to the sword. The rest of the fleet got into a safe harbour, which is known by the name of Phœnicus, under the Mimas. From hence they afterwards took their course to Lesbos, and got all in readiness to raise fortifications.

From Peloponnesus, the same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedæmonian, putting out to sea, with ten sail of Thurians commanded by Doricus, the son of Diagoras, and two colleagues, with one ship of Laconia and one of Syracuse, arriveth at Cnidus. This place was now in revolt from Tissaphernes. Those at Miletus were no sooner advised of the arrival of this squadron, than they sent them orders, with one moiety of their ships to keep guard upon Cnidus, and with the other to post themselves at the Triopium, in order to take under their convoy the trading-vessels which were in their course from Egypt. The Triopium is a point in the territory of Cnidus, jutting out into the sea, and a temple of Apollo. But the Athenians, informed of their designs, and standing away from Samos, take six of the ships which were stationed at the Triopium : The crews, indeed, quit their ships, and reach the shore. This being done, the victors sailed directly to Cnidus ; and, making an assault upon that city which was quite unfortified, had very nearly taken it. On the next day they renewed the assault. Yet, as the inhabitants had taken care to make it more secure by favour of the night, and the men escaped from the vessels taken at Triopium had thrown themselves into the place, they

did less damage than on the preceding day. After scouring and laying waste the territory of Cnidus, they failed back to Samos.

About the same time, Aftyochus having rejoined the fleet at Miletus, the Peloponnesians were still abounding in all the needful expedients of war. Good pay was regularly advanced them, and the soldiers had store of money yet remaining of the rich booty they made at Iäsus. The Milesians, farther, sustained with alacrity the burden of the war. It was, however, the opinion of the Peloponnesians, that the first treaty made with Tissaphernes by Chalcideus was in some articles defective and less advantageous to themselves. Upon this they drew up and ratified a second in the presence of Theramenes. The articles of it are these :

“ STIPULATED, by the Lacedæmonians and  
 “ confederates, with king Darius and the sons of the  
 “ *king* and Tissaphernes, that peace and amity subsist  
 “ on the following conditions :

“ Whatever province or city soever belongeth to  
 “ king Darius, or did belong to his father or ancestors,  
 “ against them in a hostile manner not to march, and  
 “ no injury to do, are bound both Lacedæmonians and  
 “ confederates of the Lacedæmonians. Not to exact  
 “ tribute from any such places, are bound both Lacedæmonians and confederates of the Lacedæmonians.  
 “ Neither shall king Darius, nor any subject of the  
 “ *king*, march in a hostile manner against, nor do any  
 “ injury to the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

“ But, in case the Lacedæmonians or confederates  
 “ need any assistance whatever from the *king* ; or the  
 “ *king* from the Lacedæmonians and confederates ;  
 “ whatever either party can convince the other to be  
 “ right, let that be done.

“ Be the war against the Athenians and confederates  
 “ carried on by both parties in strict conjunction. And,  
 “ in

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“ in case an accommodation be taken in hand, be it  
“ settled by both parties acting in conjunction.

“ But, whatever army be brought into the territo-  
“ ries of the *king* at the request and summons of the  
“ *king*, the *king* to defray the expence.

“ And, if any of the *States*, comprehended in this  
“ league with the *king*, invade the territories of the  
“ *king*, the others to oppose and act with all their power  
“ in defence of the *king*.

“ And, if any province belonging to the *king*, or  
“ subject to his dominion, invade the territory of the  
“ Lacedæmonians or confederates; the *king* to oppose,  
“ and with all his power to defend the party invaded.”

When the finishing-hand was put to this treaty, Theramenes, after delivering up the fleet to Aftyochus, puts to sea in a fly-boat, and entirely disappears.

But the Athenians from Lesbos, having now made their passage and landed their forces in Chios, and being masters of the coast and sea, fortified Delphinium; a place remarkably strong by nature towards the land, abounding, farther, with harbours, and seated at no considerable distance from the city of the Chians. And now the Chians, dispirited by the many defeats they had already received, and, what is worse, far from being actuated by general unanimity, (but, on the contrary, Tydeus the Ionian and his adherents having been lately put to death by Pædaritus for *atticizing*, and the rest of the citizens obliged by necessity to submit to the *few*, each individual amongst them suspecting his neighbour,) — the Chians now remained quite inactive. Thus, for the reasons above-mentioned, they neither looked upon themselves, nor the auxiliaries under Pædaritus, as a match for the enemy. Yet, as their last resource, they send to Miletus, requesting Aftyochus to come over to their succour. But, as he was deaf to their intreaties, Pædaritus sends a letter to Lacedæmon about him, which accused him of injustice.

And to this situation were brought the Athenian affairs at Chios.

Their squadron also at Samos made several visits to the squadron of the enemy at Miletus ; but, as the latter refused to come out to engage them, they returned again to Samos, without committing any hostilities.

From Peloponnesus, in the same winter, twenty-seven sail of ships, equipped by the Lacedæmonians for Pharnabazus, at the instances of his agents, Calligitus the Megaræan and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out to sea, and made over to Ionia, about the solstice. Antisthenes the Spartan was on-board as admiral. With him the Lacedæmonians sent also eleven Spartans, to be a *council* to Astyochus ; in the number of whom was Lichas, the son of Arcefilaus. To these an order was given, that, “ when arrived at Miletus, they should “ in concert act in all respects as might be best for the “ service ; and this squadron, or one equal in strength, “ or larger or smaller, at their own discretion, should “ proceed to Hellepont for the service of Pharnabazus, “ and be sent away under the command of Clearchus “ the son of Ramphias, who accompanied them in the “ voyage ; and, in case it was judged expedient by the “ council of *eleven*, to dismiss Astyochus from the chief “ command, and substitute Antisthenes.” On account of the letters of Pædaritus, they began to suspect the former. This squadron, therefore, standing out to sea from Malea, arrived first at Melos ; and, falling in with ten sail of Athenians, they take and burn three of them, which their crews had abandoned. But, apprehensive that those Athenian ships which had escaped might advertise the fleet at Samos of their approach, as was actually the case, they stretched away for Crete ; and, for better security, keeping a good look-out, and taking more time, they made land first at Caunus of Asia. From thence, as being now beyond the reach of danger, they dispatch a messenger to the fleet at Miletus, to attend and bring them up.

But,

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But, about the same juncture of time, the Chians and Pædaritus, not bearing to acquiesce under the dilatory answers of Aftyochus, pressed him, by repeated messages, “ to come over with the whole of his force, “ and relieve them from the present blockade ; and by “ no means to look indolently about him, whilst the “ most important of the confederate *States* in Ionia was “ shut up by sea, and by land exposed to rapines.” For, the domestics of the Chians, — being many in number, nay, the largest that any one community except the Lacedæmonians kept, and accustomed, because of their multitude, to be punished with extraordinary severity for their misdemeanors, — no sooner judged that the Athenian forces, by throwing up works, had gained a sure footing in the island, than large numbers of them at once deserted to the enemy, and were afterwards the persons who, as perfectly well acquainted with the country, committed the heaviest depredations. The Chians, therefore, urged, that “ the last necessity “ called upon him, whilst yet there was hope or a possibility of success remaining, (the works round Delphinium yet incomplete, and a larger circle even still “ to be taken in and fortified for the security of the “ camp and the fleet,) to undertake their relief.” Upon this, Aftyochus, who, to verify his threats, had never before thought seriously about it, being now convinced that the whole confederate body was bent on their preservation, determined in person to go to their succour.

But, just at this crisis, advice is brought him from Caunus, that “ twenty-seven sail of ships and the assistant-council of Lacedæmonians are arrived.” Concluding, upon this, that every other point ought to be postponed to this large reinforcement, that his junction with it might be effected in order to invest them with the sovereignty of the sea, and that the Lacedæmonians who came to inspect his own conduct might securely finish their voyage ; throwing up immediately all concern for Chios, he sailed away for Caunus. But, having



ving landed in his passage at Cos Meropidis, the inhabitants of which had refuged themselves in the mountains, he rifled the city, which was quite unfortified, and had lately been tumbled into ruins by an earthquake, the greatest that had been felt there in the memory of us now living. By excursions, also, through all the country, he made prize of all he found, excepting seamen; for such he dismissed unhurt.

From Cos advancing by night to Cnidus, he is dissuaded by the Cnidians from landing his men; but, on the contrary, without loss of time to get out to sea, and make head against twenty sail of Athenians, which Charminus, one of the commanders from Samos, had under his orders, and with them was watching the approach of the twenty-seven sail coming up from Peloponnesus, which Aftyochus was now going to join. For they at Samos had received from Miletus advice of their coming, and Charminus was appointed to cruise for them about Cyme, and Chalce, and Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia; and by this time he knew, for a certainty, that they were lying at Caunus.

Aftyochus, therefore, without loss of time, stood away for Cyme, with a view to surprise the ships of the enemy at sea before they could get any advice of his approach. A heavy rain and thick cloudy weather occasioned the dispersion of his vessels in the dark, and sadly disordered him.

When morning broke, the fleet being widely separated and the left wing driven already within the view of the Athenians, the remainder yet driving in confusion about the island, Charminus and the Athenians launch out against them with all possible expedition, though with fewer than twenty sail, imagining this to be the squadron from Caunus whose approach they were to observe; and, proceeding instantly to action, they sunk three and disabled others. They had by far the better in the action, till the numerous remainder of hostile ships appeared, to their great consternation, and incompassed

compassed them round on all sides. Then, taking to open flight, they lost six of their ships; but with the remainder reach in safety the isle of Teuglussa, and from thence proceed to Halicarnassus.

This being done, the Peloponnesians, putting back to Cnidus, and the twenty-seven sail from Caunus completing here their junction with them, they put out again to sea in one body; and, after erecting a trophy at Cyme, returned again to their anchorings at Cnidus.

The Athenians, on the other hand, had no sooner been informed of the engagements of the squadrons, than with the whole of their fleet they put out from Samos, and made the best of their way to Cyme. And yet against the fleet at Cnidus they made no sallies, as neither did the enemy against them; but, after taking up the tackling of the vessels left at Cyme, and making an assault upon Lorima on the continent, they returned to Samos.

The whole united fleet of the Peloponnesians, now lying at Cnidus, was busy in refitting completely for service; and the Lacedæmonian council of *eleven* had a conference with Tissaphernes, who was now come to them, in which they notified to him their dislike of some things in past transactions; and, in regard to the future operations of war, debated in what manner they might be carried on for their\* joint benefit and convenience. But Lichas was the person who scrutinized most closely into the past, and expressed a dissatisfaction with both treaties; affirming, that “ even the last settled by The-  
 “ ramenes was far from being good; but that terrible  
 “ it would be, should the *king* now claim, upon that  
 “ pretext, the possession of that tract of country of which  
 “ either he or his ancestors had formerly been masters:  
 “ For thus he might be enabled once more to enslave  
 “ all the islands, and Thessaly, and Locri, quite as far  
 “ as Bœotia; whilst the Lacedæmonians, instead  
 “ of freeing, would be obliged to impose the Median  
 “ subjection

“ subjection on, the Grecians. He insisted, therefore, that a better treaty should be made, or at least the former should be instantly disannulled ; for on terms like the present they would scorn to take pay from *the king*.” Nettled at this, Tissaphernes went from them in a fit of choler, without bringing affairs to any kind of settlement.

The scheme now next in agitation was a voyage to Rhodes, which the most *powerful* persons there had by embassies solicited them to undertake. They were full of hopes to bring into their subjection an island by no means inconsiderable either for number of mariners or soldiers ; and at the same time judged themselves able, by their present alliances, to defray the expence of their fleet without requesting pay from Tissaphernes. Accordingly, this winter, with great dispatch, they put to sea from Cnidus ; and, arriving first at Camirus, on the Rhodian coast, with ninety-four ships, they struck a consternation into the *multitude*, who knew nothing of past transactions, and were the sooner tempted to abandon their dwellings as the city was not guarded by the least fortification. The Lacedæmonians, afterwards, summoning to a conference these, and the Rhodians also from two other cities, Lindus and Iëlysus, persuaded them to revolt from the Athenians. Rhodes accordingly went over to the Peloponnesians.

At the same juncture of time, the Athenians, who had discovered their design, put out with their fleet from Samos, earnestly bent on preventing the scheme. They were seen indeed out at sea by the enemy, but made their appearance a little too late. For the present, therefore, they put back to Chalce, and from thence to Samos ; and afterwards, making frequent trips from Chalce, and Cos, and Samos, they warred against Rhodes.

The Peloponnesians exacted from the Rhodians a sum amounting to about \* two and thirty talents ; and,

\* 6200*l.* *Sterling*.

having

having laid their ships aground, continued with them eighty days without subjecting them to any farther imposition.

During this interval of time, nay, extended farther back, before they undertook this enterprize against Rhodes, the following transaction happened :

Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus and the battle of Miletus, falling under the suspicion of the Peloponnesians, and through them a letter having been sent from Lacedæmon to Alistyochus to put him to death, — for he was an enemy to Agis, and his treachery in other respects was become notorious, — Alcibiades, I say, fearful of his life, withdraws himself first to Tissaphernes, and, in the next place, did all in his power to undermine what interest the Peloponnesians had in him. Grown at length his dictator in every affair, he abridged their pay ; that, instead of an Attic \* *drachma*, three *oboli* only should be given them, and that too with no punctuality. He advised Tissaphernes to remonstrate with them, that “ the Athenians, who through a long  
“ tract of time had gained experience in naval affairs,  
“ paid only three *oboli* to their seamen, — not so much  
“ through a principle of frugality, \* as to prevent their  
“ seamen from growing insolent through too much  
“ plenty ; some of them would otherwise render their  
“ bodies less fit for fatigue, by having wherewithal to  
“ purchase those pleasures by which weakness is occa-  
“ sioned ; and others would desert, and leave their ar-  
“ rears to balance their desertion.” He instructed him, farther, how, by seasonable gratuities to the commanders of ships and generals of the *States*, he might persuade them all to acquiesce in his proceedings, excepting the Syracusans ; for, amongst these, Hermocrates alone made loud remonstrances in behalf of the whole alliance. Nay, Alcibiades himself took upon him to give the denial to such *States* as petitioned for money ;

\* Six oboli, or 7d.  $\frac{1}{4}$  Sterling.

making answer himself, instead of Tissaphernes, that, for instance, "the Chians were void of all shame; who, though the most wealthy of the Grecians, and hitherto preserved by the auxiliary efforts of others, yet are ever requiring strangers to expose their lives and fortunes to keep them free." As for other *States*, he maintained "they acted basely, if, when subjected to vast expences before they revolted from the Athenians, they refused to lay out as much, nay, a great deal more, in their own defence." He was also dextrous at proving, that "Tissaphernes, since now he supported the war at his own private expence, was in the right to be frugal; but assuredly, when returns were made him from the *king*, he would make up the present abatement of pay, and do strict justice to every single *State*." He farther suggested to Tissaphernes, that "he should not be too much in a hurry to bring the war to a conclusion; or entertain the wish, either by bringing up the Phœnician fleet which he had provided, or by taking in to pay a larger number of Grecians, to turn the superiority at land and sea in favour of the Lacedæmonians. He ought rather to leave both parties pretty nearly balanced in strength; and so enable the *king*, when one of them became troublesome, to let the other party loose against them: Whereas, should the dominion in both elements be given exclusively to either, he would then be distressed for want of sufficient power to pull down the triumphant *State*; unless, at a prodigious expence, and through infinity of danger to himself, he should choose to enter the lists in person and war them down. The risks incurred by the other method were far more eligible, because attended with a smaller proportion of expence; and his master might lie by with perfect security, whilst he was wearing out the Grecians by their own reciprocal embroilments." He moreover hinted to him, that "the Athenians were the best suited of the

" two

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“ two to share the dominion with him ; because they  
“ were less desirous of power on the continent, and by  
“ their peculiar turn of politics and military conduct  
“ were better adapted for this purpose. They would  
“ be glad, at the same time, to subdue the maritime  
“ parts to their own yoke, and to that of the *king* all  
“ Grecians whatever who live upon the continent. The  
“ Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, came thither with  
“ the sole passion to set them free ; nor in common  
“ prudence could it be judged likely, that *men*, who  
“ were this moment employed to deliver Grecians from  
“ the yoke of Grecians, would in that case be stopped by  
“ any thing but a superior force from delivering them al-  
“ so from the yoke of barbarians.” He advised him,  
therefore, “ in the first place to wear out the strength  
“ of both ; and, after clipping as much as possible the  
“ wings of the Athenians, then instantly to drive the  
“ Peloponnesians from off his coasts.”

The larger part of this advice Tissaphernes determined to follow, so far at least as may be gathered from his actions : For, satisfied by this means with Alcibiades, as a person who on these points gave him sound advice, and resigning himself up to his guidance, he paid but sordidly their subsistence to the Peloponnesians, and would not suffer them to engage at sea. By the constant pretext that the Phœnician fleet was coming up, and then with so great a superiority of strength the war might be brought to a clear decision, he ruined all operations of war ; he suffered the vigour of their fleet, which in fact was strong and mighty, insensibly to moulder away, and disconcerted them so openly, in other respects, that his motives in doing it were no longer to be concealed.

Such was the advice which Alcibiades gave to Tissaphernes and the *king* when he had opportunities, and which he really thought to be the best in policy : But at the same time he had deep in his heart and in his study his own return to his country ; assured, within himself,



himself, that, if he preserved it from a total destruction, he might find a time to compass his own restoration: And nothing, he judged, could expedite his purpose more, than if it appeared to the world that Tissaphernes was his friend; which also was verified by fact.

For, when the Athenian troops at Samos perceived that he had so strong an interest with Tissaphernes, and Alcibiades had already paved the way by sending intimations beforehand to the men of influence and authority amongst them, how desirous he was “ they  
“ should patronize his return with the consent of the  
“ persons of the greatest honour and worth in their  
“ company; since only under an *oligarchy*, but not under an iniquitous *cabal* or that *democracy* which had  
“ formerly banished him, could he even desire it; —  
“ and, thus recalled, he would come and join his cares  
“ with theirs for the public welfare, and procure them  
“ farther the friendship of Tissaphernes;” — when, more than this, the officers of those Athenians at Samos, and the men of highest authority amongst them, were voluntarily inclined to put an end to the *democracy*; — the method of bringing it about began to be agitated first in the army, and from thence soon made a stir in Athens itself.

Some persons passed over from Samos, to concert matters with Alcibiades; who gave them room to hope that “ he could render first Tissaphernes, and in the  
“ next place the *king*, their friend, if they would dissolve the *democracy*; since, on this sole condition,  
“ could the *king* be assured of their sincerity.” This contributed to enhance their languine expectations, that on this their affairs might take a new turn, in which men of first rank in the community, who in the present management were most depressed, might recover the administration, and gain the ascendant over their enemies. Returning, therefore, to Samos, they took in the most proper persons there to be assistants to the scheme; and to the *many* made public declarations, that  
“ the

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“ the *king* might be made their friend, and supply them  
 “ with money, were Alcibiades recalled, and the *de-*  
 “ *mocracy* suspended.” The effect of these declarations  
 on the *many* was this, that, though for the present they  
 were chagrined at the scheme in agitation, yet, soothed  
 by the flattering hope of the royal subsidies, they re-  
 frained from all manner of tumult.

But the set which was caballing in favour of an *oli-*  
*garchy*, after such open declarations to the *multitude*, re-  
 considered the promises of Alcibiades amongst them-  
 selves, and with a larger number of their associates.  
 The scheme was judged by all the rest to be feasible  
 and sure; but Phrynichus, who was yet in the com-  
 mand, declared a total dislike of it. It appeared to  
 him (which was really the case) that “ Alcibiades  
 “ cared as little for an oligarchical as a democratical  
 “ government; and that no other thought lay seri-  
 “ ously at his heart than to throw the present govern-  
 “ ment into some state of confusion, which his friends  
 “ might so far improve as to carry his recallment. Of  
 “ consequence, the first point themselves should guard  
 “ against was, not to be thrown into seditions for the  
 “ benefit of the *king*. It was not probable, (he plainly  
 “ told them,) when the Peloponnesians had gained a  
 “ power by sea equal to their own, and were masters of  
 “ cities not the most inconsiderable amidst the *king*’s do-  
 “ minions, that the latter should turn the balance in  
 “ favour of the Athenians, in whom he hath no confi-  
 “ dence at all, whilst he might firmly depend upon the  
 “ friendship of Peloponnesians, who had never done  
 “ him any harm. As for confederate *States*, to whom  
 “ they were to give a certain pledge of future oligar-  
 “ chy by setting up that government amongst them-  
 “ selves, *he told them* he was well assured that on that  
 “ account neither such as had revolted would the sooner  
 “ return, nor such as were at present their own would  
 “ the longer continue in their duty; since the point on  
 “ which their wishes turned was, not to be enslaved by  
 VOL. II. Y “ an



“ an oligarchy rather than a democracy, but to recover  
 “ their liberty, indifferent equally to either form. As  
 “ for those of their fellow-citizens to whom was given  
 “ the appellation of *worthy and good*, even they would  
 “ perplex the train of government as much as the *people*,  
 “ when, by cajoling that people, and authoritatively  
 “ leading them into a series of bad measures, they would  
 “ principally regard their own private emoluments :  
 “ And, should they be subjected to the caprice of such,  
 “ to die by violence and without a trial must be, the ge-  
 “ neral fate ; whereas the *people* was a sure resource in  
 “ seasons of extremity, and ever tempered the fury of  
 “ the *great*. He was well convinced, the *States*, en-  
 “ lightened by a long tract of experience, judge of  
 “ their government in the same light. Upon the whole,  
 “ therefore, the negotiations of Alcibiades, and all at  
 “ present upon the carpet, could in no wise be approved  
 “ by him.”

The party, however, associated together in this design, abiding by their former determinations, resolved to proceed to their execution, and were preparing to send Pisander and others by way of deputation to Athens, to set on foot the negotiations concerning the return of Alcibiades, the dissolution of the *popular* government there, and the gaining over Tissaphernes to the Athenian friendship.

Phrynichus,—now convinced that the return of Alcibiades would be brought upon the carpet, and the Athenians assuredly grant it ; apprehensive, farther, that, from the opposition he had given it at their consultations, he should then be exposed to his resentments, as one who had endeavoured to stop it, — hath recourse to the following project : He sends to Astyochus, admiral in chief of the Lacedæmonians, who yet continued in the station of Miletus, a secret hint, by letter, that  
 “ Alcibiades is ruining their affairs, by endeavouring  
 “ to gain over Tissaphernes to the Athenians ;” and, after giving him a clear explanation of other matters,

he

he pleaded “ the candour of Aftyochus in his own excuse, if he desired in this manner to ruin his mortal foe, though with some prejudice to the welfare of his country.” But Aftyochus had given up all thoughts of putting Alcibiades to death, especially as now he never came within his reach; yet, on this occasion, making a visit to him and Tiffaphernes at Magnesia, he communicates to them the advices sent him from Samos, and becomes himself an informer. He is accused by report, not only on this but many other occasions, to have made court to Tiffaphernes for his own private lucre; and, for the same reason, when the pay was not fully rendered before, he suffered it much more pliantly than in duty he ought to have done. Alcibiades sends away immediate notice to the managing party at Samos, that the treachery of Phrynichus was detected by his own letter, and insists upon it that he be put to death. Phrynichus, terribly alarmed and pushed to the very brink of destruction by such a discovery, sends again to Aftyochus, blaming his indiscretion on the former occasion in not keeping his secret, and assuring him that “ now he was ready to deliver up to his fury the whole force of the Athenians at Samos,” (distinctly reciting to him the particulars by which, as Samos was unfortified, the whole scheme might be accomplished,) and that “ undoubtedly he ought not to be censured, if, when his unrelenting foes had reduced him to such extremity of danger, he chose to do this, or even more than this, rather than be destroyed by their rancour.” But this proposal also Aftyochus communicates to Alcibiades.

Phrynichus, perceiving in time that Aftyochus betrayed him, and that notice each moment was only not arrived from Alcibiades about the contents of his last, anticipated the discovery, and becomes himself informer to the army, that, “ the enemy had resolved, as Samos was unfortified and the whole of their fleet not securely stationed within the harbour, to endeavour

“ a surprise : Of this he had gained the most certain  
 “ informations ; and therefore Samos ought necessarily  
 “ to be put into a posture of defence with the utmost  
 “ expedition, and proper guards in every respect be  
 “ appointed.” He himself commanded, and consequently was impowered to see this put in execution. All hands were instantly at work on the fortification ; and Samos, though otherwise intended soon to be, was by this piece of artifice immediately, secured. And, no long time after, came letters from Alcibiades, importing that “ the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and  
 “ in pursuance of it the enemy was coming to surprise  
 “ them.” Their opinion of the good faith of Alcibiades was not in the least established by this : It was argued, that, as he was privy to the plans of the enemy, from a principle of enmity he had fastened upon Phrynichus the charge of being their accomplice. By the last notification, therefore, he was so far from hurting him, that he only confirmed his evidence.

Yet, subsequent to this, Alcibiades continued to make use of all his address and persuasion with Tisaphernes to gain him over to the Athenians, who in fact stood most in terror of the Peloponnesians, because they had a larger fleet at hand than the Athenians ; but was inwardly inclined, were it any how feasible, to comply with his suggestions ; especially as, ever since the jar at Cnidus about the treaty of Theramenes, he had been exasperated against the Peloponnesians : For that jar had already happened at the time of their expedition to Rhodes ; and the suggestion of Alcibiades, formerly mentioned, that “ the views of the Lacedæmonians  
 “ were to set the cities free,” was yet more verified by the behaviour of Lichas, who had affirmed, that “ it  
 “ was an article never to be suffered in treaty, that the  
 “ king should have those cities of which either himself  
 “ or his ancestors had at any time been possessed.” And in truth Alcibiades, as one who had important concerns

at

at stake, continued with much zeal and assiduity to ingratiate himself with Tisaphernes.

The Athenian deputies, with Pisander at their head, who were sent from Samos, had no sooner reached Athens than they obtained an audience from the *people*; where, after touching in a summary manner upon many other advantages, they expatiated chiefly on this, that, “ by recalling Alcibiades, and making an alteration in  
“ the democratical form of government, they might  
“ gain the friendship of the *king* and a superiority over  
“ the Peloponnesians.” Large was the number of those who would not hear the proposal against the *democracy*. The enemies, farther, of Alcibiades were loud in their clamours, that “ shameful it would be if so  
“ enormous a transgressor of the laws were recalled;  
“ one, to whose crimes, in point of the mysteries, the  
“ \* Eumolpidæ and Ceryces had borne solemn attestation, the consequence of which was his exile; nay,  
“ had, farther, denounced a curse upon those who  
“ should restore him.” Pisander, interposing to put a stop to this violent opposition and these tragical outcries, addressed himself apart to each of these opponents, and asked them singly, “ Whether any hope  
“ they had left of saving their country, now that the  
“ Peloponnesians had as many ships upon the sea as  
“ they had themselves, but a larger number of confederate *States*, besides supplies of money from the  
“ *king* and Tisaphernes, whilst themselves were quite  
“ exhausted, unless somebody could persuade the *king*  
“ to declare in their favour?” And when those, to whom the demand was put, replied in the negative, he

\* These were sacerdotal families at Athens, descended from Eumolpus and Ceryx. The former of them instituted the Eleusinian mysteries; and it was the grand privilege of his descendants to preside at and regulate those sacred rites. Who Ceryx was, and what the particular privileges of his descendants, any farther than that (according to Suidas) they were holy and venerable,” is not agreed. All of them were commanded to pronounce the solemn curse on Alcibiades when he was outlawed. Yet one priestess, (as *Plutarch* relates,) Theano, the daughter of Menon, refused to obey; alledging, that “ it was her duty to bless, and not to curse.”

proceeded to make them this plain declaration — “ And  
 “ yet this turn in your favour can never take place,  
 “ unless we temper our form of government with  
 “ greater moderation, and intrust the administration in  
 “ the hands of *the few*, that *the king* may have room  
 “ to place confidence in us : For we are at present to  
 “ consult about the very being of the *State*, and not to  
 “ litigate the forms of its administration. The sequel  
 “ may again enable us to return to the primitive form,  
 “ if we find it expedient ; and we shall recover Alci-  
 “ biades, the only man alive who is able to accomplish  
 “ the point.”

The people, in fact, upon the first mention of an *oligarchy*, were stung to the heart : Yet, afterwards, convinced by Pisander that no other resource was left, dispirited by fear, and encouraged at the same time by a distant hope that another change might in the sequel be brought about, they yielded up the point to the necessity of the *State*. Accordingly they passed a decree, that “ Pisander and the ten joined with him in the  
 “ deputation should pass the sea, and negotiate the af-  
 “ fair with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, in the method  
 “ judged by them most conducive to the public ser-  
 “ vice.” At the same time, as Pisander had preferred a charge of mal-administration against Phrynichus, they discharged him and his colleague Skirondas from their commands, and sent away Diomedon and Leon to take upon them the command of the fleet. The article, with which Pisander charged Phrynichus, was the betraying of Iäsus and Amorges. The truth is, he thought him by no means a proper person to be let into a share of their intrigues with Alcibiades.

And thus Pisander — after visiting in order all the several juntos of the accomplices, already formed in the city with the view to thrust themselves into the seats of judicature and the great offices of state ; and exhorting them severally to act with unanimity, and by general concurrence to labour the demolition of the *popular* government ;

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vernment; and, after adjusting all previous measures to guard the best against dilatory proceedings — repasseth the sea to Tissaphernes, accompanied by his ten associates in the deputation.

In the same winter, Leon and Diomedon, being arrived at their post, at the head of the Athenian fleet, made an expedition against Rhodes; and there they find the ships of the Peloponnesians hauled ashore. They made a descent upon the coast; and, after defeating in battle such of the Rhodians as made head against them, they stood away for Chalce, and for the future carried on the war more from thence than from Cos; for in that station they were better enabled to watch the motions of the Peloponnesian fleet.

But at Rhodes arrived Xenophantidas, a Lacedæmonian, dispatched by Pædaritus from Chios, with advice, that “the works of the Athenians were almost “perfected; and, unless with the whole of their shipping, they come over to relieve them, all is lost at “Chios.” A resolution accordingly was taken to endeavour their relief; but, in the mean time, Pædaritus, at the head of his body of auxiliaries and the Chians, with all the force he could assemble together, sallied out against the rampart which the Athenians had raised around their ships, demolished a part of it, and made himself master of those vessels which were hauled ashore. The Athenians ran from all quarters to their defence; and, having first engaged and put to flight the Chians, the rest of the forces under Pædaritus are also defeated. Pædaritus is killed, as were numbers also of the Chians, and many arms were taken. And, after this, the Chians were blocked up by sea and land more closely than ever, and a terrible famine raged amongst them.

The Athenian deputation, headed by Pisander, having reached Tissaphernes, enter into conference about terms of accommodation. Alcibiades now, — as the conduct of Tissaphernes was still dubious and wavering,

since he stood in great awe of the Peloponnesians, and adhered to that rule of policy he had learned from him, “to war both sides out,” — Alcibiades now had recourse to another piece of refinement, causing Tissaphernes to insist upon such exorbitant terms that no accommodation could ensue. Tissaphernes, truly, seems to me to have proceeded in this manner from his own voluntary motives, because fear was predominant in him: But in Alcibiades it was purely art; since, as he found the other would not agree upon any terms whatever, he affected to strike the conceit into the Athenians that it really was in his power to manage him at pleasure, and that he was already wrought to their purpose and willing to come to terms, whereas the Athenians would not offer enough. For Alcibiades himself made such extravagant demands, (since, though Tissaphernes assisted at the conference, the other managed it,) that, though the Athenians had yielded to the far greater part, yet the breaking off the treaty would be thrown at their doors. It was insisted, beside other demands, that “all Ionia should be given up;” and, what is more, “all the islands on the Ionian coast;” and other points. The Athenians seeming to acquiesce in these, at length, upon the third meeting, lest the smallness of his own influence should be plainly detected, he demanded leave “for *the king* to build a fleet, and to sail “along the Athenian coasts, wherever, and with whatever force, he pleased.” Here all accommodation was over: The Athenians, concluding these points insuperable, and that they were abused by Alcibiades, broke off in indignation, and return to Samos.

In the same winter, immediately after breaking off the conference, Tissaphernes repairs to Caunus, with intention to bring the Peloponnesians again to Miletus, and to form other compacts with them the best he should be able, to supply them farther with pay, and by all means to stave off an open rupture. He was in fact apprehensive, that, should so large a fleet be deprived of subsistence,  
or,

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or, necessitated to engage with the Athenians, should suffer a defeat, or should the mariners quit their vessels, the Athenians then would carry their point without thanks to him ; but his greatest fear was this, lest for the sake of subsistence they should ravage the continent. Upon all these considerations, and the prudential motives arising from each, co-operating with his principal maxim of balancing the Grecians against one another, he sent for the Peloponnesians, pays them their arrears of subsistence, and makes the following treaty, the third of the kind, with them :

“ I N the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippidas presiding in the college of *Ephori* at Lacedæmon, articles are signed, in the plain of Mæander, between the Lacedæmonians and confederates on one side ; and Tisaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnacus, on the other ; concerning the affairs of *the king* and those of the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

“ The whole of the *king's* dominions situate in Asia belongeth to the *king* ; and all his own dominions let the *king* govern as to him seemeth meet.

“ The Lacedæmonians and confederates are not to enter the dominions of the *king* to commit any act of hostility whatever : Nor let those of the contracting parties for any act of hostility whatever.

“ And, in case any of the Lacedæmonians or confederates enter in a hostile manner the dominions of the *king*, the Lacedæmonians and confederates are bound to restrain them : And, in case any subjects of the *king* act in a hostile manner against the Lacedæmonians and confederates, be the *king* also bound to restrain them.

“ Tisaphernes shall pay subsistence to the ships now upon the station, according to the rates agreed on, till the *king's* fleet come up.

“ But



“ But the Lacedæmonians and confederates, so soon  
 “ as the *king's* fleet shall be come up, shall have it in  
 “ their own option to maintain, if they please, their  
 “ own fleet; or, in case they choose to take subsist-  
 “ ence from Tissaphernes, he is bound to supply them.  
 “ Yet the Lacedæmonians and confederates, at the ex-  
 “ piration of the war, shall repay to Tissaphernes  
 “ whatever sums they may thus receive from him.

“ When the *king's* fleet cometh up, let the ships  
 “ of the Lacedæmonians, and those of the confede-  
 “ rates, and those of the *king*, carry on the war in con-  
 “ cert, by the joint counsels of Tissaphernes and of the  
 “ Lacedæmonians and confederates.

“ And, whenever a peace with the Athenians be  
 “ thought adviseable, it shall be concluded by the joint  
 “ consent of both parties.”

The treaty was made and ratified in these terms. And, after this, Tissaphernes employed himself with diligence to bring up the Phœnician fleet, as hath been mentioned, and duly to perform all the branches whatever of his engagements. At least he was willing to convince the Peloponnesians, by the measures he took, that he was heartily in earnest.

In the close of this winter the Bœotians got possession of Oropus by treachery, though an Athenian garrison was in it. The business was effectuated by the management of a party of Eretrians, and those Oropians who were plotting the revolt of Eubœa. For, as this town was situated over-against Eretria, it was impossible but, whilst in Athenian hands, it must terribly annoy both Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. Having therefore thus gained Oropus, the Eretrians repair to Rhodes, inviting the Peloponnesians to come over to Eubœa; but their inclinations were rather to relieve Chios, now sadly distressed. Putting therefore from Rhodes with the whole of their fleet, they stood away to sea; and, having gained the height of Triopium, they descry the  
 Athenian

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Athenian Squadron out at sea in a course from Chalce; yet, neither making any motion to bear down upon the other, one fleet pursued their course to Samos, the other put into Miletus. They were now convinced, that, without fighting at sea, they could not possibly relieve Chios.

Here this winter ended: And the twentieth year of this war expired, the history of which Thucydides hath compiled.

### Y E A R XXI. ‡

I N the ensuing summer, upon the first commencement of the spring, Dercylidas, a *Spartan*, at the head of an army not considerable for numbers, was sent overland to Hellepont to effectuate the revolt of Abydus: They are a colony of the Milesians. The Chians also, whilst Aftyochus was perplexed about the method of relieving them, were necessitated, by the intolerable closeness of the blockade, to hazard an engagement at sea. It happened, whilst Aftyochus was yet in Rhodes, that Leon, a *Spartan*, who came over with Anrilenes, though merely as a passenger, had arrived at Chios from Miletus, to act as governor after the death of Pædaritus, with twelve sail of shipping draughted from the Squadron stationed at Miletus: Of these, five were Thurian, four Syracusan, one belonged to Anæa, another was Milesian, and one was Leon's own. Upon this, the Chians having sallied out with all their force and carried a strong post from the enemy, and at the same time their fleet, consisting of six and thirty sail, launching forth against the thirty-two Athenian, an engagement followed; and, after a battle hotly maintained on both sides, the Chians and allies, who had not the worst of the dispute, sheered off again into harbour; for by this time it began to grow dark.

‡ Before Christ 411.

Instantly upon this, Dercylidas having completed his march from Miletus, Abydus in Hellespont revolts to Dercylidas and Pharnabazus; and two days after Lampfacus did the same.

But intelligence of this having reached Strombichides at Chios, and he, with four and twenty sail of Athenians, including the transports which carried the heavy-armed, stretching thither with all possible expedition, the Lampfacenes sallied out to repulse him. He defeated them in battle; and, having at a shout made himself master of Lampfacus, which was quite unfortified, he gave up all the effects and slaves for pillage to his men; and, after re-establishing such as were free in their old habitations, proceeded against Abydus. But, finding them deaf to all schemes of accommodation, and himself unable to reduce them by force, crossing over to the spot opposite to Abydus, he garrisons Sestus, a city in the Chersonese, which had formerly belonged to the Medes, and put it in a condition to guard the Hellespont.

During this interval of time, the Chians had very much enlarged their room at sea; and those stationed at Miletus, and even, Aftyochus, upon receiving the particulars of the late engagement, and advice that Strombichides was drawn off with so many ships, began to be high in spirits. Aftyochus, accordingly, arriving at Chios with only two ships, carrieth off along with him what shipping was there, and with the whole force is now at sea, in order to make an attempt upon Samos. But when the enemy there, because mutually embroiled in jealousies, came not out against him, he returned again to the station of Miletus: For, about this time, or rather before, the democracy was overturned at Athens.

The deputation, at the head of which was Pisander, were no sooner returned to Samos from Tissaphernes, than they found their schemes had gained a stronger footing in the army, and that the Samians had been encouraging

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encouraging the men of power amongst the Athenians to join their efforts with them for the erection of an oligarchy, though a party was very busy in opposing them, with a view to quash the projected alteration. The Athenians, farther, at Samos had in private conferences come to a resolution — “ to think no longer “ of Alcibiades, since he shewed himself so averse to “ join them, and in fact was by no means a proper “ person to have a share in an oligarchical administration :— But, merely from a principle of self-preservation, as now they were environed with dangers, “ they should take all possible care that the project “ should not drop in the execution. — That, farther, “ they should prosecute the war with vigour, and contribute largely towards it from their own private “ purses, and answer every other exigence of service, “ since, no longer for others, but their own sakes, they “ must continue the struggle.” Determined, therefore, to proceed in this manner, they dispatch Pisander and half the former deputation once more to Athens, to manage the execution of the project there : To whom, farther, instructions were given, at whatever places in their dependency they should touch upon the voyage, to set up the oligarchy. The other half they sent severally about to other of the dependent *States*. Diotrophes also, who was now at Chios, but appointed to take upon him the command of the Thracian provinces, they ordered away immediately to his post.

Diotrophes, upon his arrival at Thasus, dissolved the *popular* government. And, in the second month at most after this, the Thasians fortified their city, as men who no longer cared for an *aristocracy* under Athenian influence, but were in daily expectation of receiving liberty from the Lacedæmonians : For a number of their countrymen, driven out by the Athenians, were now refuged among the Peloponnesians. These were labouring the point with their correspondents in Thasus, to bring off their shipping, and declare a revolt.

The

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The present alteration, therefore, fell out exactly to their own wish; their *State* was restored to its ancient form without any trouble; and the *people*, who alone were able to disconcert them, were divested of their power. In Thasus, therefore, the event took an opposite turn to what those Athenians who laboured the *oligarchy* had at heart; and, in my judgement, the case was the same with many other of their dependent *States*: For, having now their eyes open to their own welfare, and being exempted from the dread of suffering for what others did, they ran into the scheme of a total independence, which they preferred before the precarious situation of being well governed by the Athenians.

Pisander and his colleagues in the course of their voyage observed their instructions, and dissolved the *popular* governments in the cities where they touched. From some of these they also procured parties of heavy-armed to aid them in the grand project, and so landed at Athens. Here they find affairs in great forwardness, through the activity of their accomplices: For, some of the younger sort having combined together in a plot against Androcles, who had the greatest sway amongst the people, and had also been deeply concerned in banishing Alcibiades, they secretly dispatch him. On him, for a double reason, because of his influence with the people, and with the thought that it might oblige Alcibiades, whose recallment was now expected, and through his interest the friendship of Tissaphernes, they chose first to wreak their fury. Of some others also, whose tractability they doubted, they had rid themselves by the same practices. A specious harangue had, farther, been dressed up for the purpose, that “ none  
“ ought to receive the public money but such as served  
“ the *State* in war with their persons; that affairs of  
“ state ought not to be communicated to more than  
“ *five thousand*, and those to be men who were best  
“ qualified,

“ qualified, by their estates and personal bravery, to  
 “ serve the public.”

This with the majority of the city had a fair outside, since such as should concur in the change bid fairest for a share in the administration. Yet still the assembly of the *people* and the \*council of the *bean* continued their meetings; but then they only passed such decrees as were approved by the cabal. Nay, of this number were all who spoke, and who had previously considered together what should be said upon every occasion. No other person presumed at any time to oppose their motions through dread of a cabal which they saw was large; or, did any one venture to open his mouth, by some dextrous contrivance he was certainly put to death. Who were the agents in these murders, no enquiry at all; and of who were suspected, no kind of justification. The people, on the contrary, looked on with stupid gaze, and such a fit of consternation as to think it clear gain not yet to have suffered violence, even though they held their tongues; imagining, besides, that the conspiracy had spread much farther than it really had, they were quite dispirited. To discover any certainty of their numbers they were quite unable, because of the great extent of the city and their ignorance how far their neighbours might be concerned. On the same account it was also impossible for him, who deeply resented his condition, to bemoan himself in the hearing of another, or to participate counsels for reciprocal defence; he must either have opened his mind to one whom he did not know, or to an acquaintance in whom he durst not confide; for all the *popular* party regarded one another with jealous eyes, as in some measure involved in the present machinations. Some in fact were concerned who could never have been suspected of oligarchical principles; and these men gave rise to the great diffidence which spread amongst the *many*, and drew after it the highest security to the schemes of the

\* The senate.

*few*, as it kept alive that mutual distrust which reigned among the people.

Pisander, therefore, and his associates, arriving at this very juncture, gave the finishing stroke without delay. In the first place, having called an assembly of the people, they moved for a decree, — “ That a committee of *ten* should be elected with full discretionary power. This committee of *ten* should draw up the form of a decree, to be reported to the people on a day prefixed, in what manner the *State* may be best administered.” In the next place, when that day came, they summoned an assembly of the people at Colonus : This is a temple of Neptune without the city, and distant from it about \* ten stadia. And here the committee reported no other proposal than this, — That “ it be lawful for any Athenian to deliver whatever opinion he himself thought proper.” They then enacted heavy penalties against any man who hereafter should accuse the speaker of a breach of law, or should bring him into any trouble whatever.

This being done, it was now, without the least reserve or ambiguity, moved, — That “ no magistrate whatsoever should continue in his post upon the old establishment, nor receive a public salary ; but that five † presidents be chosen, who should choose one hundred persons, and each of these hundred should name three persons for associates : That these persons should enter into the senate, be invested abso- lutely with the administration, and should farther be empowered to convene the *five thousand* whenever they should deem it proper.”

Pisander was the person who made this proposal, and who also in other respects shewed himself openly one of the most zealous to pull down the democracy. But he, who contrived the whole of the plan, and by what steps the affair should be thus carried into execution,

\* One English mile.

† Πρύτανες.

was Antipho, a man who in personal merit was second to no Athenian then alive, and the greatest genius of his time to devise with sagacity, and ingeniously to express what he had once devised. At the assemblies of the people, or any public debate, he never assisted, if he could possibly decline it, since the *multitude* was jealous of the great reputation he had gained: Yet, in the courts of judicature or appeals to the people, he was the only person who was able effectually to serve those clients who could get him for their patron. And this same Antipho, when in process of time the government of the *four hundred* was quite demolished, and severely prosecuted by the *people*, is judged to have defended their conduct, and pleaded in a cause where his own life was at stake, the best of any person that down to this time was ever heard to speak.

Phrynichus also was another who singularly distinguished himself in his zeal for the *oligarchy*. He dreaded Alcibiades, as conscious that he was privy to the whole of the correspondence he had carried on with Astyochus. He proceeded thus, on the supposition that Alcibiades would never be restored by an oligarchical government. And then he was a man in whose capacity and zeal, if once engaged, the greatest confidence might reasonably be placed.

Theramenes, farther, the son of Agnon, a man who both in speaking and acting made no ordinary figure, had a principal share in the dissolution of the *popular* government: No wonder, therefore, as the business was managed by so many and so able agents, that, spite of every obstacle, it was brought to effect. Grievous, indeed, it was to the Athenian people to submit to the loss of their liberty a century after the expulsion of their tyrants, during which period they had not only been independent, but accustomed, for above half that space, to give law to others.

To return. When, in the assembly of the people, not a soul was heard to oppose the motion, it passed into a law, and the assembly was adjourned. They after-



wards introduced the *four hundred* into the senate, in the following manner.

The whole body of the citizens were daily under arms, either upon the walls or in the field, to bridle the excursions of the enemy from Decelæa. Therefore, on the day appointed, they suffered such as were not in the secret to repair to their posts as usual: But, to those in the plot, it had been privately notified, — “by no means to repair to their posts, but to lag behind at a distance; and, in case any one should strive to oppose what was now to be agitated, they should take up arms and quell all opposition.” Those, to whom these orders were previously imparted, were the Andrians and Teians, three hundred of the Carysthians, and other persons now established in Ægina, whom the Athenians had sent thither by way of colony, but were now invited to repair to Athens with their arms to support the scheme. When these dispositions were formed, the *four hundred* (each carrying a concealed dagger, and guarded by one hundred and twenty youths of Greece, whose hands they had employed when assassination was the point) broke in upon the \* *counsellors of the bean*, who were this moment sitting in the senate-house, and called out to them “to quit the place and take their † salaries.” Accordingly they had ready for them the full arrears due to them, which they paid to each as he went out of the house. In this manner the *Senate*, without giving the least opposition, removed themselves tamely from their office; and the rest of the citizens made no effort to check such proceedings, and restrained from any the least tumult.

The *four hundred*, having thus gained possession of the senate-house, proceeded immediately to ballot for a ‡ set of *presidents* from amongst their own body; and

\* The senate of five hundred.

† The stated salary for a senator of Athens was a *drachma*, or seven pence three farthings, a day.

‡ Περτάται.

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made use of all the solemn invocations of the deities and the sacrifices with which the presiding magistrates execute their office. By their subsequent proceedings they introduced considerable alterations in the *popular* form of government; excepting that, on account of Alcibiades, they refrained from recalling exiles: But, in all other respects, they ruled with all possible severity. Some persons, whose removal was deemed convenient, though few in number, they got assassinated; some they threw into prison, and some they banished. To Agis also, king of the Lacedæmonians, who was still at Decelæa, they dispatched a deputation; notifying  
 “ their readiness to accommodate all disputes; and that  
 “ with greater confidence he might proceed to make  
 “ up matters with *them* than with a *democracy* which  
 “ was not to be trusted.”

Agis, full of the imagination that the city would not quietly submit to these changes, and that the *people* would not thus tamely part with their ancient liberty; or, should they now behold his numerous army approaching, that public combustions must ensue amongst them; unable to persuade himself that at the present juncture they could possibly be kept from tumults, — Agis, I say, returned no proposal of terms to the deputation which came to him from the *four hundred*. But, having sent for a numerous reinforcement from Peloponnesus, he advanced soon after, with the garrison of Decelæa and the fresh reinforcements, up to the very walls of Athens. He took this step on the presumption that “ thus, either thrown into utter confusion,  
 “ they might be mastered whenever he gave the word,  
 “ or even at the first sight of his approach, through  
 “ the great confusion which in all probability must follow both within and without: Since, to make himself master of their *long-walls*, as there could not be  
 “ hands at leisure for their defence, he could not fail.”

But when, upon his nearer approach, the Athenians within were thrown into no stir or bustle at all; when

even

even they caused their cavalry, and detachments of their heavy-armed, light-armed, and archers, to fall out into the field, who made a slaughter of such as were too far advanced, and became masters of their arms and dead bodies ; — finding then he had proceeded upon wrong presumptions, he again drew off his army. After this, he himself, with the former garrison, continued in the post of Decelée ; but the late reinforcement, after some continuance in the country, was sent back to Peloponnesus.

Yet, subsequent to this, the *four hundred* persisted in sending deputies to Agis with as much eagerness as ever ; and, he now receiving them in a better manner, with encouragements to proceed, they even send an embassy to Lacedæmon to propose a treaty, being of all things desirous to obtain an accommodation.

They also send to Samos a deputation of ten, in order to satisfy the army, and give them ample assurance that “ the *oligarchy* was not set up for the prejudice either of the *State* or any individuals, but as the only expedient left to preserve the whole community ; — that the number of those, who now had the management, was *five thousand* and not barely *four hundred* ; and yet on no occasion whatever had the Athenians, partly through employs in their armies abroad or other foreign avocations, ever met together, to consult on affairs of state, in a number so large as five thousand.” Having instructed them to intert some other alleviating pleas, they sent them away upon the first instant of the change they had made ; apprehensive of what actually came to pass, that the bulk of their seamen would never quietly submit to an oligarchical government, and an opposition beginning there might overturn all that had hitherto been done.

For at Samos some stir had already arose about the *oligarchy*, and that which is now to be recited happened exactly at the time that the *four hundred* seized the administration at Athens.

The

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The party which at this juncture was subsisting at Samos against the *nobility*, and were of the *popular* side, having now altered their schemes, and followed the suggestions of Pilander ever since his return from Athens, and gained the concurrence of Athenians at Samos, combined together by oath to the number of about three hundred, and resolved to fall upon their antagonists, as factious on the side of the *people*. Accordingly, they murder one \* Hyperbolus, an Athenian, a scurvy fellow,

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- \* This was the person whom the *ostracism* made in some measure famous, and who made the *ostracism* quite infamous. *Plutarch* hath repeated the story thrice.  
 • The following extract is taken from the life of *Nicias*.

“ When the opposition was very hot at Athens between Alcibiades and Nicias, and the day for *ostracizing* was drawing on,——which at certain intervals the people of Athens were used to enforce, and send away into a ten years exile some one citizen suspected of designs against their liberty, or odious for being too illustrious or rich, —— each of these grand competitors was under grievous apprehensions; and with reason too, that it might be his own lot to be exiled on this occasion. Alcibiades was hated for his way of life, and for his bold and enterprising genius. Nicias was envied on account of his wealth; his way of living was neither sociable nor popular; as he avoided a crowd, and herded with a few intimates, he gave great distaste; besides, as he had often opposed the caprices of the people, and constrained them to pursue their real interest, he was deep in their displeasure. In short, the contest ran high between the young and military men on one side, and the old pacific Athenians on the other, whilst each were endeavouring to throw the *ostracism* upon the hated object. But,

“ Parties ran high, and scoundrels got renown.

“ Such dissensions in the community gave scope to knaves and incendiaries. There was one Hyperbolus, of Perithadæ, very assuming without the least reason to be so; however, by dint of impudence working himself into power, and the disgrace of his country so soon as he had made himself conspicuous in it. On this occasion Hyperbolus could have no suspicion of becoming himself the butt of an *ostracism*; he had a much better title to the gallows. Presuming, on the contrary, that, when either of these great men were exiled, he himself could easily make head against the other, he manifested great pleasure at the contest, and irritated the fury of the people against them both. Nicias and Alcibiades, perceiving his roguish intent, conferred privately together; and, getting their several factions to unite, secured one another, and threw the votes on Hyperbolus. Such a turn at first gave the Athenians much pleasure and diversion; yet soon after they were highly chagrined, by reflecting that making such a scoundrel the object of it was shaming the *ostracism* for ever. There was dignity even in punishments: The *ostracism* was of such a nature as to suit a Thucydides, an Aristides, and men of

“ such

low, and banished by the *ostracism*, not from a dread of his influence or weight, but for the profligacy of his life and his being a public disgrace to his country. In this they were countenanced by Charminus, one of the commanders, and some of the Athenians associated with them, to whom they gave this pledge of their fidelity. Some other acts of the same nature they committed by instructions from them, and had it in agitation to multiply their blows; but those marked out for destruction, getting wind of their design, communicate the whole to Leon and Diomedon, who thought of an *oligarchy* with high regret, because their credit was high with the *people*; to \*Thraſybulus also and Thraſyllus, the former a captain of a trireme, and the latter of a band of heavy-armed; and to such others as were judged most likely to stem the fury of the conspirators. These they con-

“ such exalted characters. It was clear honour to Hyperbolus; and gave him  
 “ room to boast, that, though a scoundrel, he had been distinguished like the greatest  
 “ and best Athenians; as Plato, the comic poet, says of him,

“ He always acted worthy of himself,  
 “ But quite unworthy of such high reproof :  
 “ The *shell* was ne’er design’d to honour scoundrels.

“ In a word, no person was ever banished by the *ostracism* after Hyperbolus; it  
 “ was he who closed the list.”

\* Thraſybulus, whose name now first occurs, acts a very high-spirited and noble part in the close of this history. “ If virtue could be weighed merely by itself, “ without any regard to outward circumstance, I should not hesitate (says Cornelius Nepos) to prefer him before all the great men in Greece. But I aver, “ that not one of them ever surpassed him in integrity, in resolution, in grandeur “ of soul, and true patriotism. ——— Yet, I know not how it is, though nobody “ excelled him in real merit, many have outstripped him in point of fame. In “ the Peloponnesian war, (*the part of it which now remains,*) Thraſybulus did “ many things without Alcibiades; Alcibiades did nothing without Thraſybulus; “ and yet the other, through a happiness peculiar to himself, reaped the glory and “ benefit of all.” So far this elegant Roman writer. The reader will soon see some of Thraſybulus his exploits, separately from and in concert with Alcibiades: But the glory of his life was ridding Athens some years after of *thirty* tyrants at a blow; for which he was rewarded by a wreath of olive, the most honourable recompence his grateful countrymen could bestow upon him. He was ever a firm, intrepid, disinterested, patriot; and lost his life at last in the service of his country.

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jured “not to look calmly on till their destruction  
 “should be completed, and Samos rent away from the  
 “Athenians, by which alone till now their empire had  
 “been preserved and supported.” Listening, therefore, to these representations, they privately exhorted every single soldier not to suffer such proceedings; and more earnestly than others the *Paralian*, since all that sailed in that vessel were citizens of Athens, all free, and enemies determined, from time immemorial, to an *oligarchy*, even when it had no existence. Leon also and ~~Diomedon~~ never went out to sea without leaving them some ships for their guard; insomuch that, when the *three hundred* made their attempt, as all these united in their obstruction, but most heartily of all the *Paralians*, the *popular* party at Samos was rescued from destruction. Thirty of those *three hundred* they even slaughtered, and three of the most factious amongst the survivors they doomed to banishment. Then, having published an indemnity for the rest, they continued to support the *democracy* at Samos.

But the Samians and soldiery dispatch the *Paralus* with all expedition to Athens, having on-board her Chæreas, the son of Achestratus, an Athenian, who had borne a considerable share in the last turn of affairs, charged with a notification of these last transactions; for yet it was not known at Samos that the *four hundred* had seized the administration. No sooner, therefore, were they come to their moorings, than the *four hundred* caused two or three of the crew of the *Paralus* to be dragged away to prison; the residue they turned over from that vessel into another ship of war, and ordered them away as a guard-ship for the station of Eubœa. But Chæreas, sensible in what train affairs were going, had the good fortune to make his escape; and, returning again to Samos, related to the soldiery all that had been done in Athens, exaggerating every point with abundant severity.—That “every citizen was now kept  
 “in awe with whips and scourges, and that even their

“ own wives and children daily felt the insolence of those  
 “ tyrants ; nay, they have it now in agitation, that  
 “ if any on duty at Samos shall presume to oppose their  
 “ pleasure, immediately to arrest and imprison the whole  
 “ of their kindred ; and, in case the former will not  
 “ submit, to put the latter to death.” On many other  
 points he also expatiated, all aggravated with falsehoods.

His audience, in the first instant of their passion, were fully bent on the destruction of all those who had appeared most active for an *oligarchy*, and in those of all who had any hand in its promotion ; but, being stopped by the interposition of others more moderate, and listening to the remonstrance, that “ they ought not to  
 “ accelerate the ruin of their country, now that a fleet  
 “ of the enemy lay almost ranged against them for battle,” they desisted. And, afterwards, those who had openly avowed the design of restoring the democratical form at Samos, namely, Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, (for these had the principal agency in this new revolution,) caused every soldier to swear the most solemn oaths, more especially such as were for an *oligarchy*, that “ they would submit to no form but  
 “ the *democracy*, and would act in this cause with general unanimity ; and, farther, would zealously prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians ; that eternal  
 “ enemies they would remain to the *four hundred*, and  
 “ would enter into no treaty of accommodation with them.” All the Samians, farther, that were old enough to bear arms, took the same oaths ; and henceforth the army communicated all their affairs to the Samians, and gave them an insight into all the dangers which might attend the sequel ; convinced that otherwise no safe resource remained for either ; but, if the *four hundred* or the enemy at Miletus proved too hard for them, their ruin was unavoidable.

Terrible were the present embroilments of the times, whilst those at Samos were striving to re-establish the *democracy*

*mocracy* at Athens, and those at Athens to force an *oligarchical* form upon the army. The soldiers, farther, immediately summoned a general assembly, in which they deposed their former commanders, and all such captains of triremes as fell under their suspicions, and then chose others to fill up the vacancies, both captains of triremes and land-commanders, amongst whom were Thralybulus and Thrasyllus. The last rose up in the assembly, and encouraged them by every topic of persuasion; particularly, — that “they had not the least reason to be dispirited, though Athens itself had revolted from them; for this was merely the secession of a minority from men whose numbers were greater, and who were better furnished for every exigence; because the whole navy of Athens was their own, by which they could compel dependent states to pay in their former contingents of tribute as fully as if they sailed on such an errand from Athens itself. Even yet they were masters of a city at Samos, a city despicable in no respect, but which once in a former war had well nigh wrested the empire of the sea from the Athenians. The seat of war, in regard to their public enemies, would continue the same as it was before; nay, by being masters of the fleet, they were better enabled to procure all the needful supplies than their opponents who were now at Athens. It was purely owing to their own peculiar situation at Samos that the others had hitherto been masters of the entrance into the Piræus; and they soon should be highly distressed if they refused to restore them their ancient polity, since these at Samos could more easily bar them the use of the sea than be barred up by them. What assistances Athens had hitherto given them against the enemy were but trifling, and of no real importance. Nothing could be lost from that quarter; which was no longer able to supply them with money, since with that *they* had been supplied by the army; nor to send them any valuable instructions,



" tions, for the sake of which alone the troops abroad  
 " were submissive to the orders of the *State* at home.  
 " Nay, in some points those at Athens had most egregi-  
 " ously offended, since they had overturned the laws  
 " of their country, which those *here* had preserved, and  
 " were exerting their efforts to compel others to the ob-  
 " servance of them; and therefore, in every method  
 " of valuation, the men, who *here* provided well for  
 " the public welfare, were in no respect worse patriots  
 " than the men at Athens. Even Alcibiades, should  
 " they grant him an indemnity and a safe return,  
 " would readily procure them *the king's* alliance. And,  
 " what had the greatest weight, should they miscarry  
 " in every branch of their present designs, many pla-  
 " ces of refuge lay always open to men possessed of so  
 " considerable a fleet, in which they might find fresh  
 " cities and another country."

After such occurrences in the assembly convened by  
 the soldiery, and the conclusion of their mutual exhor-  
 tations, they continued their preparations for war with  
 unremitting diligence. But the deputation of *ten*, sent  
 from the *four hundred* to Samos, being informed of these  
 proceedings when\* they were advanced in their voyage  
 to far as Delos, thought proper to proceed no farther.

About this very time, the Peloponnesians on-board  
 the fleet stationed at Miletus clamoured loudly amongst  
 themselves, that " they are betrayed by Aſtyochus and  
 " Tiffaphernes; as the former had already refused to  
 " engage, when themselves were hearty and in fine  
 " condition, and the fleet of the Athenians was small;  
 " nor would do so even now, when the latter are repor-  
 " ted to be embroiled with intestine seditions, and their  
 " own ships are daily impairing; but, under pretext of a  
 " Phœnician fleet to be brought up by Tiffaphernes,  
 " an aid merely nominal, and which would never join  
 " them, he was ruining all by dilatory measures. And,  
 " as for Tiffaphernes, it was never his intention to bring  
 " up that fleet; but he was plainly undermining the  
 " strength

“ strength of theirs, by not supplying them constantly  
 “ and fully with their pay. The time, therefore, they  
 “ insisted, ought no longer to be thus idly wasted, but  
 “ an engagement hazarded at once.” Yet in such clamours those deepest concerned were the Syracusans.

The confederates and Aftyochus himself being affected with these clamours, and having declared in a council of war for engaging the enemy forthwith, as they had received undoubted intelligence of the confusions at Samos; putting out to sea with the whole of their fleet, amounting to a hundred and twelve sail, and having ordered the Milesians to march thither overland, they stood away for Mycale. At Glaucae of Mycale the Athenians were now lying, with eighty-two ships of the Samian department: For in this quarter of Mycale Samos lies, but a small distance from the continent: But, when they saw the fleet of the Peloponnesians approaching, they retired to Samos, judging their own strength insufficient for an engagement with the foe which might prove decisive. Besides, as they had discovered the intention of those at Miletus to venture an engagement, they expected Strombichides from the Hellespont, who was to bring to their assistance the ships on the station of Chios which had gone up to Abydus; and a message had already been dispatched, to hasten him up. For these reasons they plied away to Samos. The Peloponnesians, arriving at Mycale, encamped upon the shore along with the land-forces of the Milesians and those sent in by the bordering people. On the next day, when they were fully bent on standing directly against Samos, advice is brought them that “ Strombichides is come up with the ships from the “ Hellespont;” upon which they made the best of their way back again to Miletus. And now the Athenians, having gained so large an accession of strength, shew themselves immediately before Miletus, with a hundred and eight sail, desirous of coming to an engagement

ment with the enemy. But, as nothing stirred out against them, they also returned to Samos.

In the same summer, immediately after the former movements, the Peloponnesians — who had waved coming out to an engagement, since with the whole of their strength they thought themselves by no means a match for their enemy; and were now reduced to great perplexities about the methods of procuring subsistence for so numerous a fleet, especially as Tissaphernes was so remiss in his payments — send away to Pharnabazus (pursuant to the prior instructions from Peloponnesus) Clearchus the son of Ramphias, with a detachment of forty sail: For Pharnabazus had demanded such a force, and was ready to support the expences of it; and it had been farther notified to them in form that Byzantium was ripe for a revolt. And thus this detachment of Peloponnesians, having run out far to sea to get clear of the Athenians during the course, met with very tempestuous weather. The bulk of them, it is true, with Clearchus, rode it out to Delos, and from thence return again to Miletus. But Clearchus, setting out again, travelled over land to Hellespont, and took upon him the command. Ten ships, however, of the detachment, under Elixus the Megaræan, who was joined in the command, reached the Hellespont without damage, and effectuate the revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Samos, informed of these incidents, send away a detachment to the Hellespont, to support and guard the adjacent cities: And a small engagement happens before Byzantium, between eight ships on a side.

Those who were in the management at Samos, and above all Thrasylbulus, adhering still to the sentiments they had entertained ever since the last turn of affairs there, that Alcibiades must needs be recalled; the latter at last obtained, in full assembly, the concurrence of the soldiery. Accordingly, when they had voted a return and an indemnity to Alcibiades, Thrasylbulus repaired

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repaired immediately to Tiffaphernes, and brought Alcibiades back with him to Samos; convinced their last resource depended on his being able to alienate Tiffaphernes from the Peloponnesians. Hereupon, an assembly being called, Alcibiades at large expatiated upon and deplored the malignity of his fate, in having been exiled from his country: And then, having amply run over every topic relating to the present posture of affairs, he raised their expectations high in regard to the future. He magnified, with a mighty parade of words, his own interest in Tiffaphernes; from the view, not only to intimidate the patrons of the oligarchical government at Athens, and put a stop to their cabals, but also to render himself more respectable to these at Samos, and to raise up their confidence in him as high as possible; — to give the enemy, farther, as many handles as he was able to calumniate Tiffaphernes, and to lower all their present sanguinary expectations. These were the schemes of Alcibiades, when, with all imaginable ostentation, he gave the strongest assurances to his audience, that “ Tiffaphernes had pledged his word “ to him, that, could he once firmly depend upon the “ Athenians, they never should be distressed for want “ of supplies whilst he had any thing left, nay though “ at last he should be forced to turn into ready cash the “ very bed he lay on; and the Phœnician fleet, already “ come up to Aspendus, he would join with the Athenians, but never with the Peloponnesians: The only “ pledge of fidelity he required from the Athenians “ was, for Alcibiades to be recalled and pass his word “ for their future conduct.”

The army, delighted with these and many other soothing topics, proceed immediately to associate him with the rest of the commanders, and implicitly trusted every thing to their management. Not a man was any longer to be found amongst them who would have parted with his present confidence of certain security and revenge on the *four hundred* for all the treasure in  
the

the universe. Nay, they were ready this very moment, upon the strength of what Alcibiades had said, to slight the enemy now at hand, and steer directly for the Piræus. But, though numbers with vehemence recommended the step, he stopped their ardour by remonstrances, that “they ought by no means to think of steering for the Piræus, and leave their nearer enemies upon their backs: But, in relation to the operations of war, since he was elected a *general*, (he said,) he would first go and confer with Tissaphernes, and would then proceed to action.” Accordingly, the assembly was no sooner dissolved than he immediately departed, that he might appear in all respects to be perfectly united with Tissaphernes; desirous also to raise himself in his esteem, and give him a sensible proof that he was appointed a general; and, by virtue of this, enabled either to do him service or to do him harm. It was the peculiar fortune of Alcibiades to awe the Athenians by Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes by the Athenians.

The Peloponnesians at Miletus had no sooner heard of the recal of Alcibiades, than, as before they suspected treachery in Tissaphernes, they now loudly vented invectives against him. What more inflamed them was, that, ever since the Athenians shewed themselves before Miletus and they had refused to put out to sea and engage them, Tissaphernes had slackened more than ever in his payments; and thus, hated by them for that reason sufficiently before, he now became more odious on account of Alcibiades. The soldiery again, as on former occasions, ran together in parties, and enumerated their grievances. Nay, some of higher ranks, persons of real importance, and not merely the private men, were full of remonstrances, that “they had at no time received their full subsistence; his payments had been always scanty, and even those had never been regular: In short, unless they were led directly against the enemy, or carried to some other  
\ “ station

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“ station where they might be sure of subsistence, the  
“ crews would abandon their vessels. And the whole  
“ blame of all that befel ought to be charged upon  
“ Aftyochus, who for private lucre endured patiently  
“ the caprices of Tiffaphernes.” Employed as they  
were in thus enumerating grievances, a tumult actually  
broke out against Aftyochus : For the mariners belong-  
ing to the Syracusan and Thurian vessels, by how much  
they enjoyed the greatest liberty of all others in the fleet,  
by so much the more heightened confidence did they  
flock about him and demand their pay. Upon this,  
Aftyochus returned an answer too full of spirit, threat-  
ening hard \* *that Dorian*, who seconded and encour-  
aged the demands of his men, and even lifting up his  
staff and shaking it at him. This was no sooner per-  
ceived by the military croud, than, seamen as they  
were, with a loud uproar, they rushed at Aftyochus to  
knock him down : But, aware of their design, he flies  
for refuge to an altar. He escaped, indeed, without  
any blows, and the fray was ended without any harm  
committed.

The Milesians also made themselves masters, by sur-  
prise, of a fort erected by Tiffaphernes at Miletus,  
and oblige the garrison left in it to evacuate the place.  
These things pleased the rest of the allies, and not least  
of all the Syracusans. Lichas, however, was by no  
means satisfied with these proceedings. He insisted  
“ the Milesians were obliged in duty to be submissive  
“ to Tiffaphernes ; and that all others who lived in the  
“ dominions of *the king* lay under the same obligation,  
“ and were bound to pay due regard to his just autho-  
“ rity, till such time as the war was handsomely com-  
“ pleted.” This drew upon him the resentment of the  
Milesians ; and, because of these expressions and some  
others of the same nature, when he afterwards died of  
a natural disease, they would not suffer him to be bu-

\* *Hermocrates.*

ried in a spot of ground which the Lacedæmonians who were amongst them had chose for his interment.

Whilst affairs were thus sadly embroiled, between the soldiery on one side, and Aftyochus and Tiffaphernes on the other, Mindarus arrived from Lacedæmon, as successor to Aftyochus in the chief command of the fleet. Accordingly he takes the command upon him, and Aftyochus sailed away for home. But with him, as embassador, Tiffaphernes sent one of his own creatures, by name Gaulites, a Carian, who spoke both languages, to accuse the Milesians about the seizure of the fort, and also to make apologies for *his* conduct. He knew that the Milesians were already set out with an outcry, chiefly against him; and that Hermocrates was gone with them, well armed with proofs that Tiffaphernes, in concert with Alcibiades, baffled all the Peloponnesian schemes, and basely tampered with both the warring parties. But an enmity had always subsisted between these two about the payments of subsistence. And at length, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and other Syracusans came to Miletus to take upon them the command of the Syracusan vessels, (namely, Potamis, and Myscon, and Demarchus,) Tiffaphernes vented his choler more bitterly than ever against Hermocrates, now an exile; and, amongst his other accusations of him, affirmed, that "he had demanded a sum of money, which being refused him, he had ever since declared himself his enemy." Aftyochus, therefore, and the Milesians, and Hermocrates, are now sailed for Lacedæmon.

By this time also Alcibiades had repassed from Tiffaphernes to Samos: And from Delos the deputation sent from the *four-hundred* on the late revolution, to soothe and gain the concurrence of those at Samos, arrive also whilst Alcibiades is there. Upon which, an assembly being called, they endeavoured to open the cause. The soldiers at first refused to hear them, and roared aloud for the murder of those who had over-  
turned

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turned the *popular* government. At length, with great difficulty, being quieted, they gave them a hearing.

The deputies remonstrated, that “ not for the ruin  
“ of Athens was this new change introduced, but  
“ purely for its preservation — in no wise to betray it  
“ into the hands of the enemy ; because that might  
“ have been done effectually upon the late approach of  
“ its enemy to her walls, since *they* were in power.  
“ Every single person amongst the *five-thousand* was  
“ intended to have a regular share in the administra-  
“ tion. Their friends and relations are not treated in  
“ an insolent manner, as Chæreas had maliciously sug-  
“ gested to them ; nay, were not in the least molested,  
“ but every where remained in the undisturbed posses-  
“ sion of their property.”

Though on these topics they amply enlarged, yet they were heard with no manner of complacence, but with manifest indignation. Different methods of proceeding were recommended by different persons ; but the majority declared for sailing away at once for the Piræus. On this occasion Alcibiades first shewed himself a true patriot ; nay, as much a patriot as ever Athenian had been : For, when the Athenians at Samos were hurried furiously along to invade their own selves, the plain consequence of which was giving up at once Ionia and Hellespont to their public foes, he mollified their fury ; and, at a crisis when no other man living could have been able to restrain the multitude, he persuaded them to desist from this strange invasion ; and, by reprimanding those whose private resentments burst out most violently against the deputies, prevented mischief. At length, he himself dismissed them, with the following answer. — That “ the administration in the  
“ hands of *five-thousand* he had no intention to oppose :  
“ But he ordered them to give an immediate discharge  
“ to the *four-hundred*, and to restore the council of  
“ *five-hundred* to their prior state. If, farther, from a  
“ principle of frugality, they had made retrenchments,



“ in order that ~~those~~ who served in the armies of the  
 “ *State* might be better subsisted, he praised them alto-  
 “ gether. He then recommended to them a steady re-  
 “ sistance, and by no means in any shape to give way.  
 “ to the enemy : For, could the *State* once be secured  
 “ from its public foes, a reconciliation amongst its  
 “ members might easily be hoped for ; but, should  
 “ either party be once destroyed, either this at Samos,  
 “ or theirs at Athens, none would soon be left to be  
 “ reconciled at all.”

There were present at this audience ambassadors from the Argives, who brought assurances of aid to the ~~Peo-~~  
*ple* of Athens at Samos. Alcibiades commended them .  
 for their zeal ; and then, exhorting them to hold them-  
 selves in readiness to come upon a summons sent, he  
 civilly dismissed them. These Argives came to Samos  
 in company with the *Paralians*, who had been lately  
 turned over by the *four-hundred* into a vessel of war, to  
 cruize round Eubœa, and to carry to Lacedæmon the  
 ambassadors, Læspodias, Aristophon, and Melesius,  
 sent thither from the *four-hundred*. But, when ad-  
 vanced to the height of Argos, they put the embassa-  
 dors under arrest, as chief agents in pulling down the  
*democracy*, and delivered them up to the Argives. They  
 had no business now at Athens, and so came from Argos  
 to Samos, convoying the Argive ambassadors in the  
 trireme which they had seized.

The same summer, Tissaphernes, — about that junc-  
 ture of time in which the Peloponnesians were most fu-  
 rious against him, for the other reasons, and the recall-  
 ment of Alcibiades, as having now pulled off the mask  
 and declared for the Athenians, — desirous, as in truth  
 it appeared, to efface the bad impressions they had en-  
 tertained of him, got ready to go to Aspendus to the  
 Phœnician fleet, and prevailed with Lichas to bear him  
 company. In regard to the Peloponnesians, he declar-  
 ed that he substituted his own lieutenant, Tamas, to  
 pay them their subsistence, whilst he himself should be  
 absent.

absent. Various accounts are vented about this step; nor can it certainly be known with what view he repaired to Aspendus, or why, when there, he did not bring up the fleet. That a Phœnician fleet, consisting of one hundred forty-seven sail was now come up to Aspendus, is allowed on all sides; but, why they did not come forwards, is variously conjectured. Some think he went out of sight merely to carry on his old scheme of wearing away the Peloponnesians; and, in consequence of this, Tamas paid in their subsistence which he was ~~ordered~~ <sup>obliged</sup> to pay, not better but even worse than Tissaphernes. Others say it was, that, since he had brought the Phœnicians to Aspendus, he might save large sums by dismissing them there, as he never had sincerely designed to make use of their service. Others, again, attribute it to a desire to quiet the clamours against him at Lacedæmon, and to get himself represented there as one abounding in good faith, and who is actually gone to bring up a fleet fairly and honestly fitted out for service.

But, in my opinion, the true solution of the mystery is this: He would not bring them up, merely to wear out and to balance the strength of the Grecians, that, during his absence and this studied prolongation, the latter might be running into ruin; and, farther, for the sake of balancing, to join with neither party, for fear of making them too strong; for, had he once determined to join heartily in the war, the consequence was certain beyond a doubt. Had he brought them up to join the Lacedæmonians, he must in all probability have given them the victory, since already their naval strength was rather equal than inferior to that of their opponents. But, that their ruin alone was designed by him is plain from the excuse he made for not bringing up that fleet: He pretended they were fewer in number than *the king* had ordered to be assembled: yet, if this were so, he might have ingratiated himself more abundantly with *the king*, if he made a great saving of money for his mas-




ter, and with less expence had accomplished his service. To Aspendus, however, whatever was his view, Tiffaphernes repairs, and joins the Phœnicians; nay, farther, at his own desire, the Peloponnesians sent Philip-pus, a noble Lacedæmonian, with two triremes, to take charge of this fleet.

Alcibiades had no sooner received intelligence that Tiffaphernes was at Aspendus, than, taking with him thirteen sail, he hastened thither after him, promising to those at Samos an assured and important piece of service: For, “ he would either bring the Phœnician “ fleet to the Athenians, or at least prevent their junc- “ tion with the Peloponnesians.” It is probable that, from a long acquaintance, he was privy to the whole intention of Tiffaphernes never to bring up this fleet; and his project was now, to render Tiffaphernes still more odious to the Peloponnesians for the regard he shewed to himself and the Athenians, that so he might at last be necessitated to strike in with the latter. He stood away therefore directly by Phaselis and Caunus, and held on his course upwards.

The deputation, sent from the *four hundred*, being returned from Samos to Athens, reported the answer of Alcibiades;— how “ he encouraged them to hold “ out, and give way in no shape to the enemy; and “ that his confidence was great, he should be able tho- “ roughly to reconcile them with the army, and give “ them victory over the Peloponnesians.” By this report they very much revived the spirits of many of those who had a share in the *oligarchy*, and yet would gladly extricate themselves from the business upon assurances of indemnity. They had already begun to hold separate cabals, and shew open discontent at the train of affairs. They were headed by some of principal authority even in the present *oligarchy*, and who filled the great offices of state, namely, Theramenes, \* the son of Agnon,

\* Theramenes was very expert at turning about and shifting his party. He got by it the nick-name of *Cotburnus*, or the *Bulkin*; because the tragedians’ bulkin was made



non, and Aristocrates, the son of Sicelius; and others who were most deeply concerned in late transactions; and from a dread, as they gave out, of the army at Samos, and Alcibiades, had concurred in sending an embassy to Lacedæmon, lest by unreasonable dissents from the majority they might have done mischief to the public. Not that they hastened themselves even now to put an utter end to the oligarchical government, but to enforce the necessity of making use of the *five thousand* not merely in name but in act, and to render the polity more equal. This was, it must be owned, the political scheme which they all pretended; but, through private ambition, the majority had given into that course, by which an *oligarchy*, founded upon the ruins of a *democracy*, is ripe for subversion: For it was the daily claim of each single person concerned, not to be equal with the rest, but to be pre-eminently the first; whereas, when out of a democracy a preference is awarded, the distinction is the more easily brooked, as if it were the real consequence of superior worth. But what of a certainty elevated them most, was the great influence of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own consciousness that this business of an oligarchy carried with it no prospect of firm or lasting continuance. A contention, therefore, ensued among them, which of them should shew the greatest zeal for the *people*.

But such of the *four hundred* as made the greatest opposition to this new scheme, and were leaders of their party; — namely, Phrynichus, who formerly, during

made large enough for any foot to go into it. He was however a man of great abilities, and generally regarded as a lover of his country. His turns were dextrous, well-timed, and made with a view of public good. Cæsar, when making Cicero a compliment, likened him to Theramenes. He was deeply concerned in all the subsequent revolutions at Athens. He put the finishing hand to the peace with the Lacedæmonians after the taking of Athens by Lysander, when they demolished their long walls, opened their harbours, and gave up their shipping. He was afterwards, nominally, one of the *thirty* tyrants: For he soon began to oppose them; first with moderation, then with vehemence; which exasperated them so, that they put him to death.

his employment as general at Samos, had embroiled himself with Alcibiades; and Aristarchus, one of the most violent and also most inveterate opponents of the *people*; and Pisander, and Antipho, and others of the greatest influence amongst them; who formerly, upon establishing themselves first in the government, and ever since the army at Samos had dissented from them in favour of the *democracy*, had bestirred themselves, in sending embassies to Lacedæmon, in more firmly establishing the *oligarchy*, and erecting a new fortification on the spot which is called Eëtioneïa; — these, I say, exerted themselves with much greater ardour than ever, since the return of the deputies from Samos, as they plainly saw the inclinations of numbers, and some of their own body, on whose perseverance they had highly depended, were intirely changed. They even caused Antipho, and Phrynichus, and ten others, to set out with all expedition; so apprehensive were they of fresh opposition, both in Athens itself and from Samos; and charged them with instructions to strike up an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians upon any tolerable terms they could possibly procure. They also carried on with redoubled diligence the new works at Eëtioneïa. These works were intended, as was given out by Theramenes and his party, not so much to keep out of the Piræus those from Samos, should they endeavour to attempt it, as to enable themselves, at their own discretion, to receive both the ships and land-forces of the enemy; for Eëtioneïa is the mole of the Piræus, and the entrance into it opens at the end of this mole. The new work was therefore joined in such a manner to that which guarded it before, on the side of the land, that a small party posted behind could command the entrance. For the extremities of it were continued down to the fort in the very mouth of the harbour, which was narrow; and both the old wall, which was built on the land-side, and this new fortification within, reached down to the sea. They also enlarged and secured the *great portico*, which  
adjoined

adjoined to the new work erected in the Piræus, and kept it intirely in their own custody. Here they obliged all the citizens to lodge what corn they already had, and all that should hereafter be imported, and here only to expose it to sale and to vend it.

These proceedings had for a long time drawn sharp insinuations from Theramenes; and, when the embassy returned from Lacedæmon without bringing to any manner of issue a general accommodation for the whole of the *State*, he averred, that “by this new work the safety of the City was visibly endangered.” For from Peloponnesus, at this instant of time, at the request of the Eubœans, no less than forty-two sail of ships were on the coast of Laconia; some of which were Italian, from Tarentum and from Locri, and some Sicilian; and all were now bound for Eubœa. At the head of this equipment was Hegesandridas, a Spartan, the son of Hegesander. Theramenes maintained, that “it was set out less for Eubœa than for those who were now fortifying at Eëtioneia; and, unless we stand upon our guard, they will surprise and complete the ruin of Athens.” There was really something in the conduct of the men he accused to countenance this charge, nor was it merely the outcry of slander. Those who now composed the *oligarchy* were principally desirous to preserve in their hands the whole appenage of the republic; if this were impracticable, to secure the shipping and walls, and subsist with independence; but, should they be unable to compass this, rather than fall the first victims to the *democracy* re-established, to let in the enemy; and, resigning their shipping and fortifications, to make any terms whatever for the *State*, provided they could obtain security for their own persons. They accelerated, therefore, this new work; which was so contrived as to have posterns, and sally-ports, and passages enow to let in the enemy; and they proceed with all imaginable dispatch, in order to outstrip prevention.

Hitherto, indeed, this charge against them had only been whispered with an air of secrecy amongst a few. But, when Phrynichus, upon his return from the embassy to Lacedæmon, was treacherously stabbed, by one of the *patrole* in the forum, at the hour of public resort, being got but a few steps from the house where the *council* was sitting, and dropped down dead upon the spot; — when, farther, the assassin made his escape; and a stranger from Argos, who assisted at the fact, being apprehended and tortured by the *four hundred*, discovered not the name of any one ~~person~~ who set them on, nor made any farther confession than that “ he knew “ large numbers met at the house of the officer who “ commanded the *patrole*, and at other places; ” — then, at length, as nothing could be made of this affair, Theramenes and Aristocrates, and as many either of the *four hundred* or of others as were combined with them, proceeded to act in a more open and resolute manner. For by this time the fleet was come round from Lacedæmonia; and, riding before Epidaurus, had made ravages upon Ægina. Theramenes therefore averred it improbable, that, “ were they intended for Eubœa, they “ would ever have put into Ægina, and then go again “ and lie at Epidaurus, unless they had been sent out at “ the express invitation of those whom he had always “ accused of traiterous designs; and it was impossible “ to be passive any longer under such practices.” In fine, after many speeches made to excite a tumult, and many suspicions disseminated abroad, they fell to work in earnest. For the heavy-armed, posted in the Piræus to carry on the new works of Eëtionēia, amongst whom Aristocrates himself was employed at the head of his own band, lay under an arrest Alexicles, who commanded there for the *oligarchy*, and was a most vehement adversary to the opposite party; and, carrying him into a house, put him under confinement. To this action they were also emboldened by the concurrence of others, as well as by Hermon, who commanded the *patrole*

*patrole* assigned for Munichia; and, what was of most importance, it was openly countenanced by the whole body of the heavy-armed. The news of it was immediately carried to the *four hundred*, who were this moment assembled together in council; and all, excepting those dissatisfied with their measures, were ready to run to arms, and vented terrible threats against Theramenes and his associates.

But he, apologizing for himself, declared his readiness to take up arms along with them, and attend them to the rescue of Alexicles; and, taking with him one of the generals who was in his secret, he hurried down to the Piræus. Aristarchus also ran down to assist; as did, farther, the young men belonging to the cavalry of the *State*.

Great, in truth, was the tumult, and full of horror: For those who were left in the upper-city imagined that the Piræus was already seized, and that Alexicles was slain; and they in the Piræus each moment expected an assault from those in the city. Not without difficulty could the men of years and experience stop such as were wildly running up and down the streets, and rushing to arms. And Thucydides, the Pharsalian, public host of the *State*, who happened then to be at Athens, threw himself with lively zeal in the way of all who were flocking down; conjuring them earnestly “not to finish the ruin of their country, when the enemy lay so near to strike the blow.” But thus, at length, their fury abated, and the effusion of one another’s blood was prevented.

As for Theramenes, he was no sooner got down to the Piræus, than, assuming authority, (for he himself was at this time a *general*,) he pretended to rate the heavy-armed for this piece of mutiny, at least so far as mere making a noise could do it; whilst Aristarchus and all the opposite faction were angry with them in earnest. But the bulk of the heavy-armed drew together in a body, and betray no sign of regret for what they had done.



done. Nay, they demanded aloud from Theramenes, — “ If, in his judgement, these new works were raised  
 “ with a good design, or would not better be demo-  
 “ lished ?” His reply was this — That, “ if *they*  
 “ thought it expedient to demolish them, his opinion  
 “ should concur with theirs.” Hereupon, at a signal  
 given, the heavy-armed and many others who belonged  
 to the Piræus rushed on in a moment, and pulled down  
 all the new fortification.

The watch-word now published to the *multitude* was  
 this — “ Whosoever would have the administration  
 “ lodged in the *five-thousand* instead of the *four-hundred*,  
 “ let him join in the work.” For even still they judged  
 it politic to veil their design under the name of the  
*five-thousand*, and not to say downright — “ Whosoever  
 “ would have the *democracy* restored,” — lest possibly  
 the former might have been actually in force, and a  
 person speaking to any one of them might spoil all by  
 some inadvertent expressions. And, on the same ac-  
 count, the *four-hundred* would neither have the *five-*  
*thousand* declared, nor yet have it known that they had  
 never been appointed. To admit so large a number  
 into a share of the government, they judged was in fact  
 a mere democracy ; but that leaving the matter in sus-  
 pense would strike a dread of his neighbour into every  
 Athenian.

The next morning, the *four-hundred*, though highly  
 disordered in their politics, assembled however in coun-  
 cil. But those in the Piræus, after enlarging Alexicles,  
 whom they had put under confinement, and comple-  
 ting the demolition of the new works, marched to the  
 theatre of Bacchus in Munichia, and there, all armed  
 as they were, held a formal assembly ; and then, in  
 pursuance of what had been resolved, marched directly  
 into the upper-city, and posted themselves in the Ana-  
 céum. Here they were accosted by a select committee  
 sent from the *four-hundred*, who man to man reasoned  
 calmly with them ; and, perceiving any to be tracta-  
 ble,

ble, plied them with persuasions to proceed in a gentle manner, and to restrain the fury of their associates; giving them assurances, that “ the *five-thousand* would “ be declared; and from them, by regular succession, “ at the pleasure of the *five-thousand*, the *four-hundred* “ should be appointed;” conjuring them, in the mean time, “ not to forward, through impatience, the destruction of the *State*, nor give it up for a prey to “ the public enemy.” The whole multitude of the heavy-armed, attentive to these arguments, on which many expatiated at large and pressed home upon numbers, became more tractable than they were at first, and were most terribly alarmed at the mention of the total destruction of their *polity*. It was at last concluded, that, on a set day, an assembly should be held in the temple of Bacchus, to devise an accommodation.

But, when this assembly, to be held in the temple of Bacchus, came on, and all parties were only not completely met, comes in the news that “ the two and “ forty sail and Hegesandridas are coasting along from “ Megara towards Salamis.” Not one of the heavy-armed this moment but pronounced it true, what before was given out by Theramenes<sup>a</sup> and his friends, that “ to the new fortifications these ships are now bound;” and it was judged that in the nick of time they had been levelled with the ground. But Hegesandridas, as perhaps had beforehand been concerted, only hovered about at Epidaurus or the adjacent coast. It is however probable, that, on account of the present sedition amongst the Athenians, he lay for a time in this station, in hope to seize some fair opportunity to strike a blow.

Be this as it will, the Athenians no sooner heard the news, than, to a man, they flocked down amain to the Piræus; less alarmed at their own domestic war, than at an invasion from a public enemy, no longer remote, but at their very ports. Some of them threw themselves on-board what shipping was ready; others launched such as  
were

were aground; and others posted themselves upon the walls and at the mouth of the harbour.

But the Peloponnesian fleet, having sailed by and doubled the cape of Sunium, comes to anchor between Thoricus and Prasîæ, and proceeds afterwards to Oropus. Hereupon the Athenians, in all imaginable hurry, manning out their ships with what hands could be got on this sudden emergency, as in a city distracted with sedition, and yet eager to stave off the greatest danger that had ever threatened it, (for, as Attica was occupied by the enemy, Eubœa was now their *all*,) cause Thymocharis, a commander, to stand away with their fleet to Eretria. On their arrival there, and their junction with such as were already in Eubœa, they amounted to six and thirty sail, and were immediately forced to engage: For Hegesandridas, after the hour of repast, came out in line of battle from Oropus.

The distance of Oropus from the city of the Eretrians, across the sea, is about \* sixty stadia: And therefore, upon his approach, the Athenians ordered their men on-board, imagining the soldiers to be ready at hand to obey their orders; whereas they happened not yet to be returned from the market, whither they had gone to buy provisions. For, through the management of the Eretrians, nothing could be got by way of sale, except in such houses as lay in the most remote quarters of the city; with an intent that the enemy might attack the Athenians before they were all embarked, and oblige them in a hurrying and disorderly manner to begin the fight. Nay, a signal had even been held out to the enemy from Eretria towards Oropus, at what time they ought to come forward to the attack.

Upon so short a notice, the Athenians, having formed their line as well as they were able, and engaging the enemy before the harbour of Eretria, made however a gallant resistance for a time. At length, be-

\* About six English miles.

ing compelled to sheer off, they are pursued to land; and as many of them as ran for safety to the city of the Eretrians suffered the most cruel treatment, in being murdered by the hands of men whom they supposed their friends. Such, indeed, as could reach the fort of Eretria, which was garrisoned by Athenians, are safe; as also the vessels which could make Chalcis.

. But the Peloponnesians, after making prizes of two and twenty Athenian vessels, and either butchering or making prisoners all on-board them, erected a trophy. And, no long time after, they caused all Eubœa to revolt, excepting Oréus, which an Athenian garrison secured, and then settled the state of that island at their own discretion.

When advice of what was done at Eubœa reached Athens, the greatest consternation ensued of all that had to this day been known. Not even the dreadful blow received in Sicily, though great concern, in truth, it gave them, nor any other public disaster, caused so terrible an alarm amongst them. For, at a time when their army at Samos was in open revolt, when they had no longer either shipping in store or mariners to go on-board, when they were distracted<sup>o</sup> with intestine sedition, and ready each moment to tear one another to pieces; — and on the neck of all these *this* great calamity supervened, in which they lost their fleet, and (what was more of consequence) Eubœa, which had better supplied their necessities than Attica itself, — had they not ample reason now to fall into utter dejection? But what alarmed them most was the proximity of ruin, in case the enemy, flushed with their late success, should stand immediately into the Piræus, now utterly destitute of ships. Not a moment passed but they imagined they were only not in the very harbour; which, in truth, had they been a little more daring, they might easily have been. Nay, had they made this step and blocked up the city, they must infallibly have increased the seditions within it; must have necessitated the fleet  
to

to come over from Ionia, though averse to the *oligarchy*, in order to prevent the ruin of their own relations and the total destruction of their country: And, in the mean time, Hellespont, Ionia, the isles even up to Eubœa, in a word, the whole empire of Athens, must have been their own. Yet, not in this instance only, but many others, the Lacedæmonians shewed themselves most commodious enemies for the Athenians to encounter: For, as nothing differed more than their respective tempers; the *one* being active, the *other* slow; enterprising *these*, but timorous *those*, especially in naval competitions; they gave them many advantages. The truth of this the Syracusans most plainly shewed, who very nearly resembled the Athenians in disposition, and so warred against them with the highest spirit and success.

Terrified, however, at these tidings, the Athenians made a shift to man out twenty vessels, and convened an assembly of the people, on the first report of their loss, in the place which is called the *Pnyx*, and where generally that assembly was held. In this they put an end to the administration of the *four-hundred*, and decreed “the supreme power to be vested in the *five-thousand*, which number to consist of all such citizens as were enrolled for the heavy armour; and that no one should receive a salary for any public magistracy; whoever offended in this point they declared a traitor.” Other frequent assemblies were afterwards held, in which they appointed *Nomothetæ*,\* and filled up the other posts in the government. And now at least, though for the first time in my opinion, the Athenians seem to have modelled their government

\* The general course of appointing *Nomothetæ* was by lot. Their number in the whole was a thousand and one. Their business was not, as the name seems to imply, to make new laws, since that belonged to the supreme power lodged in the people; but to inspect such as were already made, to re-consider such as were thought to be, or were complained of as, grievous, and regularly report such as ought to be continued or ought to be repealed.

aright. A moderation, finely tempered between the *few* and the *many*, was now enforced. And, from the low situation into which their affairs were now plunged, this enabled Athens to re-erect her head.

They decreed, farther, the recallment of Alcibiades and his adherents; and, dispatching a *deputation* to him and the army at Samos, exhorted them to exert their utmost efforts for the public service.

In the first moments of this new revolution, Pisander and Alexicles, with their partisans, and in general all the great sticklers for the *oligarchy*, withdraw privately to Decelæa. But Aristarchus, who was one of the generals of the *State*, took a different route from all the rest; and, carrying off a party of archers, though rank Barbarians, went off towards Oenoë: Oenoë was a fortress of the Athenians on the frontiers of Bœotia. But the Corinthians, on a provocation peculiar to themselves, having procured the concurrence of the Bœotians, held it now blocked up, because a party of their countrymen, drawing off from Decelæa, had been put to the sword by a sally of the garrison from Oenoë. Aristarchus, therefore, having in a conference settled matters with the besiegers, deceives the garrison in Oenoë, by assuring them, that, “as their countrymen in Athens had made up all their quarrels with the Lacedæmonians, they also were bound to deliver up this place to the Bœotians; and that this was an express provision in the treaty.” Giving credit therefore to him as in public command, and ignorant of all the late transactions because closely blocked up, they agree with the enemy and evacuate the fortress. In this manner the Bœotians regained possession of abandoned Oenoë: And thus the oligarchy and sedition were suppressed at Athens.

But, about the same space of time in the current summer, in regard to the Peloponnesians at Miletus: — When none of those, who were substituted by Tisaphernes during his absence at Aspendus, made regular payments;

payments; and nothing could be seen either of Tissaphernes or the Phœnician fleet; and Philippus, who accompanied him, sent advice to Mindarus, the admiral in chief; and Hippocrates, farther, a citizen of Sparta, who was then at Phaselis, advised him also, that “this fleet” would never join him, and in all respects they were “shamefully abused by Tissaphernes;”—as Pharnabazus had made them an invitation, and declared himself ready, if aided by the confederate fleet, to engage as strongly as Tissaphernes for the revolt of what cities yet remained in subjection to the Athenians;—Mindarus, hoping to find more punctuality in the latter, with notable conduct, and by a sudden signal to the fleet, that his motions might not be discovered at Samos, weighs from Miletus with seventy-three sail, and bent his course to the Hellespont. But, earlier this summer, sixteen ships had steered their course thither, and ravaged part of the Chersonesus. Mindarus met with tempestuous weather in his passage, which forced him to put into Icarus; and, after staying there five or six days for want of weather to keep the sea, he arrives at Chios.

Thrasyllus, so soon as informed of the departure from Miletus, stood after him with five and fifty sail, making the best of his way lest the other should enter the Hellespont before he reached him. But, gaining intelligence that he was put into Chios, and concluding he designed to remain there, he fixed his scouts at Lesbos and the opposite continent; that, if the Peloponnesian fleet put out, their motions might be descried. He himself, repairing to Methymne, ordered quantities of meal and other necessaries to be prepared, that, in case he should be forced to stay in these parts, he might make frequent cruises from Lesbos against Chios.

But, as Erethus in Lesbos had revolted, his design was farther to attempt its reduction, in case it were feasible. For some of the Methynéan exiles, and those not the most inconsiderable of the number, having brought

brought over from Cyme about fifty heavy-armed who were most firmly attached to their cause, and hired others from the continent, which increased their number to about three hundred,—Anaxarchus, the Theban, in respect of consanguinity, being chosen their leader, — assaulted first Methymne; and, being repulsed in the attempt by the Athenian garrison which came up from Mitylene, and then driven quite off by a battle fought in the field, they retired across the mountain, and made Ereſſus revolt. Thraſyllus, therefore, steering with his fleet against Ereſſus, projected an assault. But Thraſybulus, with five ships from Samos, arrived there before him, upon information received of the re-passage of the exiles; yet, coming too late before Ereſſus to prevent a revolt, he lay at anchor before it. Two other ships, also, bound homewards from the Hellespont, came in, and the Methymnæan. All the ships in the fleet amounted now to sixty-seven, from which they draughted an army for the operations of land, as fully bent, if possible, to take Ereſſus by a bold assault, with engines and all the arts of attack.

In the mean time, Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after two whole days employment in taking in provisions, and receiving from the Chians every man on-board three Chian *\*tesseracoſts*, on the third day with urgent dispatch launch out from Chios into the wide sea, that they might not be descried by the fleet before Ereſſus; and, leaving Lesbos on the left, stood over to the continent. There, putting into the harbour of Crateræi on the coast of Phocæa, and taking their noon repast, they proceeded along the coast of Cyme, and supped at Arginusæ of the continent, over-against Mitylene. From thence, at dead of night, they went forwards along the shore; and, being arrived

\* This, according to Spanheim, was a month's pay, since he explains it by forty-three Chian *drachmas*. But the words will not bear such a construction: A *tesseracoſt* was, it is most probable, a coin peculiar to the Chians; but of what value is not known, nor is it of any great importance.



at Harmatus, which lies facing Methymne, and having eat their dinner there, they passed with the utmost speed by Lectus, and Larissa, and Amaxitus, and other adjacent places, and reach Rhætium of the Hellespont before midnight. Not but that some ships of the fleet got up no farther than to Sigæum and some other adjacent places on that coast.

The Athenians, who were lying with eighteen sail at Sestus, when the lights were waved by their own friends for signals, and they beheld numerous fires kindled on a sudden on the hostile coast, were well assured that the Peloponnesians are approaching. The same night, therefore, under favour of the dark, and with the utmost expedition, they crept along under the Chersonesus, and reached Eléus, desirous to put out to sea and avoid the enemy; and, for the sixteen ships at Abydus, they stole away unperceived of the Abydians, though notice had been sent them from their friends just arrived, to keep a good look-out, and not suffer them to steal off. Yet morning no sooner appeared, than, finding themselves in sight of the fleet under Mindarus, and that they were actually chased, they could not all get off. The greater part, indeed, fled safe to the continent and Lemnos; but four, that got lost under sail, are overtaken by the enemy near Eléus; one, also, that ran ashore at the temple of Protefilaus, they seize with all her hands; and two more, the crews of which escaped. One, farther, but abandoned, they burn at Imbrus.

This done, the ships from Abydus having joined them, and the whole fleet being now increased to four-score and six sail, they spent the rest of the day in investing Eléus; but, as it would not surrender, they drew off to Abydus.

The Athenians, who had been deceived by their scouts, and never imagined that so large a number of hostile ships could pass along undetected, were very coolly carrying on their siege; but yet were no sooner informed

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informed of the enemy's motions, than, instantly quitting Ereffus, they advanced with the utmost expedition to secure the Hellespont. They also pick up two ships of the Peloponnesians ; which, running out too boldly to sea in the late pursuit, fell in amongst them : And, coming up only one day after them, they anchor at Eléus, and re-assemble from Imbrus the ships which had fled thither. Five whole days they spend here in getting every thing in readiness for a general engagement : And after this respite they came to an action in the following manner.

The Athenians, ranged in line of battle a-head, stood along shore towards Sestus. The Peloponnesians, aware of their design, stood out to sea from Abydus, to be ready to receive them. And, as both sides were determined to engage, they unfolded their lines to a greater length ; the Athenians, along the Chersonesus, reaching from Idacus to Arrhianæ, in all sixty-eight sail ; and the Peloponnesians, over-against them, from Abydus to Dardanus, being eighty-six. The line of the Peloponnesians was thus formed : The Syracusans had the right ; and on the left was ranged Mindarus, and the ships most remarkable for being good sailors. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had the left, and Thrasylulus the right : The rest of the commanders were regularly posted according to their rank. The Peloponnesians, shewing most eagerness to begin the engagement, endeavoured with their left to over-reach the right of the Athenians, in order to exclude them, if possible, from stretching out into the main sea, and, by keeping them cramped up, to force their center against the shore, which was not far distant. The Athenians, aware of the enemy's design to shut them up, plying up a-head, forced themselves an opening, and in velocity beat them all to nothing.

By these motions, the left of their line became extended beyond the cape called Cynos-fema. The consequence of which was exposing their center, composed

only of the weakest ships, and those ranged at too great a distance from one another ; especially as in number of vessels they were quite inferior, and as the coast round the Cynos-fema was sharp, and in an acute angle runs out into the water, so that part of the line on one side was out of sight of the other. The Peloponnesians, therefore, charging the center, drove at once the ships of the Athenians upon the beach ; and, being so far manifestly victors, leaped boldly on shore to pursue them. But neither those under Thrasylbulus could assist the center from the right, because of the multitude of ships that stood in to awe them ; nor could those under Thrasyllus do it from the left, because the interposition of cape Cynos-fema hid from him the view of what had passed ; and at the same time the Syracusans and others, who, equal in strength, lay hard upon him, prevented his moving. At length, the Peloponnesians, presuming the victory their own, broke their order to give different chace to single ships, and in too heedless a manner threw confusion upon a part of their own line. And now those under Thrasylbulus, finding the squadron opposed to them began to slacken, stopped all farther extension of their line a-head ; and, tacking upon them, resolutely engaged, and put them to flight. Charging next the dispersed ships of the Peloponnesians, which composed the squadron that presumed itself victorious, they made havoc ; and, by striking them with a panic, routed the greater part without resistance. Now also the Syracusans were beginning to give way before the squadron under Thrasyllus ; and, seeing others in open flight, were more easily tempted to follow their example. The defeat now being manifestly given, and the Peloponnesians flying away for shelter, first towards the river Pydus, and afterwards to Abydus, the Athenians made prize of only an inconsiderable number of shipping ; for the Hellespont, being narrow, afforded short retreats to the enemy. However they gained a victory by sea, most opportune indeed

deed in their present situation : For hitherto, afraid of the naval strength of the Peloponnesians, because of the rebuffs they had lately received from it, and the calamitous event of the Sicilian expedition, from this moment they stopped all fruitless self-accusations or groundless exaggerations of the enemy's ability by sea. Some ships of the enemy in fact they take ; for instance, eight Chian, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Bœotian ; but, of Leucadian, and Lacedæmonian, and Syracusan, and Pellenéan, a single one of each : But then they suffered the loss of fifteen ships of their own.

After erecting a trophy upon the cape of Cynos-sena, and picking up the shatters of the fight, and giving up, under truce, their dead to the enemy, they dispatched a trireme to Athens, to notify the victory. On the arrival of this vessel, those at home, after hearing the news of this unhopèd-for success, greatly resumed their spirits, which had been dejected by the recent misfortunes at Eubœa and the sad effects of their sedition, and hoped the *State* might again resume its power if they cheerfully exerted their efforts in its behalf.

On the fourth day after the battle, the Athenians, having diligently refitted their fleet at Sestus, sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted : And, descrying eight ships from Byzantium riding at anchor under Harpagium and Priapus, they crowded sail towards them ; and, having in battle upon the shore defeated their crews, made prizes of them all. Repairing thence against Cyzicus, which was quite unfortified, they reduced it once more, and exacted large contributions from it.

But, during this interval, the Peloponnesians made a trip from Abydus to Eléus, and brought off as many of their own ships which had been taken as were able to sail ; the residue the Eléusians burnt. They also dispatched Hippocrates and Epicles to Eubœa, to fetch up their fleet from thence.

About the same space of time, Alcibiades also, at the head of his squadron of thirteen sail, returned from Caunus and Phaselis into the harbour of Samos, reporting that “by his management he had diverted the junction of the Phœnician fleet with the Peloponnesians, and made Tissaphernes a faster friend than ever to the Athenians.” After enlarging his squadron by the addition of nine more just manned, he levied large contributions upon the Halicarnassæans, and fortified Cos. After these exploits, and putting the government of Cos into proper hands, he returned again, about autumn, to Samos.\*

From Aspendus also Tissaphernes rode back post-haste into Ionia, so soon as advised of the departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Miletus for the Hellespont.

But, as the Peloponnesians were now in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, (who are of Æolic descent,)

\* As the English reader is here to take his leave of Alcibiades, he may have the curiosity to know what became of him after. — Every thing succeeded so well, under him and his active colleagues, that the Lacedæmonians, having received several defeats both by land and sea, and lost two hundred ships, were again necessitated to sue for peace. After such great services, Alcibiades returned triumphant to Athens. The whole city flocked down to the Piræus to meet him. All strove to get a sight of Alcibiades; they caressed him, crowned him, cursed the authors of his exile, and hurried him away to an assembly of the people. There he harangued them for a time; then stopped and shed tears in abundance; then harangued them again. In short, they undid all they had ever done against him; and Alcibiades for a time was all in all at Athens. Yet, in subsequent commands, he happened not to be successful; a crime which his countrymen very seldom forgave. He became a second time an exile from Athens. His great abilities made him a continual terror, both to foreign and domestic enemies. Yet now he persevered to serve his country, by caballing in their favour, and advising them on critical occasions. Yet all in vain: Lyfander was soon master of the Piræus and of Athens. Alcibiades retired into Phrygia, and was handsomely supported by the bounty of his friend Pharnabazus; who however was wrought upon at last, by the joint solicitations of his enemies and the plea of its necessity for the service of the king, to undertake his destruction. The agents of Pharnabazus durst not attempt him in an open manner, but set fire to his house by night. By throwing in clothes to damp the flames he got out safe. The Barbarians soon spied him, shot him to death with arrows and darts, then cut off his head, and carried it to Pharnabazus. I shall only add, that he was but forty years old when he was thus destroyed.

having

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having procured from Abydus a party of heavy-armed who marched across mount Ida, received them into their city, provoked to this step by the injurious conduct of Arsaces, a Persian, lieutenant to Tissaphernes. This man, pretending he had enemies to cope with whom yet he never named, prevailed with the Delians settled in Adramittium, because they had been obliged by the Athenians to quit Delos in the affair of the expiation, to attend him in this secret expedition with the flower of their strength; and, leading them forwards with all the shew of friendship and alliance, watched the opportunity when they were busy at their meal, surrounded them with a body of his own soldiers, and shot them to death with darts. Fearing him, therefore, because of this instance of a cruel temper, lest some such act of violence he might execute also upon them, as in other respects he had imposed some burdens upon them which they could not bear, the Antandrians ejected his garrison out of their citadel. But Tissaphernes, perceiving how deeply the Peloponnesians were concerned in this affair, and esteeming himself sadly injured also at Miletus and Cnidus (since in those places too his garrisons had been ejected); and fearing they would proceed to other commissions of the same nature; chagrined moreover that perhaps Pharnabazus, in less time and with less expence, having obtained their concurrence, should make a greater progress against the Athenians; — he determined in person to repair to Helleipont, in order to expostulate with them about their late proceedings at Antander, and to wipe off, as handsomely as he could, the aspersions thrown upon his own conduct in regard to the Phœnician fleet and other points. Arriving therefore first at Ephesus, he offered sacrifice to Diana \* \* \* \* †

When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the twenty-first year of the war will be also completed.

† Here breaks off abruptly the History of the Peloponnesian war by Thucydides. The adjustment of time annexed seems plainly of another hand.

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Recd. on 31. 8. 83

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